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Abstract
The thesis is an investigation into the concept of modem political myth and its relationship 
to ideology. It argues that political myth can best be understood as the personalisation 
or familiarisation of ideology, by which ideological constructions are identified either 
with an individual, normally a political leader, or are expressed in mythic representations 
familiar within a given state and drawn from the traditional myths which permeate the 
political cultures of that state. The thesis argues that the personalisation and possible 
personification of ideology is one of the most obvious methods of political myth 
production and notes that the inherent contradictions and tensions resulting from an 
attempt to identify an individual with a principle almost always results in the construction 
o f political myth. Political myth construction and development remains dynamic and 
reciprocal in relation to its ideational and material environment.
Iran during the Palilavi period (1921-79) provides the case-study for the thesis, as a 
society in the process of profound social and economic change led by a government both 
enthusiastic and economically able to impose its own particular conception of 
development and modernity within a nationalistic framework, upon the country. The 
continued importance of personalities to the political process and then attempts to identify 
with particular ideologies provided cogent examples of political myth construction and 
development. With particular emphasis on Shah Mohammad Reza Palrlavi, the thesis 
shows the development of his ideological world-view, the initial reciprocal dynamic of 
these views, leading towards increasing identification, polarisation and isolation by the end 
of his reign. The thesis seeks to show how political myth was employed to naturalise and 
legitimise the Palrlavi Dynasty within the Iranian state.
In charting the ideological development in the Pahlavi era, from traditional state towards 
a particular conception of modernity, political myth is seen to be not a uniquely modem 
phenomenon. However, the emergence of the modem mass media, especially in electronic 
form has resulted in the acceleration of political myth construction and its widespread and 
rapid dissemination. This technological change helps to differentiate modern political 
myth from its predecessors and given the continuing growth of the mass media, is likely 
to ensure that the concept of political myth will be increasingly important to political 
discourse.
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A Note on Transliteration and Dates
A simplified form of Persian transliteration has been used thr oughout, making allowances 
for pronunciation. I have omitted diacritical marks, but have retained the ciyn and ezafe. 
Thus Shah rather than 6a/?; and Shahanshah-e Iran rather than Shahanshah Iran. Names 
of individuals are rendered in the way they are most commonly known, or has been 
reflected in the sources. Thus 'Mosaddeq1 throughout as opposed to Musaddiq, and the 
names Muhammad and Riza are rendered Mohammad and Reza, unless the names are 
quoted from a source in which case the original transliteration is retained.
With respect to dates, three different calendars are used in the sources, the Lunar Hejri, 
Solar Hejii and Imperial calendars. All dates are provided with their Christian equivalent.
Note on Foreign Office Archival references: those references to FO files which begin FO 
371 [..] represent published FO documents located in Bidwell R (ed) Biitish Documents 
on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from Foreign Confidential Print. Part II From the 
First to the Second World War. Series B. Turkey. Iran, and the Middle East. 1918-39. 
while the other FO references represent files located at the Public Record Office.
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Chapter 1
Theoretical Framework and Structure of Study 
Central Thesis
The following thesis is a study of the concept of political myth’ and its relationship with 
ideology, looking in particular at the mechanics of its operation within the political cidture 
of a given political entity. The thesis will suggest a number of analytical parameters within 
which one can situate a concept whose utility as a tool of political analysis remains 
problematic, and whose very existence may be regarded as 'essentially contested’. 
However it will concentrate on an examination of two important aspects of mythic 
production and re-production in contemporary political discourse: the relationship of the 
cult of the individual leader with myth creation; and, the consequences o f the growth of 
the modem mass media for myth production and dissemination. The phenomenon of 
political myth is not specific to the modem era, though the communications revolution and 
the consequent ability of agent to immediately disseminate ideological constructions to 
increasingly larger audiences within a shorter space of time has altered the framework of 
operation from pre-modem societies. In contrast, the cultivation of the myth of the leader 
is a political strategy that pre-dates the modem era but it is precisely in juxtaposing these 
two distinct developments that the phenomenon of modern political myth becomes more 
apparent.
This thesis argues that political myth can be defined as the personalisation or 
familiarisation of ideology. As such, political myth is not a distinct concept but on the 
contrary forms an integral pait of ideological construction. The epitome of personalisation 
and the most characteristic manifestation of political myth is witnessed in the cult of the 
individual and the process reification of a complex of ideas within the material constraints 
represented by the individual leader. It is precisely this political strategy of reification in 
which an ideology is identified with an individual through the existence of an essential 
tension, that results in the production and emphasis of political myth, reflecting both the 
definition that personalisation provides as well as a vital ambiguity. Indeed the paradox 
of myth is that its parameters, or vehicle of expression appear well defined, while meaning 
and interpretation remain ambiguous. In this sense it marks the summation - an apparent 
absolute - of one cycle of ideological interpretation while at the same time opening up the 
vista to others.
Iran during the Pahlavi dynasty provides a useful case study for exploring the concept of 
political myth and highlighting this central thesis as both Pahlavi monarchs sought to 
epitomise within their persons and the dynasty they represented, the transformation of Iran 
from traditional monarchical state to a modem industrial nation state. The process of rapid 
social and economic change this transformation entailed ensured that the Iranian state in 
the 20th century possessed an essential tension which provided fertile ground for the 
production of ideological absolutes or political myth. The growth of the mass media, in 
particular the emergence of the radio, and critically, the persistent crisis of legitimacy 
which remained the essential tension of the dynasty itself simply compounded this 
situation.
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This chapter will set out the theoretical framework and structure for the study. It will 
begin by briefly surveying the literature on political myth and argue the need for further 
definition. It will then proceed to establish the theoretical basis for the study by discussing 
the philosophical and epistemological framework. This will be followed by an analysis and 
discussion of the concept of ideology and political myth, providing working definitions 
and concluding with an analysis of the methodological and hermeneutical problems 
inherent in such a study. Following this, the chapter will look specifically at the factors 
which will be highlighted in the body of the thesis: the relationship between myth and 
leadership; and the impact of the emergence and growth of the modem mass media. The 
reasons why Iran during this period is a useful case study will then be detailed followed 
by a discussion and justification of the sources, concluding with a brief outline of the 
structure of the study.
The Importance of Political Myth
The concept of myth in political discourse is one which is frequently used but rarely 
defined. It has become a convenient conceptual receptacle for all that is perceived to be 
irrational or judged false in political ideas. This view is essentially a product of the 18th 
century Enlightenment which sought to remove myths through the use of reason and 
philosophy.
Myth as a concept, nevertheless enjoys a substantial intellectual pedigree compared not 
always unfavourably with the study of history. Indeed Aristotle rejected history in favour 
of myth, arguing that while history dealt with the particular and provided no valuable
10
lessons for mankind, myth in contrast dealt with universal truths which could he applied 
to the human condition.1 Myth therefore enjoyed a utility that history did not. The 
competition between classical historians’ and poets was such that Polybius conceded that 
some historians succumbed to the writing of what he termed tragic history’. The use of 
myth as history, and indeed the porous nature of the boundary dividing them was not 
confined to the Western world as the Persian Shahnameh testifies, but while the West 
developed a discipline of history antagonistic to myth, the close relationship between the 
two remained in the East.
However even with the emergence of the discipline of history in the 19th century following 
the rejection o f myth by the Enlightenment Philosophers, the concept of myth itself was 
not disregarded. Indeed the Romantic Philosophers of the early 19th century reacted 
against then predecessors and re-opened the discussion of the importance of myth to 
human society.2 Nevertheless myth remained for much of the 19th century a social rather 
than a political term of analysis, while the French Revolution and the works of Marx gave 
credence to a new term - ideology - which would henceforth define the study of ideas, 
'scientifically constructed’ to explain and motivate political action. Myth, rejected by the 
Enlightenment was similarly rejected by the educational establishments which were its 
offspring. Two exceptions to this general trend were Thomas Carlyle and later George
1 Aristotle - Poetics London, Penguin, 1996, chapter 9, pg 16. Aristotle is 
discussing epic poetry and his criticism, arguably, is directed towards what Hegel 
characterised as 'original* history, as opposed to reflective’ or 'philosophical’ history.
2 For example, Schelling discusses a philosophy of mythology.
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Sorel3. While Carlyle focussed on the historical role of the hero and the myths that 
surrounded great men’, Sorel was explicit in his enunciation of mytli as a motivator for 
political action. Mannheim developed this theme, circuitously, and probably inadvertently 
in that he focussed 011 the concepts of ideology and utopia. Myth, in his conceptualisation 
was irrational and essentially conseivative in character although he agreed with Sorel in 
the motivating capacity of such 'irrationality’. Indeed the characterisation of myth as an 
important if irrational actor in political discourse may be considered one of Mannheim’s 
most significant if problematic contributions to the debate on myth. More useful was his 
implicit argument that myth was part of ideology.4
The study of modem political myth gained in importance in the aftermath of the fall of the 
Third Reich and Nazism, as social scientists sought to explain the rise to power of the 
Nazis and their ability to sustain power through the use of images, symbols and discourse 
which chew heavily on the traditional myths of Germany’s romantic perception of her past. 
Myth as a subject of study gained renewed attention, the concept was explored and 
expanded, but it was nevertheless regarded as essentially irrational and thus a destructive 
influence on human development, as could be witnessed in the activities o f Nazi Geimany.
3 Thomas Carlyle - On Heroes. Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History Lincoln, 
University of Nebraska, 1966, first published in 1841, The first chapter on The Hero as 
Divinity makes the link between history and myth explicit. George Sorel Reflections on 
Violence New York, Collier Books, 1961.
4 Mannheim’s argument is more implicit than emphatic since attention is focussed
on the terms ideology’ and 'utopia’ rather than myth. However the concept of myth and 
its role in ideological development is repeated. See for example, K Mannheim Ideology
& Utopia London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960, pp 32, 78, 86 & 122-23. For a wider 
discussion, see B Halpem Myth and Ideology in modem usage in History & Theory I, 
1961, pp 129-149
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Cassirer's study ou 'The Myth of the State', first published in 1946, encapsulates this 
development, effectively warning his readers of the dangers of myth which, he argued, is 
no longer a social activity but a calculated political one, a new phenomenon peculiar to 
our 'technical age5.5
Since Cassirer’s study a number of scholars have sought to better define the concept of 
myth, though almost all were clear about the negative consequences of a society gripped 
by myth. Myth, like ideology, was a false consciousness which afflicted the other and 
although some scholars argued that myth had previously been considered superior 
to'history’, and sought to relate myth and history6, by and large studies of myth were 
initiated to explain the peculiar irrationality of other 'political* cultures. If these works 
added to our general understanding of the concept of myth and its role in modem political 
discourse, they tended to be theoretical discussions providing often useful philosophical 
arguments but lacking any system of practical application, other than in the broadest 
sense.7
Barthes’ seminal study, Mythologies published in 1957 shifted the study of myths from 
the other to the self, with a detailed analysis of French popular culture. Not only did he
5 E Cassirer The Myth of the State New Haven, Yale University Press, 1946, pg
282.
G See for example M I Finley Myth. Memory and History in History & Theory IV, 
1965, pp 281-302; P Mirnz History and Myth in The Philosophical Quarterly Vol 6 No 
22 January 1956, pp 1-16.
7 See for example such useful articles as B Halpem Myth and Ideology in modem 
usage in History & Theory I, 1961, pp 129-149; and, T H Gaster Myth & Story in 
Numen, 1954 pp 184-212.
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derive a theoretical argument through observation of French society, but he also provided 
important insights into the structure of mythic discourse, which although for his study was 
a cultural phenomenon 8, can easily be translated to the political sphere. Thus he 
emphasised that myth was a form of communication, or indeed, interpretation, which had 
a finite existence. Objects could be mythicised, but then could lose their mythic 
characteristics. Importantly he emphasised the historical link, “Ancient or not, mythology 
can only have an historical foundation, for myth is a type of speech chosen by history: it 
cannot possibly evolve from the 'nature’ of things.”9 Furthermore, Barthes argued, 
'speech’ was not confined to oral discourse but also covered other modes of 
representation including writing and symbology. The structure of language was important 
for myth, with 'articulated’ languages being the most vulnerable to myth making,10 while 
Barthes suggested a structure for the relationship between different competing myths 
arguing for the construction of semiological chains, “...the best weapon against myth is 
perhaps to mythify it in its tuni, and to produce an artificial myth.,.All that is needed is 
to use it as the departure point for the third semiological chain, to take its signification 
as the first term of a second myth....It is what could be called an experimental myth, a 
second order myth.”11
Probably Barthes’ most important contribution to the study of myth was his assertion that 
myth should be viewed as 'value-free’; “Myth hides nothing and flaunts nothing: it
8 R Barthes Mythologies London. Paladin, 1970, pg 155.
9 Ibid  pg 118
10 Ibid 142
n Ibid pg 147.
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distorts; myth is neither a lie nor a confession: it is an inflexion.” He adds, “We reach here 
the very principle of myth: it transforms history into nature.”12 What Barthes is arguing 
is that myth is a major tool for the strategy of naturalisation, a concept which is immensely 
important for political strategy.
Despite the works of Cassirer and Barthes there have been few attempts to combine both 
approaches to provide a framework for the study of myth as a tool of political strategy. 
Myth has re-emerged as an important component of the study of ideological 
constructions, especially in scholarship on nationalism and the distortion of history for 
nationalist goals, but the precision provided by Barthes appears to have been neglected 
in favour of Cassirer’s more judgmental and general approach with the result that works 
are either entirely theoretical or provide an insufficient epistemological framework or 
explanation for the practical application of the concept.13 The ambiguous nature of the 
concept of myth has been further emphasised by the tendency towards extreme relativism 
in the social sciences characteristic of post-modernist discourse, resulting in a 
conceptualisation of myth which fails to bridge the epistemological gap between theory 
and practice. This problem, it is argued, can be alleviated through the application of 
critical hermeneutics.
12/£/ripg 140
13 See for example, H Tudor Political Myth London, Macmillan, 1972, this is a 
useful introductory text providing synopses of the debates in sociology, anthropology and 
linguistics; L Feuer Ideology and the Ideologists Oxford, Blackwell, 1975; J Girling Myths 
and Politics in Western Societies London, Transaction Publishers 1993; A D Smith The 
Ethnic Origins of Nations Oxford, Blackwell 1986, especially pp 174-209; Farhang 
Rajaee, "Osturesazi va Tarikhneeari; Afsaneh va Vaqe 7wrt.' YMvth Making and 
Historiography; Fiction and Fact) Etela’at Siyassi va Eqtessadi (Political & Economic 
Etela’at). Nos 53-54 Bahman/Esfand 1370 / Feb-March 1992, pp. 14-23.
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Epistemological Framework
Although any thesis which seeks to illuminate the structure and mechanics of ideological 
operation will draw substantially on the works of idealist’ philosophers, it should not be 
concluded that this thesis is as a consequence situated within an idealist philosophical 
framework. The power of ideas in human interaction is prominent in most fundamental 
philosophical perspectives14, and this thesis, in focussing 011 the influence of political 
leadership on the structure of ideology and the creation of political myth tends to argue 
for a reciprocal relationship between the materialistic and idealistic conceptions of 
ideation.13
The epistemological framework of this thesis contends that ideological constructions are 
universal rather than particular. The ideas which permeate a given society are relative and 
inter-related and as such an approach to their study must strive to be value-free. It follows 
from this position that analysts of ideas are themselves conditioned by the ideological and 
mythic constructions which permeate their own world-view, and an awareness of this 
situation is essential to the study of ideology. One cannot study ideas from the outside 
looking in, but must instead accept and be aware of one’s own situation within the 
ideological complex. Thus Mannheim argues that, “"A new type of objectivity in the social
14 K Marx The Eighteenth Bmmaire of Louis Napoleon Peking, Foreign Language 
Press, 1978, pg 9.
15 M Weber The Protestant Ethic & the Spirit of Capitalism London, Routledge 
1992, pg 183. See also P Ricoeur Myth as the bearer of possible worlds in A Ricoeur 
Reader: Reflection and Imagination M J Valdes (ed), Toronto, University of Toronto, 
1991, pg 483.
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sciences is attainable not through the exclusion of evaluations but through the critical 
awareness and control of them.11,6 As Ricoeur argues,
“..it is necessary to understand that all comprehension implies a pre-comprehension; that 
is to say, a certain affinity with the object and, therefore, also a whole cultural equipment.
It is from the depth of a certain culture that 1 approach a new object of the culture. As a 
result pre-comprehension and prejudice are necessarily a part of comprehension. There 
cannot be any self-criticism by a neutral critic. And, inversely, a critic cannot be partisan.
So, there is an extremely delicate point of balance, there [sic] between, on the one hand, 
die conviction that pre-comprehension and prejudgement are a vital part of comprehension 
and at the same time, the critique of the illusions of the subject which one may make with 
the aid of either Marxism or psychoanalysis.”17
The study of ideology is therefore essentially subjective. Iudeed Mannheim argues that, 
"In a realm in which everything is in the process of becoming, the only adequate synthesis 
would be a dynamic one, which is reformulated from time to time,"18 adding that we 
should leam to think dynamically and relationally rather than in immutable ideas and 
absolutes. Ricoeur pursues this notion arguing that, “..the critique of ideology is a task 
which must always be begun, but which in principle can never be completed. Knowledge 
is always in the process of tearing itself away from ideology, but ideology always remains 
the grid, the code of interpretation, in virtue of which we are not unattached intellectuals
16 Mannheim Ideology & Utopia pg 5.
17 P Ricoeur Phenomenology and the theory of literature in A Ricoeur Reader pg
446.
18 Mannheim op, cit pg 135.
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but remain supported by what Hegel called the 'ethical substance5, Sittlichkeit.”19
It is precisely because as intellectuals we exist within the complex o f ideas that we are able 
to begin the process of interpretation and attempt to bridge the epistemological divide 
between theory and practice and the problems of subjectivity and relativity that this entails 
must be tackled through the application of dynamic and relational thought as well as 
critical hermeneutics. The solution is by 110 means perfect, but, as Ricoeur argues, it is 
the pursuit of perfection rather than its attainment that is important and as Thompson 
argues, “There is a great deal of room 011 the spectrum between incontestable 
demonstration and arbitrary choice and the interpretation of ideology, like all forms of 
interpretation, hes in the region in between.”20
Ideology & Political Myth
Defining Ideology
It is the contention of this thesis that 'Ideology1 may be defined as a systematic collection 
of ideas which serve to support and sustain a particular conception of relations of 
domination. Thus as Thompson concisely argues, "...to study ideology is to study the 
ways in which meaning seives to establish and sustain relations of domination."21 Ideology
19 P Ricoeur Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences (ed & Trans J Thompson), 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp 245-46.
20 J B Thompson Ideology & Modem Culture Cambridge, Polity Press 1990 pg
71.
21 Ibid pg 56.
therefore has a distinctively political purpose.
It is argued that the modem conception of ideology is a direct consequence of the 
Enlightenment and the lise of modem education although the use of a complex of ideas 
to justify and sustain power is not a product of the modern era. As Mannheim argues, 
"The distrust and suspicion which men everywhere evidence towards their* adversaries, at 
all stages of historical development, may be regarded as the immediate precursor of the 
notion of ideology. But it is only when the distrust of man toward man,...becomes explicit 
and is methodically recognised, that we may properly speak of an ideological taint in the 
utterances of others."22 From our present perspective, and particularly with respect to 
Europe, this distinct methodical or systematic reorganisation of ideas arose after the 
'Scientific Revolution' and the advent of'rationally’ centred education. It is no accident 
that the term was initially coined to denote the 'science of ideas1. This growth of rational 
education coincided with the period of unprecedented change in European society which 
created instability and uncertainty to which ideologies, as systematic and organised 
studies, could provide explanations and solutions.
However it is important to note that the conception of ideology adhered to in this thesis 
is neither scientific, nor particular, but as the epistemological framework argues is both 
relative and universal. As such ideology is considered to be neither 'rational* nor 
necessarily fovmded 011 'reason1, nor, as it would later be inverted, is ideology either 
'irrational’ or representative of a 'false consciousness’. It follows that the construction of
22 Mannheim op.cit pg 54
19
ideologies is not dependent on the support of a 'rationally’ educated class of intellectuals 
and although ideological development is normally associated with an intellectual group, 
there is no quantifiable intellectual quorate required for this development.
This thesis argues that modem ideologies are distinguished from then predecessors by the 
emergence of the modem mass media and new forms of communication. In particular, 
modem printing techniques which have magnified the importance of textual discourse, in 
addition to the traditional oral and symbolic techniques. Furthermore the growth of 
modem mass communications in the form of radio and film have altered the construction 
and dissemination of ideological constructs.
Ideologies form one part of the continuum of ideas that have shaped human action and 
behaviour and then social efficacy is maintained through an essential dynamism and 
flexibility which results in a certain ambiguity of construction. It is this ambiguity which 
makes the practical distinction of myth from ideology problematic, though as conceived 
in the next section, arguably, not insoluble.23 Ideologies draw on the traditional myths 
which permeate a given political culture, systemise them for the purposes of political 
action and in the process produce idealistic reductions and schemas at once both absolute 
yet paradoxically, ambiguous. Modem political myth marks the termination of one 
meaning yet opens the door of interpretation for others - they represent the process of
23 P Ricoeur Science & Ideology in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences pp 222- 
246. The conception of ideology draws heavily from Ricoeur although the tendency 
towards simplification and schematism will here be defined as 'myth’.
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rejuvenation24
Defining Political Myth
Just as ideological construction remains essentially ambiguous, so too, the distinction 
between political myth and its ideological parent, is also often difficult to delineate. As the 
following case study will show the division between ideology and myth can often become 
blurred. This problem however reflects an essential characteristic of myth and indeed the 
continuum of ideas, and as argued above should not deter the pursuit of its study. Myth 
as a concept is possessed of a substantial intellectual pedigree and to dismiss its utility on 
account of practical difficulties is not satisfactory. This section will propose a conceptual 
definition for myth in relation to ideology while the following will suggest those 
manifestations which are considered the most productive for study. Given the close 
relationship between myth and ideology it follows that the following analysis about the 
processes and problems of mythic construction applies in similar measure to ideology 
itself.
Ricoeur is not explicit about a relationship between myth and ideology, however in his 
discussion about the essential dynamism of ideological construction he argues a position 
which can be interpreted as suggestive of a possible relationship:
24 Hegel Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction trans Nisbet 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1975, pg 32. See also pg 50, Hegel’s metaphor 
of the 'seed’ as “the starting point and the end result.”
21
“...all ideology is simplifying and schematic. It is a grid or code for giving an overall view, 
not only of the group, but also of history and, ultimately, of the world. The 'codified’ 
character of ideology is inherent in its justificatory function; its transformative capacity is 
preseived only 011 condition that the ideas which it conveys become opinions, that thought 
loses rigour in order to enhance its social efficacy, as if ideology alone could mediate not 
only the memoty of founding acts, but systems of thought themselves. Hence anything can 
become ideology: ethics, religion, philosophy. 'This mutation of a system of thought into 
a system of belief, says Ellul, is the ideological phenomenon. The idealisation of the 
image which a group forms of itself is only a corollary of this schematisation. For it is 
through an idealised image that a group represents its own existence, and it is this image 
which, in turn, reinforces the interpretive code.”25
This statement is loaded with a number of suggestions about the relationship between 
myth and ideology. In the first place, myth is essential to the ideological function despite 
the fact that the tendency towards myth in ideological thought may result in the loss of 
ideological rigour in favour of social efficacy. The centrality of myth to ideology is echoed 
in the writings of a number of writers including Feuer.26 The loss of rigour and flexibility 
is parallelled by a tendency towards increased definition which myth represents, but as 
Ricoeur points out, 'reinforces the interpretive code’.Meaning is open to interpretation, 
thus myth represents, as argued above, the termination of one meaning while opening the 
door of interpretation for others. Finally, it suggests the other cyclical function of myth, 
the mutation of a system of thought into a system of belief, in other words to paraphrase 
Barthes, the naturalisation or institutionalisation of a complex of ideas into the social
25 P Ricoeur Science & Ideology pg 226.
26 L Feuer Ideology & the Ideologists Oxford, Blackwell, 1975.
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milieu.27 It can be argued therefore that political myth is the vehicle by which ideology 
seeks to reinvent itself as a fundamental system of belief and embed itself within the 
political culture and world-view of the group concerned. As such it may be conjectured 
that, while ideology seeks to sustain a particular conception of relations of domination, 
the role of political myth is to naturalise that particular conception in the guise of 
authority. A new interpretative code is established from which the cycle of ideological 
construction can begin anew.
The tendency for myth to naturalise a set of ideas reinforces the essential difficulty of 
distinguishing and interpreting ideology and political myth in that as Ricoeur argues, “..the 
interpretive code of an ideology is something in which, men live and think, rather than a 
conception that they pose. In other words, an ideology is operative and not thematic. It 
operates behind our backs, rather than appearing as a theme before our eyes. We think 
from it rather than about it.”28 In a relatively stable political environment in which a system 
of thought has become naturalised and is accepted, the problems of identifying ideological 
constructions and myth, especially if one is thinking 'from’ it, is multiplied. Thus it is 
argued that the study of political myth is facilitated by the existence of tension within a 
political environment. Tension, be it social, economic or political, encourages 
interpretation, explanation and justification.
27 See above note 12. It can be argued that myth has 'hegemonic’ tendencies.
28 Ricoeur Science & Ideology pg 227. See also Ricoeur Myth as the Bearer of 
Possible Worlds in A Ricoeur Reader M J Valdes (ed) pg 484, “Tor it is only when it is 
threatened with destruction from without or from within that a society is compelled to 
return to the veiy roots of its identity; to that mythical nucleus which ultimately grounds 
and determines it.”
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The greater the tension the greater the likelihood that ideology will tend towards the 
absolute, or mythic construction. As Ricoeur argues, “..the inertia, the lag, which appears 
to characterise the ideological phenomenon,” tends to aggravate, “the non-reflective and 
non-transparent status of ideology.”20 Tension polarises the ideological phenomenon 
making myth explicit and thus facilitating its study. As tension increases, the ideological 
status quo is challenged and a dialectical relationship is established as the critique prompts 
a response. Thus, ‘Ideology is both an effect of and resistance to attrition.”30 The process 
by which ideology can polarise into an increasingly narrowly defined political myth is 
suggested by the following analysis:
“..ideology is both interpretation of the real and obturation of the possible. All 
interpretation takes place in a limited field; but ideology effects a narrowing of the field in 
relation to the possibilities of interpretation which characterised the original momentum 
of the event. In this sense we may speak of ideological closure, indeed ideological 
blindness. But even when the phenomenon veers towards the pathological, it conserves 
something of its initial function.... Ideology is thus affected by the schematisation which 
ineluctably accompanies it; and in modifying itself in this way, it undergoes 
sedimentation... ,”31
Identifying Political Myth
29 Ricoeur Science & Ideology pg 227
30 Ibid pg 221.
31 Ibid  pp 227-228
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Political myth is an integral part of ideology. It represents the supreme refinement of 
ideological development, the simplification of an idea profoundly expressed. Identifying 
the sedimentation’ between ideology and political myth is a problem alleviated by socio­
political circumstances and the rigours of hermeneutics, but not solved, hi order to better 
facilitate empirical analysis it is therefore useful to further narrow down the focus of 
attention to those manifestations and developments that will highlight mythic construction. 
That is not to say that political myth cannot be interpreted in a myriad of ways but simply 
that definitions need to be rigorous enough to sustain application.
It is argued that the reduction of ideological thought towards a concise definition in the 
form of political myth can best be witnessed in the anthropomorphisation of ideology 
through the reification of ideological complexes within culturally familiar individuals and 
symbols. Ideology and myth are transmitted in three principal forms: oral, textual and 
visual. The vehicle that can best express all three forms within a single unit, is the 
individual. Thus if political myth is the personalisation of ideology, the identification of 
an individual with a principle may be considered its most powerful manifestation. The 
following two examples will seek to illustrate this argument.
Political myth can be constructed through the ideologisation of traditional myths: thus a 
mullah (progenitor) discusses the tale of Yazid and Abbas after the battle o f Karbala (680 
CE), noting that Yazid (or in this case his representative) refuses Abbas water to take to 
Hussein and instead cuts off Abbas’ hand. By applying a modem ideological construct to 
this traditional myth known to most Iranians, such as anti-imperialism (or specifically in 
this case - anti-Americanism) plus a whiff of nationalism - the nation as martyr - the
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mullah replaces Yazid with the United States and draws comparisons between Abbas 
and/or Hussein with Iran, thereby providing a modem political myth with immediate 
relevance and emotive power to move his audience. In this case the newspapers had 
written that the United States had refused medical serums/syringes to Iran and this action 
the mullah argued was comparable to Yazid preventing water being given to Hussein. In 
this example we see the anthropomoiphisation of two countries - the personalisation of 
ideology.32
In the case of symbolic representation, given the absence of an intermediate 'interpreter5 
the propensity exists for more diverse interpretation. In the following example we witness 
a case o f political myth construction without an obvious and immediate relationship to 
traditional myth. Indeed this case highlights the reciprocal relationship between the 
different constructions of ideas as well as the nature of political myth as a summation of 
one ideology whilst retaining an esserrtial ambiguity open to other interpretations.
Thus, for example, in Iran with regard to the Lion and Sun motif, supporters of one 
particular ideology, that of nationalism, aware of its significance as an icon of identity, 
appropriate the symbol as the supreme symbol of nationalism. The Lion proudly holds out 
a sword and blocks out the sun - the precise meaning of this symbolic construction and 
its positive or negative reper cussions are themselves debated by nationalists - representing 
for nationalists a proud and mighty Iran. The symbol is thus transformed into a tool of 
political action - modem political myth - through its appropriation by an ideology. This
32 This example is taken from personal experience during a visit to the Husseiniye 
in Arak, Ir an, during the month of Muharram in the summer of 1993.
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symbol, at once the epitome of the nationalist idea, is nevertheless open to other 
interpretations.
Thus, while nationalists argue that the lion represents the ancient Iranian deity Mehr 
(Mithra), or alternatively the concept of light1, reified in a terrestrial form which is 
representative of the spirit of Iran, the more religiously inclined view the lion as 
representing Imam Ali, who was also given the title Lion of God’. Given that Iran is 
predominantly Shi’a, this view is not entirely antithetical to the nationalist view, but it 
does shift the emphasis of the meaning towards religion. For these people the sword 
carried by the lion is 'Zu1fiqar\ the famous sword of Ah, although nationalists would 
argue that the sword was a later addition to the motif. Others dismiss the symbol 
altogether as a creation of British colonialism and therefore an insult to the very dignity 
of Iran - arguably a nationalist position in reverse. 53
Once challenged, nationalists may seek to justify then particular interpretation by 
providing it with a long pedigree - in other words root it in traditional myth and thus 
naturalise the interpretation. In this way the development of a meaning ensures the 
construction of a past and scholars are recruited and sent in search of a past. Since there 
are no extant representations of this particular symbol from pre-Islamic Ban, scholars have 
sought to substantiate the Mithraic perspective through circumstantial evidence such as 
the importance of the concept of light to Zoroastrian Iran and certain obscure references 
to the fact that the Sassanian royal standard, the Devafsh-e Kaviyani, was emblazoned
33 It should be pointed out that the motif was also symbolic of the monarchy, and 
in some ways became the quintessential symbol of'dynastic nationalism5.
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with the symbol. The most comprehensive analysis to date was probably conducted by the 
nationalist historian and ideologue, Ahmad Kasravi, who through a study of documents 
and numismatics came to the conclusion that the symbol could at best be traced back to 
the Mongols.34
Retrospective historical construction is common in arguably the highest form of 
ideological personalisation, that of the cult of the individual. The very difficulty of this 
problematic construction - the imposition of the ideal (or indeed many different ideals) 
onto one person, often results in past and present contradictions which can only be 
resolved through considerable historical revisionism. The re-interpretation, and in some 
cases re-invention of the past to suit the present arguably seeks to establish the authority 
which the present relation of domination requires.
Political Myth and Leadership
The particular relationship between ideology, political myth and the individual, or more 
specifically, political leadership, is central to this thesis. The individual leader provides the 
ultimate physical manifestation of ideological construction, the summation of an idea 
within the ultimate vehicle for expression. All the more so, because unlike other discursive 
or visual representations, the individual is a living manifestation of the ideological 
construct and as such adds a further dimension to the interpretative process. With other 
symbolic reifications, the vehicle is static while interpretation may vary, with the
34 Ahmad Kasravi Torfkhche-ye Shir-o Khorsheed (The History of the Lion and 
Sim) Tehran, undated.
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individual, interpretation and indeed transmission and dissemination, are complicated, by 
a vehicle which is dynamic. This dynamism represents the essential paradox of this 
particular manifestation. Political leadership is thus both a transmitter and progenitor of 
political myth.
As Hegel argues in 'The German Constitution1, successfiil political leadership requires 
that the individual be identified in the popular consciousness with an idea.
“Blit they Piis enemies] gave way not to Richelieu as a man but to his genius, which linked 
his person with the necessary principle of the unity of the state and made the public 
officials dependent on the state. And herein lies political genius, in the identification of an 
individual with a principle. Given this linkage, the individual must carry off the victory.”35
Although Hegel identifies this idea with the realisation of freedom in human consciousness 
throughout history, for the purposes of this thesis the substance of the Hegelian 'Idea1, 
is less important than the concept itself, and the relationship it suggests exists between 
political leaders and the ideologies they inherit, transmit and modify. Hegel expands on 
this relationship in his Philosophy of World History, explaining that 'world-historical 
individuals’, “are those who seize upon this higher universal and make it their own end.”36
The political leader seeks to identify himself with an idea, to become the reification of an 
ideology and to redefine that ideology in his own terms. The individual facilitates the
33 Hegel The German Constitution 1802, in Hegel’s Political Writings trans T M 
Knox, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1964, pg 216.
36 Hegel Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction pg 82.
29
reduction, simplification and polarisation of an ideology through its identification with his 
person. A complex, often ambiguous, sometimes ill-defined, set of ideas becomes 
apparently clear, manifest and concise through the medium of this identification - people 
'know’ without necessarily understanding. This personalisation of ideology transforms the 
ideology into political myth through the inherent contradiction of transposing the ideal 
into the material and the limitations this imposes on the ideal. The process of identification 
and its consequences are concisely described by Hegel:
“...in fulfilling their grand designs as necessitated by the universal spirit, such world- 
historical individuals not only attained personal satisfaction but also acquired new external 
characteristics in the process. The end they achieved was also their own end, and the hero 
himself is inseparable from the cause he promoted, for both of these were satisfied.”37
In seeking to consolidate the identification with the ideology a leader is increasingly 
required to mirror the ideology represented. As such, the past, present, and as a 
consequence, the future are all modified and adapted to conform with the ideal while at 
the same time the leader seeks to redefine this ideal in his own image. The essential 
tension of this relationship facilitates myth construction. In one sense it may be argued that 
the leader in this situation begins to represent a particular manifestation, or microcosm, 
of the hermeneutic cycle, the wider relationship between ideological constructions and 
interpretation.
The essential tension which characterises the relationship between the ideology and the
37 Ibid pg 86.
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individual, the differing pulls of the ideal and the material, is a vital process for the 
production of political myth. As such, if political myth is the personalisation of ideology, 
so too, the personalisation of ideology leads to political myth.
Political myth, in particular its association with political leadership, is not a product of the 
industrial era. Indeed its existence is testified to hy the persistence of symbolic ritual which 
has accompanied autocratic rule throughout history.38 Rulers and political leaders have 
sought to identify themselves, and in some cases have succeeded in effectively embodying, 
particular ideas in order to secure for themselves legitimate authority. The difference in 
the post-industrial age; the factor which has made political myth 'modem’, is the presence 
of mass media and communications.
The advent of mass communications
As Thompson argues, "The analysis of ideology in modem societies must give a central 
role to the nature and impact of mass communication", adding that, "The development of 
mass communication greatly expands the scope for the operation of ideology in modem 
societies, for it enables symbolic forms to be transmitted to extended and potentially vast 
audiences which are dispersed in time and space."39
The advent of mass communications, in particular the electronic mass media has not only
38 Cannadine & Price (eds) Rituals of Royalty - Power & Ceremonial in Traditional 
Societies Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987.
39 J Thompson Ideology & Modern Culture pg 267.
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magnified the essential tension which results in political myth construction, it has also 
multiplied the frequency of ideological dissemination while at the same time increasing the 
immediacy of transmission. Radio and television, as a medium of transmission tend to 
favour shorter and more concise expositions of ideological dogma and thus encourage the 
production of political myth. Furthermore the frequency of transmission not only increases 
the quantitative level with political myth being imparted into society at a far higher rate 
than previously possible, the immediacy of the medium means that the tension which exists 
between the ideal and the material, particularly in political leadership, is heightened by 
greater public accessibility and scrutiny. The modem mass media behaves as an 
accelerator to the process of reciprocal interpretation.40 As Thompson explains:
“..it is important to stress that the increased visibility afforded by mass communication is 
a source both of enormous political opportunities and of unprecedented political risks.
Through the medium of television, political figures can communicate to a vast and widely 
dispersed audience, can present themselves and their views in a carefully controlled 
fashion. But this medium also allows for the possibility that political figures may appear 
incompetent, ill-informed, out of control, in ways and on a scale which never existed 
before. In the electronically mediated political arena, an impromptu remark or an 
emotional outburst can bring about the fall of an aspiring leader.”'11
The frequency and intensity of this scrutiny not only magnifies the tension but also 
multiplies it. The magnification yields new details which in turn require a more precise and
40 See M Edelman Constructing the Political Spectacle Chicago, Chicago 
University Press, 1988
41 J Thompson op. cit pg 17
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exacting standard from the leader. The exposure of a traditional political strategy to the 
microscopic scrutiny of modem technology, through the medium of mass communications 
and media, tends to emphasise and highlight the tension resulting from the essential 
contradiction of identifying an individual with a principle.
Pahlavi Iran as a case study
As a traditional society in the throes of socio-economic change, Iran during the Pahlavi 
era provides a usefiil case study for the analysis of ideology and political myth. 
Furthermore, this transition fr om a traditional to an industrial society during this period 
centred upon the aspirations and leadership of the two Pahlavi Shahs who sought to 
embody the ideals of modernisation and nationalism within their persons. In addition Iran 
during this period came into increasing contact with the West, and thus more Iranians 
came into contact with Western conceptions and ideas with which they could compare and 
contrast themselves. Indeed during this period Iranians moved both vertically, in gains in 
wealth, as well as feelings of international inadequacy, and horizontally; they travelled 
abroad on a scale unparalleled by citizens of other developing countries. The propensity 
for a multiplicity of collective and individual, often contradictory, consciousnesses was 
therefore profound. O f particular importance for this thesis is the emergence of the mass 
media, especially the rapid adoption of the radio throughout Iran, which, juxtaposed with 
the cultivation of the myth of the leader, positively facilitates the study of modem political 
myth.
Ideological dissemination was assisted by the tremendous growth in mass communications
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which occurred in the more than fifty years of Pahlavi rule. Printed material became more 
influential as literacy rose, though it may be argued that for the bulk of the period, the 
print media had a limited influence. This is however to misunderstand the role of the 
educated elites in Iranian society, and to underestimate their social influence. Furthermore, 
in periods of liberalisation, such as 1941-53, the print media were active in supporting a 
wide variety of interest groups, albeit within a nationalist framework. As Cottam notes, 
"..the press of the past fifty years is replete with references to the days of Iranian 
supremacy; hardly an issue of any newspaper can be found that fails to refer to Iran's 
past."42 By far more important, was the growth in radio and television broadcasting, in 
particular the spread of the transistor radio which allowed ideological messages to reach 
a geographically disparate and often isolated population. Indeed technology assisted the 
centralisation of power in the Pahlavi state.
While recognising the importance of modem mass communications for the construction 
and dissemination of ideology, this did not obviate the need for traditional methods of 
discourse. On the contrary, it both supplemented and expanded its reach. Thus the 
medium of personal communication was greatly assisted by the advent of the telephone 
and modem transport. As a result such traditional modes of information transmission 
expanded into more diverse and complex networks. Being neither systematic nor exact, 
though sufficiently accurate to be accepted, such networks were prone to mythic 
reproduction. A rigorous domestic security service in the Pahlavi era only enhanced the 
utility of such a 'service'.
42 R Cottam Nationalism in Iran Pittsburgh, University o f Pittsburgh Press, 1964,
pg 26.
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Apart from these specific tensions, there are general cultural and historical tensions and 
circumstances which are conducive to the analysis of political myth. Iran's long and 
turbulent history has resulted in a rich tapestry of conflicting traditional myths. The 
consequent collective Weltanschauung which has resulted in the resilience and durability 
of the cultural phenomenon known as Iraniyyat, arose from compromise and 
appropriation facilitated by this rich reservoir of accompanying ambiguous myths. To take 
but one, if possibly the most famous, example of this contra dictory consciousness', the 
Iran-Islam dichotomy, as Mottahedeh has said, there is a, "world of ambiguity between 
Iranian-ness and Islam.1,43 Therefore it may be said that the dominant Iranian world view 
is cemented by a multiplicity of traditional political myths, which are a rich reservoir of 
material for ideologues and political myth-makers.
The ambiguity of this multi-faceted construction is assisted by the predominant language, 
Farsi and its dialects. As Beeman notes, "Persian is a language with a very simple 
grammatical structure and rich set of stylistic variables that help individuals to convey 
accounts o f then feelings...The basic dimensions of Iranian society are not terribly 
complex in a structural sense, but they provide for a rich play of linguistic expression."44 
Furthermore, Zonis comments that, "..all forms of communication - speech and other 
behaviours - had as one component of their transmission of meaning that conveyed by
43 R Mottahedeh - Mantle of the Prophet London, Chatto & Windus, 1986 pg 313.
44 W O Beeman Language. Status & Power in Iran Bloomington, Indiana 
University Press, 1986 pg 10. See also P Ricoeur Poetry & Possibility in A Ricoeur 
Reader M J Valdes (ed) pp 448-462.
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nuance, that delicate variation in the execution of behaviours or articulation of speech at 
which Iranians are such masters. Second, virtually all b anians paiticipated in this form of 
discourse. The result was an extraordinarily complex communication field in which 
foreigners were grossly inept."45
Sources
The sources for the study of ideology and political myth are potentially extensive, ranging 
from architecture and nomenclature, to the oral recording of the recollections of 
individuals who participated in political discourse during the time period under 
investigation. This potential is however limited by the availability of resources, whether 
records were kept of events and speeches, and the manner in which they were recorded. 
A speech which is orally delivered may contain nuances and emphases which later 
transcriptions fail to recognise. Furthermore, in analysing the development of a concept 
whose manifestation and expression is arguably ubiquitous, a certain amount of judicious 
selection is necessary when approaching sources, so as to allow a balanced assessment to 
made of developments during the historical period in question.
The vast majority of the sources used for this thesis have been textual, with the occasional 
use of visual representations and personal interviews when they complement or support 
the textual evidence. Given the focus of the thesis on the structure of mythic relationships, 
in particular the relationship between political leadership and political myth, the sources
45 M Zonis Majestic Failure Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1991 ft 66 pg
299.
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reflect the ideological enunciations of the Pahlavi shahs especially Mohammad Reza Shah 
(1941-79), or the state apparatus which they instructed. The sources include speeches, 
private conversations recorded by Iranians, or by foreign diplomats, official government 
publications, as well as the major state newspapers of the period.
For the later period, more visual material is available in the form of films of the coronation 
(1967) and the celebrations of 2,500 years of the Persian Monarchy (1971), along with 
the 50(il anniversary of the Pahlavi dynasty (1976). Additional visual material was provided 
by architecture, banknotes and stamps. Little cinematic or televisual material was 
available, but transcripts of Tehran Radio were available through the Summary of World 
Broadcasts of the BBC. Though these were English transcripts they represented the only 
available source for what was an increasingly important medium of ideological expression 
in Pahlavi Iran. Indeed the importance of both the Public Record Office files and the SWB 
was that they provided chronologically consistent sources, through which developments 
could be traced.
With respect to the Public Record Office files, it should be pointed out that although the 
earlier chapters rely heavily on material located in the Foreign Office files, the consular 
files contain considerable Persian language material (especially for the politically prolific 
period 1941-53), while the English records used are those which cite speeches, specific 
events of importance for ideological construction, and private conversations, either with 
Iranians or with the Shah himself Memoirs, or comments by British diplomatic staff have 
been used rarely and mainly where they substantiate or support an event confirmed 
elsewhere. Two exceptions to this were the reports submitted by A K S Lambton, which
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normally conflicted with Embassy assessments, and the memoirs of Sir Dennis Wright, 
which were kindly made available to me.
The main, though not exclusive, sources in Persian have been the collected speeches of 
Mohammad Reza Shah, although many of these are retrospective compilations and as such 
may exclude subjects considered unfavourable to the Shah; official publications issued on 
the occasion of the main festivals mentioned above; and five important texts which allow 
us to chart the trajectory of ideological development: 'Mission for my Country’ (1961), 
'Palilavism5 (1966), 'The White Revolution’ (1967), issues of the party organ ' Rastakhiz'' 
(1975-76), in particular those issues dealing with the philosophy of Rastakhiz, and, 
'Towards the Great Civilisation’ (1977). Although the focus of the research has been the 
ideological constructs of the state, opposition literature and radio broadcasts have been 
used where possible to show the relationship between the different ideological constructs 
and the influences upon Pahlavi ideology. This is particularly the case for the chapter 
dealing with the period 1941-53 when state control was weak and political pluralism 
flourished.
Framework for Analysis
Critical Hermeneutics
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The methodology adapted here from Thompson is one of hermeneutics, specifically, 
'depth hermeneutics', which itself has drawn heavily on the theory o f critical hermeneutics 
developed by Paul Ricoeur.46 Along with the categorisation of political strategies which 
follows, the methodology selected is a framework rather than a definitive schema which 
will guide rather than dictate the direction of the research.
Critical hermeneutics, as understood here, provides a critical framework for the analysis 
o f ideology, acknowledging the importance of socio-historical analysis and cultural 
empathy which must underpin the more detailed analysis of texts and symbols within a 
given political culture. It is critical not only in the rigorous totality in which it seeks to 
analyse ideological constructs but also in the awareness of the individual limitations of the 
student of ideology. Critical hermeneutics, while accepting the interpretive nature of 
ideological deconstruction, seeks to implement the precision of traditional ideological 
critiques. As Thompson argues, “The interpretation of ideology is a process of creative 
synthesis.”47
46 P Ricoeur Hermeneutics & the Human Sciences (ed & trans Thompson) CUP 
1981, in particular chapter 2, Hermeneutics and the critique of ideology pp 63-101.
47 J B Thompson Ideology & Modem Culture pg 293.
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Forms of Hermeneutical Inquiry48
1) Social-Historical analysis -spatio-temporal settings; 
-fields of interaction; 
-social institutions;
-social structure; 
-technical media of
Methodological transmission
framework 2) Formal or discursive -semiological analysis;
analysis -conversation analysis; 
-syntatic analysis; 
-narrative analysis; 
-argumentative analysis.
3) Interpretation/re-interpretation.
Political strategies
The following political strategies, adapted from Thompson, have been identified and will 
be used and the categories are a framework for analysis. It must be emphasised that the 
categorisation is by no means exhaustive, nor are the categories definitive.49 There may 
be overlaps, intentional or otherwise both between the general modes as well as their
48 Adapted from J B Thompson op. cit. pg 281
49 Ibid  pp 52-67
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subdivisions. Nevertheless, the following table will provide an essential guide and 
framework for reference for the empirical research which will follow.
General Modes Some typical strategies o f  symbolic 
construction.
Legitimation Rationalisation
Universalisation
Narrativization
Reification
Naturalisation
Etemalisation
Dissimulation Displacement
Euphemisation
Trope (eg: synecdoche, metonymy, 
metaphor)
Passivisation
Unification Standardisation 
Symbolisation of unity
Fragmentation Differentiation 
Expurgation of the other 
Creation of social problems
In seeking to establish and sustain a particular relation of domination, all ideology by 
definition operates in order to legitimise and naturalise a given power relationship. 
Political myth, as argued above, is central to this process of naturalisation, and from the
41
above table it may be concluded that the most important mode of operation is that of 
legitimation’ with particular reference, as it pertains to leadership, to the strategy of 
reification. However, all the modes of operation to a greater or lesser extent aim to assist 
in the process of social institutionalisation, by which it is understood, a popularly accepted 
legitimate authority, for the particular relation of domination.
With respect to legitimation, the particular strategies are understood as follows: 
rationalisation, by which it is meant 'perceived' rationalisation; a particular relation of 
domination is explained and interpreted as logical and sensical. Universalisation, by which 
it is meant a strategy in which a circumstance is legitimised by appearing universally 
applicable. Universalisation entails the justification of a situation or event by noting its 
apparently universal acceptance or existence, either within a given political culture or 
outside its boundaries.
Narrativization draws most clearly from traditional myth by embedding modem 
interpretations in well-known narratives and elucidating parallels and conclusions from 
this. It is a strategy which facilitates the personalisation of ideology and as such, the 
creation of political myth and enjoys a reciprocal relationship with it. Narratives and larger 
meta-narratives, particularly historical narratives, can be both manipulated and created by 
leaders seeking to justify their claims. This strategy is consequently closely linked to that 
of reification, by which it is understood, the materialisation of an abstract concept into a 
thing or person. It must be emphasised that a non-Marxist definition of 'reification’ is 
being utilised with the emphasis 011 the process of'personalisation’ as opposed to 'de­
personalisation’. Naturalisation and etemalisation are also ideological strategies winch
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encourage the development of political myth, although as argued above, all strategies tend 
towards a goal of naturalisation.
The second general mode of operation is termed dissimulation which is understood as the 
manipulation of the accepted social facts. As Thompson argues, dissimulation means that, 
"Relations of domination may be established and sustained by being concealed, denied or 
obscured, or by being represented in a way which deflects attention from or glosses over 
existing relations or processes."50 Thus, through displacement, one appropriates the 
character traits of another much as Louis Bonaparte ignited a nostalgia for his illustrious 
uncle, and put it to good use, or as Mohammad Reza Shah less successfully tried to 
appropriate the characteristics of Cyrus the Great.
By euph.emisat.ion is understood the process by which standard descriptions with negative 
connotations are replaced by more positive terms, and vice versa. One of the most recent 
and explicit examples of this occurred during the Persian Gulf War. The Danish paper, 
Politiken examined the English language press and came up with the following revealing 
examples: while the allies had an army, navy and air force, the Iraqis possessed a 'war 
machine’; or alternatively, while the allies were 'professional’ the Iraqis were 
'brainwashed’.51 Passivisation is understood as a strategy in which the actor is 
deliberately 'hidden1 possibly giving the impression that an event that has occurred, does 
so naturally. Thus, as Thompson argues, 'the prime minister has banned imports', is
50 Ibid pg 62
51 D Kellner The Persian Gulf TV War Oxford, Westview Press 1992, pp 238-242
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redefined as 'the banning of imports'.52
Similar to euphemisation, is what Thompson calls 'trope', by which it is meant the 
figurative use of language. Thompson has subdivided 'trope' into synecdoche, metonymy 
and metaphor. By metaphor, one means the application of a description which would not 
make literal sense. Thus, for example, describing Margaret Thatcher as the 'lion Lady'. 
A synecdoche is a method of figurative speech when the whole is stated but understood 
as a particular, or vice versa. Thus a nationality (the 'British') is used when only the 
specific government is meant. By metonymy, one means the substitution of the name of 
an attribute or adjunct for that of the thing meant. For instance, 'the crown' instead of the 
more personal, 'king*. Thus, with respect to Iran in the Pahlavi era, the ruins of Persepolis 
were frequently used to suggest the longevity of monarchy, or indeed simply the monarchy 
itself.
Unification can be achieved through the following strategies: standardisation is one 
method of achieving a sense of unity. This may be the adoption of a uniform, or a standard 
credo, or in a broader sense, this can be witnessed in attempts to standardise language, 
currency and laws. Symbolisation o f unity involves the use of symbols and slogans which 
stress the unity of the group. As Thompson notes, this strategy is most obviously 
interwoven with narrativization strategies.51 Symbols of unity include flags, anthems and 
assorted emblems.
52 J B Thompson op. cit. pg 66.
53 Ibid  pg 64
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A fourth mode of operation can be categorised as fragmentation, which is closely linked 
to that of unification. Clearly, in most practical situations unification strategies are likely 
to enjoy only degrees of partial success. There will always be groups who will be more 
difficult to sway to one's position. Furthermore legitimacy is often enhanced or justified 
through the creation of problems. Fragmentation may be said to involve three strategies, 
that of emphasising disunity among one's opponents (differentiation); that of creating 
foreign enemies to foster unity; and, that of creating domestic enemies, or social problems. 
As Edelman says, "The language that constructs a problem and provides an origin for it 
is also a rationale for vesting authority in people who claim some kind of competence. 
Willingness to suspend one's own critical judgement in favour of someone regarded as 
able to cope creates authority,'04
Concluding Remarks & Structure of Study
The central thesis of this study argues that political myth can be interpreted as the 
personalisation or familiarisation of ideology. It provides either a human face to an 
ideological construct, or alternatively appropriates symbols already familiar to the target 
audience. It is thus closely bound to the traditional myths and 'histories’ of a given 
political culture. The ultimate expression of this 'personalisation5 is a particular individual. 
The ultimate personalisation of ideology lies with the cult (-ivation) of the individual; 
hence the Hegelian argument that the identification of a principle with an individual is 
political genius. Beyond, though included in, this specific example in which political myth
54 M Edelman op. cit. pg 20.
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becomes more tangible, it is argued that myth is the simplification of ideological ideas, the 
conceptual termination, or polarisation, of one ideological construct which opens the door 
of interpretation to others, the cyclical point of rejuvenation. By reducing an ideology to 
a 'self-evident trutlf, political myth seeks to institutionalise the power that ideology 
sustains and supports. Importantly, political myth remains an integral part of ideology, and 
at times the distinction is difficult to make. However, rather than see this as an argument 
against the utility of political myth it should be accepted as confirmation of the importance 
of political myth to the integral structure of ideology.
Chapter Structure
The thesis will take a chronological approach with respect to the division of chapters, with 
each chapter highlighting the thematic issues relevant to the argument developed about 
the nature and operation of political myth. As such, there has been no attempt to provide 
a comprehensive historical suivey of Pahlavi Iran beyond what is relevant to the argument.
Chapter 2 - the Rise & Rule o f Reza Shah
This chapter provides the ideological blueprint for the rest of the thesis on two counts: it 
allows us to discern the ideological parameters which characterise the Pahlavi state while 
at the same time providing a reference point for the development of those ideological 
parameters both in relation to each other and in relation to perceived social reality. The 
chapter highlights a number of points characteristic of the Pahlavi state which are 
important for the thesis, including: the crisis of legitimacy which was the critical 
characteristic of the regime as a whole and which provided the essential 'tension’ which
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encouraged political myth production and cultivation. This formed the basis of the 
fundamental ideological construct defined as 'dynastic nationalism’. The chapter also 
establishes the other important ideological parameters which were characteristic of the 
Pahlavi state, such as militarism, modernism and nationalism. In particular it will show the 
essential triangular tension between modernism, nationalism and traditionalism, which 
resulted in increasing political myth in the guise of dynastic nationalism.
Chapter 3: 1941-53 - Pluralism & the triumph o f nationalism
This chapter complements the first in providing the societal background for the reign of 
Mohammad Reza Shah. It also elaborates on the ideological parameters introduced in the 
second chapter and provides an example of the cult-ivation of the individual in the person 
o f Dr Mohammad Mosaddeq, which was to prove immensely influential for the Shah. 
Specifically, this chapter, confirms the strength of nationalism as the pivotal ideology in 
Iran; introduces the impact of the emergence of the modem mass media on ideological 
development principally through the emergence of the radio; elaborates on the ideology 
of dynastic nationalism, in this case incurred by a profound feeling of impotence, 
insecurity and inferiority felt by Mohammad Reza Shah; and, finally it combines the three 
elements discussed above in the oil nationalisation crisis in which the cult of individual is 
crystallised not around the person of the Shah but instead, Dr Mosaddeq.
Chapter 4 - the consolidation o f power
This chapter represents a transitional phase when the Shah attempted to appropriate the
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ideological potency of Dr Mohammad Mosaddeq while extending it and tentatively 
modifying it to identify himself with an idea of his own making. The Shah is thus seen 
attempting to appropriate a cocktail of ideological constructs more complex than his 
father - nationalism, socialism, modernism and traditionalism - and thus incorporating far 
greater tensions.
Chapter 5 - 1960-67: the White Revolution
Disappointed by failure in the I950's, the Shah seeks in the aftermath of Dr Amini’s 
reforms to identify himself with revolutionary reform, through the launch of a programme 
of development known as the 'White Revolution1. In ideological terms this marks a 
turning point for the Shah as a concerted attempt is made to identify him with an idea and 
to institutionalise and 'authorise1 his power. Myth begets myth with the development of 
the concept of'Palilavism1 while the tensions between the Shah’s desire to portray himself 
as a moderniser and his traditional office, along with the tensions inherent with 
nationalism, force him to increasingly emphasise dynastic nationalism expressed in 
increasingly emphatic symbolic forms and ceremonial gestures, as a solution to the 
comm drum.
Chapter 6 - 1967-77: Towards the Great Civilisation; the myth o f  Imperial Authority
The tendencies visible in the previous chapter become emphatic at this stage. 
Reductionism, simplification and polarisation become explicit as the Shah moves to 
definitively establish his authority. It is in this period that the peculiar characteristics of the
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relationship between political myth and political leadership become apparent in that a 
concerted effort is made to revise the historical record in order to satisfy the modem 
image of the Shah. The volatile cocktail of ideological constructs the Shah sought to reify 
in his own person was so contradictory as to result in the increasing generation of political 
myth. The Shah used the media more aggressively to pursue his ideological agenda which 
was essentially the identification of himself as the quintessential hero-saviour leading his 
country to the promised land.
Chapter 2
Defining the Ideological Parameters:
The Rise and Rule of Reza Shah
Introduction
In order to better understand the development of ideology and the use of political myth 
during the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, it is important to define the ideological 
parameters of the Pahlavi state. This can be best achieved by analysing the rise and rule 
of his father Reza Shah who dominated Iran between the years 1921-41. The creation and 
re-invention of modem political myths and their parent ideologies is a continuous process 
with often profound (if not necessarily widespread or popular) historical roots, and any 
such historical division into 'periods’ may be regarded as problematic. This is particularly 
relevant for the study of myths and ideology in that many of the important personages 
involved in the construction and reconstruction of myths are themselves the practical 
products of ideological debates which may have occurred a generation earlier in then 
youth - they are in many ways the children of the Constitutional Revolution. Indeed, it 
must be stressed, and it will be shown, that Reza Shah and in particular the intellectuals 
who originally supported him, were very much of their time, influenced by and reacting 
to political events in the late Qajar period, the Constitutional Revolution and its 
consequences. Indeed, they were arguably the capable products of a particularly fertile and
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dynamic era in modem Iranian history.
Nevertheless, it can with justification be argued that Reza Shah’s determined and single- 
minded pursuit of his goals, aided and assisted by an influential clique of competent 
bureaucrats and ideologues, makes the period of his rise and rule a pivotal one in the 
development of modem Iran and the Pahlavi state in particular. The period from 1921 to 
1941 provides us with both an historical and practical framework and a reference point 
from which to analyse the development of political myth in the last 37 years of Pahlavi 
rule, as well as providing more explicit examples of ideological and mythic construction 
which itself provided Mohammad Reza Shah, eager to elevate the importance, to the point 
of sanctity, of his father and founder of the Pahlavi dynasty, with a rich reservoir of 
material. Of central importance to this thesis is the attempt by Reza Shah to identify 
himself with the principles of modernity and nationalism as he understood them. Indeed, 
it would be no exaggeration to argue that, in retrospect, and with particular reference to 
the development of dynastic nationalism, Reza Shah and his associates established the 
ideological blueprint of the Pahlavi period.
This chapter m il be divided into two unequal parts. The first section will deal with the 
broad historical context, such as the background to the rise of Reza Shah, emphasising the 
fragmented nature of the Iranian polity in this period. Linked to this analysis will be a 
more detailed scrutiny of the Iranian intelligentsia, the personalities involved, and their 
disproportionate influence on ideological construction during the period. Lastly, there will 
be a brief discussion of the importance of emergent 'nationalism1, arguably the most 
influential ideology of modern Iran, indicating its dominance in modem Iranian political
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culture through its pervasive use in both establishment and oppositional literature.
The second, more comprehensive section, will deal exclusively with the ideological 
parameters identified through a reading of the available sources. Having first identified the 
broad ideological categories and noted the general strategies they served, the chapter will 
proceed to analyse the various developments in ideological construction throughout the 
period emphasising the inter-relationship between the competing ideologies and the areas 
of political myth development.
Background to tlie Rise of Reza Khan
Of central importance to any understanding of the rise of Reza Khan and the establishment 
of the Pahlavi dynasty, is the fragmentation of Iranian society, literally as well as 
intellectually, and the consequent tension this resulted in during this period. Reza Khan 
represented for many from diverse intellectual backgrounds, the solution to Iran’s 
problems. If anarchy is but a stepping stone to absolute power, in intellectual terms, 
diverse intellectual movements, initially at least, voluntarily submitted to the immediate 
expression of ideological reification known as Reza Khan. Indeed, it is important to 
remember that Reza Khan was very much a product of the intelligentsia. To paraphrase 
Tulard, faced with internal or external threats to its interests, the Iranian intellectual elites 
invented a 'saviour1.55
55 J Tulard Napoleon - The Myth of the Saviour (trans Waugh) London, Methuen, 
1984 pg 350
-52-
As such it is important to recognise that the rise of Reza Khan and all that he represented, 
though in some way fortuitous, was by no means an aberration. Iran's political elite had 
been wrestling for nearly a century with the gradual but evident decline of Iranian power, 
made increasingly stark by the blatant influence of foreign powers in the country, 
especially Britain and Russia. This presence' of foreign powers, not only in political 
matters, but in educational establishments, was the first real catalyst to change in Iran. 
With her own weakness apparent, certain Iranian politicians sought to stem and indeed 
reverse the decline by appropriating what they felt had lent success to the Western 
powers. Among the many factors discerned, such as education, the most important was 
widely considered to be a clear sense of national identity.
The new brand of Iranian intellectual who had been educated abroad or who had 
encountered Europeans within Iran began increasingly to see Iran's salvation in what can 
be termed 'secular nationalist' terms, though it must be stressed that only a veiy small 
minority considered national Iranian identity as antithetical to religion in general and Shi’a 
Islam in particular. Many indeed remained personally devout, but retained a deep mistrust 
and suspicion of particular aspects of the Shi’a hierarchy.56
These new nationalists retained an influence which belied their small numbers, and ranged 
from the elitist, largely establishment figures drawn from the aristocracy who felt that 
reform could be achieved from within, to radicals, who argued for more fundamental
56 The relationship between the intelligentsia and the ulema was a complex one and 
was not in all cases antagonistic, as is revealed in the role played by the ulema in the 
Constitutional Revolution.
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structural reform, and at an extreme, chauvinists, who somewhat paradoxically, viewed 
all things foreign with suspicion. Something of the temperament of this new breed of 
Iranian nationalist can be gauged by the writings of Mirza Agha Khan Kermani, 
recognised as the first Ir anian nationalist ideologue, who wrote in the 1890s, "The root 
of each of the branches of the tree of ugly character of Persia that we touch was planted 
by the Arabs and its fruit [sprang from] the seed sown from the Arabs. All the despicable 
habits aud customs of the Persians are either the legacy and testament of the Arab nation 
or the finit and influence of the invasions that have occurred in Persia."57
That these men remained a minority within the political elite explains their relative lack of 
practical political success throughout the 19th century, however then disproportionate 
influence on Iranian political thought is proved by the success, albeit temporary, of the 
1906 Revolution, which sought to impose a Western style constitution on the Qajar 
monarchy, complete with an elected assembly.58 The subsequent failure of the 
Constitutional Movement to fulfil its promise, compounded by the political and economic 
dislocation of the First World War, in which an estimated 25% of the Iranian population 
died not only from the direct consequences of military occupation and conflict, but also
57 Quoted in S Bakhash Iran: Monarchy. Bureaucracy & Reform under the Oajars: 
1858-1896 London, Ithaca Press 1978 pg 345.
58 The Electoral Law of September 1909, was in many ways explicitly 
'nationalistic’. Article 4 notes that elected deputies must be able to speak, read and write 
Persian, which in 1909 must still have been a minority of the population as a whole. See 
E G Browne The Persian Revolution 1905-1909 London, Frank Cass, 1966. The delay 
in political repercussions may be a consequence of the fact that for much of the 19th 
century the standard of living of the average Iranian actually rose, and that economic 
decline only set in the last two decades.
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from widespread famine induced by a political and economic breakdown59, was acutely 
felt by the intelligentsia, who not surprisingly felt their hopes betrayed by a combination, 
they argued, of internal dissent, encouraged by the Qajar court, and foreign intervention. 
The war of course, also made it even more apparent, to Iranians of all economic strata, 
who now also came into contact with foreigners, how impotent their country had 
become60.
The attempted imposition of the Anglo-Persian Agreement in 1919 was the final straw for 
many Iranian nationalists, and in many ways was the single most important event which 
convinced the Iranian intelligentsia that drastic measures were needed to 'save’ the 
country. Certainly, the British were taken aback by the depth of feeling against the 
Agreement, though paradoxically, the architect of the Agreement, Lord Curzon, was one 
of the first to publicly acknowledge the emerging nationalism in Iran. Added to this the 
increasing impotence of the Iranian government, based in Teheran, to govern beyond its 
own provincial borders, resulted in the gl owing frustration of many Ir anians and the desire 
for increasingly radical measures. Members of the Iranian intelligentsia, ambitious for 
reform and progress, and fr ustrated by the failure of the Constitutional Movement and 
apparent public apathy, saw their salvation and Iran's, in the image of a 'strong man'. As 
one historian has commented, "The reformist intelligentsia rallied behind Reza Khan,
59 M Zirinsky - Imperial Power and Dictatorship: Britain and the Rise of Reza 
Shah 1921-1926 IJMES vol 24, 1992, pg 640.
60 G Hamblin Tire Pahlavi Autocracy in the Cambridge History of Iran Vol 7, CUP 
1991 pg 214.
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perceiving him as a stabilising, nationalist force."61 Significantly, this conviction was 
shared by the British, without whose passive acquiescence nothing could be achieved.62
Aside from the persuasive practical arguments in favour of the emergence of a 'strong 
man1, there were also important cultural factors. In the first place, it should be noted that 
the concept of a 'saviour1 was not alien to the cultural world view of many Iranians 
whether the framework of reference was essentially Iranian1 - there was widespread 
familiarity with the tales of the ShahtiarnehM - or Islamic - familiarity with the Imamate. 
There was another less conspicuous cultural factor, and that was the intellectual 
conditioning of many of the intelligentsia themselves, who had acquired an affinity for 
French revolutionary history and political thought64. Of returning Iranian students in the 
19th century, Hedayat wrote, "each holds under his arms [sic] a thesis about the French 
Revolution aud wishes to play the role of Robespierre or Danton..."65. The noted historian 
and intellectual of early 20th century Iran, Kasravi openly compared Iran to France when 
he wrote that, "In Tabriz during the Constitutional Revolution, as in Paris duiing the 
French Revolution, the sans-culottes reared their ugly heads. The driving force of these
61 M R Ghods Iranian Nationalism & Reza Shah in Middle Eastern Studies, 2 7 ,1, 
1991, p g  37.
62 For Sir Percy Loraine's role see: M Zirinsky op.cit. Interestingly, the British 
assessment may have been too pessimistic owing to then own conflicting reports. For 
sympathetic opinions among other foreign nationals see: Powell By Camel & Car to the 
Peacock Throne. New York, Garden City 1923, pg 307.
63 See, Vita Sackville-West Passenger to Teheran London, Hogarth Press, 1926, 
pg 105, pg 121.
64 See B Hopper The Persian Regenesis. Foreign Affairs, 13, 2, 1935, pg 298.
65 Quoted in Menashri Education and the Making of Modem Ban New York. 
Cornell University Press, 1992, pg 73.
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men was towards anarchy. First the overthrow of the despotic order, and then to turn 
upon the rich and propertied classes. It was with the backing of these men that Danton 
and Robespierre rose to power. In Tabriz 110 Dantons aud Robespierres appeared, but if 
they had we would also have had a 'reign of terror'."66 Clearly, Reza Khan's admiration 
for Napoleon would be well received by an intelligentsia wary of the potential for 
revolutionary anarchy67.
The Intelligentsia
Reza Shah could not have risen to power without the active support of a politically 
influential intelligentsia who virtually willed him into existence. It was then views that 
prepared the intellectual ground for the establishment of the Pahlavi dynasty and the 
policies that followed. Both Pahlavi monarchs enjoyed ambiguous if often tense relations 
with the Iranian intelligentsia, but while Mohammad Reza Shah ultimately sought a limited 
accommodation, Reza Shah became increasingly dismissive of then contribution as his 
reign progressed.
These men were drawn almost exclusively from the aristocracy and the propertied middle 
classes; those who could afford expensive Western education. Among then ranks were
66 Quoted in Abrahamian The Crowd in Iranian Politics. Past & Present, vol 41, 
Dec 1968, pp 184-210.
67 The admiration for Napoleon in Iranian political circles had been growing since 
the early 19th century; see A Amanat Nasir al Din Shah and the Iranian Monarchy London, 
IB  Tauris 1997. Reza Shah was also an ardent admirer of Nader Shah; see comment by 
the British diplomat Mallet, quoted in Zirinsky op. cit. pg 656.
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included, landlords, courtiers, businessmen, members of the literati, journalists and clerics. 
Although they may have argued as to the best method of reform, they all agreed on the 
fundamental aims, which could be summarised as unity', 'centralisation1, and an end to 
'foreign interference’ in Iranian affairs. In 1917, Hassan Taqizadeh, the noted Iranian 
nationalist and Azerbaijani Democrat described Iran as such, "one homogenous 
nation...composed of one pure race, one culture, and one encompassing civilisation with 
one single historical heritage"™.
To achieve these amis the intelligentsia sought to reorganise the regional administration 
on a 'rational’ basis, settle the tribes, distinguish politics from religion (views nevertheless 
varied as to what this meant in practice), establish fiill constitutionalism, a full welfare 
system, provide universal free education, and propagate the Persian language69. Though 
some reformists argued for greater regional devolution, viewing centralisation as a 
weakness to be exploited by foreign powers, by the end of the Fust World War, these 
people were in a minority, and it would be fair to say that in the initial stages the vast 
majority of the intelligentsia supported what Reza Khan purported to represent.
Of the 'Teheran clique’70, as one British diplomat labelled the intelligentsia, a number were
68 Quoted in M Reza Ghods op. cit. pg 36. Azerbaijan, one o f the most populous 
provinces in Iran continued to provide the country with some of its leading statesmen and 
intellectuals. This was in part due to its economic and pohtical importance throughout the 
Qajar period as well as its proximity to the outside world. Tabriz was effectively the 
gateway for new ideas coming from Russia and the Ottoman Empire.
69 The programme of Davar’s Renewal party; FO 371 9024 E6348 dated 14/5/23. 
It has since been argued that Davar personally favoured enlightened autocracy to 
constitutionalism.
70 See FO 371 9024 E46I2 dated 7/5/23.
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especially prominent and worthy of mention71. Indeed, for at least the first half of his rule, 
Reza Shah was aided by a handlid of extremely competent officials, one of whom arguably 
was the actual architect of many of the reforms72. As the British embassy noted in 1929, 
"When in February 1927 the then Persian government was reconstituted it was very soon 
realised that apart from questions connected with the army, the control of the whole 
machinery of government was centred in three men, Teymourtache, the Minister of Court, 
who was outside the Cabinet but yet dominated it; Prince Firuz, the Minister of Finance; 
and Davar, the Minister of Justice. These three men were ultimate friends and for more 
than two years completely controlled the situation; it was an open secret.."73. 
Teymourtache was probably the most influential member of this triumvirate and he knew 
it. Clive later added, "The present arrangement whereby the Minister of Court is a grand 
vizier in all but name would appear to be a temporary expedient, due to the personality 
of Teymourtache and the idiosyncrasies of the Shah. It is unconstitutional and no-one 
expects it to last."74
Mirza Abdul Hussein Khan Teymourtache was a major Khorasani landowner. Educated
71 For a more comprehensive list, see Abrahamian, Iran Between two Revolutions 
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 19B2, pp 102-169, and the various Foreign Office 
lists of 'Personalities', for example FO 371 12300 E3366 dated 2nd August 1927.
72 After Teymourta che's fall, the foreign press attributed much of the reforms to 
him, "...down to, or up to, the Shah’s social and hygienic education," much to the 
annoyance of Forouglii - FO 371 16941 E879 dated 28/1/33. For a long overdue 
reassessment of Teymourtache see, M Rezun Reza Shah's Court Minister: Teymourtache 
lintemational Journal of Middle East Studies, (IJMES) 12, 1980, pp 119-137
73 FO 371 13782 E4703 dated 16/9/29. See also Forbes Conflict: Angora to 
Afghanistan London, Cassell, 193 1, pg 185.
74 FO 371 13782 E6245 dated 2/12/29. Also FO 371 15341 E3611 dated 11/7/31.
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at a military school in St Petersburg, he spoke French aud Russian well, and understood 
English. He had travelled throughout Europe, including Germany, France and Switzerland 
and was recognised as an ardent nationalist and main architect of the repeal of the 
capitulations. Prince Firuz Mirza GCMG, a great great grandson of Fath Ali Shah, and 
had been educated in law at Beirut and Paris and was a member of the Paris Bar. He was 
fluent in French and understood English. Ali Akbar Khan Davar, the true technocrat, was 
the son of a minor court official. He studied law at Geneva University, having served in 
a number of ministries. Mirza Mohammad Ali Khan Foroughi, who held a number of 
senior posts in the 1920s before going out of favour had been educated in law and had 
been a colleague of Malkam Khan. Founder of the first Freemasons lodge in Tehran in 
1909, he spoke French and English.
Among the literati who supported Reza Khan was Ahmad Kasravi, who later went on to 
write a comprehensive history of the period before being assassinated by Shi'a radicals in 
1946; the poet Eshqi, who strongly attacked the Anglo-Persian Agreement, and who later 
wrote an operetta entitled Resurrection in which the great kings of Ban and Zoroaster 
returned to witness the pitiful state of their country; Bahar, and Arif who openly glorified 
the Zoroastrian faith. As one historian writes, "...the fact remains that they and then fellow 
poets have guided the public along the channels of patriotic thinking.."75.
75 Shafeq Patriotic Poetry in Modem Iran Middle East Journal VI, 4, 1952, pg
428 .
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A Concept, o f Nationalism
It is argued that 'nationalism' was and remains the paramount ideology of modem Iran, 
but it achieved this by being a broad church, and nationalist ideas were certainly not the 
monopoly of the intelligentsia who initially sustained Reza Shah. It is important to 
recognise that despite popular apathy the language of nationalism was not alien to the 
majority of the Iranian population76. Although the majority of the population may not have 
been politically aware, or understood the precise rationale behind the activities of the 
political elite, the latter were not detached culturally from those they led, though they may 
have at times followed their passions to an extreme. In order to better appreciate the 
dominance of nationalist conceptions in early 20th century Iranian political culture it is 
helpful to look at oppositional literature, largely republican, which remained firmly 
embedded in nationalist ideology77.
Three main opposition groups can be distinguished, the Republicans, the Communists and 
the ulema. Of the three, the Republicans were the strongest and present at the beginning 
of the period under discussion; the ulema were initially mollified by the rejection of 
republicanism in favour of monarchy, and the Communists emerged in the latter part of
76 Loraine writes on his arrival in Iran in 1921: "...it seems to me that there is a far 
more effective and coherent public opinion than when I formerly knew this country and 
it is intensely nationalistic." And later, "These are my first impressions, the strongest is 
that of a growing national feeling," FO 371 6408 E 14290 dated 23/12/21.
77 A disaffected Iranian poet hired by the BBC Persian seivice likened Reza Shah 
to the tyrant Zohak and asked his listeners where such men as Fereidun and Kava were 
to remove this tyrant - see D Wilbur Reza Shah Pahlavi: the Resurrection and 
Reconstruction of Iran New York, Exposition Press, 1975, pg 207.
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Reza Sliah's reign from disaffected intellectuals78.
It is important to recognise that republicanism, with its broad aim of eliminating 'royal and 
clerical despotism5, enjoyed the support of significant sections of the Iranian political elite 
even dividing loyalties in the army7‘J, and was probably seriously considered by Reza Khan, 
prior to his visit to Qom80. Many of those who later supported the installation of Reza 
Khan as Shah, still expressed the view that Reza was shah for life, and that his reign was 
a transitional one, for Iranians who had become used to the concept of a shah. Indeed as 
Reza Shah's attempt to impose a 'dynastic nationalism' increasingly failed, this option 
became more realistic. Many voiced the opinion that the vciliahd (hen-apparent) would 
not succeed his father. The Republican pamphlets of the period were a mixture of ridicule 
(of the person of Reza Shah) and nationalist hyperbole. One article printed in India, and 
signed 'The Committee of Action of Persian Republicans', seems to set the blueprint for 
opposition criticism of the Pahlavi state right up until 1979. It read in part, "The 
government of Reza Khan expends over 50% of the state budget for military purposes, 
not in the interests of Persia but in the interests of Great Britain, and in order to the better 
to hold down the native population."81
78 hi a similar vein a proto Nazi Party was also set up, though quickly disbanded - 
FO 371 20835 E3685 dated 5/7/37.
79 See FO 371 10145 E2914 dated 1/4/23. See also the 'Times' 19/3/24. A number 
of newspapers supported the establishment of a republic - see Abrahamian Iran Between.. 
pg 133.
80 FO 371 10145 E3748 dated 29/4/23.
81 FO 371 15348 E3795 dated 4/6/1931; also FO 371 15352 E5662 dated 4/11/31.
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Among the left wing opposition was Dr Taqi Arani, who increasingly turned to Marxism 
the more disillusioned he became with the Pahlavi state. Despite this, he remained 
fervently nationalistic, even chauvinistic, and argued in favour of the cleansing of the 
Persian language, the re-establishment of the centralised state of the Sassanians and the 
restoration of Zoroastrianism. In an article in IranshahrhQ openly hailed Cyrus the Great 
and Darius the Great as among Iran's great heroes and in an article in Farangistan wrote 
that, "All patriotic Iranians, especially the officials in the Ministry of Education, must do 
their very best to replace Turkish with Persian. We must send Persian journals, Persian 
newspapers, Persian textbooks, and Persian teachers to Azerbaijan - that ancient homeland 
of Zoroaster and of the Aryans."82 The ulema were clearly most against the nationalist 
mood, and given the policies of the nationalists, were in many ways justified. However, 
even within this group, those who became politically active were popularly recognised as 
patriots. Many clerics were involved in the Constitutional Revolution and formed alliances 
with the nationalists, including importantly the prominent cleric Modanis, who was a 
fervent opponent of the Anglo-Persian Agreement and was recognised as a patriot.
Defining the Ideological parameters
The following ideological categories have been defined for the pmpose of facilitating 
analysis. They provide a framework for ideological reference and suggest the major 
resources for the development of political myth. Since, "...Reza Shah never formulated 
a systematic blueprint for modernisation - writing no major thesis, delivering no grand
82 Quoted in Abrahamian Iran between... pg 156.
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speeches, and leaving behind no last testaments..."81, the current parameters are the result 
of retrospective construction, and are not definitive or exclusive. As will be seen, these 
categories will be added to and modified in the next chapter, to accommodate the 
pluralistic political environment which emerged after the abdication of Reza Shah.
It is unlikely that any of the major participants, avowed Marxists excepted, felt that they 
were following a particular ideology, although concepts such as 'nationalism’ and 
'modernisation’ would have been familiar to them, especially those familiar with the West. 
As such, some of the policy initiatives, labelled here as tools, or symbols of ideological 
expression, do more often than not, express different ideological proclivities 
simultaneously. As argued, political myth is both the summation of one ideological 
construction while at the same time opening up the possibility of interpretation. For 
example the European hat was at once defined as 'modem’ as well as, ironically, a 
nationalist icon dating to the Sassanians.84 Indeed the ambiguity which existed between 
the parameters and the tension this caused facilitated political myth.
It should also be noted, that much like his son, Reza Shah was not himself effective in the 
dissemination of his views and plans. Alfa effectively concedes this when he writes, "The 
Shah received no help from the non-politically minded masses of the people, in whose 
interest his reforms were directed, but although the secret which he kept about the 
projected reforms, which were all to the advantage of the working classes, did not allow
83 Ibid pg 140.
84 D Wilbur op. cit. pg 166
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them to realise the extent of the Shah's solicitude for them, little by little people 
understood that he was working for them, especially in the country....a// this even though 
not advertised in advance by State propaganda [italics added], created a feeling of 
confidence in the public at large."85
For the purposes of this period five ideological parameters have been identified, of which 
three can be regarded as major and two as relatively minor. The most pervasive ideology 
is that of nationalism.
a) Nationalism;
b) Modernisation;
c) Dynastic Nationalism;
d) Militarism;
e) Traditionalism/Patrimonialism.
a) Nationalism:
Reza Shah and his government were intensely nationalistic.86 A product of then age, they 
nevertheless occasionally took nationalistic concepts to an extreme and found it
85 H Alfa Under Five Shahs London, J Murray, 1964, pg 283.
86 As Haas wrote in 1945, "Far from talking of a 'deified nation as Mussolini did, 
he did assign to the nation a place in the scale of values that came very near to such a 
conception." R Haas Iran New York, Columbia University Press, 1945 pg 169.
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contradicting another major ideological cornerstone, that of modernisation.87 Arguably the 
'nationalism’ espoused by Reza Shah and the intelligentsia was a consequence of 
'modernism’ as they understood it, however the tendency of nationalists to seek refuge 
in tradition (itself often recently 're-discovered’) and to evoke sentiments of self- 
sufficiency often brought nationalism into conflict with the needs of rapid modernisation88. 
The aim of the government in espousing nationalism was twofold. In the first place 
nationalist ideology was a tool of unification; while at the same time distinguishing the 
'Iranian nation’, from the 'outsiders1.
It may be added to this, that nationalism would prepare the country for modernisation. 
The creation of a homogenous nation, was to be achieved through policies which 
symbolised unity, and policies of standardisation, while fragmentation would be achieved 
by pursuing policies which accentuated the differences between Ir anians and outsiders, as 
well as policies which encouraged the creation of social problems. It should be stressed 
that the ambition was not to simply unify the country in practical terms, but to create an 
emotional bond. Reza Shah was very clear that he intended to change attitudes among 
Iranians, and to instill a sense of patriotism.86
87 A commentary in The Times dated 29/7/30, argued, "When the choice has to 
be made between the two ideals of national self-sufficiency and modernisation, the former 
is preferred, with the unfortunate result in Persia of the backwardness in public works."
88 It can be argued that in this period, with the Fascist dictatorships of Europe as 
the model, the nationalist need for self-sufficiency was not necessarily in conflict with 
ideas of modernisation, however it was likely to cause a conflict o f interest when the 
desire for rapid development necessitated a measure of technology transfer.
89 See Reza Shah's speech to the 9th Majlis, quoted in Wilbur op. cit pp 149-150
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b) Modernisation:
Closely related, though as noted above, sometimes in conflict with the predominant 
ideology of nationalism, was the ideology of modernisation.90 Reza Shah and his 
government had a particular conception and vision of modernity which they sought to 
implant upon Iranian society. Many of the policies which served nationalism also served 
the ideology of modernisation, and vice versa. In many ways, nationahsm was itself 
viewed as an aspect of 'modernity'. Modernisation provided the government with 
legitimacy, a degree of unity, and the converse, fragmentation, by distinguishing between 
those who were 'progressive’ and those who were 'reactionary’ or 'backward’. 
Modernity, as understood by the intelligentsia, was by extension progressive, and a 
government which pursued progressive policies was legitimate91; rational bureaucracy 
provided unity and cohesion, while those who disagreed with this particular conception 
of modernity were differentiated as backward and regressive.
c) Dynastic Nationalism:
Central to this thesis is the parameter of dynastic nationahsm. As the label suggests it 
involved the linking of the dynasty to nationalism in the hope that it would be perceived
90 FO 371 21895 E4770 dated 30/7/38 notes photos of a tour of an aircraft factoiy 
carefiilly excluded British technicians.
91 FO 371 12286 E4109 dated 10/9/27: Tims Teyraourtache's Iran-e No Party was 
committed to, "...the progress of Persia through the power of Reza Shall to civilisation 
and modernity." There is sufficient evidence to suggest that however unpopular Reza Shah 
may have become, people admired and respected what he had achieved, see FO 371 
15341 E5391 dated 29/10/31.
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as inseparable by the public. This was an ideological construct which intended to combine 
the other parameters within the person of the Shah, and in so doing, to institutionalise the 
dynasty aud make it the focus rather than for instance, pure nationahsm or modernisation. 
As argued, this process of personalisation made it amenable to the construction and 
development of political myth.
With the aforementioned ideologies, the dynasty and the person of Reza Shah were 
justified in the assistance they lent to the goal of creating a nation-state, or modernisation. 
But the dynastic nationalism espoused by the Shah and his most ardent admirers, elevated 
the role of the dynasty and shifted the focus. This process was noticed by Haas, who 
significantly says of Reza Shah, “Apparently it was his policy to divert the energies 
invested in religion to the nation and the dynasty. He was, of course, too wise and 
rationalistic to claim for himself any quasi-divine position, but it was his constant 
endeavour to make the people consider him and his dynasty as the great symbols of the 
nation and to implant veneration and love of the dynasty in the hearts o f the people”92
d) Militarism
Any analysis of the ideas which shaped and guided and the reign of Reza Shah would be 
deficient without the inclusion of the following categories. Both militarism and 
'traditionalism' were important in the main because of the Shah's personal encouragement 
of these trends, which he regarded as essential to the retention of power.
92 Haas ban pg 169.
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Oftlie two 'militarism' was the more obvious. The Shah never tiled of telling people that 
he was a soldier first aud foremost and he recognised that his power rested with the 
growing army. For Reza Shah, the army, and military life in general represented all that 
was good about Iran describing it as, "the soul of the nation"92. It was the lack of a good 
army, it was argued, which had resulted in decline during the Qajar period. The army was 
to be the ultimate tool in re-shaping both the Iranian mentality and wielding the country 
into a unified whole, principally through conscription, though the army was also intended 
to educate the public through various programmes.94 The discipline of a modem military 
would seive as an example which the modem nation would emulate, thus providing an 
educational, moral as well as practical tool for the dissemination of patriotism. The 
importance of the armed forces for nation building was of course common in this period 
in Ataturkist Turkey as well as much of Europe.
e) Traditionalism:
The practice of'traditionalism' was intended to legitimise the Pahlavi dynasty in the eyes 
of the old aristocracy and the Shi'a hierarchy. It was aimed at reassuring these important 
sections of society that there would be more continuity than change. On the whole, as 
Reza Khan he was more able and willing to utilise traditionalism than he was after 
becoming Shah when he found little need to consistently cultivate the support of these 
sections of society. However, it is argued that ultimately Reza Shah did follow a well-
93 D Wilbur Reza Shah... pg 95
94 M R Ghods Government and Society in Iran. 1926-34 Middle Eastern Studies, 
27, 2, 1991, pg 223.
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established pattern of patrimonialism, because although he expressed contempt for the 
feudal landowners, he himself joined their ranks as the largest landowner in Iran.95 The 
contradictions between traditionalism and modernisation was one essential tension which 
encouraged the reification of a complex of ideas here defined as dynastic nationahsm, 
within liis person. It is in this process that political myth - the personalisation of ideology - 
becomes explicit.
The Rise & Rule of Reza Shah
Although all five ideological parameters were in evidence tluoughout the rise and rule of 
Reza Shah it is argued that the importance of the parameters fluctuated. Both 
modernisation and nationalism were centra! to the ideological foundations of the Pahlavi 
state and continued to be explicitly promoted in government literature, speeches and the 
media. Although it is at times difficult to distinguish between these two pivotal 
parameters, (indeed ideas of modernisation were rarely expounded by Reza Shah himself 
who preferred to derive his rhetoric in the language of nationalism) it can be argued that 
as the reign progressed the emphasis shifted from modernisation to nationahsm. The 
centrality of these parameters should not however detract from both militarism and 
traditionalism which both continued to play an implicit role in the ideological complex. 
Militarism, though never explicitly promoted was central to Reza Shah’s world-view, 
while traditionalism was exploited when politically expedient or convenient for the 
ideological and practical establishment of the Pahlavi monarchy. Dynastic nationahsm, and
95 M R Ghods op. cit. pg 219, argues that, "Traditionalism and patrimonialism, and 
not any ideological blueprint, guided his rule."
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the cult o f the individual gained increasing ground as the reign progressed, ultimately 
subsuming the other ideological parameters, though it must be stressed that eulogies to 
the 'saviour’ were present during Reza Khan’s rise to power and assumption of the 
crown.
The Construction of Power 1921-1926: iVlodernisation & Nationalism
The rise of Reza Khan from an officer in the Cossack regiment to dynastic founder is a 
matter of continuing controversy, and as a result would continue to provide fodder for 
political myth construction throughout the Pahlavi era and beyond. The nature of the coup 
and his consolidation of power, along with the fact that Reza Khan was already identified 
by some with the persona of national saviour, encouraged the development of political 
myth which at the same time allowed his rise to be interpreted in widely differing ways. 
The Pahlavi dynasty in effect began with an essential tension of problematic legitimacy.
British involvement in the coup which brought Reza Khan to political prominence and 
installed the government of Seyyid Zia Tabatabie in 1921 can no longer be dismissed. 
However the degree of direct involvement from Whitehall as opposed to the energetic 
responses of local British military and diplomatic officials, was probably not as great as 
opponents of the Pahlavi regime have argued9f\ Belief in British involvement in the 
establishment of the Pahlavi state was to haunt Reza Shah and his son as much if not more
96 See Zirinsky op. cit. pg 639 “...Britain did less than is believed by those who 
accept the myth, but more than London thought at the time...” On the other hand a British 
embassy report from 1932 concedes that the British put Reza Shah 'on the throne’. FO 
371 16077 E2844 dated 8lh June 1932.
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than the 1953 coup was to cause problems of credibility for Mohammad Reza Shah. 
Indeed the popular view that the British were involved in the 1921 coup was noted as 
early as March 1921 by the American embassy and relayed to the Iran desk at the Foreign 
Office97, and Reza Khan was sufficiently concerned to issue a proclamation emphasising 
his authorship of the coup98.
In the immediate aftermath of the coup, Reza Khan sought to consolidate his power base 
with the traditional political elite whom Tabatabie had targeted in his proclamation as the 
causes of Iran’s recent political and economic woes99. The result was a second 'coup’ 
which witnessed the removal of Tabatabie and his replacement by Qavam as prime 
minister. Reza Khan, who had been appointed Minister of War by a grateftd Tabatabie 
was now dispatched by Qavam to restore order and central government authority 
throughout the country, a task which Reza Khan pursued with singular determination 
earning the admiration of the British Minister Lora in e who was impressed by the apparent 
transformation of the Iranian military1'1". This vigorous pursuit of central government 
authority, which resulted in Britain effectively abandoning its protege, the Sheikh of 
Mohammerah, also allowed the new Minister of War to consolidate his personal standing 
within the new army.
Indeed, the first few years of Reza Khan’s rise to power, although frequently interpreted
97 Zirinsky op. cit. pg 646
98 Wilbur op. cit. pp 62-63
99 FO 371 6403 E4906 dated April 1921.
100 FO 371 9024 E4612 dated 7,h May 1923
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and justified as a powerful exhibition of the new nationalist mood, and eagerness to 
impose a 'modem’ government structure upon the country through centralisation, carries 
hallmarks of the traditional patrimonial consolidation of power so evident in the rise to 
power of many of Iran’s previous kings and dynastic founders, including Shah Ismail, 
Shah Abbas the Great, Nader Shah and Agha Mohammad Khan Qajar, all of whom had 
to effectively 'construct’ an army, with which to 're-conquer’ Iran101. As such, the 
restoration of central authority, although legitimised by the intelligentsia as an essential 
precursor to the implementation of reforms which would restore national dignity, can 
easily be interpreted as the traditional consolidation of power by a warlord with dynastic 
ambitions, with the new army substituted for the traditional tribally based armies of the 
past. Certainly, the belief that the Pahlavi army was little more than an manufactiued tribe 
surfaced many times in opposition rhetoric, not least during the Revolution of 1978-79. 
At the same time being the military arm of a coup engineered by the liberal intelligentsia, 
Reza Khan’s rise to prominence broadly echoed the coup d’etat of the 18lh of Brumaire, 
allowing pro-Western modernists to draw their own parallel and impose their own 
interpretation on events.
During this period Reza Khan’s speeches appealed to both nationalist and traditionalist 
sentiment, but paid little direct attention to the language of modernisation. Thus in the 
aftermath of the fir st coup in 1921 Reza Khan addressed Iranians with terms such as 
'fellow countrymen’, and ending with 'Long live the Persian nation.’102 Again, prior to one
101 Given that Nader Shah was one of Reza Khan’s heroes this parallel cannot have 
escaped his attention.
102 FO 371 6403 E4906 dated April 1921
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military operation in 1923, the Iranian historian Makki has Reza Khan urging his men on 
with words that echo those of the young General Bonaparte, “Gentlemen! Our homeland 
stands in urgent need of its brave sons; it is up to you to show lofty resolve in the service 
of your country, and to make efforts to secure the independence of your country. Have 
positive confidence that through unity and the principle of centralisation of the forces, you 
will harvest the fruits of magnanimity. Be alert and diligent; the dust of Ardashir is 
watching over you.”103 The language of modernisation was chiefly the preserve of the 
intelligentsia, including Seyyid Zia, and Davar, the future Minister of Justice whose 
'Renewal’ Party issued a programme in 1923 urging the reorganisation of government on 
rational lines and the creation of a welfare state.1"4
In the meantime, the foundations of dynastic nationalism were being laid by literati 
impressed by the Minister of War’s practical achievements. Thus the poet Arif wrote, 
"The winds of the Sardar Sepah [Reza Khan] will revive this country from the verge of 
destruction...".105 It should also be remembered that Western commentators were also 
keen to rationalise and hence legitimise Reza Khan's rise and rule in this manner. Tlius 
Loraine, who admired the practically minded and forthright Reza Khan argued that the 
recent upsurge in military spirit was entirely due to Reza Khan’s leadership106 and that any
103 Makki Tarikh-I bist Saleh-ye Iran (A twenty year history of Iran, Tehran 1944- 
46, pg 354. The public reaction to Reza Khan’s 'imperious’ edicts and declarations was 
not always sympathetic - see Katouzian Nationalist Trends in Iran 1921-26 IJMES 10 
1979, pg 539.
104 FO 371 9024 E6348 dated 14 May 1923
105 Quoted in M R Ghods Iranian Nationalism and Reza Shah Middle Eastern 
Studies, 27, 1, 1991, pg 42.
106 FO 371 9024 E4612 dated 7,h May 1923
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hope for the salvation of the country lay in his hands107.
Consolidating his power base in the army, Reza Khan moved to secure the premiership 
at the end of 1923, relying on fervent nationalising legitimise his political ascent.108 In 
a speech on November 12th 1923, which highlighted the emphasis o f nationalism over 
modernisation, Reza Khan argued that Iranian nationality had to be reconstructed not only 
through the elimination of internal dissent, which had been achieved, but through a change 
in attitudes, especially towards foreigners. “Tt is iucumbent upon every Iranian to maintain 
the glory of Iranian history by learning to rely upon himself and upon the powerfiil force
of the nation Compatriots! It is a thousand times better to staive in poverty and
destitution rather than to prostrate yourselves in humiliation before foreigners.”109 At the 
same time, the importance of the army was emphasised as witnessed in a discussion with 
the American traveller Powell, ‘In  the course of a long and veiy candid conversation with 
Reza Khan I asked him what, in his opinion, was the most pressing need of Persia. 'A  
foreign loan’, he answered promptly. 'And what would you do with it?’ I asked him. 
'Treble the size of the army.’”110 On the 4th anniversary of the coup, Reza Khan described 
the army as the 'soul o f the nation,’111 in effect arguing that the aimy was the essence of 
Iran.
107 FO 371 9024 E6353/E6928 dated 4th July 1923
108 FO 371 [..] E l 1729/77/34 dated 30,h October 1923
109 Quoted in Wilbur op. cit pp 73-74.
110 Powell By Camel and Car to the Peacock Throne 1923 pg 298.
111 Quoted in Wilbur op. cit pg 95
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One of the most serious reforms which Reza Khan sought to implement was that of 
universal conscription, which, as well as increasing the size and importance of the aimy, 
would have had a major impact on the social and economic life of the country. Indeed the 
imposition of conscription was one of the most visible and profound acts of 
'modernisation’ and as such at this stage he shifted once again to ally himself with the 
proponents of modernisation. The social and economic impact of such a move was cause 
for concern, and the ulema in particular were wary of the 'secularising’ effects which two 
years military service might have on the country’s youth. Having failed to get his way in 
the 4th Majlis, Reza Khan engineered elections for a more pliable 501 Majlis. This convened 
on 11th February 1924112 and succeeded in ratifying a dramatic legislative programme 
which included compulsory 2 year military service, a cut in the court budget, the abolition 
of decorative court titles which had become the hallmark of the Qajar court (ie al- 
mamalek, al-Saltaneh), made it a statutory obligation for all citizens to obtain birth 
certificates and register family names, levied taxes on tea, sugar and income for the 
proposed trans-Iranian railway, standardised weights and measures, and reformed the 
country’s calendar, replacing the lunar Hejri year with the old Iranian solar calender (still 
dated ftomthe flight to Medina) and adopting Persianised months in place of the Muslim
113ones/
Reza Khan himself adopted the old Iranian name 'Pahlavi’ as his surname, the name given 
to Middle Persian, the language of Sassanian Iran, though there is evidence he was
112 FO 371 [..] E2431/455/34 dated February 16th 1924.
113 Abrahamian Iran Between... pg 132,
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unaware of the origins of the name.114 A publication carrying the date to July-August 1924 
(Dhu al Hijja 1342) entitled Shahanshah Pahlavi (itself an indication of the presence of 
dynastic nationalism prior to the deposition of the Qajar dynasty) argues that the name 
means 'civilised5, 'free5 and was accorded to the best of people during the Sassanian 
period. Indeed it argues that it was the family name of the Sassanian 'tribe5 (ta 'efeh) and 
this remarkable lineage represented the purest of Iranians - a formidable claim which 
would seek to provide Reza Khan with a royal pedigree without comparison115. The 
adoption of the name 'Pahlavi5 is the earliest and clearest indication of Reza Khan seeking 
through political myth to alter his historical record in line with his image and aspirations. 
As argued the personalisation of ideology itself results in more political myth.
Reza Khan and his reformist allies in the 5th Majlis made one further foray into 
modernising discourse, and this was the promotion of republicanism which had been 
gaining ground among certain members of the intelligentsia and had even divided loyalties 
within the army.116 There is little doubt that Reza Khan was influenced by developments 
in Turkey, and although the British legation notes that he had dismissed notions of a
114 Wilbrn op. cit. notes pg 229, that Reza Shah asked Ernst Herzfield what the 
name actually meant. Recent commentators have suggested that the 'Pahlavis5 were one 
of the seven great aristocratic clans of the Achaemenian period.
115 It is possible that the date 1342, alludes to the solar calendar dating it to May 
1963, yet the history recorded certainly does not carry on further than 1925 (suggesting 
perhaps that the actual publication date post-dated the authors dated introduction). The 
fact that it uses Islamic months would seem to indicate that it predates the reform of the 
calendar. Furthermore, there are none of the characteristic references to his son that 
would have appeared on official publications of this date.
116 For a comprehensive discussion see Vanessa Martin Mudanis. Republicanism 
and the rise to power of Riza Khan. Sardar Sip ah Brismes Journal, Vol 21,2, 1994, pp 
199-210, 1995.
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republic as early as 1923 following a trip to Qom117, there is evidence that he toyed with 
the idea a little while longer, encouraging the media to publish articles in favour of 
republicanism while at the same time attacking the decadent Qajars.118 Such ridicule of the 
Qajars of course served to elevate the person of Reza Khan who was perceived as 
everything the Qajars were not.
Thus the journal Ircmshahr in an editorial entitled 'Republicanism and Social Revolution’, 
suggested a strategy of universalisation when it argued that, “Today almost all of Europe, 
Including Russia, has adopted the republican system of government. There is no doubt in 
our minds that in the modem age the republican form of government is the best system 
of government...”119 Poets and writers were also reported to have been paid to ridicule the 
Qajar Ahmad Shah and write favourably about the republican movement. Thus the poet 
Arif wrote a poem entitled 'The Republican March5 which included the following lines: 
“From the Angel Gabriel, afar’, hear the soul stirring soul of Pahlavi, Arif, may Sardar 
Sepah [ie Reza Khan] live long in Iran, for he will lead the country facing extinction to its 
smvival.5,120 The Majlis even began to draw up a bill for the abolition o f the monarchy and
117 FO 371 10145 E3748 proclamation dated 29,h April 1923
118 FO 371 [..] E3512/255/34 Intelligence summary dated 1st March 1924. Money 
was also allocated to sympathetic members of the clergy. See also FO 371 [..] 
E3944/255/34, See also FO 371 [..] E3743/455/34 a useful diary o f events on the 
republican movement, dated 1st April 1924 which notes that, “The abuse of the Kajars was 
accompanied by the by the most flattering remarks and praise of the Serdar Sepah, whom 
the papers proposed to elect President of the future republic.55
119 H Kazemzadeh Republicanism and the Social Revolution in Iranshahr 2 
(February 1924) pp 257-258. Quoted in Abrahamian Iran between., pg 133.
120 Quoted in Wilbur op. cit. pg 76.
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deputies avidly scrutinised the American Constitution.121
Growing concern over the consequences of a republic witnessed a strong traditionalist 
surge against such a development, and even some members o f the liberal intelligentsia, 
fearfiil o f possible dictatorship, sought refuge in tradition. Thus a move intended to rid the 
country of'royal and clerical despotism’ instead resulted in a consolidation of royal and 
clerical tradition; a consequence Reza Khan could not ignore nor was indeed inclined to. 
On the 4th March 1924 it was noted that the ulema in Qom had declared a republic to be 
contrary to Islam, and indeed would mean the end of Islam.122 Mudanis, a staunch 
opponent o f Reza Khan, was also known to be working against the establishment of a 
republic.123 hi the face of such opposition, Reza Khan, 'bowed’ to establishment pressure, 
and as he had detached himself from Seyyed Zia Tabatabie in 1921, now he moved to 
position himself firmly with the traditionalists.124 Indeed according to one recent 
interpretation o f events Reza Khan actively cultivated ulema support in order to restore 
some of his battered prestige following the apparent unpopularity o f republicanism.123
On April 1st 1924, Reza Khan had decided emphatically against the institution of a
121 See Vanessa Martin op. cit. pg 203, and Wilbur op. cit. pg 77.
122 FO 371 [...] E3944/255/34 Intelligence Summary dated 8th March 1924.
123 FO 371 [...] E3945/255/34 Intelligence summary dated 15th March 1924.
124 The apparent confusion over the popular status of republicanism can be 
witnessed in the pages of the 'Times’ which carried two differing reports dated 19 th March 
1924.
125 Vanessa-Martin op. cit. pg 210. See also FO 371 [..] E3743/455/34 dated 1st 
April 1924 reports Reza Khan’s indecision and uncertainty over the popular response to 
republicanism.
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republic, issuing a declaration which made clear his alliance with the traditionalists, 
“...from the very first both I and, indeed, the whole army have considered the care and the 
preservation of the gloiy of Islam as one of the greatest of our duties and objectives, and 
have always striven that Islam might advance daily in the path of progress and exaltation, 
and that the honour owed to sanctity might be completely obseived and respected, 
therefore at the time when I went to Rum [sic] to bid farewell to the ulema, I took the 
opportunity of exchanging views with them, and finally we decided that it was expedient 
to proclaim to the whole people that the question of the republic be dropped...”126 The fact 
that he publicly acknowledged his discussion with the ulema and that the decision was 
made after consultation undoubtedly str engthened his position with the traditionalists and 
the ulema in particular. Here, apparently, was man who would compromise with the 
traditional sources of authority and whose reformist zeal was tempered by respect for 
tradition.
Arguably, political weakness forced such a compromise with tradition and the 
traditionalist fear of an Ataturkist dictatorship was to a considerable extent assuaged by 
the alternative trajectory of a dynastic change rather than an abolition of the monarchy.127 
This was by no means a smooth process and although the Majlis began discussions for the 
deposition of the Qajars in 1924, the actual deposition was not ratified by the Majlis until 
31st October 1925, when the government was temporarily entrusted to Reza Khan Pahlavi
126 FO 371 [..] E3748/455/34 inclosure, prime minister’s proclamation from 
'Sitareh Irarf dated April 1st 1924.
127 FO 371/Persia 1926/34-11500 Annual report for 1925.
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“pending the establishment of a final form of government.”128 Within a month it was 
becoming apparent that Reza Khan would soon become Reza Shah though it was still not 
clear whether he would be a transitional monarch 'for life5 or actually found a new 
dynasty.129 This last debate was itself resolved in the next month, when the Majlis invested 
dynastic sovereignty in Reza Shah Pahlavi.
Reza Shah became king on the twin pillars of tra dition and nationalism while at the same 
time purporting to be a force for modernisation. His first edicts acknowledged his debt to 
the forces o f tradition by stressing the importance of Islam. He also adopted largely 
symbolic policies which emphasised the traditional patriarchal role o f the monarch. He 
reduced the price of bread, urged women to be 'moral’ in then eveiyday conduct and, in 
an act echoing the behaviour of the most just’ of Iran’s past rulers, he instituted a series 
of complaints boxes’ thr ough which the ordinary man could make direct appeals to the 
Shah.130 Nationalism was seived by the fact that the deposed dynasty was 'Turkish’ as 
against the 'Persian’ character of the Pahlavis, as noted by The Times, ‘TJnder the Qajars, 
who were Turks, the mothers of princes in the line of succession had to members of the 
Royal tribe, consequently no son of a Persian mother could sit on the thr one of Persia. In 
future this will be reversed.”131
128 The Times dated 3S1 October 1925. Although there was apparently little 
general interest in the deposition of the Qajars, there were reports that members of the 
clergy and merchants had “expressed amazement at the audacity of Reza Khan in aspiring 
to kingship.” See FO 371 [..] E7529/18/34 dated 19th November 1925.
129 FO 371 10840 E7540 dated 21st November 1925.
130 FO 371 10840 E7219/E7532 dated 23t<lNovember 1925 & 81h December 1925.
131 The Times dated 13th December 1925. This was also commented upon by the 
British Embassy, see FO 371 10840 E7677.
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Tlie coronation ceremony, although replete with nationalist imagery, paid more heed to 
tradition than may have been expected from a modernising monarch, although as Loraine 
noted, difficulties arose when officials failed to discover the correct procedure from 
previous coronations, and that the only real guideline was that the crown had to be placed 
on the head of the Shah by the eldest member of the Imperial family; a possibility made 
less likely for a “dynasty of humble origin and recent creation.”132 In the event, the 
coronation ceremony was modelled upon the non-religious portions of the British 
coronation ceremony, while the act of crowning would be performed by the Shah himself 
The mullahs were present at the ceremony, and there was no music in deference to 
religious sensibilities.
As the Shah sat on the throne, the Imam-Jomeh of Tehran proceeded with a speech 
sprinkled with verses from the Qoran, following which, the Minister of Court, 
Teymouitache, proceeded towards the throne with the 'Pahlavi crown’ which according 
to Loraine combined, “the forms and motifs of European regalia with those of the tiaras 
of the Achaemeuid and Sassanian dynasties. Hie crown was delivered to the Shah by both 
the minister of court and the “aged mullah of Khoi”, another symbolic gesture to the 
ulema, and was promptly placed by the Shah upon his head, thus associating himself not 
only with modernisation, but with Iran’s ancient dynasties. Additional regalia, included 
the sword of Nader Shah and a royal sceptre, which the Shah wore, while other artefacts 
of royalty not worn by the Shah included the swords of Shah Abbas the Great and Shall 
Ismail, Nader Shah’s bow and Shah Ismail’s armour.
132 FO 371 [...] T 6376/191/379 dated May 1st 1926.
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Hie twin pillars of tradition and nationalism were evident in the Shah’s coronation speech 
in which he stressed that, “..the object to which my special attention has been and will be 
directed is the safeguarding of religion and the strengthening of its basis, because I deem 
this as a measure which is beneficial for national unity and to the social morals of 
Persia...”133 This was followed by a speech fiom the prime minister which quoted verses 
from Ferdowsi, after which the Shah left the palace in a glass coach flanked by outriders - 
one aspect of the ceremony which was definitely borrowed fiom Britain, although the 
presence of detachments of tribal levies in national costumes provided a more ’authentic’ 
national and traditional flavour.
The Consolidation of Power: Nationalism and Modernisation
Until 1932, Reza Shah was assisted and very possibly guided by his Minister of Court, 
Teymomtash, who broadly shared the monar ch’s vision of a national renaissance taking 
Iran into the modem world. Arguably many of the policies adopted dining this period 
were instigated and prepared by the Minister of Court, a probability not lost on the British 
legation who noted that, “Taimourtache [sic] is of course the prime mover in the present 
Nationalist policy of the Persian government..”134 For the period up to Teymomtash’s 
arrest, three policies will be detailed in order to highlight the development of the
133 FO 371 [...] T 6376/191/379 inclosure document 87, dated MayT 1926 - 
translation of Shah’s speech fiom throne.
134FO 371 [...] E2316/526/34 dated 5thMay 1927. See also M Rezun Reza Shah’s 
Court Minister: Teymouitash I.TMES 12 1980 pp 119-137.
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ideological parameters and tlieir relationships to one another as well as the growing 
primacy of nationalism within the ideological arena. All the parameters discussed above, 
save traditionalism, were to a greater or lesser extent promoted by the Pahlavi state in 
policies which dealt with conscription, the repeal of the capitulations and the reform of 
the judiciary, and the dress code.
The mood could be conveniently summarised by the programme of Teymourtash’s Iran-i 
No Party (New Iran) which called for, “The independence of Persia under the banner of 
Pahlavi; the progress o f Persia through the power of Reza Shah to civilisation and 
modernity; resistence to foreign influence; opposition to all reactionary and subversive 
ideas...”135 The centrality of the person of the Shah is evident, hi addition, the fact that 
mullahs were not permitted to join the new paity confirmed the shift away from the 
traditionalists.136 Indeed proponents of traditionalism were to find themselves largely in 
opposition to government policy and there is little evidence that the government sought 
to accommodate the views of traditionalists.
Among the most serious structural changes to be addressed was the continuing existence 
of 'capitulatory rights’ which had been offered to foreign governments throughout the 
previous century and which provided for extra-judicial privileges for foreign citizens. 
Nationalist opinion viewed them as an affront to national dignity and sovereignty, and 
wanted their abolition. For this to be achieved, Iran needed a domestic judicial system
135 FO 371 12286 E4109 Intelligence Summary, dated 10,h September 1927.
136 FO 371 12293 E3909 dated 13th September 1927. Clive described the party as 
'Fascist5.
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comparable to those operating in the West, and this in turn entailed removing judicial 
authority from the ulema. The decision to abolish the capitulations’ was announced at the 
opening of the new Courts of Justice on 26th April 1927137 and the British diplomat Clive, 
with a view to the position of the Anglo-Persian Company, expressed concern over the 
possibility of implementing a new judicial system complete with laws and a trained legal 
profession within a year.138 The rapidity with which the Minister of Justice, Davar, was 
expected to implement the overhaul reflected a nationalist determination which superseded 
considerations of practicality and also revealed how concepts of modernisation took 
second place to the nationalist agenda. Although the dis-enfranchisement o f the ulema was 
undoubtedly seen as a worthwhile consequence there is no evidence to suggest that it was 
the prime mover behind the decision.
The dominance of nationalism could also be witnessed in the implementation of a number 
of minor reforms in which Iranians were increasingly separated and distinguished from 
foreigners ranging initially from the justifiable - Ir anians were no longer permitted to be 
hired as agents for foreign legations139 - to (one year later) the increasingly sensitive, 
which required that the flags of foreign legations only be flown on special days, and that 
the term 'oriental’ be dropped since it suggested inferiority.140 It may be argued that in 
constructing then own political myths such as a new national flag and more positive
137 The decision to reform the judiciary had been revealed earlier, see FO 371 
12293 E1225, dated 14th March 1927.
138 FO 371 [..] E2316/526/34 dated 5th May 1927.
139 FO 371 12286 E4109 Intelligence Summary, dated 10th September 1927
140 FO 371 13071 E4672 dated 24* September 1928.
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terminology, the Iranians were determined to curtail and limit the myths o f others.
The traditionalists, represented in the main by the ulema but also containing members of 
the traditional middle classes (bazaaris), were not prepared to accept the changes without 
a measure of resistence. The ulema began to agitate against the changes in the dr ess code 
which promoted the wearing of the Pahlavi hat and short jacket, especially among 
government employees, as well as the reforms in the judiciary which resulted in an eight 
day strike in Isfahan.141 Although the government had not made it compulsory there was 
evidence that the police and army were encouraging members of the public to make the 
change.142 The other cause for discontent was the implementation of conscription which 
again foimd widespread opposition among the traditional middle class who were 
concerned for the social and economic consequences of losing an adult male for two years 
to a state organisation. The main disturbances occurred in Isfahan and Shiraz where the 
bazaar closed down prompting the Shah to comment that, “the foreigners were still at 
work and had now succeeded in making trouble down there.” The opposition was so 
strong that the Shah was persuaded to compromise with the ulema - although the choice 
of Teymourtash as negotiator was undoubtedly misplaced given ulema misgivings - 
arguing that the law would not be applied rigorously for many years, and that importantly 
there would be an option to buy oneself out of military service.143
This compromise however represented only a temporary respite for the traditionalists as
141 FO 371 12286 E4109 Intelligence Summary, dated 10,h September 1927
142 FO 371 [..] E353/95/34 dated 31st December 1928.
143 FO 371 [..] E4979/520/34 dated 5th November 1927.
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the emphasis shifted towards revisions in the chess code. The imposition o f the new chess 
code, although incremental, was probably the most explicitly ideologically driven policy 
implemented by Reza Shah. Its aim was to change attitudes thr ough imitating the fashion 
of the West - by dressing like the Europeans, it was hoped Iranians would begin to think 
like them. Although it failed to draw on subjects familiar to most Iranians, chawing its 
inspiration fiom an alien culture, it was arguably an attempt at mass identification with the 
principle of modernisation (as dictated by the West). It was the attempted personalisation 
o f an ideology on an unprecedented scale and one that presaged the era of mass 
communications.
There was however a limit to the Shah’s tolerance, and when the Queen was allegedly 
insulted by a mullah in Qum for apparently 'revealing’ too much whilst visiting a shrine, 
Reza Shah reacted ferociously, reportedly entering the shrine with his boots on and 
beating the chief of police as well as the mullah in question. 144 Later in the year, following 
a visit by the King and Queen of Afghanistan, when the latter had appeared unveiled, Reza 
Shah used the opportunity to relax the strict dress code for women. Meanwhile the 
European style of dress was continually being encouraged and when a deputation of 
merchants all suitably attired in Pahlavi cap and frock coats went to see him, Reza Shah 
was, “enormously pleased and made them a little speech about uniformity in dress and 
manners, which, he said, [would] lead to uniformity in life and politics, and would finally 
wield Persia into a unified whole. ” 145
144 FO 371 13064 E2128 dated 23rd April 1928.
145 FO 371 13071 E4672 dated 24th September 1928
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Thus the dress code reflected not only nationalism and modernism, but in its uniformity, 
an aspect of militarism. Some Iranians indeed suggested that the Pahlavi cap appealed to 
the soldier in Reza Shah. As Clive noted when the dress code finally passed into 
legislation, the Pahlavi cap and frock coat had the unfortunate quality of making “the 
wearer look like a railway porter,...Many believe that the Pahlavi cap is but a stage on the 
road to the adoption of the European hat and many would wish that it were so, but others 
believe that the somewhat vague military conception of the head-wear delights the heart 
of the Shah, and that it is likely to remain at least during his lifetime as the universal head­
gear o f his subjects. ” 146
The law that was introduced to the Majlis at the end of 1928 instituted a series of fines 
and terms of imprisonment for those who failed to comply and although the ulema and the 
priests of other faiths were exempted there is evidence that the police and army were not 
especially discerning when it came to enforcement. The law was further added to when 
in 1930 the government ordered all school childr en to wear clothing made fiom Ir anian 
cloth, extending the regulation a month later to all government employees. 147
The combination of unpopular conscription and dress laws, along with a rigorous policy 
of enforcement made the Shah increasingly unpopular especially with the traditional 
middle classes and aristocracy for whom the Shah made no pretence of tolerance. His visit 
to Shiraz at the end of 1929 is a good example of the pattern of developments when
146 FO 371 13781 E353 dated 31st December 1928.
147 FO 371 14538 E1804 dated 7h April 1930, and FO 371 13542 E2447 dated 
14th May 1930.
attempts to whip up some genuine enthusiasm for the visit and promote the myth of the 
saviour through the press, fell on largely deaf ears. The crowds that did turn up were 
organised by the local governor general, Abul Hasan Khan Pimia who according to the 
local British consular official, cchad worked like a trojan in the past month to stir up 
enthusiasm for the visit,” and in the event such was the security that few managed a 
glimpse o f the Shah as he sped away in his car. This simply encouraged Shirazis in the 
view that the Shah was afraid. When presented with a delegation of notables, mullahs and 
merchants, the Shah ignored them or was perceived as rude, with the impression being 
that he preferred the company of the foreign legation representatives. 148
The disparity between the ideological determination of the government and the growing 
resentment and resistence of Iranian society was most obvious in the ambitious 
government programme of town planning which sought to replace traditional urban 
structures with 'modem4 housing and boulevards on a perceived European model. As with 
the dress code, though familiarly 'modem’ to those acquainted with the West, this 
materialisation of a concept of Western modernisation was essentially alien to the 
traditional political culture of Ban. The results at times impressed foreign observers, who 
remarked on the progress that had been made on road construction and upkeep, though 
others considered the developments to be superficial.
Forbes, writing in 1931, described Tehran as “slightly Hollywoodesque, for the new
148 FO 371 13781 E95 dated 7th December 1929 notes that in Tabriz the police and 
army regularly tear “off the hats of aged sheikhs, trampling on them and otherwise 
destroying them.”On the visit to Shiraz the Shah is quoted as having accused the 
presented notables of being muft-khur (parasites).
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streets looked as if they liad not quite settled where they were going, and the rows of new 
houses, one room deep, were all frontage. ” 149 Favourable impressions aside, even the 
British embassy had to concede that, ‘"houses that might impede the municipal schemes 
[were] being ruthlessly swept away with little or no compensation to the owners. ” 150 
Under such circumstances it is not surprising that resistence to change moimted and in 
some cases new towns were simply left uninhabited, as one visit to a new town in Sistan 
revealed:
"This 'town' which had been constructed within the year by Sarhang Murteza Khan in 
anticipation of His Majesty's visit, is commonly known as 'the town of walls'. It is 
distinguished by the fact that it has no inhabitants, although giving the illusion of fine 
streets and sumptuous houses. There are some eight wide, straight avenues, brilliantly 
illuminated at night by electricity, bounded on either side by high wliite-washed walls and 
with quite magnificent porches at regular’ intervals, apparently the entrances of the houses 
o f the wealthy. To those 'in the know' that is 'the sum and total' o f the town, with the 
exception of the house, situated in a garden which the Shall occupied. Behind the walls 
and within the fine entrances are plots of waste land, on which there are not and never 
likely be, any buildings. The inhabitants continue to five in the ancient part of the town 
which His Majesty did not see. Sarhang Murteza informed me that His Majesty was well 
pleased with the 'new' town. He also complimented Hisam ud Dawla on his garish, 
modem dwelling and told Shaukat ul Mulk to learn fiom his nephew and bring his fine old
149 Forbes Conflict: Angora to Afghanistan 1931 pg 105
150 FO 371 13071 E5964 dated 17Ul December 1928.
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Persian house at Biijand 'up to date."1151
The reforms which were implemented in the first ten years on Reza Shah’s rule (1921-31) 
were dramatic in then breadth and had a profound impact on Iranian society. They 
accelerated the pace of socio-economic change and added to the essential tension which 
had characterised Iran in the aftermath of the Constitutional Revolution. Questions remain 
as to how far the central government was able to penetrate the rural areas where the 
majority of the population still resided. That said, the fact that many peasants migrated 
regularly to towns for work or to sell produce meant that they too were affected by the 
changes, even if it was temporary.
By 1930, the triumvirate which had guided Reza Shah’s policy was breaking apart. The 
Shah arrested Prince Firuz, the Minister of Finance for embezzlement, and within two 
years, the dominant personality of Teymourtash was also removed. 152 Teymourtash was 
the first to be murdered, while Firuz survived until 1938, a few months after the energetic 
Davar committed suicide rather than face humiliation at the hands of his monarch. 153 
Without the tiiumvirate to coordinate and check developments, policies were administered 
with even more haste and the cultivation of dynastic nationalism was emphasised with
151 FO 371 15341 E606 dated 21/1/31; see also FO 371 13781 E95 dated 7/12/29, 
street widening in Tabriz; FO 371 16076 E1458 dated 23/3/32, Shiraz; FO 371 16953 
E l 101 dated 27/2/33, new town of Tol-e Khosrow; Filrner The Pageant o f Persia. Indiana, 
Bobs-Menill, 1927, describes the development ofMalayer. See also the 'Times' 8/4/31.
152 FO 371 14542 E1804 dated 7th April 1930 & Rezun Reza Shah’s...
153 According to one book, Davar left a forthright letter for the Shah to read 
criticising the implementation of policies. See B Aqoli Davar va adleveh (Davar and the 
administration of Justice) Tehr an, Elrni Publishers, 1369 / 1990
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increased vigour, 154
Institutionalising the dynasty - the politics of dynastic nationalism
The removal and murder of Teymourtash along with the break up of the triumvirate 
indicated that dynastic nationalism, with Reza Shah and the Pahlavi dynasty as the focus 
of political developments now superseded both nationalism and modernisation as the 
ideology of primacy. Though both continued to be promoted with vigour, threats to the 
security of the dynasty over-rid all other considerations. Teymourtash was simply the most 
visible and powerfid of a series of able reformers and technocrats who were sacrificed 
because he feared then political ambition. 155 Similarly, despite charges o f embezzlement, 
Prince Firuz’s Qajar lineage had led the Shah to believe that there was going to be an 
imminent Qajar uprising.156 hi an atmosphere of growing paranoia it is natural that the two 
ideological constructs of militarism and dynastic nationalism would gain in emphasis. 157
Militarism was evoked in part because it pleased the Shah, but also because it consolidated 
the loyalty of a gratefiil aimy, while dynastic nationalism and the cult of personality that 
it entailed was in pait a result of official obsequiousness in the face of the potential
154 FO 371 16951 E610 dated 14th January 1933. Laments that with Teymourtash 
gone no one will stand up to the Shah.
155 See Rezun Reza Shah’s... who argues that it was popularly held that 
Teymoiutash would succeed Reza Shah as the fust President of a Persian Republic.
156 FO 371 15341 E3611 dated 11th July 1931
157 FO 371 14542 E1802 dated 7th April 1930 notes Teymomtash’s discomfort at 
the increasing suspicions of the Shah.
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consequences of the imperial displeasure. As tlie Shall became increasingly convinced of 
his identification with the principles of progress and national independence, so courtiers 
competed to reassure bin of this, and to reinvent the past.
The importance of the army for the succession ensured that the crown prince became 
involved and identified with it fiom an early stage, and the Shah continued to give 
preferential treatment to soldiers in particular the officer coips, ensuring that ample funds 
were always allocated fiom the budget. 158 hi his final dispatch Clive noted, “the artificial 
growth of militarism in what is essentially an unmilitary country. The arrogance and 
indiscipline towards the civil population of the officers and men of this new army are 
growing more marked. The Persian soldier today carrying his rifle does not hesitate to 
level it at any civilian on the slightest provocation, real or imagined...The newly enrolled 
conscripts are the worst offenders...The danger which 1 0  years ago existed fiom banditry 
is today tending to increase fiom the forces called into being to suppress it. " 159
At the end of 1931 the Shah ordered an amendment to the conscription law requiring all 
students of theology to perform military service after the completion of their studies 
thereby eroding the concessions he had previously granted the ulema. As one diplomat 
noted, “The Shah has not forgotten the instrument by which he rose to power, and 
continues to take a deep and personal interest...They profit by then* importance in the eyes 
of their royal master and, though naturally timid, adopt a swashbuckling attitude and stmt
158 FO 371 13542 E6707 dated 3rd December 1930
159 FO 371 15341 E3611 dated 11/7/31. Also FO 371 17907 E l 133 dated 31/1/34. 
A notorious case of favouritism was recorded in The Times 28/11/33.
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about the streets of the capital shouldering then civilian brethren into the gutter. ” 160
The fear, distrust and disdain which he engendered in the general populace and the 
traditional middle classes in particular contrasted markedly with the steady stream of 
eulogies which emanated fiom government officials. 161 The closing session of the $ 
Majlis saw a number of deputies compete to praise the Shah. The President of the Majlis, 
Mirza Hussein Khan Dadgar argued that the 8 th Majlis had been successful, “owing 
entirely to the wisdom and firmness of His Imperial Majesty the Shah... .Mirza Khalil Khan 
Fahimi then eulogised the President for his self denial, his calm temper and his impartiality, 
and went on to allude to the happy results obtained and reforms realised under the aegis 
of His Majesty. Another speaker... observed that the people of Persia ought to thank God 
for giving them such a sovereign as Riza Shall Pahlavi.” 162
As Hoare summarised, “..the sum and substance of the matter...is that nothing has any 
existence in this country but for the grace and creative will o f the supreme mind and no 
man has any personality or authority but by the imperial inspiration. In fact the Lord he 
is God.” 163 To complement the rhetoric, lavish festivals were organised in commemoration 
of the Shah’s birthday, in a clear example of the naturalising tendency political myth, 
seeking to embed a particular concept within popular culture. Li some cases nevertheless,
160 FO 371 17907 E l 133/1133/34 dated 31 January 1934.
161 FO 371 16953 E l 101/1101/34 dated 27th February 1933
162 FO 371 16941 E878/47/34 dated 28th January 1933
163 FO 371 16941 E879/47/34 dated 2811 January 1933. See also FO 371 17890 
E56 dated 6 ,h December 1933 in which concern is expressed over the 'insistence’ of the 
use and 'arrogance’ of the title Shahanshah (king of kings).
- 94 -
the effect was counterproductive, “"The first chariot, in the form of a large head, was 
supposed to be a 'div' (devil) announcing the arrival of the procession. The irreverent saw 
in this head a likeness to Reza Shah Pahlavi. " 164
At the opening of the 9111 Majlis the Shah said that one of the major aims of the session was 
to prepare for the .moral purification and the education of the public.” 165 The reform of 
education and the founding of Tehran University was to be one of the great achievements 
of Reza Shall, but as with other reforms, the pull of competing ideological imperatives 
diluted the effectiveness of this achievement. Reza Shah made it clear that he wanted 
Iranians to study in Iran rather than be faced with having to go abroad, but integral to this 
was the desire to control education and to avoid having to send Iranians abroad where 
they may be confronted with political ideas contrary to the security and stability of the 
dynasty.
Education reforms had been initiated in the mid 1920s, but had only really gathered pace 
by the end of the decade. In 1928, a standardised textbook was enforced throughout all 
secondary schools along with a standardised Persian. Local dialects were avoided and 
history teaching emphasised the Achaemenid period while geography stressed the unity 
of the nation. 166 With the Persianisation of elementary schools proceeding vigorously, the 
government tinned its attention to foreign schools, preventing Iranians who had not
164 FO 371 17907 E2251 dated 24/3/34. See also FO 371 17907 E3490/940/34 
dated 241h May 1934 - the army were often heavily involved in such festivals.
165 FO 371 16941 E1878/47/34 dated 25th March 1933
166 See Menaskri op. cit. pp 93-98.
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attended completed elementary school in Persian from attending them and insisting that 
they teach at least some classes in the Persian language. 167
The law for the foundation of Tehran University which was passed on 29th May 1934 also 
highlighted the nationalist mood combined with a desire for state control. Thus the 
principal of the university was to be appointed by royal decree, 168 and students, certainly 
in secondaiy school, were expected to parade once a week under the aegis of an officer 
fiom the army. 169 As Reza Shah told students being sent abroad, "You will render fiill 
service to your country only when you have seived in the aimy. Military service is one of 
the essential duties of eveiy patriot, especially the student class. " 170 The foundation of the 
university was swiftly followed by the establishment of a language academy which would 
scrutinise the Persian language for extraneous Arabic loan words, and replace them with 
Persian words, a process which was begun in the Bill establishing Tehran University. 171
Nationalism, along with a desire to differentiate oneself fiom the Persia of the Qajars also 
influenced the decision to insist that foreigners henceforth call the country Iran. 172 The 
Pahlavi state in effect sought to re-invent the country by redefining its name. A term,
167 FO 371 [check reference] dated 1934. This policy was combined with that of 
highlighting the importance of Iran’s poets, in particular Ferdowsi.
168 FO 371 [..] E4642/2960/34 dated 24th June 1934
169 FO 371 18988 E616 dated 121h January 1935. Also see Haas op. cit pg 169.
170 Quoted in Wilbur op. cit pg 143.
171 FO 371 18992 E4041/608/34 dated 14th June 1935.
172 FO 371 18988 E3505/305/34 dated f9  December 1934, FO 371 18988 
E952/305/34 dated 23rd January 1935.
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familiar to most Iranians, was appropriated and emphatically associated and identified with 
specific ideologies, such that along with the term 'Pahlavi’, it was one of the most 
evocative and profound expressions of political myth developed. Like the 'Lion & Sun’ 
motif, the term 'Iran’ was the summation of a particular ideological conception which 
opened the door to other interpretations - indeed the precise meaning o f 'Iran ’ is still 
contested.
The desire to present a 'modem’ image to the word was further boosted when the Shah 
decreed on his return to Iran fiom Turkey on the abolition of the Pahlavi cap and its 
replacement with the European hat173 which was enforced with similar zeal. 174 This latest 
campaign on the dress code was to culminate in Reza Shah’s most striking assault on 
tradition - the forced abolition of the veil for women, given visible manifestation when the 
Queen attended a ceremony in European dress. The reaction to this policy even among 
the professional and propertied middle classes varied fiom satisfaction at seeing the 
members of the ulema “dying of grief and strain”, to a sense o f the ridiculous born fiom 
the knowledge that unaccustomed as they were to European dress, then appearance might 
be regarded as ludicrous. As one British diplomat noted, “What, I think has hurt the richer 
classes most is that they know themselves to be ludicrous in then Europeanised roles, and 
ridicule is notoriously hard for an Ir anian to bear...one feels that many wrongs will have 
been forgotten before people forgive the Shah for the offence which has given to nearly
173 FO 371 18992 E4041/608/34 dated 14th June 1935.
174 FO 371 18992 E4628/608/34 dated 12,h July 1935.
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all classes by bis passion to imitate Ataturk .” 175
Protests that did emerge fiom this policy were often brutally suppressed, the most 
notorious having occurred in Mashhad. 176 Protected by the army, and promoted by 
comprehensive censorship which prevented news of protests or dissent fiom being 
published, 177 the Shah’s identification of himself with his conception o f Iran continued to 
be emphasised. As one commentator noted, almost all nationalist outbursts were state 
controlled and press articles frequently extolled “the Shah as the father o f his people,” 
concluding pessimistically that, “hi his policy of centralisation and unification the Shah has 
created enemies and in destroying the power of the mullahs he has forgotten Napoleon’s 
adage that the chief purpose of religion is to prevent the poor fiom murdering the rich. 
There is nothing to take the place of the religious influence, save an artificial nationalism 
which might well die with the Shah, leaving anarchy behind it. ” 178
Conclusion
As will be seen in the following chapter, the ideology of nationalism remained central to 
Iranian political discourse and continued to be a source of legitimation for the actions of 
politicians fiom all sides of the political spectrum. That some form of 'anarchy’ did
175 FO 371 20048 E476/E994/E1155/E1565/E2325/E3172/E4515/405/34 dated 
11th January 1936. Provides a comprehensive survey of the consequences of this reform.
176 FO 371 18992 E5443/608/34 dated 23rd August 1935.
177 FO 371 20052 E l 147/1147/34 Annual report dated 28th January 1936
178 FO 371 18992 E794/794/34 dated 5th January 1935 - views of Mi’ Busk.
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emerge in Iran in the aftermath of Reza Shah’s abdication might in part have been due to 
the fragile ideological basis of the Pahlavi regime and the difficulty inherent in combining 
often contradictory ideological constructs within the person of the Shah. Dynastic 
nationalism, rather than nationalism remained the problematic construction.
This chapter has sought to provide an oveiview of ideological construction and operation 
in the Pahlavi period and as such points to developments which would recur, albeit 
complicated by greater political plurality as well as awareness through the emergence of 
mass communications. Some of the theoretical arguments about the concept and operation 
of political myth are indicated by the desire of the Shah to identify with certain ideological 
parameters and the consequences of this for myth, in particular the adoption of the 
surname 'Pahlavi’, an early attempt to redefine the past; but also the desire to identify with 
the 'nation’ and to impart a particular conception of the term 'Iran’, a term which amply 
illustrates the quality of rejuventation characteristic of myth. The coronation ceremony 
itself was also a powerful expression o f political myth in that familiar symbols were 
associated with particular ideological constructs such as modernisation, nationalism and 
traditionalism, and indeed it is this trilateral tension which is essential to any understanding 
of ideological development in the Pahlavi period.
Reza Shah’s Iran was quintessentially a state replete with multiple competing tensions, 
both materially and ideologically. It can be argued that Reza Shah, inherited, exacerbated 
and created tension, the most important being the essential tension between the cocktail 
of contradictory ideological constructs he sought to embody. Reza Shah was unable to 
solve the essential crisis of legitimacy which stigmatised his rule and sought to remedy this
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by personifying a number of ideological constructs which could institutionalise his rule. 
To a greater or lesser extent therefore he sought to identify himself and his dynasty with 
the concepts of modernisation and nationalism, while at the same time aware of the 
essential traditionalism of his office. The trilateral tension which resulted from the 
contradictoiy pulls of these ideological constructs, resulted in the hybrid construction 
known as dynastic nationalism - the desire to combine these contra dictoiy elements within 
the person of the Shah. Political myth both eased and exacerbated such tensions, with the 
consequence that his son inherited an ideological environment more contentious and 
complex than his own.
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Chapter 3
1941-53 - political pluralism and the ascendancy of nationalism. 
Introduction
The twelve years following the abdication of Reza Shah, between 1941 and 1953, were 
witness to a dynamic period of political activity in Iran. Situated after the political 
suppression of the previous 16 years and the developing political suffocation o f the reign 
of Mohammad Reza Shah, the period provides a valuable window into the dynamics of 
political and ideological relationships. As a result the focus of the chapter will not rest 
exclusively with the monarchy which in this period had lost the primary position it had 
enjoyed in the Iranian political arena. Though it remained in many ways the lynchpin of 
the Iranian state, around which others sought to manoeuvre, its ability to operate 
unhindered was at times severely curt ailed, and certainly during the premiership of 
Mosaddeq, the Shah was effectively powerless. Nevertheless, the monarchy did remain 
a key player, its veiy existence attracting support and criticism, and the analysis of 
ideological utilisation by other groups will be limited to the extent that they affected the 
monarchy, or provided it with an ideological reservoir, from which, reinvigorated, it 
sought to appropriate.
With the emergence of limited political plurality and the advent of mass communications, 
ideological discourse in Iran became more complex. The state-centred framework
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established in the previous chapter was openly challenged by various groups seeking to 
redefine ideological constructs in their own interests. As such, this chapter allows us to 
see the operation of ideology and political myth in a far more dynamic environment. The 
period can effectively be divided into two parts: the first to 1946, essentially the period 
of the Allied occupation, sees the breakdown and fragmentation of the artificial ideological 
consensus imposed by Reza Shah and the challenges posed to it; while from 1947 onwards 
we witness the Shah’s first attempts to reinvent dynastic nationalism in light of these 
changes. Ironically, this attempt at re-invention was definitively appropriated by Dr 
Mohammad Mosaddeq who became the supreme icon of the nationalist movement.
As with the previous period, tensions throughout Iranian politics and society were high 
and so too was the tendency for ideological constructs to develop into political myth. 
Indeed, so intense was the tension that the tendency towards polarisation between rival 
factions often became explicit, and the potential for myth to build upon myth, particularly 
through the process of rejuvenation, becomes apparent. This was particularly true during 
the oil nationalisation crisis. Above all this was quintessential^ a period of conflicting 
personalities in which myth came to be used to personify both friend and foe in the 
political battles that ensued. It was to have a profound effect on the young Mohammad 
Reza Shah and to become a major part of his ideological inheritance.
The Socio-Historic Context
The levels o f  political awareness
Li assessing the general levels of political awareness in this period it may be useful to start 
with a self-assessment provided by 'progressive elements in Iranian society1 in an 
anonymous letter to the British Embassy in 1946. The writers note that: "About two thirds 
o f the population of Ban is composed of peasants and tribesmen who are illiterate... In 
recent years the Tudeh Party has conducted a campaign against then exploitation, which 
has made them conscious of this aim, which is for them then only interest in politics. 
Otherwise their apathy is unbounded. The other thud of the population live in towns and 
nearby villages; more than half being illiterate labourers...with slightly more political 
consciousness resulting from their contact with town life... There remains one sixth of the 
population with degrees o f political consciousness varying according to their standard of 
education and intelligence. They include government employees and other people in 
receipt of salaries, artisans, shopkeepers... Over this stratum sits a class estimated to be a 
mere one per cent of the whole population which possesses and controls nearly all the 
wealth of the country and rules its people... They are the real rulers o f the country. . . 1' 179
Though the writers lament the 'unbounded apathy' of the rural masses, they do 
nevertheless point to the fact that this was the period when their* political consciousness 
was being awakened, largely through the systematic efforts of the communist Tudeh
179 FO 248 64/149a/46, dated 17 August 1946.
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Party, ably assisted by the occupying Soviet forces. For the Tudeh, the rural peasantry 
were an untapped political resomce, and they expended much effort in seeking to cultivate 
then loyalty. It is true that the rural population were as yet not as relatively important in 
a political sense as their* urban cousins, and their* political awareness remained very much 
second hand, but they were never entirely ignorant of developments, and as the period 
progressed, could not realistically be ignored.
As one Times columnist wrote, "..this illiterate peasant is no fool. The poets are his 
companions and he knows his Ferdowsi and Hafiz and Saadi. Given hrcentive, he is quick 
and apt. . . " 180 Similarly, the British Embassy noted in 1941 that the Banian public was a 
good deal more sceptical about Allied war aims than at first expected: "British 
propaganda...suffers, however, from one grave handicap. References to the objects for 
which the war is being fought - democracy, freedom, liberty, the seciuity o f the smaller 
nations - have a cynical sound in Persian ears. " 181
The low level of literacy attested to in the above letter is reinforced by an industrial survey 
conducted for the Seven Year Plan published in 1326 [1947-48], which reveals that 
among industrial workers literacy levels were no higher than 10-20%. Thus in chemical 
factories, o f 4548 workers, some 1331 were registered as literate, whereas among 4501
180 The Times - Persia Old and New: Younger Generation groping for Reforms - 
dated 25 April 1946,
181 FO 371 27188 - Intelligence Summaries 1941. It should be noted that in 
contemporary British somces, 'Ban' was still referred to as 'Persia'. Whenever such 
somces are quoted, this usage is retained.
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workers in the sugar factories only 297 were noted as literate. 182 This challenges the 
concept o f political dynamism and at least favours the view that politics remained the 
preserve o f the political elite and was focussed almost exclusively in Tehran. Indeed 
Tehran's primacy in domestic politics and the consequent dubious legitimacy of many 
'national' parties was criticised in an article entitled 'Parties of Ban1 in the newspaper 
Rahbar in April 1943: "Do not wonder that instead of parties of Ban we speak of the 
parties of Tehran. All the parties arise in Tehran and consist of some interested persons 
staying in the capital. . . " 183 However it is argued that so intense was the level of political 
activity among the intellectuals and professional classes, and such was the social structures 
prevalent that even the illiterate were drawn in some measure towards political awareness 
and participation.
The Mass Media
Some idea of the level of political activity can be ascertained by the propensity for political 
parties and the proliferation of newspapers. That both these organs often lacked structure 
and durability shotdd not detract Bom the fact that they existed because of tremendous 
political enthusiasm. One scholar has recorded 22 significant parties active between 1941- 
46, each with a comprehensive political programme. 184 Parties mushroomed in the run up 
to elections and branches or associate parties were established in provincial centres;
182 FO 371 75485 E6175 dated 13 May 1949 - Naficy - Statistics for the principal 
industries o f Ban for the year 1326 [1947-48].
183 Quoted in Machalski Political Parties in Ban in the Years 1941-1946 Folia 
Orientalia IH, 1961, pg 169
184 Ibid.
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student groups were actively cultivated. 185 Trade Unions and 'Workers Committees' also 
developed and invariably produced lists of demands which contained political rhetoric, hi 
the case of the Azerbaijan Workers' Commitee, the Soviet influence is clear, when the first 
article of its 35 point programme of action stresses that it has been established "To fight 
energetically against despotism, dictatorship and fascism  [italics added], and to establish 
complete liberty: of the nation, of association, of the individual, o f language, and of the 
press. " 186
Press activity was if anything even more energetic, and eveiy political grouping had at 
least one newspaper, usually a weekly, with which to voice its views. The number of 
newspapers often surprised Western observers. Bullard noted in 1943 that, "There are 47 
newspapers in Tehran, a city of only 750,000 inhabitents, the large majority of whom are 
illiterate. 1,187 By 1951, in the lead up to oil nationalisation, this figure had risen to some 
700 papers in Tehran alone. 188 Cuyler-Young noted astutely in 1948 that, "In few 
countries of the literacy percentage of Iran are joxuualists more numerous, facile, 
superficial and irresponsible. Yet for all the spawning and specious nature o f the Iranian 
press, it can be said that a considerable section of it is substantial and serious, and 
influential beyond what literacy statistics might lead one to expect, since papers are read 
in groups and news and opinions passed on by readers to illiterate fir ends and
185 FO 248 1428 - files relating to the Majlis elections o f 1943; dated 14 July 1943 
and 7 August 1943.
186 FO 248 1410: Programme and Desires of the Azerbaijan Workers Committee', 
dated 26 February 1942.
187 FO 248 1427, dated 24 April 1943.
188 FO 248 1514, file 10101/4/51 dated 5 January 1951.
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acquaintances. " 189 Indeed the awareness of widespread illiteracy ensured that many 
pamphleteers would ask readers to inform others who were unable to read of the contents 
of a particular pamphlet.190
The one party that actively sought the support of the illiterate be they in cities or in rural 
areas was the Communist Tudeh Party. A thorough organisational framework and a 
seductive programme of action, along with a measure of support from the Soviet 
authorities resulted in a positive and arguably successfirl attempt to mobilise the otherwise 
politically apathetic masses. The other parties and political groupings, often suspicious of 
the 'masses' were forced to react to the Tudeh challenge. The British Consul in Tabriz 
notes the development of Tudeh tactics as early as December 1941 along with the concern 
of the traditional political elite:
"...It is not that the proletariat' here are communist minded so far, but the authorities fear 
that the demagogues....will gradually work upon them to cause unrest and later revolt 
against the established order. One of the new 'parties' is called Tudeh Azerbaijan'... and its 
aim seems to be to interest the lower classes, who so far have never been touched by 
political ideas. Its newspaper Azerbaijan'...prints twice weekly cartoons of wretched 
peasants and farmers being beaten and buhied by hard faced landlords, or dr awings of rich 
capitalists cheating poor ragged workers of a halfpenny while handing out large banknotes
189 T Cuyler-Young The Problem of Westernisation in Modern Iran Middle East 
Joiumal2, 1948; pg 130.
190 FO 248 1410; copy of a notice placed upon a wall in Tabriz, dated 24 February
1942
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to dancing girls at cabarets, and so on. " 191 Almost ten years later, Lawford noted of the 
Tudeh paper Mardorn, that, "the paper is clearly designed less as a medium for educating 
Persians in the theory of dialectical materialism than as a weapon in the Tudeh Party's 
campaign to achieve political power in this country. " 192 It should be clear from the above 
two examples that groups were using imagery and political myth to cultivate support 
among the masses.
The Radio
With Soviet finance and support the Tudeh also had a spectacular new tool of 
dissemination which required no literacy, allowed immediate reception of political news 
and propaganda, and was dependent upon no-one: the radio. The Allied occupation as 
well as political interest ensured a relatively wide ownership of radios which meant that 
rousing speeches were no longer limited by space. As Pyman noted of the relatively 
remote town of Arak in central Iran: "A member of the Qajar family who owns a good 
deal o f land near Arak told me the other day that there are many wireless sets in the 
villages in that area to which all the peasants listen. The effect of this and of the bundles 
of Tehran newspapers which periodically reach the village is to give people an interest in 
politics which they never had before and a critical attitude towards then landlords. " 193 
Governments of the day were quick to acknowledge the power of radio and would 
broadcast programmes to repudiate Tudeh views, stress then own commitment to reform
191 FO 248 1410 - report of the British Consul in Tabriz, dated 29 December 1941.
192 FO 248 1494, Lawford to Bevin, 101/5/15/50, dated 18 February 1950.
193 FO 248 1531 10105/50 - Memorandum by Pyman dated 28 January 1950.
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and of course trumpet their achievements. 194
The limits o f  plurality
Nevertheless, there were limits to this emergent political dynamism. As Abrahamian points 
out "..of the 12 premiers, 9 came from the 19th century titled families, 2 from Reza Shah's 
bureaucracy, and one from his military elite. Similarly, of the 148 cabinet ministers, 81 
were sons of the titled and wealthy families, 13 were technocrats representing the coiut, 
11 were army officers, and eight were prosperous entrepreneurs outside the bazaar." He 
adds, "Of the 148 ministers, only 15 were salaried personnel and modem educated 
professionals with roots in the middle class and without links to the palace. What is more, 
of the 50 ministers who held three or more cabinet posts, 39 came from titled and landed 
families, seven fromthe upper echelons of the bureaucracy, two from prominent military 
households, and only two from the salaried middle class. " 195 As if to emphasise the 
venality of the system Elwell-Sutton c o m m e n te d  in 1949 that, "The 300 odd vacancies in 
some 24 cabinets between August 1941 and November 1948 were filled with few 
exceptions from a clique of 70 to 80 politicians, all over 50 years o f age, and many over 
60. " 196 Even the Majlis, which so frequently argued with the executive, remained the 
preserve of the traditional elite. Of 128 deputies elected in 1943, 44 had sat in the
194 FO 248 1494 101/5/15/50 dated 18 February 1950, on government attempts 
to broadcast to minorities in then own language.
195 Abrahamian Iran between two revolutions pg 170 - one can contest his use of 
middle class'.
196 Elwell-Sutton Political Parties in Iran The Middle East Journal, 3 ,1 , 1949, pp
45-62
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previous Majlis, 65 were landowners, 13 connected witli commerce and industry, 4 were 
mullahs and another 46 were dependant on various forms of political activity including a 
number who were elected to serve traditional interests. 197
Despite the existence of various competing political 'fractions' and parties this group 
remained essentially fluid, choosing to revolve around personalities. The Shah in this 
period was but one personality attempting to re-invent himself as the saviour of Iran. Few 
parties could develop coherent durable structures which would outlive the founder. The 
only real contender was ironically the Tudeh Party (and its offshoots) which despite solid 
social foundations, suffered the stigma of foreign support. Qavam enjoyed modest success 
with the establishment of the authoritarian Democrat Party. The National Front, a broad 
coalition of parties, was the most successfiil of all the political groupings but this was 
more down to a unique combination of talents and circumstances (ironically a well defined 
'enemy'), rather than coherent structure and organisation. Indeed Mosaddeq argued 
against any such organisation, saying that the country was not ready for such a body . 198 
Indeed the necessity for political manoeuvre at the highest level along with the need to 
mobilise a politically unsophisticated mass resulted in the simplification of ideological 
constructs. Add to this prudent ambiguity a broad agr eement on the dir ection of reform
197 FO 248 1435 22/181/44 dated 22 September 1944. For detailed backgrounds 
of Azerbaijani deputies see file 22/151/44 dated 18 May 1944; for Fars see file 22/38/44 
dated 19/4/44; Hamadan & Malayer file 22/126/44 dated 31 March 1944; and Khorasan 
file 22/103/44 dated 23 February 1944. For a not untypical character assessment of the 
foremost deputy from Kermanshah see FO 248 1428 dated 7 June 1943.
198 R Ranxazani Intellectual Trends in the politics and history of the Musaddiq era 
in J Bill & W R Louis (eds) Mosaddeq. Iranian Nationalism and Oil London, IB  Tauris, 
1988, pg 311
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and it becomes more easily understandable why personalities featured so highly in this 
period. All this was conducive to the formation of political myth.
Ideological Constructions
Limited political plurality and the emergence of mass media encouraged a greater level of 
ideological sophistication and subtlety, and although the parameters outlined in the 
previous chapter remain valid some further categorisation is required to reflect the 
complexity of the period. Principally, this revolves around the ideology of nationalism, so 
decisively appropriated by Reza Shah in the guise of dynastic nationalism, was now in turn 
appropriated by other groxrps eager to champion the caxrse in then own image.
Nationalism:
Developments confirm that this was by far* the most potent ideological constrxrction of the 
period. Iranians of all political persuasions attempted to appear more nationalistic than the 
other and the most stinging criticism of a political opponent remained the charge of 
traitor'. Competing agents, including the Shah, sought to appropriate as mxrch nationalist 
myth as possible. Its fundamental credentials as the ultimate arbiter o f legitimacy were not 
challenged, and so pervasive was this concept that it spawned a number of ideological 
subsets. However, though the generalities were accepted, the details of nationalist 
ideology and myth were serioxxsly dispxxted. The crown no longer had a monopoly, and its 
conception was under challenge.
- I l l -
Tlie differences were often subtle, but to take one example; the use of the term Iran'. 
Reza Shaft had ordered the official use of Iran' in order to establish a particular historical 
narrative which would connect the modem state to its Aryan past. The new nationalists 
debunked this dubious connection replete with racial overtones, but were equally 
passionate in its usage as a term which would foster unity. Thus one could still be a Kurd 
or Azerbaijani and still be fimdamentally Ir anian'. This emphasis is more clearly seen when 
contrasted with the British persistence in using the term 'Persia' and 'Persian1.
Dynastic nationalism, the emphatic identification of the Palrlavi dynasty with the ideology 
of nationalism remained important to the Shah himself and by personalising this construct 
we witness an attempt at inventing what can be termed the 'myth of the saviour ’. 
However, just as groups sought to detach the dynasty from an association with 
nationalism, they redefined nationalism in other terms and in turn sought to personalise 
these new distinctive nationalisms in their own leaders. There were thus many potential 
'saviours’ during this period, though ultimately Mosaddeq appeared to have achieved 
what others could only aspir e to in eventually coming to symbolise nationalism without 
distinction. Arguably he achieved this by leading a broad based movement which 
effectively combined all the strands of nationalist thought, including socialistic as well as 
religious trends and utilising to great effect a strategy of differentiation thr ough which the 
'enemy’ of the Iranian nation was identified and personalised.
Ideological Development: Fr agmentation and Re-invention
This complex period can be divided into two broad sections for the piuposes of
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ideological analysis. The first period to 1946 essentially witnessed the challenges to and 
fragmentation of the ideological consensus imposed by Reza Shah. Associations were 
challenged and the young Shah and the military sought to distance themselves from Reza 
Shah and much of what he appeared to represent. Nevertheless there were limits to this 
process, and the greater the challenge the keener the army and the Shah were to reinvent 
themselves. For the Shah, this attempted identification with a new type of nationalism 
gathered speed in the aftermath of the fall of autonomous Azerbaijan and witnessed 
attempts to reinterpret the past and rehabilitate his father for current political needs. It 
proved to be an attempt too far, as the Shah found himself outmanoeuvred by a more 
skilful politician.
Ideological fragmentation
The Impact o f  the Allied Invasion and Occupation:
The immediate impact of the allied invasion and subsequent occupation of Iran was a 
virulent attack upon the ideology of militarism. Similarly, with the abdication of Reza 
Shah, the attempted cult of the Pahlavi dynasty came under rapid scrutiny and criticism. 
As parties developed, a softer nationalist concept with a strong socialist agenda became 
prominent, though as the allied occupation became protracted and relations with the 
occupying powers became more tense, so more general nationalistic and anti-imperialistic 
views were expressed. This reaction, and the fear for the integrity and unity of the state 
helped rehabilitate within the general consciousness, the institutions of the monarchy and 
the army.
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Having been trumpeted as the veiy soul of the nation by Reza Shah, the undignified 
rapidity of the aimed forces apparent disintegration in the face of the allied attack brought 
the military into popular disrepute and effectively destroyed its acquired myth of social 
and political superiority. Similarly, the particular conception of monarchy espoused by 
Reza Shah, dictatorial and aloof, was seen as a prime reason why the Iranian state failed 
to respond effectively to the Allied invasion. Key to this defective structure was the close 
association between army and monarchy which was regarded as detrimental to the security 
of the State.
As such, traditionalist politicians, most of whose formative years revolved around the 
events of the Constitutional Revolution, sought to divest the crown o f its authority over 
the aimed forces and bring the military under civilian control. 199 This attack upon the army 
and the monarchy was supported by the new young socialists who along with the 
traditionalists viewed the 'military state' as conceptualised by Reza Shah to be detrimental 
to the welfare of the country. Though these two ideological camps differed strongly on 
the specifics of political reform (most yoimg socialists had little time for the old elite), the 
allied invasion offered them the opportunity to challenge the centralised militarist- 
monarchical autocracy, which they both had reason to despise.
Not surprisingly the aimy and the monarchy sought to defend their positions and rallied
199 FO 248 1407 dated 13 August 1942. See also Seyyid Zia's speech to the 14th 
Majlis, quoted in Abrahamian Iran Between Two Revolutions pg 205.
- 114-
to each other.200 The Shah was weaker and was encouraged to distance himself from the 
person of his father.201 This clearly was not a credible position to take especially when it 
became apparent that the new Shah was in reality in awe of his father,202 as he was later 
to indicate; but in the immediate aftermath of the invasion, it was deemed prudent to 
publicly argue against 'dictatorship'203, to emphasise a willingness to reign rather than rule 
and to acknowledge the excesses of the father. In effect the Shah sought to redefine the 
image he had inherited from his father in line with the ideological realities of his own time 
accounting for the subtleties in ideological development which had taken place in his own 
more pluralistic environment.
hi contrast to his father, he became more accommodating, stressing to the Majlis, that he 
'had no powers1, in effect using dissimulation to acquire greater real power.204 His 
apparent lack of power also allowed him to chaw on traditional mythic narratives such as 
the 'reluctant leader' with greater veracity. Indeed his real weakness meant that 
traditionalists, eager to maintain the social status quo in an increasingly destabilised 
situation turned to support this symbol of unity (as long as he stayed just that). Thus as
200 FO 248 1407 file 1628, note 9/7/42, records quite clearly the relationship 
between the Shah and the aimy, noting that so uncertain was the Shah of his position that 
he stationed 600 soldiers round Saadabad Palace. S ig n if ic a n tly , some older generals were 
reportedly less trustworthy.
201 The Times, 18 September 1941, notes the lacklustre reception given to the 
Shah as he was to be sworn in.
202 FO 248 1426 - Interviews with the Shah dated 2 1  August 1943.
203 FO 248 1426 - Interviews with the Shah, dated 21 August 1943.
204 FO 248 1407 file 628 - HM Minister's relations with the Shah, note no. 9/20/42 
[1942; exact date unclear].
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early as late 1942, tlie Prime Minister, broadcast a speech effuse with praise for the 
"...beloved shah who is the source of the nation's happiness. . " 205 The Shah was assisted 
in this belief in himself by a characteristically sycophantic court, 206 as well as the general 
adulation of the provincial populace who frequently expressed genuine enthusiasm on 
meeting the Shah.207 Ironically therefore, his real weakness was compensated for by a 
reconstruction of the ideology of dynastic nationalism.
The army sought refuge with the crown208, though initially it sought to disassociate itself 
from such an exclusive relationship. Eager to deflect criticism, it first sought to re- 
legitimise its social and political status in Iranian society by divesting itself of responsibility 
through the rationalisation of its defeat and indicating the relative commonality of such 
rapid defeats in modem warfare. Thus in 1942, the minister of War claimed that the defeat 
of the army was due to poor mechanisation, noting that other armies had suffered similar 
reversals for just such technical weaknesses (presumably France in 1940 and the USSR 
in 1941).209 Then it sought to distance itself as a tool of the monarchy, and re-associate 
itself as the ultimate symbol of national unity. As one Majlis deputy noted, '..people must 
not get into the habit of the thinking of the army as something distinct from the nation; it
2°5 pQ 2 4 3  1 4 0 7  file 628 - HM Minister's relations with the Shah, press summary 
dated 17 September 1942.
206 FO 248 1407 dated 10 April 1942.
207 FO 248 1423, note from Bullard dated 29 June 1943.
2°8 pQ 2 4 3  1 4 2 7  _ Persian Government & Internal Affairs, dated 8  May 1943, 
notes that Misbahzadeh, the former editor of Keihan was aware of the influence officers 
had on the shah.
209 FO 248 1409 file 49, internal situation Fars; press summary dated 13 April
1942 .
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was not.'210 Nevertheless the relationship between the monarchy and the military remained 
intense, helped by the Shah's personal fascination with all things military.211 The Shah 
always regarded the aimy as his chief pillar of support212.
The aimed forces felt deeply humiliated by the defeat and then dislike for the allied forces 
and desire for revenge213 was both endemic and infectious among a population whose 
national pride was dented and whose relationship with the occupying powers rapidly 
turned sour. The popular cynicism towards allied war aims and the ostensible reasons 
given for the invasion were initially outweighed by the general satisfaction at the 
abdication of Reza Shah. But the social reality of occupation, including food shortages 
and economic dislocation214 encouraged nationalist sentiment expressed through crude 
fragmentation215. At one stage the outbreak of disease was blamed on Polish refugees and
210 FO 248 1409 file 49, internal situation Fars; Deputy Anwar quoted in a press 
summary dated 13 April 1942.
211 FO 248 1426 - Interviews with the Shah, undated noted 1943. Also memo 
dated 2 July 1943, notes that dull conversation revitalised by the mention of the 'war'.
212 FO 248 1407 - HM Minister's relation with the Shah, file 628, dated 19 August
1942.
213 FO 248 1409 - file 39, Internal situation Fars; report on the general situation 
dated 10 June 1942.
214 FO 248 1427 - Persian Govt. & internal affairs; letter from Bishop of Isfahan 
to Bullard dated 4 May 1943. See also FO 371 35109 - Intelligence Summary 1943 fide 
E l734 dated 23 February 1943, which notes that "Tehran is on the verge of starvation."
215 FO 248 1427 - Persian Government & Internal Affairs, file 544, dated 24 April
1943, notes that the press blame the British for everything. See also Bullard's report dated 
6 April 1943.
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the Allies who brought them .216 Many openly voiced then support for the Germans, and 
swastikas were daubed on pavements.217 Efforts were made to re-legitimise the concept 
of nationalism through universahsation and fragmentation. In one speech the Shah sought 
to draw comparisons between Iranian nationalism, fighting for 'independence', and 
American nationalism, subtly noting its distinction from the British.218
At the same time officials, such as the Shah and the Prime Minister Soheili in then New 
Year* messages sought to alleviate the sense of hardship and humiliation by placing events 
within an intensely nationalist interpretation of history. Thus Soheili notes, "Since the day 
when Ir an was united under the banner of Cyrus the Great and in the centre of Asia 
achieved unprecedented power and became famous throughout the world, and the star of 
her prosperity rose daily towards its zenith, 2500 years have passed. During this time, this 
2500 years, the people of this land have experienced repeatedly calamity, misfortune, 
scarcity and famine, but they have never lost then coinage and they have resisted until 
they successfully overcame their afflictions and experienced once more the more 
prosperous and more glorious days of former eras. This truth [italics added] is one of the 
secrets which compelled our ancestors to treasure to this extent the coming of the New
216 FO 248 1410 - Internal Situation Azerbaijan, file 144, dated 23 April 1942.
217 FO 248 1462 - Persian Govt. & Internal Situation 1946; letter from Alfa to 
Embassy dated 8  September 1946. See also FO 371 27188 E8305/268/34 dated 19 
November 1941, which reveals that at the opening of the 13th Majlis, crowds shouted 
Long Live Hitler!1
21S FO 248 1423 - Interviews with the Shah, note from Bullard dated 29 June
1943 .
- 118-
Year." 219 This narrative argued for the pivotal role Iran was playing in the war effort. So 
much so, that by the end of the war, official nationalist disdain for the Allies was set aside 
and, though popular anti-Allied sentiment remained strong, far from distinguishing oneself 
from the Allies, Iranian nationalism found it piudent to associate with them As one 
intelligence officer wryly noted in 1945, "Persia celebrated the victory o f herself and her 
Allies over Germany with restrained elation. 1,220
The Shah in his message, was keener to utilise aspects of racial nationalism, though he 
was also aware that the general situation was encouraging a tendency towards community 
orientated socialist policies. Nevertheless, though his real political weakness brought some 
respite from the criticism, his failure to control the extravagancies o f the court, especially 
during a time of hardship, contrasted sharply with his purported image as the caring 
monar ch, and as such the ideology of dynastic nationalism came under renewed attack.221 
Traditionalists, naturally sympathetic to the institution of monarchy frowned upon the 
loose morals exhibited by the court, however criticism from the new socialists was 
stronger. The monarchy dealt with this challenge in two ways. By exaggerating the 
potential for social disruption and revolution, he sought to manipulate the traditionalists' 
desire for a symbol of unity. At the same time he strove to become more revolutionary 
than the revolutionaries and through reification, to posit himself as the champion of youth 
and the lower classes. As such, he cleverly sought to extend his appeal to two disparate
219 FO 248 1427, file 544 - Persian Government & Internal Affair s; text of Solreili's 
NoRuz broadcast dated 23 March 1943.
220 FO 371 45458 - Intelligence Summaries 1945, E3434, dated 28 May 1945.
221 FO 248 1407 file 628 dated 19 August 1942. See also FO 248 1426 dated 18 
March 1943; 3 August 1943.
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777groups.
Tlie alliance between the traditionalists and radical national socialists proved short-lived. 
The traditionalists became increasingly concerned about the growing strength of the 
socialist agenda, with ideas which would challenge the socio-economic status quo. For the 
socialists and communists, supported by the occupying Soviet forces in the north, 
restricting the power of the monarchy and divesting it of control of the military was but 
the first step towards a complete change of the social order. No clearer indication of this 
perceived threat and the impact it had on restoring the 'value' of a strong army (and by 
extension the monarchy), can be given than the reaction to the workers revolt in Isfahan 
in 1944, couched of course, in nationalist terms. As Abrahamian notes, "Fatemi of the 
Patriots, who a few months earlier had demanded a dr astic cut in the army, now declared, 
"unless we immediately finance an effective army, such uprisings as occurred in Isfahan 
will spread and destroy the whole foimdation of private property." Similarly, a Democrat, 
whose spokesman had been vocal in denouncing the chiefs of staff, exclaimed, "now that 
our house is on fire, all citizens should be in favour of a strong military. Without a strong 
military, the fire will consume Iran. " " 223 Characteristically, it was the construction of a 
' social problem', the classic patrimonial political tactic of fragmentation which resulted in 
the gradual rehabilitation of the military-autocracy.
222 FO 248 1423 -Talks with the Shah, dated 15 January 1943. See also FO 248 
1426 - Interviews with the Shah dated 15 April 1943.
223 Abrahamian op. cit pg 209.
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The Tribal Revolts.
The tribal revolts, principally, that led by Nash Khan Qashqai in Fars, reflected another 
attempt to redefine the boundaries of nationalist ideology and to present an alternative 
perspective. The opponents of renewed tribalism attempted to de-legitimise the movement 
by attacking it as anti-nationalist and as the source of all the economic troubles of the 
country. Nash' Khan, aware of these attacks, stressed liis nationalism and his loyalty to the 
concept of an Iranian state. To Nash Khan, it was the Palilavi state which was the source 
of all problems, and which by its veiy nature was contrary to nationalist interests.
In a declaration to the people of Fars, he differentiated himself and his aims from those of 
the Pahlavi state, "Today even the brigands of the glorious cycle of Palilavi are attempting 
to accuse the true patriots of the country [vatan-parast va mellat doost] of being the 
cause of intrigue and disorder in the country... O Iranian nation! I have put everything I 
have, my life, my honour and my tribe for your sake and am prepared to make all sacrifice 
for my country. I pray to God to be able to stop all such disorder. But the Iranian nation 
should take a fundamental decision, and do not let the reins of the country into the hands 
of unqualified persons, and not allow such people to rob the country. " 224
There can be no better indication of the dominance of nationalist ideology within the 
Iranian consciousness than its use by a tribal chief whose tribe undoubtedly suffered under 
a previous interpretation of nationalism. It is also significant that Nasir Khan's objection
224 FO 248 1409 - Internal Situation: Fars file 39, dated 12 February 1942. See 
also letter from Nasir to Ghulam Hussein Muhazzab, dated 17 March 1942.
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to the centralised state did not extend to a rejection of European style clothes, which had 
originally caused such irritation. As the British Consul in Isfahan records, "He was quietly 
and extremely well dressed (without hat) in the European manner and in fact apait from 
a suggestion of sleekness and for alertness not generally associated with the soil could 
easily pass as a young and prosperous English fanner. 1'225
Lithe initial popular reaction to the mle of Reza Shah, there was considerable sympathy 
for the views and grievances of the tribes. As one British diplomat noted, "...there has 
been much agitation in the press and among certain deputies in favour o f Nash and the 
Qashqai. Nash, who is really a rebel, has been held up as a great patriot and the Qashqai 
as the potential backbone of the defence of Persia's independence. The tribes, it is being 
argued, should be conciliated and preserved as fighting units. . . 1,226 The newspaper Etela 'at 
carried Nash's plea for justice for the tribes.227 Another paper, Mehr-i Iran, carried an 
article which noted that, "Persian history is frill of great deeds of tribesmen in defence of 
the nation's soil. " 228 There was a clear attempt to rehabilitate the 'tribe’ by seeing them as 
a positive force in Iranian history, though it is significant that even those who sympathised 
with the tribes agreed with the principle of forced settlement. Nationalist concerns over 
territorial integrity combined with a desire to protect private property tended to outweigh 
any such sympathetic sentiments. Thus Majlis Deputy Nobaklif s defence of the Qashqai
225 FO 248 1347/1348, file 64 - Internal Situation in Fars; file no. 64/329/44 dated 
9 October 1944.
226 FO 248 1409 file 39, dated 4 November 1942.
227 FO 248 1409 file 39, dated 17 January 1942.
228 FO 248 1409, file 39, dated 13 April 1942. See also letter to Asr-i Azadi dated 
2 0  April 1942.
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position in tlie Majlis was shouted down with allegations that the Qashqais threatened 
internal security.229
Ultimately, the fear of state disintegration, engendered by the separatist movements in 
Azerbaijan and among the Kurds, along with the simple social reality that many tribesmen 
were not upstanding citizens and prone to looting230, meant that the initial challenge to the 
centralist conception of modernisation failed.
The Separatist Movements in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan.
In a period replete with crises and tension, the separatist movements in the Soviet 
occupied provinces of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan marked the first serious challenge to the 
Palilavi State and the popular self-conception of nationhood. It showed how myth was 
developed to combat myth and, in particular, by seeking to reinterpret the meaning of 
'Iran5, it harnessed far more intense feelings than any previous event and involved a 
greater variety of ideological sets and competing perceptions. Once again the peivasive 
ideology was nationalism, and one of the curiosities of the crisis was the similar ways in 
which the central government in Tehran and the separatist movements espoused 
nationalist rhetoric. Thus, although the government in Tabriz berated Tehran for 
centralised government along with the exclusive use of Farsi, within the boundaries of 
Azerbaijan itself, it tended to mimic those veiy policies.
229 FO 248 1409, file 39, dated 13 April 1942.
230 FO 248 1409, file 39, - Letter from the Boh* Ahmadis, dated 7 April 1944.
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As such, the ideologies of nationalism and modernisation can he seen from two distinct 
perspectives. The political nature of the Soviet sponsored movements in Azerbaijan and 
Kurdistan, set the pace for the socialist policies which were to be adopted by most groups, 
and then overt secularism was to encourage the emergence of religious nationalism. The 
crisis also witnessed the first conceited construction of a myth of the saviour around the 
person of the prime minister Ahmad Qavam, who had engineered the return of Azerbaijan, 
though ironically the very public entrance of the shah and the aimy into Tabriz was to 
provide a substantial boost to the Palilavi dynasty and the status of the military, both of 
whom sought to capitalise from new Cold War tensions.
Nationalism remained the primary ideological tool of political rhetoric for both sides 
during the dispute. Initially, there was considerable caution on behalf of the new 
'Azerbaijani National Government', and Pishevari was anxious not to ignite the nationalist 
anger in Tehran. As such, talk first revolved around autonomy with specific statements 
rejecting any notion of violating Iranian integrity.231
In Tehran however the reaction was not as conciliatory as that initially offered to the 
Qashqai. Talk o f autonomy, along with obvious Russian support raised the spectre of 
another Treaty of Turkmenchai232. For many, Pishevari's claim for autonomy was an act 
o f deception which did not concur with social reality; such as the fact that the Tehran 
appointed governor of Azerbaijan, Murteza Qulikhan Bayat discovered that the Democrat
231 The Times - Text of the manifesto of the Azerbaijani Majlis, dated 17 
December 1945.
232 The Times, dated 28 January 1946.
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Party of Azerbaijan treated him, "not as governor but as ambassador to the Azerbaijan 
Republic. " 233 On the other hand, there is also evidence to suggest that the allegations of 
separatism had been encouraged by Azerbaijani emigres in Tehran angered at the socialist 
bent of the new provincial administration in order to promote nationalist sentiment in the 
capital as well as elicit support from supporters of traditionalism, the army and the 
monarchy against the spectre of Marxism.234
Whatever the perceived reality, feelings rapidly polarised with ideological constructions 
developing into political myth. The media along with popular waiters such as Ahmad 
Kasravi were swift to raise the alarm, through a particular interpretation of Iranian history, 
ciude differentiation and exaggeration of the extent of the problem. Arguably, the 
paranoia over imminent national disintegration fuelled the growth of the problem. Thus 
Kasravi protested the existence of separate nations arguing, "If similar claims are to be 
advanced by other linguistic minorities - especially Armenians, Assyrians, Arabs, Gilanis 
and Mazandaranis - nothing will be left of Iran." The newspaper Etela 'at in an editorial 
entitled 'Azerbaijan is the centre of Iranian patriotism1, argued that Turkish was simply a 
tongue left behind by the Mongol and Tartar invaders.235 Such rhetoric was not confined 
to radical nationalists, but was even voiced by papers close to the liberal Seyyid Zia. The 
paper Kushesh insisted that Persian must remain the language o f education in Azerbaijan
233 The Times, dated 1 2  December 1945. See also FO 248 1463 - Internal 
Situation Azerbaijan; press attache report, dated 26 February 1946; also, conversation 
between Pishevari and Consul, dated 17 October 1946, and similar conclusion drawn from 
conversations with the Kurdish leader dated 1 1  September 1946.
234 FO 248 1410 - Internal Situation Azerbaijan, file 144, dated 20 February 1942.
235 Quoted in Abrahamian op. cit. pg 218.
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since Turkish, was only an 'unfortunate deposit' left hy the 'savage Mongols'.A Liberal 
Majlis deputy protested, "...this so called democratic Party of Azerbaijan is striking terror 
among peace-loving citizens and is spreading the false notion that Persian is not the 
mother language of all Iranians. 1,236
That developments in Mahabad and Tabriz could cause such consternation among the 
political and intellectual elite in Tehran was probably less a result o f genuine Azerbaijani 
nationalist sentiment, and more to do with the organisational structure and political 
leanings of the leftist Democratic Patty. Backed by the Soviet authorities the separatist 
movements were able to exploit the socio-economic disparities o f contemporary Iranian 
society and eventually suggest national independence. Ironically then methods bore a 
striking resemblance to those ofReza Shah, whom they obviously detested.
The initial stage of this policy was to inculcate a sense of distinctiveness through a 
strategy of differentiation towards the Azeri population within a particular conception of 
Iran, especially through an emphasis on the use of the Azeri language in pamphlets and 
programmes of action237. Anxious not to be labelled as traitors', the leftist groups sought 
to exploit feelings of injustice among the Azeris, and grievances against the central 
government.238 The personalisation of ideology became apparent as landlords were often 
portrayed as agents of central government, hence 'Persian1, and foreign. Thus, the British
236 Ibid pg 219.
237 FO 248 1410 - Internal Situation in Azerbaijan, file 144, - 'Programme & 
Desires of the Azerbaijan Workers Committee; dated 26 February 1942.
238 FO 248 1410 file 144, notice placed on Tabriz wall, dated 24 February 1942.
- 126-
Consul ill Tabriz noted that the newspaper "Azerbaijan....prints twice weekly cartoons of 
wretched peasants and farmers being beaten and bulhed by hard faced landlords, or 
drawings of rich capitabsts cheating poor ragged workers of a half-penny while handing 
out large banknotes to dancing girls at a cabaret. " 239 The paper did not avoid more direct 
attacks upon the competency of central government and was not averse to the use of 
dissimulation in order to aggravate the sense of distinction. As the Tabriz Consulate 
noted, "The newspaper 'Azerbaijan' overstepped itself last week in its usual anti­
government tirades by printing an article accusing the local authorities o f sending large 
quantities of wheat...to Tehran wlule there was only 40 days supply left here, so that in 
a few weeks Azerbaijan would be without bread. As a result the whole ignorant 
population of Tabriz rushed to the bakeries. . . " 240
Such pobcies were not always effective. As the British Consul in Tabriz noted, "It was 
interesting to learn from one landowner at Rezaieh that the minority o f good and humane 
proprietors who had not ih-used then peasants but had lent them money in times of need 
and taken an interest in then bves and welfare, were not being victimised now; on the 
contrary, the vibagers in some cases stuck by them as an island in a surrounding sea of 
troubles. " 241
Distinct from its attempts to encourage class differentiation and social problems, the leftist
239 FO 248 1410 - Internal Situation in Azerbaijan, file 144, dated 29 December
1941. See also memo dated 9 March 1942.
240 FO 248 1410 file 144, dated 8  April 1942.
241 FO 248 1410 file 144, dated 28 January 1942.
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groups also aimed to present themselves as socially aware, and part of the mainstream 
national socialist ideology. Thus Tudeh Azerbaijan was effectively renamed the 
Democratic Party o f Azerbaijan. Political programmes talked of the fight against 
'despotism', 'dictatorship', and 'fascism1. The first two slogans had good Iranian roots, the 
last however is a clear indication of Soviet influence.242
On the whole the extreme left wing groups had the most sophisticated political 
progr ammes and the organisation with which to disseminate it. It is a measure of then- 
ideological strength that most other political factions adopted socialist policies, and 
attempted to mimic organisational practices.243 Probably the most effective political 
reaction to the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan, was the Democrat Party of Qavam which 
had developed a far more authoritarian structure than other parties. Additionally, as one 
of Qavam's advisers was later to admit, ". .the situation forced us to adopt a radical image 
to compete with the revolutionaries. " 244 It is also an indication of the effectiveness of the 
secularising tendencies of the communist movement that Azerbaijan was witness to the 
fir st, albeit tentative, religious reaction, in the form of an Islamic Revolutionary Party.245
242 FO 248 1410 file 144, article 1 of the Azerbaijan Workers Committee, dated 
26 February 1942. See also Tabriz consulate commentary dated 16 March 1942. Also T 
Cuyler-Young The Problem of Westernisation in Modem Iran Middle East Journal, 2 , 
1948.
243 FO 248 1442 - Persian Govt. & Internal Situation file 150, notes on Majlis 
proceedings, file 150/44/44, dated 6  April 1944.
244 Quoted in Abrahamian op. cit pg 231. See also FO 248 1462; undated file 
65/94/46 - the Programme of the Democrat Party of Iran.
245 FO 248 1444 - Internal Situation in Azerbaijan, file 439; report file 439/6/44, 
dated 6  April 1944. This, and the fact that Pishevari called on Azerbaijani's to join in jihad  
against the government in Tehran, (see also Rossow R The Battle for Azerbaijan Middle
(continued...)
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Once sentiment had been sufficiently aroused in this direction, it was but a simple step to 
push in practice for independence, allowing Pishevari to claim, with some justification, 
that such a demand wa s a natur al outgrowth of years of social and economic neglect by 
central government. Thus in justifying Azerbaijani independence, Pishevari argued, 
"Azerbaijani's are Persians [Iranians] and wish to remain part of Persia [Iran] but they 
cannot surrender the liberties which they have won with so many sacrifices. . .1 was ready 
to convert the national government into a provincial council and to recommend officials 
be appointed by the central government but the government would not agree. . . " 246
Despite remaining vague about the issue of national independence,247 the new Azerbaijan 
government set about establishing the symbols of the new nation with a vigour and 
enthusiasm which would have made Reza Shah proud. The policy had been implemented 
fiom the beginning of the movement in order to make explicit differences with Tehr an. 
Thus it was noted in 1941 that, "The party held a large meeting at a theatre this week to 
pass a resolution whereby the wide main thoroughfare of Tabriz had its name solemnly 
changed fiomKhiaban Pahlavi (after the ex-shah who created it) to 'Kliiaban Sattar Khan' 
for one section and 'Kliiaban Bagher Khan' for another after two local nationalist
(...continued)
East Journal, 10, 1,1956, pp 17-32) are the first tentative indications of 'religious 
nationalism’, perhaps reflecting the glowing politicisation of the masses.
246 pQ 2 4 3  2 4 5 3  jQ2e 69; Summary of Pishevari speech file 69/191/46, dated 17 
May 1946.
247 FO 371 526S0 - Reactions to Azerbaijan; E9036, dated 11 September 1946, 
reveals that Pishevari still shied away from publicly declaring 'independence1.
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firebrands of the 1909 revolutionary days. " 248 By 1946 symbols of nationhood were far 
more explicit, including the overwriting of Iranian postage stamps, the issue of banknotes, 
the institution of new festivals as well as a new national flag. This flag was on show during 
the Noruz celebrations: "The new Azerbaijan flag was conspicuous in the procession: it 
consists o f the Persian tricolour, green, white and red, with a badge in the middle 
composed of ears of com surrounding a conventional representation of mountains with 
the rising sun or some soil of beacon above them and the word 'Azerbaijan' inscribed 
between the tops of the ears of the com . " 249 It is significant that the authorities sought to 
acquire familiar symbols of nationhood, and re-define them through the ideology of Azeri 
nationalism
hi addition a new curriculum was imposed, "which not only endeavours to imp ait to the 
students a sound knowledge but also make them politically minded, by teaching them the 
history of Azerbaijan and enables them to judge for themselves where then* real interests 
lie . " 250 Ironically, despite then* own differences with monolithic Iranian nationalism, 
Azerbaijani nationalism was found to be no more tolerant towards minorities.251 Two laws 
most similar to those of Reza Shah, were those insisting on the use o f domestic' textiles 
in manufacture, and the imposition of conscription, which was described as a 'national 
duty1. Conscription was no more appealing to Azeri nationals than it was to Banian
248 FO 248 1410 file 144, Consular report dated 29 December 1941.
249 FO 248 1463 - Internal Situation, Azerbaijan; report on Noruz celebrations file 
69/90/46, dated 23 March 1946.
250 FO 248 1462 - Persian Govt. & Internal Situation file 65; summary of article 
from Havanan newspaper dated 6  October 1946.
251 FO 371 52679 file 5; Consular tour of Azerbaijan, E7642 dated 8  August 1946.
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nationals, and the legislation caused much discontent.252
The movement centred in Mahabad, was not as well organised as that o f Azerbaijan and 
initially at least it bore more similarity to the revolt of Nash Khan, in that the Kur ds 
sought more autonomy over then own affairs. Although there was little affection for the 
central government especially in the guise of the armed forces who viewed Kurdistan as 
then special preserve, efforts were geared towards de-centralisation rather than 
independence. However agitation, and no little Soviet support encouraged the 
development of a fledgling nationalist movement complete with the explicit development 
of political myth.
Thus the British Consul noted that despite government incompetence, its position in 
Kurdistan remained relatively strong and that, "There is no genuine demand from Kurds... 
for independence. " 253 Indeed, in one of the fir st demands laid down by the Kurds for 
greater decentralisation, Soviet influence is apparent as it required that, "Arms held by 
Ajanrs [Ir anians] who are the enemies of the Kurds and Fascists, must be collected and 
handed in to the Soviet authorities..." The Iranian government was aware of Soviet 
agitation and protested to the Allied powers that the Kurds involved were simply bandits. 
Indeed the Kinds admitted in then demands that they had looted .254
252 FO 248 1463 file 69, Situation report 69/50/46, dated 23 February 1946. The 
'Times' records that Pishevari on a visit to Tehran, took to wearing the uniform of the 
'national' army, dated 28 April 1946.
253 FO 248 1410 file 144, reports dated, 24 May 1942, 22 May 1942.
254 FO 248 1410, file 144, Kurdish Demands, dated 30 April 1942.
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Soviet influence was most obvious in the use of narratives and euphemism to extol the 
Kurdish national cause. For example, a Kurdish independence pageant was held in 
Mahabad, which according the the British consul in Tabriz, involved, "A woman, with her 
hands chained, and carrying two babies on her arms, represented Kurdistan. She took her 
stand before three men representing Persia, Turkey and Iraq. A hand, bearing the Hammer 
and Sickle device, then came from behind the screen and unlocked her chains. Her veil fell 
and revealed on her bosom a Red Flag bearing the words: 'Long hve Stalin, the liberator 
of small nations.1 Durakhshani, the Commandant of Persian troops...said this new activity 
in the cause of Kurdish independence had begun immediately after the inauguration of the 
Mahabad branch of the Iran-Soviet cultural Society, about three weeks ago..." 
Furthermore, when the Kurdish leader Qazi Mohammad appeared in Tabriz, "he was 
greeted with the 'Kurdish hymn to Stalin' in which Stalin is extolled as the supporter and 
the saviour of Kurdistan. Portraits of Stalin were carried in the procession. 1,255 The 
Kurdish conception of what could be constituted as modem' also bore the hallmark of 
Soviet ideology: "We desire to inform the whole world that the Kurdish nation, in solid 
unity, desire to adopt modem educational methods and to reject age old agricultural and 
other implements which have heen in use since the days of Adam, and to adopt 
mechanistic implements. . . " 256
The separatist movements in Kurdistan and Azerbaijan failed because they did not concur
255 FO 371 45503 - Kurdish Demonstrations - file 2495; E3660 dated 16 May 
1945; E8663 dated 12 November 1945.
256 FO 248 1463 file 69 - Kurdish declaration broadcast on Tabriz radio, file 
69/120/46, dated 23 April 1946.
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sufficiently with, the social reality of sentiment within those territories257, and did not 
anticipate the strength of Iranian national feeling, which effectively forced the government 
in Tehr an to take action. There is little doubt that many of the political and intellectual 
elite were concerned about copycat movements, and indeed Nash Khan had reacted to 
developments in Azerbaijan by starting his own 'Fars National Movement1, which was in 
reality ineffectual. The liberation of Azerbaijan was seen as a major turning point for 
Iranian nationalism, and popular sentiment was well expressed by chief of staff Razmara, 
who said, "Today the population of Iran is celebrating the liberation of Azerbaijan but in 
fact we should be celebrating the liberation of Iran as a whole for, by deciding to intervene 
in Azerbaijan, we have dispelled a tremendous danger and serious menace to the entire 
territory of Iran. " 258 Three ideological parameters were to benefit from the crisis in 
Azerbaijan and Kurdistan: nationalism, militarism, and dynastic nationalism. All thr ee were 
to dr aw strength from the visible triumph of the underpinning ideology of Ir anian 
nationalism.259
The idea that Iran was in need of a saviour, someone distinct from the young shah, had 
been reverberating around elite circles since the abdication of Reza Shah. Many leading 
intellectuals and politicians sought to fill this vacuum in the national consciousness,
257 FO 248 1463, file 69, reveals that Azerbaijan forces fighting the Turkish 
speaking Afshar tribe, file 69/4/46 dated 2 January 1946. Also the reality of poor 
attendance at rallies, file 69/459/46, dated 4 December 1946.
258 FO 248 1463 file 69, file 69/467/46 dated 28 December 1946.
259 'The Times' 19 December 1946, notes that Turkish books were ritually and 
publicly burned in Tabriz.
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including the young shah, but he lacked credibility among the elite.260 This preoccupation 
with a great leader is exemplified by the fact that most political parties were centred 
around individual politicians - the Tudeh was the one significant exception to this rule. 
Qavam was the first politician able to exploit this sentiment and give substance to the 
myth. He spared no effort in cultivating this image of himself and even tested the idea with 
the British Embassy261.
Among the many nationalist leaflets chopped in Tehran to mark the success of the 
government mission to Azerbaijan (which effectively signalled its ultimate return to Iran), 
were ones which read, "Freedom lovers of Iran guided by Qavam as Saltaneh, Ban's able 
stateman, are advancing towards new and greater triumphs and victories. " 262 Qavam's 
cultivation of this image was not surprisingly to draw criticism from his political foes who 
were at once jealous of his success and anxious about his authoritarian tendencies. 
Characteristically, the saviour was charged with aspiring to 'dictatorship' and the 
dissimulation which had made him the 'guide' of freedom lovers', was used to equally 
good effect against Qavam. Far’ from being a friend of freedom, Qavam was now decried 
as its enemy; the newspaper Atesh headlined that 'Freedom was in Danger' . 263 So 
suspicious were his critics of his intentions, that a power cut which prevented the full
260 FO 248 1427 - Persian Government and Internal Affairs, file 544; interview 
with Zarin Kafsh, dated 3 September 1943; also undated report of conference in favour 
of Seyyid Zia on 14 June 1943.
261 FO 248 1427, file 544; interview with Qavam dated 25 November 1943.
262 FO 371 52678 file 5; E5994, dated 28 June 1946.
263 FO 248 1474 - Persian Government & Internal Situation, file 13, file no. 
13/74/47 dated 14 July 1947.
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broadcast of the Sliali's Noruz speech, but which was restored in time for Qavam's, was 
asciibed to a deliberate action by the Prime Minister!264
Political intrigue prevented Qavam from fully capitalising on his carefully cultivated myth 
of the saviour, and it would be left to Dr Mosaddeq, and to some extent Ayatollah 
Kashanito truly exploit the myth. For the time being it was the military and the Shah who 
basked in the reflected glory o f Qavam. For the military, the re-occupation of Azerbaijan 
ensured then* rehabilitation in the national consciousness. They were once again perceived 
as a tool of national unity. In this respect the crisis had positive implications for the 
military. The Shah, as Commander in Chief, also gained credit but the net gain was 
probably not as substantial. The Shah and the dynasty had come in for substantial criticism 
in Azerbaijan; the Shah's birthday was not commemorated265, and Reza Shah was 
described as Reza Khan266. Furthermore, insiders were aware that the 'liberation' of 
Azerbaijan had more to do with Qavam's diplomacy than the Shah's leadership.
Nevertheless, the Shah gained because it was considered necessary to restore the political 
balance.267 Such sentiments were able to benefit from the increased popular appeal of the 
monarchy in times of national crisis. Thus the chief of staff Razmara, in the French 
language newspaper Journal de Tehran emphasised that the Shah preceded Qavam in
264 FO 248 1474, file 13, file no. 13/26/47 dated 26 March 1947.
265 FO 248 1463 file 69, file no. 69/381/46 memo dated 28 October 1946.
266 FO 248 1462 file 65, Article from AzadMellat dated 6  October 1946.
267 FO 248 1427 file 544, interview with members of the elite, dated 11 July 1943, 
in which they acknowledge the importance of royal mystique in maintaining the loyalty of 
the tribes.
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significance for the liberation of Azerbaijan: "...Celni qui fUt le principal auteur de cette 
liberation est sans aucun doute Sa Majeste Imperiale le Chahinchah... Apres Sa Majeste 
hnperiale le Chahinchah, celui qui joua le plus grand role dans la liberation de l'Azerbaijan, 
fut Ghavam Saltaneh. 1,268
The Times reported that, "The troops were enthusiastically received in Tabriz by the 
crowds who lined the streets draped with the national colours and decorated with portraits 
of the Shah." The monarchy and the army cannot but have benefited from the fact that, 
"hi Tehran the opinion is that this is one of the great days in the history of Persia." They 
were both centre stage in the grand theatre of Banian history. A national holiday was 
declared and a 'big military parade1 was arranged.269 It was also noted that the Kurds 
welcomed the arrival of the troops with patriotic demonstrations, although some of this 
enthusiasm was probably engineered.270
The Azerbaijan crisis effectively marked the beginning of the Cold War271; a development 
which the Shah and the army were quick to exploit, hi an audience with Le Rougetel, the 
Shah was quick to situate Ban within the new Cold War tensions, and to rationalise his 
desire for a large well equipped army. Thus, "The Shah also spoke of the re-equipment 
of the army which he is now inclined to think of as a first line of defence against a Soviet
268 FO 248 1463 file 69, file no. 69/467/46, dated 28 December 1946.
269 The Times - 14 December 1946. See also The Times - 27 October 1946, which 
indicates the popular reception received by the shah and the army.
270 The Times - 19 December 1946.
271 Rossow op. cit. pg 17.
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invasion of the Middle East. " 272 The communists, down though not out, reacted angrily 
to this new tendency. Then* chief newspaper, Mardum ridiculed the new Cold War 
environment, describing, "America's declared interest in the integrity of Persia as blatant 
hypocrisy, the real purpose of the USA being firstly to prepare Persia as a battleground 
for a capitalist struggle against the USSR and secondly to use the country as a market for 
old clothes and military junk . " 273
The Shah, meanwhile continued to capitalise on his new popularity with a three week visit 
to Azerbaijan in 1947. By all accounts he was received enthusiastically, "Bouquets of 
flowers were thrown into the train and in some villages cows and sheep were slaughtered 
in honour of the Shah....The royal visit is a symbol of the newly restored national 
unity. . . " 274 The popularity of the Shah at the conclusion of a tense national crisis, 
especially given his relative ineffectuality throughout it, is testament to the fact that the 
monarchy was the personalisation of nationalism in the eyes of many Iranians; and, as an 
expression of political myth enjoyed a degree of institutionalisation within Iranian political 
culture. It was the symbol of national unity and coidd be identified with interpretations of 
'Ban’.
The fact that there was veiy little talk of republicanism reflected the understanding of this 
fact by the political and intellectual elite. However the Shah's interpretation differed. For
272 FO 248 1474 - Persian Government and Internal Situation, file 13, Le Rougetel 
in audience with the Shah, file no. 13/124/47, dated 13 November 1947.
273 FO 248 1474 file 13, Creswellto Bevin, file no. 13/109/47 dated 23 September
1947.
274 The Times - 29 May 1947.
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him the sanctity of the institution was not distinct from the person; adulation for the 
institution (as expressed, for instance by Razmara above) was in his eyes adulation for his 
person. Rather than respect the institution to which he was bom, the Shah was to chaw 
increasing criticism for the 'uncharacteristic' behaviour of the court, a problem he would 
exacerbate as he turned his attention to developing the ideology of dynastic nationalism.
Ideological Reconstruction
Redefining the parameters o f  Dynastic Nationalism:
Increasingly convinced by his own sense of mission, the Shah was encom aged to develop 
the ideology of dynastic nationalism. Acutely aware of the problems of associating himself 
too closely with the dynastic nationalism of his father, Mohammad Reza Shah moved 
cautiously at first, and sought to redefine himself within the context o f his ideological 
predicament. He sought to identify himself with the new interpretations of nationalism, but 
this policy of differentiation from his father sat uncomfortably with his own sentiments and 
when he felt secure enough he turned his attention to reinventing the past to suit his 
present image.
As has been noted, the institution of the monarchy increased in popularity during peak 
periods of uncertainty and tension275, and its political influence among the rural masses, 
in one sense the 'politically unaware1 remained strong. Even among the politically aware,
275 FO 248 1474 file 13, Press Summary, file no. 13/76/47, dated 8  July 1947.
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talk of 'republicanism' in this period was relatively slight. This fact is even admitted by 
critics of the notion of monarchical mystique, such as Azirni who notes that, "..it appears 
that there had been no serious thinking towards such an end [republicanism]," adding that 
it was an indication of the strength of "royalist subculture" within the Iranian body- 
politic.276
The British diplomat Lawford, who was able to become quite close to the Shah noted: "I 
was very much struck by the popularity of the Shah in all the countryside through which 
we passed on our various joruneys. Every morning as we rode out of the gates of the 
palace and through the villages that are scattered over the valley there were groups of 
peasants, often in very ragged clothes, who shouted and cheered and applauded with what 
appeared to be sincere enthusiasm. " 277 This enthusiasm was facilitated by the fact that the 
Shah was apparently at ease when it came to dealing with the common people, and was 
not averse to walking among them unguarded and hearing their petitions.278
At the same time, the Palilavi Dynasty, especially in the immediate aftermath of the 
abdication of Reza Shah, was deeply unpoprdar, in particular with the political and
276 F Azhni Ran: The Crisis of Democracy London. IB  Tauris, 1989, pg 344. See 
also FO 248 1493, file 101/2, Seyyid Zi'a comments, file 101/2/248/50, dated 1 0  
December 1950.
277 FO 248 1493 - General Political Situation, file 1 0 1 /2 , conversations between 
Lawford and the Shah, file no. 101/2/196/50, dated 16 September 1950.
278 Ibid, Lawford, also see file 101/2/185/50, Alain's comments on the Shah's trip 
to Kurdistan, dated 28 August 1950.
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intellectual elite.279 It may be argued that as more Ir anians became politically aware and 
discerning, so the fascination with monarchy waned, and criticism of the specific activities 
of the dynasty grew. The Shah was severely handicapped in this respect as his father's hen, 
and by the continuing antics of the court which clashed dr amatically with the popular 
expectation of what an Iranian royal corut should be like. Thus during his dispute with 
Qavam in the aftermath of the liberation of Azerbaijan, it was noted that Qavam still 
elicited respect and sympathy as a part of a noble and distinguished family while the Shah 
was disliked as the son of an upstart and a tyrant.280
Court extravagance was arguably a more serious problem since it was one the Shah was 
expected to manage. As early as 1943 members of the establishment criticised the 
excessive expenditure of the royal family and doubts were expressed as to the Shah's 
willingness to curb this expenditure.281 There was continued criticism of lavish parties and 
Princess Ashraf was increasingly viewed as the real power behind the throne .282 Such 
behaviour was to carry social and political repurcussions and it was noted that, "..feeling 
now varies between mild dismay and violent indignation at His Majesty's failure to make 
himself master in his own house. " 283
279 As early as 1944, Mosaddeq urged the Shah to distance himself from his father 
- FO 248 1442 - Persian Govt., file 150, file no. 150/118/44, dated 17 October 1944.
280 FO 248 1474 file 13, Memo file no. 13/36/47 dated 26 April 1947.
281 FO 248 1426 - Interviews with the Shah, files dated 26 July 1943, and 13 July
1943.
282 FO 248 1493 file 101/2 - the clergy were similarly un-enamoured by the affairs 
of the court, file no. 101/2/248/50, dated 10 December 1950.
283 FO 248 1485 - Persian Government and Internal Situation, file 21; file no.21/13
(continued..,)
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The Shah was, however, sufficiently moved by his reception in Azerbaijan and by the 
general popularity of the monarchy as an institution, to effectively ignore the criticism and 
seek to redefine himself and his dynasty in the eyes of the Iranian people. He was 
encouraged in this decision from an early stage, by courtiers and other sycophants, as well 
as those who saw political advantage in manipidating the shah. As the British Embassy 
noted in 1942, "The Shah...is gradually being got at by flatterers: in fact by just the sort 
of people who turned his papa in the wrong path. One of the major curses in Iran in the 
past has been the king-worship which dates from Darius or earlier. . . 1,284
Men such as General Razmara used displacement and narrative, as well as drawing 
unfavourable comparisons with Reza Shah, to urge the Shah to greater action: "...He is 
continually filling the Shah's head with the type of advice most palatable e.g. be the man 
your father was' - 'the country is in such a mess that only the personal rule of an absolute 
ruler can save her' - 'the Majlis: its rooted interests and internal jealousies is preventing 
the government from governing therefore you must shut it.1"285 Others genuinely felt that 
the Shah had much to offer, including Alam, and Seyyid Zia who believed him to be a 
'Man of Destiny’.286
(...continued)
49 Lambton's Assessment dated 27 January 1949, file no. 21/262/49 Le Rougetel to Bevin 
dated 18 November 1949.
284 FO 248 1407 - HM Minister's relations with the Shah, file 628, Memo dated 
10 April 1942.
285 FO 248 1442 - Persian Govt. & Internal Situation, file 150; report file no. 
150/174/44 dated 2 December 1944.
286 f o  248 1485, file 21 - conversation with Seyyid Zia, file no. 21/290/49, dated 
12 December 1949. FO 248 1493, file 101/2 - conversation with Alam file no.
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I ll attempting to reinvent himself, the Shah sought to distance himself from the traditional 
social alliances of the monarchy and instead to be seen as the champion of the emergent 
young radical intelligentsia. He was a keen advocate of social reform and made it known 
that the plight of the average Iranian was a matter of great personal concern. Thus Bullard 
noted in 1943, "I felt that the Shah now wishes to be regarded as the champion of youth 
and of the lower classes and the protagonist of social reform...," adding significantly, 
"...that he greatly distrusts the class represented by the Prime Minister."287 Frutheimore, 
"...The Shah said that the hope of the country lay in the hand of the young - in ideas and 
not necessarily only in age. He referred to a movement and what he described as 'le type 
des jeunes' which he said was growing, and encouragement must be given to them."288
Indications are that the Shah enjoyed some success in pursuing this new image, as the 
military attache noted, "The Shah was given a very enthusiastic reception by a crowd of 
about 10,000 spectators at a football match between British and Persian teams in Tehran, 
which may indicate that attempts that have recently been made to represent him as the 
champion of youth have not been without success."289 It is debatable how genuine the 
Shah was in his advocacy of social reform and arguably his revolutionary credentials were 
always tempered by political realities which dictated that his natural allies remained the
(...continued)
101/2/56/50 dated 25 March 1950. The Shah may have also chawu strength from the 
example o f Napoleon, see FO 248 1442, file 150, file no. 150/18/44, dated 1 February 
1944, which notes the prominent placement of a statuette of Napoleon in the Shah's study.
287 FO 248 1423 - Interviews with the Shah, dated 15 January 1943.
288 p o  2 4 8  1 4 2 6  - Interviews with the Shah, dated 15 April 1943.
289 FO 371 35109 - Intelligence Summary file 110, E552/110/34 dated 27 January
1943 .
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conservative tr aditional elements in society. Furthermore, the failure o f the court and to 
an increasing extent, the Shah, to curtail then often lavish expenditure drew criticism, 
especially from the most extreme left-wing groups.
In order to counter this challenge, the Shah attempted, imsuccessfiilly, to become even 
more radical, at one stage advocating a further decentralisation of power290, and shocking 
many of his traditional supporters, by announcing on a visit to the United States that he 
intended to redistribute crown lands to the peasants.291 Needless to say, "...The impact on 
the political scene has been very great. Liberal and reformist elements see in the Shah's 
decision the beginning of a process which alter for the better the whole economic, social 
and political structure of Persia; the great landowners and those who depend on them are 
alarmed and ar e seeking to prevent and forestall the promulgation of analogous legislation 
applicable to then own estates. " 292 However the Shah limited the favourable impact of this 
legislation by putting the funds received from the sale of lands at the disposal of a charity 
run by the ever unpopular Princess Ashraf293. Thus it may be said, that he succeeded in 
alienating both the radicals and the traditionalists.
Contrary to the image which he tried to portray, the Shah was neither sympathetic to
290 FO 248 1493 - General Political Situation, file 101/2/118/50, conversation with 
the Shah, dated 10 June 1950.
291 FO 248 1485 - Persian Government & Internal Situation, file 21, file no. 
21/271/49 dated 24 November 1949.
292 FO 371 91519 - The Shah's sale of Crown Lands, file 1461, E1461, dated 12 
February 1951.
293 FO 371 75504 - Royal Family Affairs, file 1944, no specific date or file no; 
dated 1949.
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greater decentralisation, nor particularly enamoured with democracy. Indeed the evidence 
suggests that he favour ed greater centralisation with himself at the helm.294 In marry ways 
the militaristic vision predominated. In order to make such an outcome plausible, he was 
forced to re-cast the image of his father, to many Iranians the quintessential despot, in a 
new mould. As one personalities list reported, "...the present ruler, retains a waim filial 
regard for his father and pays him the compliment of imitating him as much as possible; 
he also initiates propaganda in favour of Reza, but it is not taken seriously. " 295 This 
propaganda involved the careful reconstruction of the historical record stressing the 
achievements of Reza Shah, while ignoring the essential arbitrariness of his rule. Thus for 
instance in 1943, there was, "A campaign for the whitewashing of the ex-Shah, 
representing him as a misunderstood and much maligned public servant, led astray by 
astute politicians. " 295 This reinterpretation also allowed the Shah to realign himself with 
the radicals by blaming the evils of Reza Shah on the traditional elite political class. 
Nevertheless on Reza Shah's death the following year few were overcome by grief. The
294 See FO 248 1423 - Interviews with the Shah, discussion withe military attache, 
dated 16 August 1943; general report imdated; conversation with Misbahzadeh dated 8  
May 1943; FO 248 1442 - Persian Govt.., conversation with Lascelles, file no. 150/85/44 
dated 14 August 1944; FO 248 1493 - General Political Situation, conversations with the 
Shah file no. 101/2/119/50, dated 12 June 1950; conversation with Shepherd file no. 
101/2/104/50, dated 31 May 1950; FO 248 1514 - Internal Situation, interview with the 
Shah, file no. 10101/12/51, dated 14 Januray 1951.
295 FO 371 40224 - Personalities, file 2218, dated 14 March 1944. There is 
sufficient evidence to suggest that the Shah idolised his father; see FO 248 1442 - Persian 
Govt, file 150, conversation between Trott and the Shah, file no. 150/81/44, dated 27 July
1944. Also FO 248 1493, file 101/2, conversation with Shepherd, file no. 101/2/211/50, 
dated 9 October 1950; conversations with Lawford, file 101/2/196/50, dated 16 
September 1950.
296 FO 248 1427 - Persian Govt, file 544, conversation with Minister of Interior 
Bahramy, dated 22 February 1943; see also FO 248 1426 - Interviews with the Shah, 
memo dated February 1943;
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Shah's decision to initiate a period of mourning was criticised, and many sections of the 
press analysed Reza Shah's reign unfavourably. The Tudeh Party even expelled a member 
who had attended a mourning ceremony.297
This, however did not deter the Shah, and the strategy gained momentum in the aftermath 
of the triumph of Azerbaijan, as preparations were made to bring the body back to Iran. 
As Le Rougetel noted, "Many laudatory articles on the late Shah's reign have recently 
been published urging that justice should at last be done to the memory o f a great and 
patriotic sovereign.298 In seeking to achieve his father's rehabilitation into the national 
narrative he capitalised on growing nostalgia for the order' his father represented, in stark 
contrast to the apparent chaos of contemporary Iran.299 Thus he encouraged the Majlis to 
confer the title of the 'Great' on his father, in a deliberate attempt to sanctify the dynasty. 
The move was not welcomed, and many felt that the Majlis was 'usurping the functions 
of history1.300 As Le Rougetel noted, "...the attempt to elevate the reputation of Reza Shah 
by conferring him the title of 'the Gr eat1 has offended the Persian sense of propriety. 
Especially of late the Persians have been favourably inclined towards achievements of the 
late Shah, but they do not consider that this is the moment to honour him with the title
297 FO 248 1442 - file 150, file no. 150/144/44, dated 18 October 1944.
298 FO 248 1478 - Royal Family Affairs, file 83, Le Rougetel, file no. 83/7/47, 
dated 2 February 1947,
299 FO 248 1442, file 150, file no 150/97/44, dated 5 September 1944. Also FO 
248 1493 file 101/2, conversation with Shepherd, file no. 101/2/229/50, dated 20 
November 1950; FO 248 1514, file 10101, Shepherd memo, file no. 10101/68/51, dated 
12 March 1951.
300 The Times - 22 June 1949.
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which has so far been reserved for such venerated figures as Cyrus and Shah Abbas."301
Despite, or because of, this concerted campaign, the practicalities of returning the body 
of Reza Shah proved problematic and prolonged, not least because the Shia clergy were 
unsympathetic. The Shah had wanted to bury Reza Shah in the grounds of Saadabad 
Palace, but the mullahs argued that since he had been interred in non-Shia ground, he had 
to be re-interred within proximity of a shrine. The Shah's suggestion of either Mashhad 
or Qom was turned down by the local ulema.302 With respect to the tomb itself, the Tudeh 
Party criticised the lavish expenditure, and protested that the money could have been 
better expended on the poor.303 Probably the best and most favourable commentary on the 
whole affair was offered by a local gardener who noted, "Why do they not leave the old 
Shah where he is? Then there would be plenty of room in the new tomb for the present 
one."304
The Shah had been greatly assisted in his attempt to both reinvent himself and his dynasty 
by a fortunate escape from assassination which had elicited widespread public sympathy.305 
On a visit to Tehran University to commemorate its foundation by his father the Shah had
301 FO 371 75504 - Royal Family Affairs, file 1944, Le Rougetel, date 1949.
302 FO 248 1478 - Royal Family Affairs, file 83, Le Rougetel, file no. 83/19/47, 
dated 8 May 1947.
303 FO 248 1494 - Tudeh Party activities, file 101/5, article from Mardum, file no. 
101/5/50/50, dated 15 May 1950.
304 FO 248 1513 - Royal Family Affairs, file 194/2, file no. 194/2/8/50, dated 19 
April 1950.
305 FO 248 1485 - Persian Government & Internal Situation file 21, file nos 
21/44/49 dated 14 February 1949, 21/36/49 dated 7fh February 1949.
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been shot and bit several times at close range, but by dint of good fortune survived the 
attack despite being wounded in the face. The assassination attempt, and its almost 
miraculous failure, one of several throughout his reign, was to have a profound impact on 
the Shah’s perception of his own role and manifest destiny. Public sympathy, outraged at 
the attack on the institution, if not the person of the monarch, nevertheless provided the 
Shah with further encouragement and provided the catalyst, despite some considered 
protests, for the government to outlaw the Tudeh Party.306
Arguably, the Shah mis-interpreted public sentiments when he decided to exploit it to his 
benefit by pushing through constitutional reforms which would increase his direct political 
power through the establishment of a second representative house, the Senate. The reform 
which was pushed through in the face of concerted opposition, meant that the Shah would 
be able to nominate half the senators, hi order to sell reform particularly to foreign critics, 
the Shah unashamedly used dissimulation and universalisation appealing to the ideological 
logic of the West . hi an interview with a journalist from the United Pr ess which was 
reprinted in the French language Journal de Tehran, the Shah noted that the creation of 
a senate had restored balance to the constitution, and that now the Iranian monarchy 
better resembled the constitutional monarchies of Europe.307
The Shah, convinced of his own mission, and supported by a carefiilly cultivated myth of 
his dynasty’s role in the progressive narrative, had promised that his new powers would
306 FO 248 1485 - Persian Government & Internal Situation file 21 no 21/46/49 
dated 11th February 1949.
307 FO 248 1485, file 21, file no. 21/143/49, dated 11 May 1949.
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allow liim to implement practically, the social causes he had been championing. The reality 
was that he did little better than his predecessors. As Le Rougetel noted in a letter to 
Bevin, "The Shah, who had promised a new deal, has failed to live up to his promise. 
Therefore it is generally felt, he must be either knave or a fool, or both. This is of course, 
a heaven sent oppoitunity for all adversaries of the Shah, his dynasty or his country, and 
they have not been slow to exploit it."308
It was indicative of the Shah’s less than central role in Iranian politics at this time that just 
as his pursuit o f dynastic nationalism was gathering pace, he foimd himself marginalised 
by events and outmanoeuvred by his political rivals. Far from projecting himself as the 
leading character in the political theatre, the Shah found his influence waning rapidly. His 
wedding to Soraya Esfandiari, intended to solidify the dynasty by providing a male hen, 
was a haphazard affair. Efforts were made to capitalise on the fact that Soraya was 
Iranian, despite the fact that her mother was German, and this does seem to have flattered 
national pride, though it is a matter of debate how popular the wedding ceremony and 
festivities actually were.309 Though the press dutifully trumpeted the occasion and new 
postage stamps were issued, there was some concern over the inclusion of 'opium 
smoking' Bakhtiaris into the Court, and the mullahs fiowned on the European character 
and upbringing of the new queen.310 Once again sensitive to charges o f extravagance, the
308 pQ 2 4 g i4855 file 21, Le Rougetel to Bevin, file no. 21/262/49, dated 18 
November 1949.
309 FO 371 91627 - Wedding to Soraya, file 1941, E1941 dated 21 February 1951, 
and E1941, dated 26 February 1951. See also The Times 12/2/51.
310 FO 248 1513 -Royal Family Affairs, file 194/2, file no. 194/2/24/50, dated 13 
October 1950.
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Shall limited the festivities, so much so that, "When..it became known that though the 
Agha Khan and Begum were coming for the wedding, they would not be accompanied by 
Rita Heywoitli, the realisation struck home that glamour as well as pomp was to be 
absent: the issue of a special commemorative postage stamp and the reported arrival of 
a German circus were poor consolations."311
The Shah's first attempt to seize the political initiative had failed. His youthfid enthusiasm 
for his father and the dynasty had resulted in the premature implementation of policies 
which he could neither sustain nor the public genuinely support. By seeking to directly 
influence the political process he needlessly attracted criticism and was effectively 
outmanouevred by politicians who were more astute and more in tune with public 
sentiment. As a joint US-British assessment noted in 1951, "The Shah, .has thus far been 
unable to use nationalist elements to strengthen the crown or to effect much needed 
reforms in the face o f the landowning-merchant oligarchy."312 Tlie fact that by late 1951, 
pamphlets protested the official commemoration of the Shah's birthday, is an indication 
of how low the esteem of the dynasty and indeed the institution of monarchy had fallen.313 
It was to be Dr Mosaddeq rather than the Shah who was to become the supreme icon of 
the nationalist movement.
311 The Times - 11/2/51. FO 371 91627, E1941, dated 26 February 1951.
312 FO 248 1514 - Internal Situation, file 10101, file no. 10101/452/52, dated 19 
November 1951.
313 FO 248 1514, file 10101, pamphlet distributed at the Tehran sports stadium, 
file no. 10101/418/51 dated 29 October 1951, some of the pamphlets were actually 
thrown into the royal box.
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The Oil Nationalisation Crisis & the triumph o f ''nationalism
The oil nationalisation crisis which witnessed the ascendancy of Dr Mohammad Mosaddeq 
as the supreme symbol of Iranian nationalism was a fitting apogee of a period permeated 
with social tensions and political crises. All the major ideological trends which had been 
exhibited, albeit tentatively, since 1941, now competed in an atmosphere of heightened 
tension, resulting in the polarisation of ideological constructions and a propensity for 
political myth which encouraged the development of semiological or mythic chains with 
mythic constructs developing and reacting to previous constructions and consequently 
building on each other.314
The confiontation with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) and Great Britain was a 
direct consequence of the developments in Azerbaijan and Qavam's clever out­
manoeuvring of Soviet territorial and economic designs on northern Iran. While it 
appeared as though the Shah had gained the upper hand on the domestic political scene, 
the country's nationalist deputies, probably encouraged by a disenchanted Soviet Union, 
turned their attention to the other Great Power with possible territorial and definite 
economic interests in the country. It seemed logical to many that the arguments used to 
prevent a Soviet oil concession in the Caspian, could now be put to good use against the 
existing British oil concession in the south. Under the circumstances, it is surprising that 
neither the British, nor indeed the Shah appreciated the growing nationalist outrage 
against AIOC. As a result, they were both caught unawares by the first traditionally based
314 See above, pp 13-14.
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patrician politician to exploit and encourage popular feeling. This was facilitated by the 
comprehensive development and use of an aspect of nationalism which may be categorised 
as 'anti-imperialism'.
Dr Mosaddeq provided the concept of anti-imperialism, a concept with which many 
intellectuals315 and working class Iranians would have been familiar, with a tangible and 
accessible target. Just as Dr Mosaddeq sought to identify himself with the ideology of 
nationalism so he identified his enemy with all that as anti-nationalist. Thus, just as Dr 
Mosaddeq became the personalisation of the ideology of nationalism so too did the Anglo- 
Iranian Oil Company and to a lesser extent Great Britain (in the tangible manifestation of 
the British Embassy and Consular offices) became the familiarisation of the opposite of 
nationalism. They both became potent symbols of ideological constructs, symptoms and 
causes of an intense ideological conflict with a profound impact on the political culture 
of the country.
The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was the very visible manifestation of foreign economic 
and political control in Iran. It existence, and the generous concession which it enjoyed 
irritated many Iranians, but it was Dr Mosaddeq, who sensing the mood, recognised the 
opportunity provided by the need to ratify the Supplementary Oil Agreement, to challenge 
this. The National Front, which Dr Mosaddeq led, initiated a conceited campaign of 
dissimulation and fragmentation to excite popular opinion against AIOC. The oil company
315 Khalil Maliki formulated a comprehensive theoretical fiamework for this 'anti- 
imperialism' dubbing it the third force. It is at this stage that the notion of'neither East nor 
West1 enters Iranian political discourse.
- 151-
represented all tliat was wrong with Iran, and it was argued, was the major obstacle to 
reform and social progress.
Thus Mosaddeq characterised the oil company as 'dragon' which was sitting on a 'hidden 
treasure’ (ie oil), and stressed that, "The first step towards any reform in Persia is the 
nationalisation of oil."316 Later, as pressures increased, he was even more explicit in 
stating, "..that is our thesis, that all the poverty, confusion and calamity that now have 
befallen upon us are the results of the unjustified interferences by the former Oil company 
and the British Government in our internal affairs.1,317
Significantly, Mosaddeq was keen not to implicate the British people in his attack on the 
oil company. This may have been the dual consequence of his own instinctive dislike for 
excessive mob incitement as well as his realisation that the movement had to rationalised 
abroad, especially in the United States. Thus in a speech following the nationalisation he 
argued that the British government had been unreasonable and , "would not accept this 
fan offer by you people of Persia." Upon which the crowd chanted 'Death to Britain’, and 
Mosaddeq responded by saying, "No, I will not have you say, 'Death to Britain'; we want 
God to guide the British government to recognise our undoubted rights."318
316 The Times - 25 May 1951.
317 FO 248 1531, file 10105, file no. 10105/153A/52, dated 12 April 1952.
318 FO 248 1514 - Internal Situation, summary of Dr Mosaddeq's speech, file no. 
10101/368/51, dated 28 September 1951. See also 'Conversation with Dr Mosaddeq', by 
Kingsley Martin, in the New Statesman and Nation, 12 January 1952, in which he stresses 
several times that there is no quarrel with the British people. It may be interesting to 
consider the impact of Khalil Maliki's visit to Britain when he mixed with working class 
people, and came away with a firm belief that the two 'peoples' had much in common.
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The campaign against Britain was greatly assisted by the perception of British 
omnipotence319 which lent great weight and a sense of historical auspiciousness to the 
movement to nationalise AIOC. Indeed, it would not be too far fetched to suggest that the 
movement took on the characteristics of a crusade or jihad, as was to become more 
apparent by the involvement of Ayatollah Kashani and the emergence of religious 
nationalism. The first indications of this radicalisation of nationalist ideology was the 
assassination of Prime Minister Razmara, who arguably had remained pragmatic to the 
last. Far from being condemned, Razmara's assassin, a member of the Fedayin-i Islam, 
was hailed as a national hero and granted a Parliamentary pardon. None of the ulema were 
willing to accept the invitation to deliver the sermon at Razmara's funeral, and on the very 
day of his assassination people in the bazaar openly rejoiced. The President of the Senate 
was har d pressed to describe the murder as an 'unexpected event.1320 Dr Mosaddeq went 
on record to say that, "The bullet which was fired by Khalil Tahmasibi [Razmara's 
assassin] not only saved Persia from a gr eat danger but it also saved the whole of the 
East."321
The notion that the movement to nationalise the oil industry was one of 'universal' or 
international importance was one that Mussadiq continually stressed. The notion that tliis
319 This is epitomised by a private discussion between the leading fights of the 
National Front, and a British diplomat who notes, "My numerous denials that we were all 
powerful and ubiquitous in Persian politics were greeted with polite laughter - FO 248 
1493, file 101/2, file no. 101/2/211/50, dated 9 October 1950.
320 FO 248 1514, file 10101, file no 10101/78/51, dated 11 March 1951.
321 FO 248 1531, file 10105, a pamphlet circulating in Tehran, file no. 10105/88, 
dated 3 March 1952. FO 248 1493, file 101/2, file no. 101/2/261/50 dated 31 December- 
1950, notes that the National Front hoisted pictures of the murderer o f Hazhir in the 
Majlis with the caption praising him for having killed a 'traitor'.
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was an auspicious moment for Iran and for world history, not only reassured a population 
under increasing economic pressure but it also encouraged that little extra effort. Thus 
Mosaddeq would argue, "Sometimes great opportunities arise for nations which, if 
exploited intelligently, will change the course of history to then advantage and will end 
centuries o f privation, misery, and despair." Then as if to reassure the country as to its 
ability to achieve this historic change, he added, "No one can deny our ancient and 
glorious culture. The pages of history bear witness to the talent and capabilities of our 
forefathers. The museums of the world vividly manifest the genius of our ancestors."322 
Again, as pressures increased so narrativisation, naturalisation and rationalisation were 
used to legitimate the struggle, "No effort, no rewar d. History bears witness that no nation 
has ever achieved independence or gained freedom without undergoing toils and 
hardships."323 hi a radio message broadcast in 1953, he argued, "No nation has succeeded 
in shaking off foreign yoke without struggle, as can be testified by ancient and modem 
histories o f nations and freedom movements... Our movement served as inspiration to 
national risings of other peoples, and today peoples of north and south Africa anxiously 
await oiu success."324
Dr Mosaddeq's nationalist message fared less well abroad as he sought to convince the 
United States in particular that Iran's struggle was a natural outcome of nationalist
322 FO 248 1514, file 10101, file no. 10101/517/51, dated 18 December 1951.
323 FO 248 1531, file 10105, speech to 17th Majlis, file no. 1015/153A/52, dated 
12 April 1952.
324 FO 371 104561, file 1015, text of Mosaddeq's speech, file no. 1015/26, dated 
23 January 1953..
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aspirations as enshrined in the new United Nations325, and that the movement was similar 
to the America's own struggle for independence against Britain. Dr Mosaddeq used 
universalisation and rationalisation to legitimise his case before the United States. His 
methods were not lost upon the British, who discovered that their appeal to the United 
Nations had inadvertently allowed the Iranian premier to travel to the United States and 
present his case in person. Thus one journalist commented, "Ardent nationalists who are 
engaged in enlisting sympathy in the United States, always tiy and invoke the 'spirit of 
'76'.1,326 There was also a marked increase in the use of the word 'liberty', for the benefit 
of US audiences.327
Dr Mosaddeq became increasing disillusioned with the lack of practical help from the 
United States, hi an interview with American editors he complained, "We are veiy grateful 
to the American people for then* veiy valuable moral support...but we expected the 
American government to pay more consideration for the rightful demands of the Iranian 
people, being cognizant of the fact that the American people have acquired their liberty 
and independence through their continued national struggle.1,328
325 The Times - 3 May 1951; of course Iran had been one of the first countries to 
appeal to the UN Security Council over the occupation o f Azerbaijan, with apparent 
success.
326 The Times - 22 October 1951; see also The Times - 8/10/51; 23/10/51.
327 Iranian politicians had frequently liberally used such words as 'despotism', 
'tyranny' and 'freedom'. The use of 'liberty' may simply reflect the preference of a given 
translator, nevertheless its use may not be entir ely coincidental.
328 FO 248 1531, file 10105, file no. 10105/124, dated 24 March 1952 - not 
surprisingly, the word 'liberty' is used many times in his talk. FO 371 98633, file 11345, 
E l 1345, dated 20 March 1952 notes that, "This was beautifully stage managed by 
Mosaddeq who..used his opportunity so skilfully that it contributed largely to the
(continued...)
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It would be erroneous to suggest however that Dr Mosaddeq was universally successful 
in justifying the pursuit of his policies. On the contrary, as economic austerity began to 
bite, Dr Mosaddeq’s relative success in manipulating ideological constructs was subjected 
to an equally acute reaction. The auspicious moment in Iranian history, the notion of no 
gain without pain, decreased in attractiveness as hardship began to be felt. The National 
Front, compounded then problems by harping on the same themes which seemed 
increasingly ridiculous. Furthermore, the National Front became increasingly ruthless in 
its suppression of critics, alienating many of its supporters, including Ayatollah Kashani 
who complained of unconstitutional behaviour*. Opponents were directly attacked as 
agents of the British329. Dr Fatemi was quick to ascribe blame for his near assassination 
on the machinations of British Intelligence, and on his way to the hospital was quoted as 
alleging, "The British killed me."330 It is not entirely coincidental that the National Front 
coalition began to fall apart as the tangible and familiar manifestation o f the British bogey, 
in the guise of the British Embassy was removed from the scene, when diplomatic ties 
were finally severed.
Many critics of National Front policy found it difficult to directly challenge their 
fundamental goal, not only because of the practical difficulties, but because nationalist 
ideology had effectively become institutionalised within the political culture. To be
(...continued)
discomfiture of his enemies in the Senate."
329 The Times - 27 September 1951.
330 FO 248 1531, file 10105, quoted from Bakhtar-e Imruz, file no. 10105/141, 
dated 31 March 1952. His impromptu remark was quoted in the newspaper Shahid, file 
no 10105/88, dated 3 March 1952.
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labelled a 'traitor' or a 'foreign hireling' was the worst possible slur that could be inflicted, 
and so criticism tended to be of methods as opposed to principles. Anonymous writers 
however were able to use ridicule to good effect against the theatrical Dr Mosaddeq. A 
leaflet, entitled, 'A  defence of Dr Mosaddeq by the late Shir Ali Khan, Muzaffar ud Din 
Shah's gunman' is indicative of some of the reaction to the dramatic rhetoric of the 
National Front, and growing popular frustration, it begins:
"Why does this foo lish  nation not appreciate the great leader who has fre e d  them from  
the yoke o f  colonialism, and w>hy do they complain that they have no bread and sugar?
The intelligent and able leader is indignant that the people only think o f  their stomachs 
and considers them to be worthless. The people say that the leader is m ad but M atin  
D aftari says madness is a good thing and without it the leader could not have 
accomplished so much. Were not Hitler and M ussolini both mad!
M akki says that oil is dead and we should live without it. D idn't our forefathers live 
without oil fo r  thousands o f  years? The possession o f  motor cars and railways does not 
add to the honour o f  the nation. See what fin e  people this great leader has appointed to 
govern you....
The ignorant people should not question the conduct o f  their leaders, who know better 
than they do. I f  M usaddiq has made any mistake it has been his kindness which has 
encouraged the people to ask fo r  reforms. Oh stupid people, what do you  know about oil, 
what does it matter to you  that American oil shares have gone up. Am erica is a great 
nation and has as many donkeys as there are people in Iran, and will send yo u  the same 
donkeys as advisers.
The Americans have given you these fine Cyprus donkeys, so that in 50 years time you  will
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all be able to go  all over the country mounted on them and will have no need fo r  motor
cars.
I f  you  were an appreciative nation you  would ask your great leader to pardon you fo r  
complaining. You will be able to lead a simple life, riding a donkey, and without 
electricity, cars, sugar, tea, medicine and textiles, now that you  have been relieved o f  the 
burden o f  oil.
So, shut up. "331
This satirical leaflet highlights a major conflict with nationalism, the concept of 
modernisation. Many pragmatists, Razmara included, recognised that some measure of 
cooperation with the developed world would he necessary if the ambitious programme 
envisaged in the Seven Year Plan were to he implemented332. Dr Mosaddeq had accepted 
the need to keep British technicians in the oil industry, but he stubbornly refused to 
concede terms which he felt would compromise his nationalist principles, or more to the 
point, the principles he had publicly espoused, and which his supporters expected him to 
keep. It may be argued that the decision to mobilise the masses of urban Iranians had 
seriously limited his room for political manoeuvre - Dr Mosaddeq had become a prisoner 
of his slogans.
The leaflet also highlights the development of the myth of the saviour, which Dr
331 FO 248 1531, file 10105, file no. 10105/135, dated 29 March 1952
332 FO 371 75483 - The Seven Year Plan, file 1103, E2624, dated 22 February 
1949 - As far as Ebtehaj was concerned the implementation o f the Seven Year Plan was 
the only way to 'save Iran1.
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Mosaddeq was particularly adept at cultivating. It is almost ironic, and somewhat 
prescient of later developments, that what the Shah sought to cultivate for himself was 
appropriated by his rival who he habitually liked to call, 'our Demosthenes'333. As the 
British Embassy noted in 1951, "..Dr Musaddiq is personally popular and has succeeded 
in making himself a symbol of the Persian conception of nationalism..." He had achieved 
this quite simply by doing, "..something which is always dear to Persian hearts: he has 
flouted the authority of a great power and a great foreign interest and he has gone a long 
way towards damaging the prestige of the first and the prosperity of the second."334
It was not only his oratoiy and his dramatic actions against the British which appealed to 
the general public however, his general appearance, frequently mocked by his opponents 
also had a great impact. Dr Mosaddeq strove to project an image of himself which 
denoted a frugal and simple life; his frequent appearances in 'pyjamas' indicated to the 
general public that he had not forgotten a veiy traditional domestic Banian living style,335 
Had he always appealed in tie and suit, he would undoubtedly been criticised as a part of 
the aristocratic elite, which of course he was. This fundamental aspect of social reality 
combined with the increasingly harsh measures imposed by the government ensured that 
the myth of the saviour was challenged with accusations of dictatorship, by now an 
increasingly common reaction to those aspiring to the role of'saviour5.
333 FO 248 1493, file 101/2, Shepherd's audience with the Shah, file no 
101/2/104/50, dated 31 May 1950. This is an interesting characterisation since 
Demosthenes was the orator who opposed Philip and later Alexander of Macedon.
334 FO 248 1514 - Internal Situation, file 10101, Situation report, file no. 
10101/277/51, dated 4 September 1951.
335 Gandhi used similar imagery in India.
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By 1952 even some of his closest allies such as Makki and Kashani were accusing 
Mosaddeq of dictatorial tendencies336, and by 1953 it was not uncommon for newspapers 
to call him the father of the nation' one day, and 'Hitler' on the next.337 Nevertheless it is 
testament to the potency of the myth that almost to the end, "The Shah continues to insist 
to all his advisers that it would be unwise for him openly to oppose Musaddiq until the 
myth of his greatness has been exploded."338
Dr Mosaddeq was not the only nationalist saviour to emerge from the crisis. Arguably he 
owes much of his fame to posterity which has remembered him as the 'tragic hero1, the 
martyr to his cause. Certainly the personality cult he fostered was shared with Ayatollah 
Kashani, to whom he was indebted for much grass roots support339. Kashani was the 
personal manifestation of religious nationalism, which made a significant impact diuing 
this crisis because the widening of political awareness among more traditionally minded 
lower classes. As one Western commentator noted, "This large segment of the populace 
in recent years has found a shrewd and willing leader and spokesman in Ayatollah Seyyid 
Abdul Qasirn Kashani, who in the present phase of the nationalist struggle is such a 
powerful symbol because of his life-long opposition to the British and his persecution in
336 FO 248 1531, file 10105, file no. 10105/296 dated 7 August 1952.
337 FO 371 104561, file 1015, press reports, file no. 1015/18, dated 28 January
1953.
338 FO 371 104564, file 1015, file no. 1015/82, dated 19 March 1953.
339 FO 248 1514, file 10101, file no. 10101/103/51, dated 19 March 1951, notes 
that Mosaddeq and Kashani both wish to be top national hero1.
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imprisonment and exile at tlieir hands."340 As to his methods, an intelligence report noted 
that, "Kashani has taken full advantage of his unusual theatrical talents, displaying 
exceptional skill in exploiting his rural contacts and the self interest o f the B anian clergy, 
and appealing to the piety of small merchants in urban centres. He has not hesitated to use 
his position as a member of the Moslem clergy to arouse latent suspicions o f the Christian 
West..."341
The emergence of religious nationalism in this period is probably one of the most 
significant ideological developments which was subsequently ignored by policy makers 
and historians of the period.342 Yet at the time, all the political groups found it prudent to 
increase then use of religious terms and concepts, and essentially to appear 'Islamic1. 
While allowing ideologies to appropriate some of the sanctity of religion, the shift towards 
more Islamic terminology can also be interpreted as a desire to familiarise ideological 
constructs in the language, meaning and symbology of popular culture.
Thus Mosaddeq in a report to the Majlis argued, "Anyone who aims to belittle the holy 
struggle of our nation by assessing the achievements of the Banian movement in economic 
terms and by comparing the independence of our country with a few million pounds, has
340 T Cuyler-Young The Problem of Westernisation... pg 139.
341 FO 371 104565, file 1015, Intelligence report, file no. 1015/126, dated 1 May
1953.
342 SeeFO 371 98720, file 1782, file no E1992, dated 28 January 1952, on attacks 
on Christians.
- 161-
undoubtedly perpetrated a blunder."343 Not only was the struggle holy, but the Majlis also 
became 'sacred'.344 Such language not only appealed to the masses, but also dignified the 
movement and elevated it to the realms o f the sacred. In return, Mosaddeq agreed to 
consider laws banning alcohol, which many of his deputies objected to on fiscal grounds, 
and to ban missionaries in Iran. Two Christian priests were indeed expelled on charges of 
spying for Britain.345 Even the outlawed Tudeh Party, who had appropriated many 
Zoroastrian festivals, found it prudent to exploit the religious concept of martyrdom and 
sought to adopt Imam Ah as the martyr of the masses.346 The Shah, so often criticised by 
religious leaders re-discovered a public interest in such matters which would serve him 
well.347 Though Kashani was not overtly critical of secularism, he was waiy of arguments 
which called for a complete separation fo religion from politics.348 He also used the charge 
of 'secularism' to good effect against Qavam, when the latter sought to displace 
Mosaddeq.349
343 Quoted in F Azimi op. cit. pg 334. This is remarkably similar in sentiment to 
Ayatollah Khomeini's argument that the revolution was not orchestrated for the price of 
watermelons. See also FO 248 1514, file 10101, file no 10101/476/51, dated 25 
November 1951.
344 FO 371 104563, file 1015, Report to the Majlis, file no 1015/79, dated 14 
March 1953.
345 FO 371 98720, file 1782, file no. E17802, dated 3 May 1952. FO 371 104564, 
file 1015, file no 1015/81, dated 20 March 1953.
346 FO 248 1494, file 101/5, Summary of Mardum, file no. 1015/87/50, dated 19 
August 1950. The Tudeh appropriation of festivals such as Mehrigan is interesting.
347 FO 248 1514, file 10101, file no. 10101/214/51, dated 14 June 1951.
348 FO 248 1531, file 10105, Kashani interviewed in the Daily Mail, file no 
10105/99, dated 10 March 1952.
349 FO 248 1531, file 10105, Kashani's statement printed in Shahid, file no.
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The limits of religious nationalism became clear when Ayatollah Kashani tried to 
universalise the struggle. That the movement was of world importance flattered Iranian 
sensibilities; however, Kashani1 s attempt to make the movement one among a number of 
other 'Islamic' movements found little popular support. He orchestrated demonstrations 
in favour of the struggle in Egypt against Suez, and in support of the people of Tunisia. 
With respect to the latter, it was noted, "Practically nobody seems to have turned up and 
one newspaper report put the attendance at 17.1,350 He established a 'Movement of the 
East1 (Nezhat-e Sharg), ostensibly to unify all Muslim peoples, though the reception 
abroad as well as at home was modest, and in some places hostile351. Seyyid Zia alleged 
that Kashani even suggested he [Kashani] become the new Caliph, to which he had 
retorted that no Shi'a could become Caliph.352
One of the most telling examples of the lack of purely religious sentiment was the popular 
response to the foundation of Israel. Kashani made a point of differentiating Iranian Jews 
from the Jews in Palestine, and though a demonstration was held, and editorials urged 
greater concern, the public on the whole remained apathetic.353 An Islamic Economic 
Conference in Tehran in 1950 was boycotted by several Arab countries because of Ban's
(...continued)
10105/268, dated 27 July 1952.
350 FO 248 1531, file 10105, file no 10105/76, dated 21 February 1952.
351 FO 248 1531, file 10105, Assessment by Middleton, file no. 10105/330, dated 
30 September 1952.
352 FO 248 1531, file 10105, Note by Falle, file no 10105/325, dated 28 August
1952.
353 FO 371 68722, file 520, E6689 dated 19 May 1948, E7338, dated 26 May
1948
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de facto recognition of Israel, and Kashani's attempt to hold an Islamic Conference in 
Tehran in 1952 were effectively scuppered for similar reasons. In this case though, even 
the Banian government was unswayed by the Ayatollah’s argument that it would foster 
Islamic unity and neuBality in the event of a third world war, and disassociated itself from 
the event.354
As religious imagery and personalisation was used in the nationalist cause, so it was 
natural that critics of the National Front, would likewise use such language. Euphemism 
was used to compare Kashani to Shuraih Qazi, the Muslim judge who outlawed Imam 
Hussein and his Islamic credentials were attacked.355 Other pamphlets were less inventive, 
directly attacking Kashani for corruption and excessive wealth, though it did use hadith 
to justify its attack.356
Probably the most inventive use of myth in this respect was by nationalists who regarded 
the influx of religious terminology as detrimental to their' cause and directly dependent on 
US support. "No one yet knows what the insincere and unfriendly Americans want to do 
with this country. The Yankees perhaps thought that as the Persians are Moslems and as 
Kashani has religious and spiritual influence over them it is impossible for them to become 
Communists. They therefore thought that they should be put under pressure in order that
354 FO 371 82335, file 1104, E1104, dated 7 December 1950; FO 371 98719, file 
1781, E1781, dated 18 December 1952.
355 FO 248 1514, file 10101, Anti Government Pamphlet, file no. 10101/421/51, 
dated 25 October 1951.
356 f o  248 1531, file 10105, Anti-Kaslrani pamphlet, file no. 10105/28/52, dated 
21 January 1952.
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they may be reduced to destitution and then made into soldiers to fight the 
Communists...1'357 Such rationalisation was not entirely without social foundation; as early 
as 1943 it was noted, "...While the priesthood has little influence with the so-called 
educated classes, it is still regarded with some respect by the lower classes, and the 
advances now being made to certain influential mullahs probably have then origin in the 
hope that then influence may be used against the spread of Communist ideas..."358
Fear of the spread of Communist ideas and the revolutionary destruction of the old order 
resulted in further social tension. The creation of social problems in the guise of a 
destructive revolution from below had fuelled political rhetoric for many years. The Shah 
used it to consolidate power and in tandem with other politicians, to urge reform. 
Carefiilly managed reform, it was argued would satisfy growing expectations. This theory 
however, appeared during the oil nationalisation crisis to be backfiring. Despite being 
banned, the Tudeh Party continued to grow in strength, and in conjunction with other- 
socialist parties, appeared to form the backbone of the National Movement.
They continued to publish then newspaper which predicted the inevitable destruction of 
imperialism; during marches, they openly defied and insulted the institution of the 
monarchy.359 However, the Tudeh Party was never wholeheartedly behind Dr Mosaddeq
357 FO 248 1531, file 10105, Pamphlet, file no. 10105/70, dated 18 February 1952. 
This veiy arguement was of course used by opponents of the Islamic Revolution in 1979.
358 FO 371 35109, file 110, Military Attache, E3588, dated 29 June 1943.
359 FO 248 1516, file 10105, Tudeh Party assessment, file no 10105/7/51, dated 
23 May 1951. FO 371 104561, file 1015, Azerbaijan Day Celebrations in Isfahan, file no. 
1015/3, dated 31 December 1952.
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and the National Front, and tended to criticise tlie Prime Minister with equal venom, 
despite the arguments o f Mosaddeq's opponents that the two were close allies.360 It is 
testament to the strength of the myth of the communist bogey that both sides, including 
Dr Mosaddeq, exploited this Cold War narrative to justify support, especially American. 
Thus it was reported in the New York Herald Tribune that, "Premier Musaddiq warned 
the Western world today that any right wing coup against his government would only 
pave the way for certain communist dictatorship."361
Concerned about the apparent upsurge in revolutionary socialist ideas, the traditionalists, 
who still dominated elite politics, turned to then chief ally, the institution of monarchy. 
Many of the traditional elite quickly erased any notion of national socialist reform and 
instead sought to justify the limitation of the franchise.362 For them, the crisis they were 
witnessing was a direct result of premature democratisation. This view was not new, and 
indeed had been voiced by the Shah, but it now seemed to be backed by the evidence on 
the streets.363 hi addition they looked to disenchantment within the military and among the 
religious classes concerned by the growth in the new atheistic ideology.
360 FO 248 1516, file 10105, Exceipts from Mardum, in one Mosaddeq is 
compared to Attila, file no 10105/29/51, dated 6 August 1951.
361 FO 371 104565, file 1015, file no. 1015/124, dated 30 April 1953.
362 FO 248 1462 - Persian Govt, file 65, the notion that the traditional elite adopted 
'socialist ideas' for expedient reasons was noted by some Iranians, file no 65/149a/46, 
dated 17 August 1946.
363 FO 248 1474, file 13, Isa Sadiq told Butler that the franchise should be limited 
by an educational test, file no. 13/43/47, dated 9 June 1947. See also FO 248 1485, file 
21, file no. 21/132/49, dated 12 April 1949.
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Tlie military had traditionally enjoyed a large share of the annual budget, but in the 
atmosphere of austerity they found then budget drastically cut with the result that many 
officers were made redundant. These disenchanted officers formed a retired officers 
association who were repotted to be actively participating in anti-government sedition.364 
Mosaddeq was aware of the danger from the military and sought to cultivate loyalty by 
forming a new political party and encouraging senior officers to join it. It was undoubtedly 
counter-productive that an oath of loyalty had to be taken to the Prime Minister.365 His 
plan failed dramatically, and the staunch Mosaddeqist vice president of the Majlis, Razavi 
was effectively heckled out of a speech to officers.366 Furthermore, it was noted that there 
was glowing clerical support for the Shah in Mashhad.367 This would be solidified by the 
rupture between Mosaddeq and Kashani over the former's increasingly unconstitutional 
behaviour.
Staunch supporters of Dr Mosaddeq contend that his increasing accumulation of power 
was warranted by the persistent crisis, and point to the emergent alliance forming against 
him, which only encouraged him to accumulate more powers in order to fulfill his 
promises. Others argue that this reactionary affiance was itself prompted by the Prime 
Minister’s unconstitutional accumulation of power. The reality is far more ambiguous. Dr
364 f o  3 7 1  104563, file 1015, report in Etelaat, file no 1015/96, dated 13 March
1953.
365 FO 371 104566, file 1015, report in Dari, file no. 1015/33, dated 10 April 1953.
366 FO 371 104567, file 1015, file no. 1015/163, dated 21 May 1953. This reaction 
was in marked contrast to the previous year when it was recorded that many in the army 
were disillusioned with the Shah's inaction - see FO 248 1531, file 10105, file no. 
10105/295, dated 2 August 1952.
367 FO 371 104566, file 1015, file no. 1015/143, dated 6 May 1953.
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Mosaddeq had always cultivated the image of crisis in order to rationalise and justify the 
hardship caused by the oil boycott. Part of this image required the persistent vigilance 
against plots and coups, and this process effectively took on a life of its own, becoming 
an end in itself irrespective of the real propensity for coup attempts. The fact that a real 
coup was being engineered became almost incidental to the debate whose primary purpose 
seemed to be to intensify the ideological atmosphere.
With the departure o f the British Embassy, Mosaddeq's core supporters turned their 
attention to the monarchy as the source of right wing reactionism, in effect le­
per sonahsing the ideological struggle. As one diplomat noted, "...even the staunchest 
believer in the occult powers of the British Embassy cannot entirely escape the feeling that 
perhaps there are in Persian politics some forces which have some responsibility. A 
domestic scapegoat is therefore essential and for this role the Shah is obviously cast."368 
It is important to recognise that in the ensuing power struggle, "Although nominally the 
centre of the dispute the Shah appears in fact, to be a pawn in the game. The crowds 
which shouted for him on Saturday and Sunday were almost certainly doing so at the 
behest, to begin with, of Kashani, and other elements opposed to Musaddiq, and later at 
the behest of Musaddiq's National Front supporters as well..."369 Opponents o f Mosaddeq 
alleged that he wished the Shah to leave Ban. They played on sentimental fears and 
loyalty, arguing that the departure of the Shah would result in the political fragmentation
368 pQ 2 4 g 2 5 4 1  - the Shah & the Imperial Court, file 19401, dated 21 April 1952.
369 FO 371 104563, file 1015, file no 1015/61, dated 2 March 1953.
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of Ban.370 Mosaddeq found it prudent to publicly refute this allegation and also took 
measures to increase surveillance on the tribes who were known to have monarchist 
tendencies.371 hi the end the Shah had probably been xuged to act by persuading him that 
his dynasty may be in danger. As Falle noted in 1952, one method to catalyse the Shah 
into action may be to point, "out that a continuation of the present situation is dangerous 
for the dynasty."372
When the (self-fulfilling) prophecy was fidfilled and the coup attempt, organised by Britain 
and America with the support (passive or active) of the traditionalists, in favour of the 
monarchy, was uncovered, opinions were polarised. Some even argued that the coup had 
been government inspired in order to provide a pretext to depose the Shah. The press 
tended to take sides according to then political tendency. Thus Bakhtar-e Emruz argued 
for the establishment of a regency council; Niruye Sevom, declared the Pahlavi dynasty to 
be at an end. Significantly, even the Pan-Banist parties attacked the Shah. The Tudeh 
Central committee issued a statement calling for the termination of the monarchy and 
called the Shah a, "treacherous man who has committed thousands of crimes in his 
kingship; must be tried and sentenced to death."373
370 FO 371 104564, file 1015, comments by Deputy Mir-Ashrafi, file no. 1015/95, 
dated 12 March 1953. See also FO 371 104562, file 1015, on Kashani's role in mobilising 
crowds in favour the shah, file no. 1015/51, dated 2 March 1953.
371 FO 371 104564, file 1015, file no. 1015/104, dated 6 April 1953. FO 371 
104565, file 1015, file no 1015/109, dated 10 April 1953.
372 FO 248 1531, file 10105, file no. 10105/230, dated 12 June 1952.
373 FO 371 104569, file 1015, file no. 1015/205, dated 16 August 1953.
- 169-
Despite these protestations, the affiance between the traditionalists, the military, the 
religions classes, as well as foreign encouragement, in support o f the institution of 
monarchy, proved too strong. Once it became apparent that Mosaddeq had been 
overthrown, agents began constructing new myths to rationalise and legitimise recent 
events. Foreign involvement, could of course not be mentioned. The army once again 
proclaimed itself the protector of the nation. Colonel Pahlavon declared, "My dear 
compatriots, listen. I am a soldier and a faithful patriot. A number of traitors like Fatemi 
want to sell out the country to foreigners...The Royalists have defeated the demagogue 
government through which Fatemi was ruling. The Persian nation, officers and police have 
taken the situation into then hands..."
A certain Major Mhzadian hinted at the practical reasons behind the coup, "I am a simple 
infantry officer who has been retired by Mosaddeq the traitor. We have proved to the 
world that the Persian army is the protector of this country and is under the command of 
the Shah."374 On his return from Rome, the Shah tried to rationalise his impromptu 
departure by explaining that it was due to 'fatigue'. The affiance which had engineered his 
return by exploiting the essential mystique of the institution of monarchy may have 
questioned the Shah's subsequent reflection on Divine providence: "I myself on several 
occasions have been ready to lay down my life for your survival and will unhesitatingly 
continue to do so. In the February 15th incident [assassination attempt in 1949] God 
Willed that I should survive..."375
374 The Times - 20 August 1953.
375 The Times - 23 August 1953
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Concluding Remarks
This period is important for several reasons. On the one hand it provided a critical 
inheritance for the Shah’s ideological development complementing the cruder 
categorisations of ideological development during the reign of Reza Shah with a more 
sophisticated and subtle diversity of ideological construction. The appropriation by Dr 
Mosaddeq of the mantle of nationalist hero, and his successfid identification with that 
principle was to be a pivotal influence on the Shah’s own perspective of his role and along 
with the influence of Reza Shah, was to represent the two great personal models the Shah 
sought to emulate and indeed surpass. For the Shah himself, the period represented a 
harsh lesson in Iranian political processes, but many of the ideas which were to shape his 
future policies and political str ategies, as well as his flaws, were already apparent, and the 
pattern by which the young Shah sought to cultivate the ideology of dynastic nationalism 
only to find himself outmanoeuvred and marginalised by a more sophisticated politician, 
parallels developments near the end of his reign.
Political plurality and the growth of political awareness, especially through the emergence 
of mass communications along with the experience of Soviet propaganda, all contributed 
to the increasing complexity of the period in terms of ideological constructions and the 
development of political myth. The categories of ideological construction become more 
subtle and nuanced, while the increasing use of the radio and the desire to reach a wider 
audience and mobilise them encouraged the simplification of ideological constructs into 
the verbal imagery of political myth. Pluralism however meant that ideological 
perspectives could be challenged, not only the meanings ascribed dining the reign of Reza
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Shall but the new interpretations developed in the aftermath of his abdication. A reciprocal 
dialectic emerged in which ideological interpretations became increasingly polarised and 
for the first time it is possible to witness the development of a reciprocal semiological 
chain in which myth is constructed upon myth. It is in this period for instance that the 
myth of the 'saviour5 is emphatically challenged by charges of'dictatorship’. The epitome 
of one ideological construct is effectively and convincingly re-interpreted and turned on 
its head.
The personalisation or familiarisation o f ideology, the quintessential act of political myth 
construction, is also manifested in several different ways. The increasing incorporation of 
Islamic terminology and imagery in political discourse can be seen as an attempt by 
politicians to define ideological constructs in terms familiar to a section of Iranian society 
which was becoming increasingly important in political terms. While political actors 
sought to identify with principles, the most successfid political operator in this regard 
showed that political myth could be used just as effectively in demolishing certain relations 
of domination as it was in sustaining them. His successfid identification of the ideological 
construct of anti-imperialism with the vague concept of 'Britain’ and its effective 
personalisation onto British diplomatic and government personnel in Iran comprehensively 
undermined Britain’s position in Ban, at the expense, as Dr Mosaddeq was well aware, 
o f other pressing ideological concerns such as modernisation. There can be no greater 
testament to the power of political myth.
Chapter 4
The Consolidation of Power 1953-60.
Introduction
"...After leaving Tehran last August with what must have been little hope o f  returning he 
[the Shah] suddenly fo u n d  him selfsw ept back on a wave o fpopular enthusiasm. Almost 
all experienced observers here, both Persian and foreign, are agreed that this enthusiasm  
was generated more by the Persians ‘ deep rooted feelings fo r  the institution o f  the 
m onarchy than by any strong sentiments in favour o f  the person o f  the present Shah. 
Unfortunately His M ajesty has, I  understand, interpreted it largely has a demonstration 
ofpersonal affection. This and the doubtful quality o f  much o f  the advice he receives from  
his court have not made it easyfor him to make an accurate appraisal o f  the present state 
o f  the country. ”376
With the fall o f Dr Mosaddeq, as with the abdication of Reza Shah twelve years earlier, 
the ideological consensus which had been constructed around the person of Dr Mosaddeq 
was emphatically challenged and deconstructed by his opponents. Whereas in the previous 
situation the autocrat was challenged by a plurality of political groups espousing diverse 
ideological tendencies, in this case the main challenge came from a reinvigorated if not yet 
reconstructed, autocratic power base in the person of Mohammad Reza Shah. The chapter 
will look first at the attempted deconstruction of the Mosaddeqist myth of the saviour and
376 FO 371 109986 EP 1015/14 Political and Economic Situation, dated 12 
February 1954.
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the appropriation of national socialist ideology by the Shah and will conclude with an 
assessment o f the Shah’s attempt to incorporate this into a reconstructed ideology of 
dynastic nationalism which sought to portray the Shah as a 'democratic sovereign,’ with 
the people’s welfare and interests at heart.377
The contradictions and tensions implicit in his attempt to reinvent a traditional monarchy 
as a modernising institution vital for the progress of the country was in part transcended 
by his cultivation of the Cold War narrative; an ideological construction essentially alien 
to Iran, but indicative of the continuing integration of Iran into the global system. The 
Shah exploited the emergent Cold War narrative by situating himself and his country 
within it, allowing him not only to deal with his enemies, whom he labelled communists’, 
but also to ingratiate himself with his new American allies and to secure arms and 
munitions for the Aimed Forces. Indeed, the militarism which had been a hallmark of the 
Palilavi autocracy previously was now effectively disguised and justified within this myth.
Whereas Reza Shah was content to portray himself and his dynasty as indispensable to the 
nationalist progr amme of modernisation, the son sought to develop a more sophisticated 
role. For Mohammad Reza Shah a particular vision of modernisation had to be articulated. 
Not content with railways and schools, the Shah wanted Iran to be come a model’ 
country and the key word he wanted to associate with his rule was 'progress’. As such he 
began to articulate a role for himself and his dynasty not only as the saviour o f the country
377 FO 371 109986 EP 1015/14 dated 12 February 1954. See also Alain’s 
reasoning behind the Mardom Party, FO 371 140790 EP 1015/78 dated 4 November 
1959. FO 371 133007 EP 1015/55 dated October 1958, notes that the monarchy still 
retained some mystique among the peasantry.
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but as the guarantor of future happiness and prosperity. By the end of this period it is this 
particular conception of himself which begins to gain currency, though one would have 
to wait for the launch of the 'White Revolution’ in 1963 for these ideological 
constructions to gain full expression. Indeed, in this period ideological articulation by the 
Shah was hampered in some measure by his inability to divert as many resources as he 
would have undoubtedly liked, and in part through a persistent hesitancy and lack of 
confidence. 378
The overwhehning tension of the period continues to be the essential crisis of legitimacy 
surrounding the Pahlavi dynasty which was now deepened by widespread suspicions of 
foreign intervention in his restoration to the throne in 1953. Indeed, the over-riding aim 
of the policies pursued by the Shah was to legitimise his rule and his dynasty.379 The 
Shah’s precarious de jure  hold on the throne was revealed in a comment by Henderson 
who in discussions with a disillusioned Minister of Court Ala, discovered that, “Abdul 
Reza was openly intriguing with Amini, the former Minister of Court, and others against 
his elder brother, the idea apparently being to depose the Shah one day, pass over Ali 
Reza and have the son of Abdul Reza declared Shah under a regency.... The people behind 
this little plot apparently think that they can count on the support of Kashani and Makki 
and the advantage of bringing Abdul Reza’s infant son to the throne was that he had in his
378 FO 371 120752 EP1942/1 dated 14 February 1956; EP 1942/2 dated 11 April 
1956; point to the fact that the Shah often asked for guidance from the British and 
Americans. Lambton was probably the most consistently scathing foreign commentator 
on the Shah’s ability to actually do anything - F0371 114810 EP 1018/30 dated 18 July 
1955. See also FO 371 114810 EP 1018/18 dated 8  June 1955.
379 FO 371 114807 EP 1013/8 dated 19 April 1955, makes it clear that the Shah 
was not content to reign.
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veins the royal blood of the three families of Zand, Qajar and Pahlavi, and, therefore, 
could be regarded as embodying all 'legitimist’ claims.” 380
Socio-Historical Context
Political framework - tensions at the centi'e
This period marks the definitive integration of Iran into the international ideological 
system and its situation within a global meta-narrative of Cold war politics largely alien 
to the framework of political culture familiar to the majority of Iranians. This process was 
assisted and accelerated by the continued growth in mass communications. It is significant 
that the United States was fir more enthusiastic in suppoiling the Shah’s desire to expand 
his armed forces than other foreign powers or indeed Iranian politicians and this was in 
large part due to the Shah’s exploitation of ideological constructions and political myths 
familiar to US policy makers.
American aid to Iran increased dramatically during this period, not only in terms of 
financial aid, but also men and materials. The US Point Four programme was implemented 
and for the first time American personnel began to arrive in substantial numbers 
throughout Iran. There was considerable debate as to the actual benefit of the aid and the 
American embassy eventually concluded in a rep oil that the Iranians were unfortunately 
settling into a mentality that the US would bail Iran out financially, however badly they
380 FO 371 109986 EP 1015/18 dated 18 February 1954.
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mismanaged the economy.381
Key events in the development of this relationship were the Shah’s decision against the 
wishes of many Iranian intellectuals and nationalists to take Iran into the Baghdad Pact 
(later CENTO); the Iranian reaction to the Suez crisis, which highlighted popular and 
official feelings and differences towards a Western alliance; the impact of the Iraqi Coup 
in 1958, and the withdrawal of Eaq from the Baghdad Pact, and the military coup in 
Turkey in 1960. These last two events in particular were to have a catalytic effect on the 
speed and rationale behind reform in Ban.
Domestically, following the downfall o f Dr Mosaddeq the Shah in affiance with his Prime 
Minister, Zahedi, targeted his left wing opponents but significantly took a more lenient line 
against the Nationalists including Mosaddeq, much to Zahedi’s chagrin382. Furthermore, 
he exploited the growing difference in opinion between Zahedi and the head of the Seven 
Year Plan organisation, Abol Hasan Ebtehaj, who under the Shah’s patronage effectively 
ran a second government complete with its own budget and autonomous policy making. 
These differences eventually led to Zahedi’s resignation in much disgust and resentment 
at what he perceived to be the Shah’s ingratitude, and he was replaced by the aged Ala.
381 FO 371 120714 EP 1015/37 dated 29h October 1956. See also J A Bill The 
Eagle and the Lion: the tragedy of American-Tranian relations New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 1988, pp 125-26
382 FO 371 127074 EP 1015/5 dated 4 February 1957, in an article by Elwell- 
Sutton for the Scotsman, the author notes that the weeks following the coup one word 
dominated - enteqam - 'revenge’.
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The revenue derived from the oil agreement negotiated after the fall o f Mudsaddiq was 
allocated for development projects and was largely under the control o f the Seven Year 
Plan Organisation (SYPO) headed by the erstwhile Abol-Hasan Ebtehaj. Ebtehaj, a banker 
by training can be considered one of the foremost economic planners in modem Banian 
history. Convinced that Ban needed economic development above all else, he jealously 
guarded the revenues under his management and launched a number of long term 
infrastructural projects. He was hampered in his ambitions by his perceived arrogance 
which alienated many colleagues, and the failure of the government to adhere to budget 
limits by embarking on among other things, fancifril and grandiose schemes383, resulting 
in the erosion of oil revenues at his disposal as those were diverted to cover the continuing 
government deficit. He was a bitter opponent of the Shah’s plans, supported by the 
Americans to expand the military.384
hi conjunction with his cultivation o f American support, which was by no means 
consistent, the Shah sought to cement his links with the military, which was considerably 
more heterodox in its views of the monarch than commonly assumed. It should be 
remembered that until Eqbal’s appointment as Prime Minister, Tehran laboured under a 
military government under the iron fist of General Bakhtiar, and that his experience in this
383 FO 371 110003 EP 1101/1 dated 14 May 1954.
384 See Bostock & Jones - Planning & Power in Ban: Ebtehaj and Economic 
Development under the Shah London, Frank Cass, 1989, for a detailed if sympathetic 
account of Ebtehaj’s attempts at development to 1959. According to K Farmanfarmayan, 
who worked under Ebtehaj, the latter was bitterly opposed to greater military expenditure: 
“...Once Admiral Radford had finished talking about his purpose to look into military need 
and military requirements, Ebtehaj made a fist and raised it and banged on the table so 
hard....and said, 'Admiral Radford, Ban needs development, not military expenditure.’....” 
pg 153.
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post led him to becoming the first chief of tlie State Security apparatus, SAVAK, in 1957. 
Many viewed SAVAK as the extension of the m ilitary  government into a military 
autocracy over the entire country, 385 arguing that the m ilita ry  was little more than a tool 
of oppressive dictatorship and not an extension of national integrity.
Although the Shah was catitious in his approach to the ulema, it is remarkable how 
quickly the Shah was to turn on the recognisable pillars of monarchy, hi contrast to his 
assiduous cultivation of the military, he displayed a confident contempt for the land­
owning classes viewing them as an obstacle to his plans and more importantly as a 
potential source of political challenge. Furthermore, his tacit approval of the persecution 
of the Bahais in 1955, was more a reflection of his weakness with respect to the senior 
ulema, particularly Borujerdi, rather than a healthy relationship.
Of great significance was the foundation of the Mardom party, ostensibly an opposition 
party, through which the Shah undoubtedly sought to experiment with more revolutionary 
ideas, and to co-opt many former nationalists and Tudeh party members into his camp. 
The Mardom party was to prove a vital ideological melting pot which would gradually 
articulate a suitable myth of progress for the democratic Shah to espouse and lead.
Throughout the Shah consolidated his grip on the electoral process, which lost any 
credibility it may have had, dining this period, as the Shah and his government, contrary 
to the rhetoric, blatantly rigged electoral results. Nevertheless, in 1960 he may have
385 FO 371 120714 EP 1015/33 dated 29 September 1956.
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miscalculated as he had done hi 1950, as Iranians began to debunk the 'bogus history’ 
which sought to depict him as a national champion’. With economic difficulties again 
cutting into the utopia of promised prosperity, and the military coup against Menderes in 
Turkey adding to his anxiety386, the Shah decided, under some pressure, to bide his time, 
and appoint Dr Amini as prime minister. He was to prove the Shah’s last independently 
minded prime minister until Bakhtiar was appointed in 1979.
Socio-Economic Development and Political activity
Iran enjoyed economic growth during this period but it remained erratic and uneven, with 
Tehran enjoying most of the development387, hi order to satisfy the mounting criticism, 
targeted especially at continued inflation, 388 the government was encouraged to embark 
on short term, visible, economic projects which would yield political benefit, a tendency 
which Ebtehaj neither empathised nor sympathised with. The professional educated classes 
grow as a proportion of the population, and it woidd be fan to say that the politically 
conscious also increased, in part as a legacy of the Mosaddeq crisis, but also as a result
386 FO 371 149757 EP 1015/41 dated 3 June 1960.
387 pQ 2 7 2  133006 EP 1015/38 dated 21 August 1958, Sir Roger Steven’s last 
dispatch notes that, “...There have been plenty of superficial changes in these four and a 
half years, most of them according to Western ideas [italics added], for the good ”
388 See FO 371 109985 EP 1013/8 dated 14 April 1954;
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of urbanisation389 and tbe growth in communications390, and the Shah’s initial attempts to 
mobilise the lower classes in his favour.391 As Elwell-Sutton wrote in 1957:
“It is an age of campaigns in Persia - campaigns against corruption in the civil service, 
against illiteracy, against opium, and above all against pessimism and despair. Every radio 
programme, every newspaper, carries its quota of 'pep talks’ designed to overcome what 
even the authorities have to admit is the prevailing atmosphere of gloom and cynicism. 
Intellectual inquiry and scepticism is attacked as near treason...”392
Indeed it is worth noting that despite the government suppression of political activity393, 
especially in the military government of Tehran, political activity continued, with many
389 FO 371 133006 EP 1015/? dated 15 April 1958; see also FO 371 127142 EP 
1822/1 dated 12 March 1957, which provides details of the 1956 census. Addendumsto 
the overall census figures can be found in FO 371 140866 EP 1822/1 dated 1 December
1959.
390 FO 371 127074 EP 1015/3 dated 15 January 1957; according to Embassy 
official Carless, “...with better communications many peasants who formerly lived in 
blissfiil, isolated ignorance now know enviously about the comforts and dubious 
attractions of life in Tehran and other larger towns to which they are unfortunately 
attracted.” See also FO 371 127138 EP 1743/1 dated 30 May 1957, an embassy official 
writes, “...The political consciousness of the Iranian proletariat has developed quite 
rapidly during the past decade as the result of broadcasting, better communications (bus 
services are now quite highly developed), Tudeh propaganda and the stirring events of the
Musaddiq era ”. FO 371 149761 EP 1015/143 dated 23 December 1960, includes a
letter from the Iranian embassy in London which alleges that Tehran, a city of 2m, 
possesses 40,000 television sets and 200,000 radios. See also FO 371 157600 EP 1015/36 
dated 22 February 1961, which also includes a detailed class analysis.
391 FO 371 109985 EP 1013/2 dated 30 January 1954, notes the governments 
decision to establish a 'National Guidance Council’ which will control broadcasting and 
will be ' an instrument of propaganda’.
392 FO 371 127074 EP 1015/5 dated 4 February 1957, article in the 'Scotsman’.
393 FO 371 127074 EP 1015/15 dated 14 April 1957, Eqbal bans political activity 
by students arguing that, “hi my opinion the destruction wrought by these treacherous and 
illogical parties was worse than the Mongol invasion.”
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organisations active in the National Front, re-emerging in the late 50s. The British 
Embassy counted some 8  active parties, apart from the government sponsored 
organisations, which despite restrictions, remained politicaUy influential.394 The 
government and foreign observers had to accept that a growing politically aware public 
had emerged and had to be managed395. As an embassy official noted:
“In Reza Shali’s Iran life was governed by tradition and custom. Poverty prevailed but 
ignorance and traditionalism formed a strong shield against discontent. Today, however, 
poverty remains but die shield has been pushed aside by changing conditions. The political 
ideas and new hopes which were disseminated lip and down Iran by die outlawed Tudeh 
party will now be earned, eitiier unwittingly or consciously, further afield by the new 
literates. Poverty and education, when allowed to meet, are an explosive mixture...”396
Sir Roger Stevens, in his last dispatch, was quite clear how the persistent discontent had 
to be handled, “...This process will not be arrested until and unless there is a 'popular’ 
government, by which I  mean a government that has established certain myths [italics 
added] ” 397
Most criticisms of the Shah and his behaviour came from the politically active 
intelligentsia, those who provided the core support for the National Front, as well as
394 FO 371 127075 EP 1015/38 dated 16 August 1957.
395 FO 371 133006 EP 1015/38 dated 2 1  August 1958.
396 FO 371 127138 EP 1743/1 dated 30 May 1957; see also FO 371 133057 EP 
1731/2 dated 15 August 1958, which details the increases in education.
397 FO 371 133006 EP 1015/38 dated 21 August 1958.
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members of the political elite, who were coming under increasing verbal attack from the 
Shah and were threatened with land reform, and the urban lower classes. It was also the 
case that most of this was focussed in Tehran and that the citizens of other cities at times 
remained indifferent to the political irregularities of the government. Indeed many viewed 
an autocratic Shah as the natural and best form of government.398
hi the country-side, many peasants retained an almost mystical reverence o f the Shah, and 
it is not surprising therefore that he saw them in many ways as his natural constituency. 
But these people, who often migrated to the cities also retained a loyalty to Islam; a 
loyalty which the Shah along with most political activists failed to gauge accurately. A 
report by John Russell on the Moharram festivities which he witnessed in south Tehran 
in 1957 reveals the continuing disparity between the political machinations of the elite and 
their 'professional7 constituents, and the mass of the poor.
“...Here the mullahs preach every evening in packed audiences. Most of the sermons are 
revivalist stuff of a high emotional and low intellectual standard. But certain well known 
preachers attract the intelligentsia of the town with reasoned historical exposes of 
considerable merits...The Tehran that we saw on the tenth of Moharram is a different 
world, centuries and civilisations apart from the gawdy superficial botch of Cadillacs, 
hotels, antique shops, villas, tourists and diplomats, where we run our daily round....But 
it is not only poverty, ignorance and dirt that distinguish the old south of the city fr om the 
parvenu north. The slums have a compact self-conscious unity and communal sense that 
is totally lacking in the smart districts of chlorinated water, macadamed roads and (fitful) 
street lighting. The bourgeois does not know Iris neighbour: the slum-dweller is intensely
398 FO 371 157600 EP 1015/36 dated 22 February 1961.
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conscious of liis. And in the slums the spurious blessings of Pepsi Cola civilisation have 
not yet destroyed the old way of life, where every man’s comfort and security depend on 
die spontaneous, un-policed observation of a traditional code. Down in the southern part 
of tire city manners and morals are better and stricter that in the villas of Tajrish: an injury 
to a neighbour, a pass at another man’s wife, a brutality to a child evoke spontaneous 
retribution without benefit of bar or bench ”399
Seizing the Nationalist Agenda.
The Sliah basically pursued two strategies in liis attempt to assume the mantle of 
nationalist leader: in the first place he attacked Mosaddeq as a leader, seeking to identify 
him with the chaos which two years of'negative nationalism’ had brought the country. 
At the same time he often dealt leniently with other nationalist leaders, and even appeared 
magnanimous towards his fallen foe, Dr Mosaddeq, much to Zahedi’s irritation, 400 and the 
puzzlement of many of his staunchest supporters. He developed his own concept of 
'positive nationalism’ which he described as constructive and creative, and justified Iran’s 
adherence to the Western alliance partly in this way.
As such, the Cold War narrative was itself integrated into this particular nationalist agenda 
and allowed the Shah, however imperfectly, to bridge the conflicting concerns of 
nationalism and modernisation. At times, however, as will be seen, the Shah’s desire to
399 FO 371 127139 EP 1781/3 dated 7 September 1957.
400 FO 371 109986 EP 1015/4 dated 4 January 1954.
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pursue positive nationalism conflicted with the more radical national aims of those he 
wished to co-opt who saw no benefit in participating in an alliance with the West, and in 
order to satisfy the desires of this group, the Shah exploited Iran’s claim to Bahrain.401
Though resources were limited to begin with, the two-pronged strategy outlined above 
was already in evidence in 1954, August 19th, the first anniversary o f Mosaddeq’s fall 
was designated a national holiday and as one British official noted, “...Celebrations on this 
scale have not been seen here for some years. . . ” 402 At the same time, the Shah made
known his displeasure after 1 2  university professors had commented that the coup of 28th
Murdad was 'regrettable; they were duly dismissed403. However, with a 'magnanimity’ 
which was to become a hallmark of the Shah’s characterisation of himself, he allowed 
himself to be persuaded to have them reinstated. Not only that, he issued a firman  that the 
children of those convicted of treason under Mosaddeq be given a proper education, and 
duly offered 500,000 rials for the purpose404.
Indeed one British diplomat noted, “There is reason to suspect that the Shah has been 
'reinsuring’ with the nationalists, but the most recent reports suggest that he may be 
having second thoughts. Although in a speech not long ago he declared that supporters 
of Musaddiq were today even more dangerous than the Tudeh Party, engineer Hasibi has
401 FO 371 133009 EP 1018/2 dated 17 January 1958.
402 FO 371 109985 EP 1013/17 dated 21 August 1954.
403 FO 371 109985 EP 1013/25 dated 1 December 1954.
404 FO 371 109985 EP 1013/26 dated 15 December 1954. See also FO 371 
114807 EP 1013/2 dated 26 January 1955.
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been released and there is a possibility that Dr Baqai may be allowed freedom of 
movement, and even that new elections may be held in Kerman with Baqai allowed to 
participate. ” 405 Later it was noted that, “...the Shah’s equivocal attitude towards some 
nationalist elements could develop into positive encouragement if he thought that support 
elsewhere for him was seriously weakened. ” 406 That said, there were limits to that 
magnanimity, and the Shah was perturbed when Ebtehaj began employing former Iran 
Party members in the Seven Year Plan Organisation, on the justification that they were 
the only honest and efficient people available. The Shah is rumoured to have complained 
to Ebtehaj about, “...those people who broke my statues.” 407
Those people who were executed, including Fatemi, were emphatically identified as 
communists as opposed to nationalists, thereby denying an epithet which may have 
legitimised them, 408 and associating them with a group which both the landlords and ulema 
disliked. At the same time it both perpetuated and helped integrate Iran into the Cold War 
narrative. That said, even at this early stage, being labelled a communist or Tudeh Party 
member did not necessarily result in the satisfactory differentiation of the target. Though 
many were suspicious of the Tudeh, the har sh measures dir ected against them may have 
actually won them some sympathy.409 On the other hand his generosity to his nationalist 
enemies caused puzzlement among the traditional supporters of the monarchy who felt
405 FO 371 114807 EP 1013/9 dated 3 May 1955.
406 FO 371 114811 EP 1018/33 dated 3 August 1955.
407 FO 371 127074 EP 1015/4 dated 19 January 1957.
408 FO 371 109985 EP 1013/24 dated 17 November 1954.
409 FO 371 109985 EP 1013/23 dated 3 November 1954.
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tliat in appealing weak the Shah had lost substantial prestige.410
With time, the Shah’s attacks on Mosaddeq and his government increased. In 1956, with 
the economy failing to improve at the rate which had imprudently been promised in the 
aftermath of 1953, politicians began to excuse current bad performance on the 
malpractices committed under Mosaddeq. hi a press conference Finance Minister Foiuhar 
detailed the ills existing in the Iranian economy, especially the consistent failure to balance 
the country’s budget. He avoided the issue of military expenditure and instead emphasised 
the increase in the money supply administered by Dr Mosaddeq arguing that, “...it will be 
admitted that the country’s budget deficit is nothing new. For several years now the 
country has been plagued by it. . . ” 411 Li a subsequent press conference, aware of US 
pressure not to bail out the Iranian economy, and the need to enforce austerity measures, 
Foiuhar reassured reporters that, “...It should be remembered that before 1334 [1955] too 
the country faced a budget deficit, hi the days of Dr Mosaddeq this was met by expending 
the country’s reserves, borrowing from the International Monetary Fund and issuing 
banknotes. . . . ” 412
hi a clear indication of the growing importance of the mass media, the Shah took the 
decision to attend press conferences where he could explain the ideas he cherished more 
clearly to the Iranian press whose duty it would be to disseminate them dutifirlly to the 
general public. At his first impromptu press conference in 1958, the Shah’s pursuit of the
410 FO 371 120713 EP 1015/10 dated 23 April 1956.
411 FO 371 120734 EP 1113/8 dated 20 April 1956.
412 FO 371 120734 EP 1113/14 dated 11 August 1956.
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nationalist agenda took on a characteristic form, as attempts to deconstruct the 
Mosaddeqist myth of the saviour was accompanied by a reinterpretation of the meta- 
narrative of nationalist history. Thus, not only was Mosaddeq’s record attacked but 
nationalist history was reinterpreted to have begun with the accession of his father to 
power. Furthermore, the real nationalists were those who overthrew Mosaddeq in support 
of the monarchy, rather than the other way round. Having dismissed criticisms of the 
country’s economy as unwarranted and universalising the debate by pointing to 
deficiencies elsewhere, he then went on to remind people of his own nationalist pedigree 
in effect seeking to reverse the reinterpretation and rejuvenation which had occurred in 
the aftermath of Reza Shah’s abdication [italics added]:
cc..,In 1299 [1921] your Shah  came to power. What was his motive? Nationalism The
only motive of my father’s rising in 1299 was nationalism On the 25 Shakrevar when
the Union was transferred to me I had to go to the Majlis to take the oath...The people’s 
goodwill towards me was not simply due to my popularity as a crown prince but a token
of the Iranian spirit of nationalism The point I wish to stress here is that I was trained
in my father’s school, whose whole life was spent in love of his country and who was a 
great patriot. At the commencement of my reign, when the country was occupied by 
foreign forces, my inspiration was to endeavour to deliver my country from the domination 
and influence of foreigners.”
It is clear from this speech that any earlier attempts to distance himself from his father’s 
legacy had been abandoned. He then went on to attempt a characterisation of Dr 
Mosaddeq as a stooge of foreign powers, the most treasonable characteristic in the eyes 
of nationalists, and against any form of modernisation. He depicted the coup d’etat which
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overthrow Dr Mosaddeq as a spontaneous rising against the chaos he had engendered and 
as an expression of positive nationalism. “....Let me speak of the 28 Murdad (August 19 
1953), which is more than a personal matter. On that day the whole people throughout 
the country arose, whilst I myself was not here. At that time the people realised that the
country’s independence was about to disappear These successes were all the outcome
of the spirit o f nationalism which I have called constructive or positive...” Then he 
stressed again that, “...The Iranian regime became national from the time when my father 
took office.”
The Shah continued to elaborate on his theme of positive nationalism, and in this the first 
echoes o f a yearning for an ancient Persian purity become apparent [italics added]:
“We do not think that our greatness and progress can come from the adoption of a negative 
policy. We enjoy the bounties of God. We have wealth and we belong to a race that has 
had thousands o f  years o f  life. Iranians have grappled with great difficulties for years and 
survived. We have the ability. By pursuing a positive nationalism the rights, interests, 
dignity and respect of Iran may attain perfection. In this maimer we can collaborate with 
other living nations. To prove our nationalism we do not need to destroy buildings or to 
plunder, or to use abusive language about this or that. These acts are not evidence of social 
maturity, good character and strength. They are evidence of weakness. By adhering to our 
ancient customs and traditions we can obtain the maximum benefits fo r  our nation. By 
this policy we have protected our interests more than others who raise a hue and ciy. Ill 
this regard we might cite the oil question and foreign policy. I have said time after time 
that we have worked to guarantee the interests of Iran. We have no consideration except 
the protection of our own interests. Our nationalism is positive. For that reason it is 
creative. It is associated with good conduct and propriety. An Iranian is not an ill-behaved
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person. An Iranian does not find his happiness in making others unhappy Tell the
history of Iran to Iranians.
In the past Iranians rendered services to their countjy. D id Iranian mothers prevent their 
sons from  going to battle? D id they a y  'hold back’? Are we not o f  the same race? I  do 
not think we have changed. These facts should be set forth to the public. There are other 
things than the past to make us strong. Social order is being improved, and social justice 
even more so. h i the past there was no talk of social justice, but the people were self- 
sacrificing.
These are the principles of positive nationalism. To consolidate nationalism we have to 
remove the weak points in the administrative apparatus and social character, and in the 
organisation of the country as a whole. These are in brief my views on the path of positive 
nationalism. The press should strive to promote them.”413
In a booklet published later in 1958 to highlight the achievements of Iran, Mosaddeq does 
not even get a mention. The Shah achieves centre stage as the leader who averted disaster, 
“...the stamina of Iran’s people and their national pride, the integrity o f its patriots, and 
the leadership of His Majesty the Shakinshah [during the oil crisis] were such that disaster 
was avoided and the political situation was stabilised. ” 414 This was an important shift. 
Indeed, although the Shah was to continue to emphasise his own nationalist credentials,
413 FO 371 133006 EP 1015/47 dated 24 September 1958. Following a protests, 
the Shah made it quite clear to the British ambassador that his aim was to demolish 
Mosaddeq’s credentials as a nationalist champion, rather than emphasis British 
interference. See FO 371 133006 EP 1015/46 dated 24 September 1958; also FO 371 
133006 EP 1015/50 dated 30 September 1958. On the theme of Banian’s as a pure race 
seethe Shah’s press conference in FO 371 133006 EP 1015/54 dated 31 October 1958.
414 FO 371 133022 EP 1102/12 dated 30 August 1958.
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the person of Mosaddeq was to retreat further into the background, as the Shah sought 
to de-personalise the ideological identification and as such comprehensively remove the 
political myth Mosaddeq continued to represent in his identification with nationalist 
ideology. Thus at a press conference in 1959, familiar themes are reiterated [italics added]:
cThe question is that the conditions in our country are completely changed from 30 years 
ago. It was in 1920 that Iran's national and nationalist revolution started. This national 
revolution put an end to the feudal government and to the various powers who exercised 
influence in our country for many years....
From 1920 to 1941, our country progressed along a path which is known to all. Our 
country thus completed its revolution, i.e. it did the veiy same thing that some other 
countries feel proud in having performed with a spontaneous revolution removing the old 
regime and taking a new path....
...This revolution was repeated once again in 1953. This time, a people who saw their 
country on the brink of destruction spontaneously rose throughout the country and showed 
that they were not prepared to give up the many thousand year old independence of their 
country and to leave their country at the mercy o f  misguided, atheist, unfortunate and  
wretched people whose actiom  regrettably would have culminated in the interests o f  
others, and which would have ended the independence of this country. Actually in 
practice, we have had two national and nationalist revolutions 55415
A few weeks later on the occasion of the anniversary of the coup, the Shah reiterated his 
themes with adding religious terminology which may have seived to couch events in teims
415 FO 371 140789 EP1015/57 dated 30 July 1959.
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familiar to tlie masses, and added a touch of sanctity [italics added]:
“Many greetings to the pure souls of those brave Iranians who gave their lives ill 1953 for 
Iran’s independence and honour. What better reward for those who had the honour to take 
part in the national rising or for those who were martyred fo r  the sake o f  their sacred aim 
- their country’s independence - than that today we witness the results of their sacrifices.
None of us has yet forgotten the discouraging and dark situation of those days which 
culminated in the national rising of 1953. The countiy was in turmoil and disorder, our 
econom y ruined and our production apparatus almost paralysed....No one had any 
confidence and hope, even fo r  his life....
This was exactly what the foreign inspired former Tudeh Party wanted to implement.... As 
a result of disorder, subversion, propagation of distrust and destruction of the country’s 
economy, the former Tudeh Party had advanced so far in practice that it had to take only
a few more steps to implement its destructive aim. In those days, treason was
encouraged....At such a time - when the sovereignty, independence and national dignity 
of this ancient land was on Hie threshold of annihilation - you Iranian patriots arose. With 
your brave uprising, which recalls the most glorious risings of the people of this land in 
the past for the salvation of Iran, you brought about today’s stability.”416
At liis press conference on the 25th August, the Shah emphasised his own importance 
further stressing the ideology of dynastic nationalism, hi answer to a reporter’s question, 
which was couched in now familiar obsequious terns, about the coup, the Shah 
revealingly replied, “Tn 1953 the people rose spontaneously all over the country. The 
reason for this was that the great majority of people believed in the cause.. ..Perhaps they
416 FO 371 140789 EP 1015/64 dated 20 August 1959.
-192-
thought that the independence of the country depended on the monarchy, or, perhaps my 
reign [italics added] . . . . ” 417 This was an important shift, in that the focus of the uprising 
was no longer the independence of the countiy, which would have retained credibility, but 
was now the institution of the monarchy, or even more, the person of Mohammad Reza 
Shah, in these comments one can quite clearly see the links between nationalist champion 
and the development of the myth of the 'democratic sovereign’ destined to save his 
countiy.
There was also an increasing desire to cement these new ideological interpretations within 
symbolic festivities and concrete memorials, using familiar cultural icons, with the obvious 
intention of institutionalising and socialising the constructs. Thus the Shah welcomed the 
suggestion that a mausoleum be constructed for the “martyrs of the national rising. ” 418 
Similarly, the celebrations commemorating the fall of Dr Mosaddeq became increasingly 
extravagant. In the run up to the anniversary itself, it was decided in 1959 to 
commemorate the 9th Esfand, when the crowds had prevented the Shah from leaving the 
countiy .419 This was then followed by the main celebrations which Kellas describes the 
celebration of 1959 thus:
<e....A quite remarkable effort was made this year to celebrate the amiiversaiy of the
'National Uprising5 of August 20 Two warm summer nights, a riot of coloured lights,
martial music, spouting fountains and a full moon made a carnival in the capital, and
417 FO 371 140789 EP 1015/65 dated 27 August 1959.
418 FO 371 140789 EP 1015/65 dated 27 August 1959.
4,9 FO 371 140887 EP 1961/2 dated 4 March 1959.
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strenuous jubilation took place throughout the provinces. In Tehran every building in the 
main streets was beflagged, eveiy teahouse hung with rugs and tinsel, eveiy wall plastered 
with posters or painted with slogans, every window equipped with a portrait of the Shah. 
Loudspeakers bellowed resounding speeches. Helicopters showered leaflets. Jet aircraft 
screamed over the town. Tire garrison was at home to the public, and its barracks, and the 
zoo and the fun-fairs, were invaded by holiday crowds.
Monster rallies were organised on successive days by the M ardum  and M elliitn political 
parties. Under the banners of the Government Party, of merchant guilds, sports clubs and 
workers’ unions, 800 lorries, 500 buses and 90 jeeps maimed by demagogues with 
microphones, smothered by flowers, displaying gigantic pictures of the king and scattering 
pamphlets, jerked through crowded streets horn square to square. Patient labourers, 
rounded up from die southern slums, the bazaar, the suburbs and the neighbouring villages 
for Hie excitement of a day, sweated like cadle cheerfully in the lorries. In the buses frantic 
youths waved flags from the windows, and sober clerks sat quietly enjoying the ride.
Oi ators, politicians and priests, excelled themselves in the frenzy of patriotic eloquence, 
and press and radio echoed with defiant rhetoric. 'Let the world know’, said a broadsheet,
'tiiat so long as living hearts palpitate in the breasts of Iranians, the independence of Iran 
will endure’; and so on to die same effect ”420
Intlie following year, the same themes continued, though Mosaddeq was not mentioned 
by name, it was quite clear that the Shah wished to stress that he had brought the countiy 
to ruin by selling out to the Tudeh, who were foreign inspired, whereas, he (the Shah) had 
even told the British Ambassador in 1952 that he would personally stand and fight against
420 FO 371 140789 EP 1015/66 dated 25 August 1959.
-194-
a foreign invasion should it occur.421 Again, in his speech to the Majlis, he described the 
movement against Mosaddeq as quintessentially nationalist. “...Ours was not only a 
military movement but it was a national movement. The people were the first to start. I 
call this movement "positive nationalism’ . . . 55422 In 1960, in addition to the celebrations 
there was an explicit example of political myth, as Kellas noted that, “....The opportunity 
was taken, moreover, to inaugurate a ghastly new sculpture in the square of the 28th of 
Murdad, representing in colossal dimensions a soldier and a workman bullying a 
diminutive dragon. (Mi' Ala suggested to me that the dragon must be 'M r K’ but perhaps 
he is 'D r M ’ himself). Party leaders harangued the people from the steps and many 
wreaths were laid. ” 423
One could have expected Dr Mosaddeq’s popularity to have been low in the aftermath of 
the coup as peoples’ memories of the chaotic conditions preceding his downfall were 
fresh, but it is apparent that the government’s decision to put him on trial revived much 
o f his earlier popularity. Indeed as early as November 12 1953, it was reported that 
widespread demonstrations had occurred in Tehran in favour of Mosaddeq, and that the 
bazaar had closed as a mark of protest against his trial.424 In fact, the public show trial was 
the perfect stage for Mosaddeq to make his theatrical comeback.
As one British official noted, “When he fell Dr Musaddiq was largely discredited He
421 FO 371 149757 EP 1015/48 dated 17 June 1960.
422 FO 371 149757 EP 1015/42 dated 13 June 1960.
423 FO 371 149835 EP 1961/7 dated 23 August 1960.
424 FO 371 109986 EP 1015/3 dated 29 December 1953.
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might have remained so if he had not been brought to trial in the full glare of publicity. 
Although his performance in court was not very effective the trial seems to have revived 
amongst the Persian people a great deal of the popularity which he had previously
enjoyed the majority of the people probably still favour Dr Musaddiq in spite of his
policies or lack of them. . . . ” 425 Later that year it was noted that, “The articulate part of the
Persian public has I believe realised that an oil settlement is desirable Nevertheless, in
their hearts they accept these hard facts reluctantly. The blow to their foolish hopes has 
left then nationalism still extremely sensitive. They were not as they see it on the wr ong 
course, they were misled by Musaddiq slightly off the right one... .Nationalistic principles 
remain sacred - better an oilless economy than that these should be sacrificed. ” 426
It was probably the acceptance of this reality, that helped persuade the Shah that some 
form of accommodation with the Nationalists was preferable, though he was also 
undoubtedly motivated by a desir e to outshine his rival. It is debateable how effective this 
policy of co-option was, though there is evidence that members of the National Front felt 
that his leniency was a reflection o f his weakness. The release of Baqai and Ayatollah 
Kashani in 1956 caused consternation among his supporters as Russell noted; “...then 
release has tended to restore some heart to the nationalist rank and file (although 'rank 
and file’ is perhaps and expression inappropriately applied to a movement which is 
primarily intellectual and bourgeois), encouraging them to believe that neither the 
government nor the Shah have any real teeth when it comes to a showdown. The
425 FO 371 1099S6 EP 1015/14 dated 12 February 1954.
426 FO 371 110060 EP 1534/49 dated 13 March 1954.
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' Traditionalist ’ politicians are correspondingly depressed by this further example of the 
Shah’s vacillation, and the military governor in particular is said to feel that much face has 
been lost. . ” 427 The continuing activities of Dr Baqai, who was subsequently re-arrested, 
and other nationalist leaders reflects their' continuing political influence.
Still others were sceptical of the Shah’s decision to begin attending press conferences, and 
critics argued that it was acceptable for the Shah to participate actively in propaganda.428 
Reaction to the Shah’s re-interpretation of recent history remained unsympathetic. Many 
considered that he missed opportunities to restore confidence and instead, “...For the rest 
they dismiss the speech as a vainglorious and unconvincing effort, based upon bogus 
history, to represent the monarch as a national champion. . . . ” 429 As for the popular reaction 
to the increasingly elaborate annual celebrations, Kellas made the following observations 
in 1959:
“The fact is that the Shah and Government were determined to make the most of this 
slightly equivocal anniversary as a manifestation of patriotism, loyalty to the crown and 
resistance against the Soviet Union. They spared no effort to that end. Army, Air Force,
Police, provincial and municipal authorities, the political parties, industry and the bazaar 
were mobilised. Workers and staffs were paraded; shopkeepers flagged their shops upon 
instructions, hi this sense it is true that die celebration was contrived. 'All tiiis’, said ail old 
man in the crowd of spectators in Parliament Square, as a score of perspiring hooligans
427 FO 371 120713 EP 1015/10 dated 23 April 1956.
428 FO 371 133007 EP 1015/56 dated 1 November 1958.
429 FO 371 149757 EP 1015/42 dated 13 Jrme 1960.
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swept by in jeeps, 'is to be seeii with the eyes, not with the heart.’ ”130
The Shah pursued a two-pronged strategy of ideological deconstiuction and tentative 
reconstruction in this period in a process which witnessed his definitive employment of the 
mass media, and which highlights the structural development of ideology and political 
myth. The process o f rejuvenation is apparent. From the stalling point of Mosaddeq’s 
identification with nationalism and his personal representation o f the ' saviour5 within that 
construction, the Shah sought first to reverse the interpretation by identifying Mosaddeq 
with ideas that were opposed to nationalism. At the same time, he moved ahead to re- 
identify himself and his dynasty with nationalist ideology, including the co-option of many 
former nationalists, and as a consequence had to reinterpret the historical narrative of 
nationalism to suit this reconstruction. Possibly as a consequence of the failure of the this 
policy the Shah’s attack on the Mosaddeqist myth became more direct, emphatically 
depersonalising the construct by removing any mention of Dr Mosaddeq from comments 
about the period. The contradictions and tensions implicit in this attempted appropriation 
encouraged the Shah to situate himself and his particular conception of dynastic 
nationalism within the Cold War narrative.
Integrating Iran into the Cold War Narrative
The one significant area in which the Shah did differ quite strongly from the nationalists 
was on the question of foreign policy. Neutralism remained a popular sentiment among 
Iranians, and most nationalist leaders and intellectuals favoured a non-aligned approach
430 FO 371 140789 EP 1015/66 dated 25 August 1959.
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to international relations sim ilar to th a t espoused by India431. The Skah however was quite 
emphatic in his desire to bring Iran firmly into the Western camp, and almost unilaterally 
took Iran into the Baghdad Pact in 1955. For him this was an important aspect of his 
'positive nationalism’, despite the continued scepticism shown by his critics at home and 
even his allies abroad432. The Americans were however more sympathetic, and the Shah 
exploited this sentiment in order to secure financial and military aid for the Aimed Forces, 
and the country in general.433 Thus m ilitarism 434 was justified, not unusually, by raising the 
spectre of communism435. Though the Shah viewed the military as the dependable pillar 
of his throne the evidence suggests that it was weak.
The Shah was not slow to identify the economic and military potential of Iran as crucial 
to the Western alliance, as Sir Roger Stevens points out, “....When I presented my 
credentials...the Shah spoke to me cordially and at length about his desire to see Persia
431 FO 371 109985 EP 1013/1 dated 16 January 1954. See also FO 371 109985 
EP1013/12 dated 12 June 1954. FO 371 109985 EP 1013/16 dated 7 August 1954.
432 FO 371 110060 EP 1534/32 dated 25 February 1954, Stevens argues that Iran 
should sort out her economy before joining a military pact. See also FO 371 114820 EP 
1071/1 dated 31 January 1955, on British reservations.
433 FO 371 114820 EP 1071/5 dated 11 February 1955, notes that the Shah’s 
decision to take Ban into the Baghdad pact followed a visit to the US. See also FO 371 
114820 EP 1071/16 dated 12 March 1955, on the Shah’s motives. See FO 371 110035 
EP 1202/1 dated 21 December 1954, which notes that the US planned to raise the 
strength of the Banian army by 60% in 15 months. FO 371 140841 EP 1201/1 dated 29 
January 1959, the British military attache notes that the Banian army will be larger than 
the British by 1962.
434 FO 371 120734 EP 1113/7 dated 10 March 1956, notes the Shah’s favouritism 
for the army. See also FO 371 133007 EP 1015/63 dated 17 December 1958.
435 The Baqi revolution of 1958 also had a significant effect; see FO 371 140821 
EP 1102/9 dated 10 September 1959.
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militarily strong. Persia, lie said, was essential to tlie defence of the Middle East and any 
military understanding between Turkey and Pakistan must, in the long run, take her into 
account. . . . ” 436 During his subsequent trip to the United States, the Shah was more 
emphatic using constructions familiar to his audience, “....I am convinced that one of the 
essentials for preventing international communism from realising its ambitions with regard 
to Iran is for us, with the help of great free nations, particularly the US, to strengthen our 
armed forces to the extent that would render them capable of putting up an honorable 
defence if Iran is attacked.” 437
Problems were immediately apparent, when it was discovered by government officials that 
the frontline defence for the Baghdad Pact was to be the Zagros mountains, thereby 
entailing the immediate sacrificing of two thirds of the country to any Soviet invasion. 
This contradiction between the theoiy and the practice was, unsurprisingly, unacceptable 
to Iranians, and the government was careful never to annouuce this publicly. In private it 
sought to persuade the allies to establish a more 'northern5 line. This in turn, allowed the 
Iranian service chiefs to argue for even more arms and aid in order to make such a defence 
practicable, 438 though as one British diplomat later noted, “it may be that the Shah’s 
insistence on expanding and modernising his army is based to some extent on his belief in 
its role as the defender of his southern, rather than his northern, frontiers. . . ” 439
436 FO 371 109985 EP 1013/4 dated 27 February 1954.
437 FO 371 114866 EP 1941/1 dated 5 January 1955.
438 FO 371 127111 EP 1201/1 dated 14 January 1957.
439 FO 371 133021 EP 1072/2 dated 17 Febiuary 1958.
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The Cold War o f course had its uses in silencing critics of military expenditure at home. 
The Shah stressed Iran’s importance, thereby flattering national pride, hi a speech to the 
Majlis in 1957, the Shah said, “To strengthen om defensive and military power is not only 
in the interest of Iran, but also that of the Middle East and the free world . ” 440 Indeed the 
Shah continually tried to diffiise criticism of military expenditure at home by universalising 
the debate and pointing out that expenditure was proportionately far less in Iran than in 
many other countries. Indeed, “....hi comparison with other countries om military 
expenditure is not great. It would be a good idea if we considered the military expenditure 
of countries like Switzerland and Sweden and found out what percentage of then revenues 
is spent on then aimed forces, hi 1948 when I was in Switzerland that country was
spending 50% of its budget on its aimed forces At the moment this country is trying
to arm its forces with the latest weapons. We must note this fact: that if we had not joined 
the Baghdad Pact and, like any other independent country, had to secure equipment for 
our defence, om military expenditure would have been 5, 6 , or even seven times more
than it is now By this calculation the money spent on om aimed forces is about 17%
of the country’s budget, and comparing this sum with the 50% of Switzerland, the 75% 
of Pakistan, or the nearly 50% of hidia it is very little. . . . ” 441
This comparative rise in Iran’s international importance was of course also used abroad. 
A British diplomat in Rome noted that the Shah, “ looked on Iran as being the key point
440 FO 371 127095 EP 1104/2 dated 11 February 1957.
441 FO 371 133026 EP 1113/1 dated 13 February 1958. See also FO 371 140789 
EP 1015/71 dated 26 September 1959; FO 371 149792 EP 1201/3 dated 2 February
1960.
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in tlie defence of peace and of the whole Western position. History showed that many of 
the movements for world conquest had flowed out from or through Iran, and the stability 
of that country was a matter of concern for all - more so than, for example, frido-China,
Formosa or even Korea 7,442 In conjunction with Iran’s importance to the Western
world, especially in comparison with other 'less important’ countries, came the notion that 
Iran was a tranquil and stable country with a great future; concepts that would also feature 
heavily in the democratic sovereign’s 'vision’ of a stable, secure and progressive future.443
Something of the tedium induced in his allies by the Shah’s constant reference to this 
argument can be gauged from Harrison’s report in 1960:
“ ...The Shah then started talking about the fiiture prospects of various Asian 
countries....and drew the conclusion that in contrast to Iran, the exploitation of natural 
resources and the increase in national production could not possibly keep up with the 
prospective increase in population in those countries. This of course led easily to the 
conclusion that the West should do more to support strategically-placed, pro-Westem Iran, 
etc etc.
To change the subject, I said I thought the Azerbaijan day military parade had gone off 
very well. The Shah agreed that the human material was quite good, but how pitifully 
inadequate and out of date the equipment was compared with that of countries like
442 FO 371 133007 EP 1015/60 dated 3 December 1958. See also FO 371 133019 
EP 1055/1 dated 13 May 1958, where British impatience with familiar arguments becomes 
apparent.
443 FO 371 140787 EP 1015/9 3 February 1959. The germination of this concept 
begins in this period and receives its most famous outing with President Carter’s visit to 
Iran in December 1977.
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Afghanistan and even Iraq. Iran’s friends and allies must give more material aid, etc etc.
In a further attempt to get away from this rather monotonous refrain, I asked the Shah 
whether he had met Dean Rusk. He said he thought not. But he was rather wondering 
about the triumvirate, Dean Rusk, Chester Bowles and Adlai Stevenson. Rusk was a Far 
Eastern expert, Bowles was interested in India and Stevenson in Africa. Was there not the 
risk of US foreigu policy becoming rather distorted? Iran’s allies must not forget then true 
friends, etc etc....”4*14
That this strategy seemed to work better in the United States reflects the fact that the 
Cold War narrative was quintessentiaUy an American construct and Americans were 
familiar with the implicit meanings of the terms used. It was to reach its apogee with the 
Nixon doctrine. Iranians, on the hand, as the Americans were to discover, were neither
familiar, nor particularly interested in then role as a frontline state in the Cold War.
“According to then [US] own information, the general Iranian view is that the Americans 
are being had for suckers’, and that then aid has been poured out wastefully in support 
o f a useless regime with little benefit to the country. ” 445 Nevertheless, Iranian officials, 
including the Shah, recognised the advantages to be gained from playing along with the 
narrative, since, “..the Americans will bail them out yet again to stop them falling prey to 
communism. ” 446 US impatience with the Iranian inability to get then house in order led 
to tighter controls under the Kennedy administration, with controversial results for Iranian 
economic and political development.
444 FO 371 149761 EP 1015/142 dated 15 December 1960.
445 FO 371 120714 EP 1015/37 dated 29 October 1956.
446 FO 371 110060 EP 1534/49 dated 13 March 1954.
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The benefits which would accrue to the armed forces from this integration were intended 
to cement the relationship between the military and the Shah and ensured a measure of 
security for the Shah’s regime.447 Contrary to expectations however, and despite the 
obvious military role in the coup against Mosaddeq, the relationship was at times fiosty, 
with at least two major conspiracies and the development o f antagonistic relations 
between the Shah and both General Zahedi448 and subsequently, General Bakhtiar (military 
governor of Tehran and first head of SAVAK).
The first major conspiracy was uncovered only a year after the overthrow of Mosaddeq 
and involved a large section of the officer corps. “The communist organisation recently 
discovered in the defence and seciuity forces...had achieved a veiy serious degree of 
penetration. Many of the officers involved had a reputation for honesty and efficiency. The 
three services, the police and the gendarmerie were all affected throughout the country 
and even the Military Intelligence Bureau had been heavily penetrated. So far about 600 
suspects (nearly all officers to the rank of Colonel) have been arrested and more are being 
sought or watched. 1 0 0 0  NCOs are believed to have been connected with the 
organisation. Two special Courts Martial have been set up and healings are about to 
start ” 449 Still later it was rumoured that some 450 officers and NCOs had been
447 FO 371 127111 EP 1201/1 dated 14 January 1957, notes that the Aimed 
Services are indeed a privileged class.
448 FO 371 109985 EP 1013/17 dated 21 August 1954.
449 FO 371 109985 EP 1013/20 dated 21 September 1954; see also EP 1013/8 
dated 14 April 1954, andEP 1013/27 dated 29 December 1954,
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discovered with Tudeh affiliations, though the obvious embarrassment was kept quiet.450 
The most famous conspiracy was led by General Qarani in apparent league with the 
United States451, a view reinforced by the fact that Qarani received a relatively light 
sentence and his conditions in prison were comparatively comfortable.452 Indeed in 1958, 
the British embassy had reached the conclusion that, “...in the event of a coup d’etat the 
army would not repeat not support the Shah.” 453 hi light of the recent Iraqi revolution, the 
threat of a coup was not far from the Shah’s mind, and it should come as no surprise that 
the Shah sought to re-insure himself with “..an unprecedented list o f promotions...” 
indicating, “...that loyalty must in part be purchased. ” 454
Reconstructing dynastic nationalism: towards a 'Democratic Sovereign’
The development towards the 'democratic sovereign’ which as has been argued was a 
more sophisticated interpretation of the ideology of dynastic nationalism, was a natural 
outgrowth of his wish to usurp the nationalist mantle from Mosaddeq and other National 
Front leaders. The Shah had always wanted to present himself as a champion of the 
masses and had made efforts towards this prior to the rise of Mosaddeq. His failure in
450 FO 371 120714 EP 1015/35 dated 1 2  October 1956.
451 FO 371 133009 EP 1018/4 dated 28 February 1958 & 1018/7 dated 4 March
1958.
452 According to one commentator Qarani apparently argued that he was in actual 
fact a mole.
453 FO 371 133006 EP 1015/32 dated 8  August 1958.
454 FO 371 140841 EP 1201/1 dated 29 January 1959. See also FO 371 149792 
EP 1201/3 dated 2 February 1960,
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1951 however, was Mosaddeq’s success and he was determined to recast himself in the 
latter’s image. In order to achieve this reification of himself the Shah attacked tradition, 
although as will be seen he did not feel confident enough to challenge the ulema dir ectly; 
he presented himself as primarily occupied with the political, economic and social welfare 
of the mass of his people; and, he articulated a particular vision of the futur e, which 
encompassed his own ideas on 'modernity’, and laid great emphasis on the notion of 
'progress’.
hi time he would seek to re-energize the myth of the saviour, that is, not just a democratic 
sovereign, but a national saviour in the best traditions of Cyrus the Great, destined to save 
his country from chaos and anarchy.455 This myth was of course to receive more attention 
later in the reign, but it makes an early appearance. The foundation o f the Mardom Party 
under the leadership of Asadollah Alam, as an experimental vehicle for some of the Shah’s 
bolder ideas will also be examined.
The Shah was impressed by Mosaddeq’s ability to retain the loyalty of the masses by 
presenting himself as an incorruptible popular champion unconnected and indeed 
antagonistic to the traditional political elite, who were increasingly characterised as
455 The Shah privately considered himself 'predestined’, a notion that was 
reportedly dismissed in a letter from Dulles to Ambassador Chapin. The American’s 
denied the authenticity of the letter which read in part, “..You know, of course, that we 
have never cherished any illusions about the Iranian sovereign’s qualifications as a 
statesman. The man tries to pose as the Cyrus of modem times. He has no grounds 
whatsoever for doing so.” See FO 371 133009 EP 1018/7 dated 4 March 1958.
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corrupt and parasitical.456 As such he sought to emulate him with a conceited attack on 
the landlords.457 In 1954, he gave a speech urging social reform and criticising 'wealthy 
tax dodgers’ .458 By the late 50s the notion that the landlords were 'feudal’ was gaining 
currency, an identification familiar both to Iranian literate in Marx as well as Western 
political scientists.459 Furthermore, in order to differentiate himself from the land-owning 
aristocracy, to which he ostensibly belonged (despite the fact that they never really 
accepted him), he sought to surround himself with left wing thinkers, not known for their 
sympathy towards landowners. Indeed, Lambton discovered in conversation with two 
Iranians that some of the Shah’s new advisers had Tudeh affiliations.460
The Shah sought to demonstrate his concern for the welfare of his subjects through 
leading by example. Despite ciiticisms earlier in his reign that the distribution of crown 
lands to peasant proprietors was more of a public relations exercise, the Shah continued 
with this programme alter Mosaddeq’s fall.461 The criticisms continued, and in 1956, the 
Shah felt the need to justify his policies and action with the publication of a booklet
456 FO 371 114810 EP 1018/14 dated 12 April 1955.
457 FO 371 133004 EP 1015/7 dated 24 March 1958.
458 FO 371 109985 EP 1013/4 dated 27 February 1954. See also FO 371 109985 
EP 1013/24 dated 17 November 1954. FO 371 109986 EP 1015/15 dated 2 0  February 
1954.
459 FO 371 149804 EP 1461/1 dated 7 January 1960, in conversations with the 
then minister of agriculture, Amuzegar, it was noted, “...What he really had at heart, and 
the Shah also, was to attack the social system on the large holdings, the feudal 
relationship [italics mine] between landlord and peasant, though he could not say this 
openly in the Majlis...”
460 FO 371 114810 EP 1018/30 dated 18 July 1955.
461 FO 371 109985 EP 1013/3 dated 12 February 1954.
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entitled - The Palilavi Estates Offices - in the service of the people’462. It outlines 
effectively the image which the Shah wished to convey; that of an all-knowing wise Shah 
bestowing progress upon his grateful people. Challenging those who opposed land reform, 
the booklet argued:
“It is unfortunate that after the...start in the distribution of land, two classes rose in 
opposition to the reform, and tried their best to hamper the work - these were those who 
promised the villagers that agricultural reform can only be carried in the promised 
paradise, and some of the large landlords who were harbouring a misconception that the 
division of land was against the step against the law of ownership. A third group were 
those who, in sincere faith, thought that because of lack of capital and know-how, the new 
small-holders will not be able to take full advantage of the land, and Iran’s rural districts 
will deteriorate.
If we forget the first detractors, the last groups were very much mistaken. Contrary to what 
they thought the distribution of laud did not weaken the rights of property, but by creating 
new owners, strengthened these rights and created new champions for them. The villagers 
will have gained pride in themselves and their country. To quote HIM the Shah, no cone 
can stay in equilibrium on its head, and the basic stratum of our social structure are these 
veiy same villagers who constitute the broad base of the tapering cone. A historical 
example is the action of Iran’s ancient kings who, in order to safeguard the frontiers, 
granted arable land to wandering tribes who, becoming owners with pride in their 
property, defended the country ”
Apart from an early allusion to tlie 'black and the red’, this passage also highlights the
462 FO 371 127095 EP 1104/3 dated 16 March 1957. The booklet, which is 
contained in this file, was published in 1956.
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Shah’s vision of an Iranian 'yeomanry’, proud owners of land they are eager to defend, 
together with a tentative identification with Iran’s ancient kings. The process o f historical 
reconstruction was being expanded and was itself acquiring a personal characterisation. 
In continuing the attack upon the landlords, the booklet describes them as 'capitalists’, 
clearly borrowing from left wing terminology.
The British were more sceptical of this particular vision of an Iranian yeomanry, “....The 
practical aim of land reform in Iran, quite apart from any considerations of social justice, 
must be to turn an indigent peasantry into an independent and self-reliant yeomanry, and 
if possible to increase production. The Government’s American advisers (the United 
States Operations Mission) appear to be working on the assumption that anyone who 
owns his own land becomes ipso facto hard working, thrifty and enterprising in the Middle 
Western tradition; and they have succeeded in communicating something of then 
conviction to the Shah. Unhappily in Iran there is, or has been until recently at any rate, 
some substance in the more cynical landlord’s contention that, if peasants had more 
money, they simply smoked more opium. . . . ” 463
The booklet further hinted at the Shah’s vision for the future, since having articulated a 
vision of the present and the past, he now had to elaborate on a purpose:
463 FO 371 140856 EP 1461/1 dated 15 January 1959; US intellectual support was 
no doubt predicated on the assumption that an independent peasant class was conducive 
to democracy. See also FO 371 140856 EP 1461/2 dated 15 January 1959: “Critical 
observers argue also in general terms that the notion of the self reliant Iranian yeomanry 
proudly working then own farms is an American pipe-dream, for the Banian peasant’s 
object in life is not hard work, bigger production and independence but to work as little 
as he can and if possible to get rich quick.”
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“Three years ago HIM the Shall decreed that model villages be built in the uncultivated 
lands of the Imperial Estates so that villagers who owned no land could be settled in 
diem....The completion of the first part of the village was notified to Tehran in June 1955, 
and on the 7th July HIM the Shah visited the village, and amid grateful reception of the 
villagers, gave them their title deeds....Thus with an expenditure of 10 million rials, the 
model village of Shah Abad, was brought into being and eighty families have become 
small landowners....”
It cannot have gone unnoticed that the village was named ' Shah-Abad’ (ie made bountiful 
by the Shah). In addition, the Shah decided to experiment with modernisation as he 
understood it, on his remaining estates, with a clear bias towards industrialisation with the 
construction of model factories to produce a variety of goods.464 As to role of the lower 
and upper classes:
“...the Shah who considers that any reform must fust start with the lot of the working 
classes; when this step has been achieved, it would make possible all-embracing reforms 
covering the whole country. His Imperial Majesty has stressed this point at every 
opportunity, that reforms should first include the workers and, that the more privileged 
classes must be the instruments of this reform....”
Later, the model village explained in the aforementioned booklet, developed into the 
model country, the precursor of the 'Great Civilisation, hi fact in a press conference held 
on 1958, the Shah was repetitively emphatic:“...I am not content with seeing Iran a 
progressive country. I want my country to be a model country....I want Ban to become 
a model country, a model of justice and the administration o f justice and a model of
464 FO 371 110004 EP 1104/9 dated 21 December 1954.
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progress We have the possibilities for making Ban a model country. . . . ” 465 His emphasis
on the terms 'progress’ and 'justice’ helped him to identify with those historical kings who 
were popular in Banian culture.466
Progress for the Shah in practice meant catching up with the West, indeed his historical 
frame of reference was the West. In a press conference in 1958, the Shah noted that Ban 
was 'lagging’ behind Europe with regards to the emancipation of women, adding, “I am 
sure, however, that since the Banian nation is progressing in every respect and our society 
is changing rapidly from medieval conditions to a progressive and modem society, this 
transformation,” would take place shortly.467 Earlier that year he suggested the 
construction of department stores, dismissing as unrealistic the complaint that it could lead 
to the unemployment o f2 0 , 0 0 0  shopkeepers.468 Still later the Shah noted enthusiastically 
that, “I have heard tell that the plain of Gurgan has been completely modernised. In a 
short time this region will resemble a centre of European or American activity. . ” 469
465 FO 371 133007 EP 1015/54 dated 31 October 1958.
466 The term 'progress’ was used frequently, see his speech to the nation, in FO 
371 140789 EP 1015/64 dated 20 August 1959. The most obvious just king was Kliusrau 
Anuskiravan 'the Just’. See A K S Lambton Justice in the Medieval Persian Theory of 
Kingship in Studia Islamica XVII, Paris 1962 pp 91-119
467 FO 371 133007 EP 1015/59 dated 24 November 1958.
res f o  3 7 x 133026 EP 1113/1 dated 13 February 1958, the extension of this, the 
suggested clearing of the bazaars entirely was a major contributing factor to the revolution 
in 1979.
469 FO 371 157601 EP 1015/55 dated 28 March 1961. hi an article for the 
Spectator, Michael Leapman noted the unevenness of development and emphasis on 
Westernisation, see FO 371 149761 EP 1015/143 dated 23 December 1960.
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One major consequence of being a popular, progressive monarch, eager to be associated 
with the West was the need to fulfil one other important aspect of Western political 
culture - democracy. At first he strove to point out the popularity of his policies. Thus, 
in an interview for the New York Post, the Shah dismissed opposition to his plans from 
the 'Thousand Families’, a teim which increasingly acquired negative overtones, whom 
he described as an ' insignificant handfrd, but instead pointed to the support he had from 
the 'barefoot millions’ .470 By 1957 however, this image of a populist sovereign was 
insufficient, and the Shah to do more than talk about democracy and to experiment with 
a two party parliamentary system, similar, on the surface at least, to systems prevalent in 
the UK and the United States.471 Eqbal, was approached to head the conservative’ 
Melliun party, while Asadollah Alam, ironically a major landowner from Kkorasan and a 
clear’ indication of the tensions between the Shah’s image of himself and his actions, was 
to lead His Majesty’s loyal opposition, the 'progressive’ Mardom (peoples) party. Eqbal 
was reluctant to participate in the charade, but Alam was enthusiastic and set about xrsing 
the new party as a vehicle to attract the young and the radical into the Shah’s camp. 472
The 'Mardom’Party
The foundation of the Mardom Party is a turning point in the Shah’s reign because it 
marked the moment when the Shah began the transition from what was still ostensibly a 
traditional monarchy to a revolutionary leadership supported by a party organisation
470 FO 371 133007 EP 1015/62 dated 9 December 1958.
471 FO 371 127074 EP 1015/18 dated 27 April 1957.
472 FO 371 140789 EP1015/54 dated 15 July 1959.
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geared towards the propagation of a distinct ideology and political myth. Ideological 
construction was henceforth a premeditated and calculated political act. Alain’s reasoning 
behind Mardom as told to Kellas is revealing, and is worth quoting in full [italics added]:
“ ...Asadullah Alam went on to explain that wliat he had in mind was in fact a 'while 
re vo lu tio n , which he hoped to bring about under the auspices of the Shah. He was 
working upon His Majesty’s mind to this end. He confessed he had made little progress 
so far but he was confident that tire Shah, for whose intelligence and good will he had the 
highest regard, would allow himself to be persuaded that he must take the lead of a 
popular and national crusade.
A sadullah  explained that to his m ind the problem o f  the survival o f  the regime was a 
matter not so much o f  economics as o f  psychology and public relations. Colonel Nasser 
had contrived to inspire the Egyptian people with new zeal by persuading them that his 
government was their own. Dr Musaddiq had elicited the same enthusiasm by the same 
means. Asadullah had studied this phenomenon and concluded, that the key to success was 
popularity based upon a measure o f  nationalistic fa v o u r , which in turn must be founded  
in some patriotic aspiration, such as the recovery o f  Bahrain or a struggle against Arab  
expansion.
Asadullah added that the masses must also be shown that in the development programme 
of the Plan Organisation there was something for tire peasant and the man in the street. The 
most popular man of the day was M Moman, Mayor of Tehran, who was cleaning the 
streets and planting gardens which eveiy man could see for himself and enjoy. The 
mayor’s predecessor M Montasser had built an hygienic slaughter house, a much more 
important and fundamental improvement, but who cares about slaughter houses?....
....a progressive monarchy under a young ruler more popular than Colonel Nasser,
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Asadullah hoped to prevail upon the Shah to be rid of the present 'establishment’, the 
existing ruling classes must give place to new and younger men. The old gang were not 
of course to be hurt; this was white not a red revolution; but the Shah must sack them all. 
Asadullah proposed that the Shah should dissolve the Majlis, dismiss the government and 
liquidate the ruling classes on tire grounds that they were obstructing the necessary 
reforms and inhibiting the realisation of national aspirations which were the object of 
Imperial policy.
The Mardom Party was to be the instrument of this new order. Asadullah confessed, 
however, that the Party’s progress was not rapid. He found the younger intellectuals, 
whose support he courted, reluctant to join; they were suspicious and sceptical. To 
encourage them he was trying to persuade the Shah that the government should be 
encouraged to fight his Party, to persecute and be oppressive. He suggested that there 
might even be an election which his party should lose; the loss would be attributed to the 
riches of die old order and die holiest poverty of die peoples’ own Mardom Party. Slowly, 
nevertheless, young nationalists were beginning to approach him. A young man had 
recently called upon him calling himself a 'pan-Iranian nationalist’, and told him tiiat he
stood for 'nationalism without Shah’. The Shah was an enemy of the people ” Alam
tries to persuade him odierwise. “Not only was he, Asadullah, a king’s man, willing to 
listen to the young man but the king himself would hear him with sympathy, for His 
Majesty was die champion of the people.
Asadullah confessed tiiat he was experiencing difficulty with the Shah himself in 
promoting tiiese ideas, and with Dr Eqbal. The Shah was waiy, apprehending that 
Asadullah was a bit too impulsive and endiusiastic. He was afraid also that popular and 
nationalistic policies, however well controlled, might endanger stability..."173
473 FO 371 133006 EP 1015/34 dated 15 August 1958; FO 371 140790 EP 
1015/78 dated 4 November 1959;see also FO 371 133006 EP 1015/37 dated 20 August
(continued...)
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It should perhaps not be surprising to leam that at the first party conference, the 175 
delegates in attendance thanked, “the democratic sovereign of Ban, guarantor of liberty 
and the Constitution. ” 474
The party emphasised that it was to be a nationwide party ignoring class or wealth, and 
if it failed to convince others, it certainly did its best to assure itself. At the tlui d party 
conference, Alam Bump eted, “...Gradually, as the true nature of the party broke through 
the clouds of uncertainties, hesitations and bewilderment manifested by incredulous 
onlookers, the people found out that the Mardurn party was truly the home of the 
people. . . ” 475 It is interesting that in a society popularly recognised as stratified into the 
haves and the have-nots, the Shah should have promulgated a myth of a meritocratic 
'classless5 society. It is unclear whether he perceived this as the future o f Ban, or as he 
reportedly explained to students, he understood it to be the present state of affairs. 
Certainly he was participating in the invention of tradition. “...I added that fortunately 
there were no family or class barriers in Ban; that anyone with talent could rise to a high 
position. This is one of the precious traditions which we have ardently preserved. . . ” 476
(...continued)
1958, on the Shah’s initial reluctance towards a 'white revolution’.
474 FO 371 140790 EP 1015/78 dated 4 November 1959.
475 FO 371 149756 EP 1015//39 dated 24 May 1960, The government paper, 
Faiman, replied acidly to Alain’s assertions: ‘M r Alam was one of the larger feudal barons 
in the counfiy, more interested in dancing the rumba and grinding the faces o f his peasants 
than in the welfare of the nation.”
476 FO 371 140788 EP 1015/48 dated 30 June 1959; this is not entirely implausible, 
in that the famous 19th cenUuy reforming prime minister, Amir Kabir, was the son of a
(continued...)
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Reconstruction: from democratic sovereign to revolutionary leader
By the end of tlie decade, the Iranian government was sparing no effort in spreading the 
Shah’s message: “....At the end of December the Government initiated a propaganda 
campaign intended to demonstrate the extent of progress achieved during the last six years 
since the Shah’s restoration. The Minister of State in charge o f propaganda, Mr 
NasratuUahMo’inian, claimed to be publishing 275,000 posters, 180,000 pamphlets and 
750 illustrated articles, and to broadcast 120 radio talks and 800 commentaries. . . ” 477 
Harrison noted that:
“...The Iranian press and wireless afford an impression of a popular, active, earnest young 
monarch, now exhorting his Parliament to pass progressive legislation, now adjuring 
municipal authorities to care for the common people, now opening bridges and 
inaugurating new hospitals, now distributing title deeds to grateful peasants, now 
castigating corruption and reaction, now entertaining a procession of foreign rulers, now 
received by foreign princes with the honour due to the heir of Cyrus the Great; supported 
by a devoted prime minister and loyal government in indefatigable pursuit of the welfare 
of the people, upholding the national interest against the malevolence of threatening 
neighbours, and building a prosperous fiiture upon a foundation of social justice, a 
developing industry and agrarian reform. An established and duly elected Parliament, a 
Lower Chamber comprising two respectable political parties and a handful of independent 
members, and a senate of venerable elder statesmen, senior soldiers and scholars, confirms
(...continued)
cook, albeit the court cook. Curzon also noted that Banian society was highly 
democratic’.
477 FO 371 149755 EP 1015/20 dated 18 February 1960.
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this agreeable impression.”™
If  his critics found it difficult to swallow this image whole, it seemed as if the Shah was 
beginning to feel confident in this characterisation of himself (and his dynasty) as the 
saviour of the nation. He had retained a private conviction of himself as 'destined’ for 
some time479; but by the end of the decade he was becoming more public with this view, 
hi a press conference in 1959, he allowed himself the following digression:
“...I do not think it inappropriate to mention that when in other countries a man renders 
the public a service....people enthusiastically exalt him, they construct statues and 
memorials and moum his death. In this comiection I do not speak of myself because there 
is no need to. But there is no one who does not know that my father’s work and my own 
work in this country has not been confined to building schools and hospitals. You can 
compare the situation with the time before my father. One could not go to Khuzistau
because the government had no authority there This was the country which my father
took over. When he went he handed over a country throughout which reigned law and 
order, security, progress and activity. These things shall be registered in history.
After 1941, great progress was achieved, and although it is natural that I should claim 
credit for it, I do not wish to do that because it was by the grace of God that I succeeded.
hi this period tilings have been done which are quite obvious You all know that during
talks about dispossessing the former AIOC, there were hints of British warships and 
paratroopers entering Iranian waters. I frankly told the British Ambassador that if such an 
invasion took place, I would personally take my place at the head of the Iranian forces -
478 FO 371 149756 EP 1015/23 dated 8  March 1960
479 FO 371 110092 EP 1941/19 dated 18 October 1954, Shah notes that the hand 
of'Providence’ had been at work in 1953, among other times.
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both military and guerilla - and would fight such aggression.
...During these long years I have had to be at my work not only mornings, afternoons and 
evenings, but also at midnight or even two or three in the morning. I have had to defend 
the rights of the people during all these hours ,MS0
Li an interview for tlie New York Post, the Shah provided his own interpretation of the 
events of 1953, “Previously I was ready to die for my people, but the uprising 
demonstrated that my people were also ready to die for me. ” 481 This wasn’t simply his 
'election’ as the Shah frequently liked to say, but the crystallisation of a unique 
relationship.
His affection for Cyrus the Great, though not as yet trumpeted, was not a secret, and 
arguably represents an appropriation of personalisation. Association with Cyrus the Great 
not only provided Mohammad Reza Shah with a worthy reference point, and his dynasty 
with an aura o f longevity, it represented an appropriation of myth. Cyras the Great was 
an increasingly familiar personality in the meta-narrative of Iranian history and was 
generally recognizable as the first 'great’ king, and as the founder of a unified Banian state 
and creator of the Achaemenid Persian Empire, possibly the greatest of Banian kings. For 
a growing number of Banians, the reputed humanity and political acumen of Cyras, made
480 FO 371 140788 EP 1015/48 dated 30 June 1959. FO 371 149832 EP 1941/24 
dated 10 November 1960. See also FO 140789 EP 1015/65 dated 27 August 1959, by this 
stage some questioners were urging the Shah to 'find solutions’ to the constraints of 
government and bureaucracy. The notion that all modernisation began with Reza Shah is 
repeated elsewhere, see FO 371 133022 EP 1102/12 dated 30 August 1958.
481 FO 133007 EP 1015/62 dated 9 December 1958.
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him the personalisation of Iran. Mohammad Reza Shah wanted to become the 
personalisation of Iran through the ideology of dynastic nationalism. Arguably, unable to 
achieve this on his own merits his identification with Cyrus the Great was an attempt to 
acquire this personalisation by association and default.
It was known that the Shah intended to celebrate the 2500 anniversary of the Imperial 
Monarchy, though it was being habitually postponed. The announcement in 1959 of the 
impending celebrations, announced by Shoja ed-din Shafa however made public the 
present incumbent of the Peacock throne’s affection for his illustrious predecessor (while 
his reference to a 'Bill of Rights’ was clearly directed to an American audience):
“....The reigii of Cyrus tlie Great was tlie beginning of 'liberalism’ and political freedom 
in the history of mankind; tlie monarch’s public notice issued 011 tlie occasion of the fall 
of Babylon was tlie first Bill of Rights. Such an enduring monarchy was tlie secret of the 
survival of Iran. The commemoration would introduce to the world the real Iran, not the 
nation misrepresented by die Greek, Roman and other historians...Tlie Departments of 
Fine Arts and Archaeology of the Ministry of Education were to fund an exhibition. The 
University of Tehran were to publish a book about Cyrus, to organise courses of lectures, 
to arrange an international congress of orientalists and to publish an encyclopedia of 
Iranian civilisation. Tlie Institute of Translation and Publication of die Pahlavi Foundation 
would publish certain historical works. The Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs would issue 
special stamps. Tlie Ministry of Interior would erect statues of Cyrus in Tehran and Shiraz.
The Ministiy of War would administer a festival programme in the nature of a national and 
historical tatoo ’MS2
482 FO 371 149835 EP 1961/1 dated 29 December 1959. The Iranian govermnent’s
(continued...)
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When a crown prince was finally provided by his third wife, Farah Diba, the Israelis, in a 
gesture of goodwill which cannot have been without significance, offered the Shah a 
Biblical parchment in praise of Cyrus the Great. Eveiyone, it seems, had expected the 
Shah to name the baby boy, either Reza or Cyrus, in the event he was called 'Reza 
Cyrus5.483
It would be incorrect to suggest that this perception which the Shah sought to 
institutionalise was dismissed in its entirety by the populace484. Some evidence points to 
fact that most criticism of the Shah’s behaviour was either concentrated in Tehran, or 
among the socio-economic groups who were under attack.485 There is also some trath in 
the fact that Iranians instinctively distrusted then governments and were liberal in then 
criticisms and often too late in then praise486. However in assuming the reins of power, 
the Shah was bound to attract criticism, and it would be fan to say that the politically
(...continued)
wish that similar celebrations be organised abroad was met with puzzlement, FO 371 
140887 EP 1961/4 dated 27 August 1959: “ ...The Banians seemed to be in danger of 
over-estimating the general interest in foreign countries in a rather esoteric anniversary...”
483 FO 371 149816 EP 1671/15 dated 8 November 1960.
484 FO 371 120714 EP 1015/31 dated 11 September 1956, on Shah’s mystique.
485 FO 371 149762 EP 1016/6 dated 10 November 1960 notes that: “The general 
attitude toward the Shah (this was just before the birth of the hen) seemed to be that 
people liked him and admired the work he was doing for Ban; one man said to me that the 
only people who were against him were those in Tehran. There was no great interest in 
the question o f elections, though it was recognised that the latest attempt had been a 
fiasco. The view was expressed that it was the duty of the Shah and of his governments 
to guide the backward Banian nation at a gradual pace towards democracy....”
486 p o  371 127135 EP 1671/4 dated 9 March 1957, the Shah asks the press for 
constructive as opposed to destructive criticism.
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conscious and active, who were concentrated in Tehr an, were increasingly disenchanted 
with the Shah487. Many found it difficult to reconcile the traditional institution of the 
monarchy with the democratic sovereign the Shah wished to portray488. The vision of an 
egalitarian, progr essive Ir an seemed at odds with the uneven economic development of 
the present, and the ulema were increasingly concerned with a royal lifestyle at odds with 
Shi’a Islam.
With respect to the ulema the Shah found it prudent to proceed carefiilly, emphasising his 
wish to spread the faith of Islam489, and going on a pilgrimage to Mashhad490, hr 1955 he 
notoriously turned a blind eye to the persecution against the Baha’is in an effort to heal 
his persistently tense relations with Ayatollah Bomjerdi491. Baha’is were officially banned 
from associating in groups, and the Bahai temple in Tehran was very publicly demolished. 
The Shah expressed public regret over the incident492. Privately, the Shah agreed that the
487 FO 371 140787 EP 1015//15 dated 18 February 1959. See also FO 371 149755 
EP 1015/20 dated 18 February 1960, which notes that nevertheless even among the less 
politically conscious, the birthday of the 12th Imam was celebrated with more enthusiasm 
than the anniversary of the attempted assassination attempt on the Shah.
488 FO 371 133022 EP 1102/7 dated 2 June 1958, in an effort to deflect criticism
of his business activities the Shah established the Pahlavi Foundation, but this again failed
to convince his critics. See also FO 371 140787 EP 1015/18 dated 23 February 1959, 
where Lambton notes that it is not corruption per se that is the problem but the fact that 
most people believe it has breached acceptable standards.
489 FO 371 109986 EP 1015/22 dated 20 March 1954.
49° F 0  3 7 1  1 1 4 8 0 7  Ep 1 0 1 3 / 6  dated 2 3  March 1955.
491 FO 371 120714 EP 1015/35 dated 12 October 1956, Lambton comments that 
Borujerdi in fact stopped meeting with Shah on account of his wayward lifestyle.
492 FO 371 114863 EP 1781/1 dated 12 May 1955. See also FO 371 114863 EP 
1781/6 dated 26 May 1955, FO 371 114863 EP 1781/9 dated 3 August 1955.
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mullahs had to removed from politics, but argued that the time was not yet ripe, and that 
it could take several years before he could move against them .493 By 1957 one traveller 
to Mashhad (Russell) was moved to note, “Reza Shah must have been spinning in his 
grave at Rey. To see the arrogance and effrontery of the mullahs once again rampant in 
the holy city! How the old tyrant must despise the weakness of his son, who has allowed 
these turbulent priests to regain so much of their reactionary influence. ” 494 As late as 1959, 
the Shah was cultivating relations with Ayatollah Borujerdi in a bid to elicit his support 
against the Soviet Union.495 Ayatollah Borujerdi replied by issuing a fatwa  declaring the 
proposed land reform to be against Islam496; much to the irritation of the Shah who finally
decided to throw caution to the wind, “ it may be worth reporting that Dr Eqbal has
written to Ayatollah Borujerdi saying that if he did not come into line on the Bill, the Shah 
would carry out a 'white coup d’etat’, close up the two houses of parliament, and shear 
the clergy o f then remaining privileges. Whether or not the Shah really has it in mind to 
carry out this apparent threat, the remarkable thing is that Eqbal has apparently gone on 
record in writing to this effect. . . . ” 497
With respect to criticisms about a monarch being incompatible with democracy, few 
people had any illusions that the system of government was democratic in the slightest,
493 FO 371 114811 EP 1018/37 dated 9 August 1955; also FO 371 114811 EP 
1018/46 dated 29 September 1955.
494 FO 371 127075 EP 1015/30 dated 27 June 1957.
495 FO 371 140789 EP 1015/61 dated 13 August 1959.
496 FO 371 149804 EP 1461/5 dated 1 March 1960.
497 FO 371 149804 EP 1461/7 dated 8  March 1960.
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and it was almost taken for granted tiiat elections would be rigged. However, the 
Constitutional movement and the establishment of the Majlis were important political 
reference points for most politically conscious Banians, and the Shah recognised that he 
had to maintain at least the facade of parliamentary government498. He constantly stressed 
his constitutional credentials and repeatedly emphasised that freedom and democracy 
existed in Ban. Li private he was far more forthcoming, even admitting to Sir Roger 
Stevens, that his imposition of a two party system was a farce.499
Eventually, the bubble burst, and though most elections had been rigged it was the 
promise of multi-party free elections in 1960 which caused the greatest protest, largely 
because having promised so much, expectations were dashed when it became apparent 
that the Shah intended to blatently rig the vote. The daily Sedaye Mardom wrote on 14 
August 1960, “...Indeed whilst on the one hand the rulers of the country maintain that 
these elections are fr ee, 20m Banians assert that they are not free, and since propaganda 
about freedom of election persists the dissatisfaction of public opinion increases. . . ” 500 
Kellas obseived the ah of ridicule in which people perceived the elections:
“...It is claimed that many papers have been spoiled and many bogus or facetious votes
cast for the Twelve Imams, Madame Delkash, the cabaret singer, and Mr Sliamshiri, who
498 FO 371 127075 EP 1015/45 dated 6  November 1957, notes that Eqbal’s 
obsequiousness effectively shattered the facade of democratic government.
499 FO 371 133006 EP 1015/37 dated 20 August 1958. Students in Isfahan noted 
that people couldn’t tell the difference between Mardom and Melliun, see FO 371 149762 
EP 1016/2 dated 23 February 1960. See also FO 371 149832 EP 1941/9 dated 12 July 
1960.
500 FO 371 149758 EP 1015/84 dated 16 August 1960.
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runs the clielo-kabab house in the Bazaar Personally I have found it hard to trace
anybody, from my cook to the Minister of Court, who has taken the trouble to vote at all; 
and the wry explanation for die most part is that 'it has no purpose’. Certainly a substantial 
proportion of die urban middle class have no intention of voting, a privilege which belongs 
to base mechanicals...”501
The Shah sought to recover the situation by announcing that if the people so wished it, 
he would cancel the elections; he would do this, he argued because he was a true 
democrat.502 Obviously concerned at the loss of credibility the Shah reiterated his claim
again at a press conference on August 27th, “ I have never acted contrary to the
provisions of the Constitution and I am not prepared to do so now. I can act only within 
the framework of the law, unless the people - the real people, not two or three thousand 
people who stage demonstrations in the streets - show me that it is then inner wish and 
desire that the second alternative (annulling of the elections) be taken, in spite of the fact 
that this is outside the limits of the law. I am always willing to do anything for the sake 
of the country if I know that it is the real desire of the people. ” 503
hi order to convince sceptical a hies (especially after the Iraqi Revolution) and domestic
501 FO 371 149758 EP 1015/87 dated 23 August 1960. See FO 371 149760 EP 
1015/123 dated 19 October 1960, the Shah admits to Harrison that it was mistake to say 
the elections would be free.
502 FO 371 149759 EP 1015/96 dated 29 August 1960.
503 FO 371 149759 EP 1015/105 dated 10 September 1960, the Shah also took the 
opportunity to point out that the 1951 elections (under Mosaddeq) were far worse in 
terms of vote rigging.
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critics, lie stressed the comp stability of monarchy with Iranian political culture,504 In an 
interview with the correspondent for the New York Post in 1958 he dismissed 
comparisons with Iraq by stressing the 2600 [sic] year old tradition of monarchy.505 This 
was printed in a subsequent article.506 hi a subsequent press conference in 1959, his 
concern with his legitimacy and the continuing stigma of the 1953 coup are apparent, “...I 
can say that the reason for tranquillity and stability in our country is the fact that Iran is 
ruled by a natural and not an imposed regime. . . ” 507
hi his Nowruz address in 1959, he said, “At the beginning of this New Year, speaking as 
the guardian of this glorious throne which has a 2500 unbreakable bond with the hearts 
of the people of this land. . . ” 508 At a press conference on the 23 June 1959, the Shah 
apparent confidence belied a sensitivity to the challenges he was facing, “...One of our 
glories is that our regime in Iran is so natural that there is no need for dictatorship. For 
this veiy reason there is no torture or pressure. The people like the regime because it is 
of then own making and choice and is a natural one. . . ” 509 The plans for the celebration of 
2500 years of Imperial Monarchy were clearly aimed in part at reinforcing this
504 FO 371 133006 EP 1015/37 dated 2 0  August 1958. See also FO 371 133066 
EP 1961/4 dated 30/October 1958.
505 FO 371 133007 EP 1015/62 dated 9 December 1958.
506 FO 371 140787 EP 1015/2 dated 7 January 1959.
507 FO 371 140787 EP 1015/9 dated 3 February 1959.
508 FO 371 140787 EP 1015/21 dated 2 April 1959.
509 FO 371 140788 EP 1015/48 dated 30 June 1959, note that he uses the word 
'natural* twice within three sentences.
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naturalisation.510 As his autocracy became more apparent511, this attempt at naturalisation 
was less convincing in relation to democracy (although in time he would try and redefine 
democracy7), though it came to convince his increasingly receptive Western allies, and 
in cementing the myth of the saviour. There was of course a more fundamental 
contradiction in the democratic sovereign relying so heavily on 'tradition7 which had little 
to do with democracy. He would ultimately seek to resolve this by both redefining the 
concept of democracy (essentially a variation on populism) and combining both elements 
into the myth of the saviour.
Concluding Remarks
This chapter highlights a number of characteristics in the development of political myth 
and its relationship with ideology. Unlike the previous periods there is no emphatic central 
personality around which ideological constructs gravitate and the decreasing level of 
political plurality inhibits the potential for ideological friction and tensions. As such, 
although there are still essential tensions particularly in the aftermath of the coup and the 
Shah7 s attempts to re-identify himself with a more refined, if  still contradictory cocktail 
of ideological constructs, the propensity for political myth development is more difficult 
to distinguish from then parent ideologies. This ambiguity is retained in the next period 
and indicates the continuing difficulty in distinguishing political myth from ideology. At 
the same time there are still interesting insights into the construction o f political myth.
510 FO 371 140887 EP 1961/1 dated 1 January 1959.
511 FO 371 140789 EP 1015/50 dated 9 July 1959, notes that although the Iran is 
not a police state, SAVAK enjoys enormous powers.
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Whereas ill the aftermath of the abdication of Reza Shah an increasingly pluralist political 
environment rigorously challenged the imposed ideological consensus (hegemony), after 
1953, the deconstruction of the Mosaddeqist myth was led by the Shah. Li contrast to the 
previous case, the deconstruction proved to be difficult and the Shah moved to 
depersonalise the ideological challenge, in effect seeking to reverse the process which had 
resulted in Mosaddeq’s identification with a particular conception o f nationalism, hi 
seeking to reconstruct his own ideology of dynastic nationalism the Shah borrowed 
heavily from the leftist nationalist discourse and compensated for weakness at home by 
seeking to situate his own conception of Iran within an external Cold War narrative 
indicating both Iran’s integration into international ideological discourse, but also 
importantly, the Shah’s growing attachment to an ideological discourse alien to popular 
Iranian political culture.
This weakness was in turn compensated for by the use of the mass media to convey the 
Shah’s message to the Iranian people, and the move to create the Mardom party and the 
tentative development from democratic sovereign to revolutionary leader. In constructing 
his new image, the Shah characteristically had to reinvent the past, appropriating the 
nationalist narrative for his own dynasty and for the first time articulating a more coherent 
vision for the future. As such the process of the personalisation of ideology now 
encourages both the reinterpretation of the past as well as the construction of the future. 
The Shah’s increasing association of his dynasty with the Achaemenids, and himself with 
Cyrus the Great, as well as suggesting dynastic longevity, illustrates the process of 
ideological personalisation by proxy. This appropriation of a political myth by association 
simply multiplied the tensions and contradictions already implicit in the personalisation of
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ideology and would itself yield more explicit political myth construction later in the reign.
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Chapter 5
The M yth of the W hite Revolution - Mohammad Reza Shah, 'M odernisation’
and the Consolidation of Power.
Introduction
''....He [the Shah] often grew impatient w>hen American diplomats urged him to 
modernise at a pace fa ster  than his careful crawl. 7 can start a revolution fo r  you, ’ he 
apparently told an American diplomat, 'but you  w on’t like the end result. ’...A12
■ The Shah behovedm his White Fevolution. When J met him a few days after my anivaf 
In Teheran in February 1965 he sounded convincing as he told me, "We must forget all 
our past disagreements and close ranis to rescue the country from underdevelopment 
and ensure a bright future for future generations, "lie was sitting on a marble table 
in his sister Princess Ashraf's villa, with his hands beneath his thighs and his legs 
dangling. "1am going to go faster than the left, "he promised. 'You're all going to have 
to run to keep up with me. All the old economic and political feudalism is over and 
done with Fverybody should benefit directly from the product of his own labour. That's 
the objective of my agrarian reforms. And for the workers we shall institute profit 
sharing.... All young people must come back and take pari in our great, work.5/3
512 FO 371 133055 EP 1671/5 dated 3/10/58. Article in the Spectator, written by 
Andrew Roth.
513 F Hoveida The Fall of the Shah London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1979, pg 134.
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The launch of the White Revolution marks a turning point in the ideological development 
of Mohammad Reza Shah. Pushing aside the hesitancy of previous years the Shah for the 
first time sought to pursue a coherent ideological programme which encapsulated his 
particular conceptions of modernity and nationalism within a reconstructed ideology of 
dynastic nationalism, intended above all to institutionalise himself and his dynasty within 
Iranian political culture. It was a political act calculated to emphatically identify the Shah 
with a particular ideological construct - it was in effect a programme of ideological 
reification in his person. With the publication of 'Pahlavism’ it also marked the period 
when personalisation was increasingly extended into personification, that is to say, it was 
increasingly insufficient for the Shah to become identified with an ideology, the process 
was taken a stage further, and the Shah embodied an ideology. The emphasis was no 
longer on acquisition and appropriation but on the initiation of ideas by the Shah.
The heightened intensity which this process entailed resulted in greater tensions as the 
contradictions between the ideological cocktail of constructs which the Shah sought to 
represent manifested themselves both with perceived social reality as well as the 
consequence of the friction between the different constructs the Shah sought to synthesise. 
One major consequence of this was a major attempt to reinterpret the past characteristic 
of the mythic process.
The 'White Revolution’ was intended to be a bloodless revolution from above aimed at 
fidfilling the expectations of an increasingly politically aware general public as well as an 
ambitious and growing professional socio-economic group, and as such anticipating and
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preventing what many considered to be the danger of bloody revolution from below. 514 
Although many were looking to heal the socio-economic problems of the country, this 
was fundamentally a political programme conceived by members of the political elite in 
order to sustain as much of the established relations o f  domination as realistically 
possible. 515 This was a status quo centred upon the institution of the monarchy as the 
lynchpin of Iranian state and society.
Aside from the Shah, there were three men who typify the prevailing attitudes towards the 
construction of the 'White Revolution’: Asadollah Alam, the nominated leader of the 
Mardom  Party, who according to the sources initially conceived o f the idea, saw the 
White Revolution as a vehicle for consolidating the power and authority o f the Shah; Ah 
Amini, prime minister from 1961-62, whose government launched land reform and other 
reforms and who frequently used the phrase 'White Revolution’, regarding it essentially 
as social and economic reform with a monarch who reigned rather than ruled; and Hasan
514 FO 371 157605 EP 1015/123 24 May 1961. This sentiment was echoed by 
Amini himself; FO 371 157612 EP 1015/280 dated 9 November 1961. See also FO 371 
157604 EP 1015/116 dated 21 May 1961.
515 FO 248 1580 dated 30 May 1960, Dr Ram in discussion with Kellas: ‘D r Ram 
claimed that the truth of course was that the Bill was a political measure. It was intended 
to show the world that Iran was not a feudal society, such as was supposed to be a liability 
in the struggle against communism. It might indeed enjoy some success in this respect. But 
the proper way to resist Communism was economic, and the land reform law was not 
economic....” In an undated memo from 1960, Webster Johnson USOM adviser in the 
Agricultural Bank noted that: cTn conversation generally I have said that we believe some 
form of agricultural revolution as regards techniques is necessaiy for Ir an but that a 
technical revolution is quite different from re-distribution of land, which a matter of 
politics and so largely outside our sphere....” FO 248 1580. For a comprehensive analysis 
o f land reform see E Hooglund Land & Revolution in Iran. 1960-1980. Austin, Texas, 
University of Texas Press, 1982, and A K S Lambton The Persian Land Reform 1962- 
1966. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1969.
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Arsanjani, Amini’s vigorous Minister of Agriculture, whose concept of 'White 
Revolution’ was nothing less than the imposition o f a social and economic revolution, in 
which the monarchy would be a welcome and long overdue casualty. After considerable 
prevarication, and a supporting role duiing the Amini administration, the Shah not 
surprisingly opted for Alain’s conception and in 1963 was to launch his 'White 
Revolution’, as a political exercise pursuing a particular conception of modernity 
undoubtedly influenced by his perception of the industrialised West in his quest to secure 
dynastic legitimacy and the institutionalisation of his monarchy.
The Shah was anxious to be seen not only as a 'democratic’ monarch, progressive and 
benign, always with the welfare of his people in mind, a characterisation he had pursued 
to variable effect in the post-Mosaddeq period, but as a 'revolutionary’ monarch. In so 
doing, he would appropriate the myths of the left and National Front as a champion of 
revolutionary nationalism which would assist in legitimising himself and his dynasty. As 
the founder and guarantor of a new order for Iran, he would consolidate his dynasty’s 
position within the political system, which he would argue was dependant upon the 
continuation and consolidation of his dynasty. The ideologies of modernisation and 
nationalism were to be synthesised in a definitive reconstruction of dynastic nationalism 
labelled 'Palilavism’. Monarchy and modernism, perceived as contradictions by many, was 
thus rationalised into compatibility, even necessity, by the Shah, who saw no contradiction 
in drawing upon the traditional myths of past monarchs, likewise considered initiators of 
just’ orders.516 He also developed a vague notion of an alternative utopia, originally
516 The two key historic monarchs being Cyrus the Great 559-529BC, and the
(continued...)
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labelled the model society, and subsequently, (perhaps influenced by Johnson’s Great 
Society in the United States), the 'Great Civilisation’.
The 'White Revolution’ was therefore a strategy for legitimation, through the fusion of 
a cocktail o f contradictory ideological constructs providing an implicit tension which 
encouraged the development of political myth517. Socio-economic benefits were 
emphasised in an effort to disguise the real political gains, though many commentators 
were aware o f the real motives. The Shah also tried to harness the White Revolution as 
a vehicle for unifying the country by ostensibly giving peasants a stake in the economic 
welfare of the state, while at the same time of course being gratefid to then sovereign for 
having released them from their 'servitude’ to ruthless and exploitative landlords. These 
landlords which not only included the aristocracy but members o f the bazaar and ulema, 
were characterised as the 'feudal’ reactionary enemy, in a direct borrowing of language 
which can have meant little to most Iranian peasantry.
The Socio-Historic context
The decade o f the 1960s continued to be turbulent for Iran, not least because of the 
tremendous growth in education both within the country but also in the impact of Western 
student politics on the Iranian students who travelled abroad in increasing numbers.
(...continued)
Sassanian, Khosrau Anuskiravan.
517 Political myth thus provides an ambiguous interpretative matrix which allows 
these contradictory tensions to be resolved, if temporarily. This conceptualisation draws 
on Gramsci’s notion o f ‘contradictory consciousness’, operating within the individual.
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Harrison noted the dramatic expansion of geographic mobility, “Forty thousand Iranians 
of the upper and middle classes now travel abroad year and year on private and official 
business, for pleasure, for medical treatment and for training. No less than 6000 Iranians 
apply to Her Majesty’s Embassy here alone for visas for the United Kingdom annually. 
Li reverse moreover, the country is invaded by foreigners; the European and American 
communities in Tehran numbered 700 in 1914 and today well over 10,000.” With respect 
to the student population he noted that, ‘there are now 17,000 students at six universities 
in the country and 15,000 more abroad; and between 20 and 30 thousand seek admission 
to the Universities from secondary schools each year.”
Furthermore, many of the students of the previous two decades were now in positions of 
considerable influence, not least Amini’s Ministers for Agriculture and Education, and 
then ideas had been shaped by developments in the post war era. Put simply, a substantial 
'middle class’ or professional class, was finally coming of age.518 According to Harrison, 
“the development of a substantial middle class or middle classes, o f professional, technical, 
clerical and managerial people, is the most notable feature of the last 35 years of Lanian 
social history.” 519 It is important in this respect also to recognise that the political elite 
were also increasingly divided as to the need and nature of the reform. The fractures 
emergent among the 'ruling’ class both bureaucrats and landowners contributed to an 
atmosphere of change and encouraged the view that radical reform was needed to secure 
and stabilise the country and the ruling establishment. Harrison’s astute analysis o f this
518 FO 248 1582 EP 1015/36, dated 1st March 1961.
519 See also FO 371 157599 EP 1015/7 dated 31 October 1961 - Lambton’s 
assessment of growing middle class 'political consciousness’.
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development is worth quoting in Ml:
“Throughout the upper and middle classes, there are professional people, politicians, 
economists, planners, bankers, architects, journalists and writers who have been highly 
educated abroad; the elder, or pre-war, generation for the most part in France, the younger 
in die US, Germany, Switzerland and die United Kingdom. Although most of these people 
belong to privileged or prosperous families, whether of the upper 01* upper middle classes, 
they comprise a number of the real Iranian reformers and even revolutionaries. M any  
indeed would readily connive at revolution, i f  they judged  that it would serve to amputate 
the 'dead h a n d ‘ o f  social and bureaucratic tradition and woidd offer a hope o f  more 
efficient administration and fuljihnent o f  their own ideas whether political and economic 
aspirations or personal ambitions. [Italics added] These people have seen what is going 
011 in more highly developed societies. They are well read, diey have been members of 
students’ unions and debating clubs; and above all they have escaped for a few years from 
the autocratic system of domestic relations of Iranian family convention. They are acutely 
conscious, not so much of the absence of political freedoms in then own country, as of
social injustice, nepotism, corruption and incompetence The bulk of them are not more
than 45 years old, and some of them together constitute virtually a corporate intellectual 
elite ”520
Added to these factors must simply be the impact of the economic growth and land reform 
which affected Iran during this decade causing massive socio-economic dislocation and 
tension, all of which would have contributed to a certain ideological dynamism. The 
economic expansion and transformation is exemplified by the growth in 
telecommunications and mass media. Harrison noted that there were now some 1 ,0 0 0 , 0 0 0
520 FO 371 157610 EP 1015/229 1 August 1961.
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radio sets in the country, up tenfold from 1940, while a contemporary commentator was 
impressed by the rapid adoption of the television set, a whole new medium for the 
monarchy to reach the people. As Harnbly noted, “in 1962 it was estimated that there
were 67,000 television sets in use reaching a potential audience o f 670,000 an audience
far exceeding to total number of readers of newspapers and magazines. . . ” 521 For all these 
reasons, the need for a clear programme of reform within a pronounced ideological 
framework, became a matter of urgency.
Constructing the 'W hite Revolution’.
As noted in the previous chapter, Asadollah Alain, the leader of the Mardom Party was 
clear about the political imperative when he first suggested the concept of a 'White 
Revolution5 as a vehicle for the Shah in discussions with a cautious Sir Roger Stevens in 
19 5 8 . 522 hi the aftermath of the Iraqi coup d’etat, Alain argued that a 'White’ (ie 
bloodless) revolution was needed in Iran if the Iraqi coup was not to be repeated in Iran. 
Astutely, Alam argued that for the people to be mobilised behind the Shah in this 
'revolution’ an enemy had to be provided. After all, he conjectured, it was the presence 
of a tangible enemy which had contributed so much to Mosaddeq’s popular success.
521 See G Harnbly Attitudes & Aspirations of the Contemporary Iranian Intellectual 
RCAS, Vol LI, part n , 1964 pg 134. The Iranian embassy in London estimated that there 
were 40,000 television sets and 200,000 radio sets for a population of 2,000,000 in 
Tehran in 1960; see FO 371 149761 EP 1015/143 dated 23 December 1960.
FO 371 133006 EP 1015/34, dated 15 August 1958. Alam himself lacked credibility 
as a champion o f the poor, even the pro-Royalist paper, Farman commented that, “Mr 
Alam was one o f the larger feudal barons in the country, more interested in dancing the 
rumba and grinding the faces of his peasants than in the welfare of the nation.” FO 371 
149756 EP 1015/39 dated 24 May 1960.
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Significantly, the Shah was initially not overly enamoured with leading a revolution, even 
one that was ostensibly bloodless.523 However, domestic and international pressures 
gradually convinced the Shah that if he did not lead the reform, he and his dynasty might 
be overcome by revolution from below524 This view was confirmed by the anxiety caused 
by the overthrow of the Menderes regime in Turkey in I960.525 Russell noted that, “. .1 fear 
that immediate methods are needed, perhaps even a dash of cheap economic 
demagoguery. . . 1,526
The notion of a 'White Revolution’ thus gradually entered Iranian political discourse and 
was seized upon by a number of reformers as a convenient conceptualisation of the more
523 FO 371 133006 EP 1015/37, dated 20 August 1958. It should be remembered 
that since the overthrow of Mosaddeq the Shah had consistently argued that Iran had had 
her revolution and consequently was an 'island of stability’; see FO 371 149757 EP 
1015/45 dated 7 June 1960. Later Alfa would argue in conversation with Sir Roger 
Stevens that the whole notion was the Shah’s idea in the first place, see FO 371 170374 
EP 1015/33 dated 18 February 1963.
524 hi 1961, an article in the Christian Science Monitor made the following astute 
remark, “....Dr Musaddiq underestimated the attachment of Iranians to the institution of 
monarchy, although the present Shah, strictly speaking is not of royal blood. If the Shah 
can identify himself with successful reform, radical changes in the present social and 
political system of his country would not automatically mean the establishment of a 
republic...” FO 371 157603 EP 1015/99 dated 15 May 1961. See also FO 371 157605 EP 
1015/139 dated 1 June 1961, on the impending fear of revolution.
525 FO 371 149757 EP 1015/45 dated 7 June 1960: “..The coup has caused within 
the regime itself considerable anxiety.... Only a few have taken comfort from the reflection 
that unpopidar regimes have been swept away in neighbouring countries while Iran 
continues to confound the critics who have so long and so loudly proclaimed her to be the 
least stable element in the Western alliance in the Middle East.
526 FO 371 133006 EP 1015/50 dated 30 September 1958.
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or less dramatic reforms they hoped to apply527. The Shah once again lost the initiative as 
he had done in 1951, because his attempted re-invention in the 1950's as a democratic and 
progressive monarch lacked credibility in the eyes of the people. In effect the Shah once 
again lost control of the political process although his role was not as diminished as under 
Dr Mosaddeq.528
Li effect, a looming economic and political crisis precipitated by the cancellation of the 
elections of August 1960, combined with international pressure and a not untypical 
measure o f procrastination by the Shah resulted in the leadership of reform falling onto 
the shoulders of a respected Iranian aristocrat, who had been ambassador to Washington, 
Dr Ali Amini. Amini, and his zealous Minister of Agriculture, Dr Hasan Arsanjani 
represented the highly educated and socially privileged 'revolutionaries’ alluded to in 
Harrison’s dispatch quoted above, though it would be fan to argue that Amini, was more 
reformer than revolutionary.529
527 The Shah first publicly used the term in July 1960, in reference to the 
emergence of'new, (younger) blood’ in the Majlis elections; FO 371 149758 EP 1015/72 
dated 26 July 1960. Amini uses the term in a discussion with Harrison as noted in FO 371 
157604 EP 1015/109 dated 17 May 1961.
528 See FO 371 149756 EP 1015/23 dated 8  March 1960 [quoted above pg 216]. 
See also FO 371 149758 EP 1015/84 dated 16 August 1960. Comments by Kellas, see 
page 224 above: FO 371 149758 EP 1015/87 dated 23 August 1960. The Shah of cour se 
had always been keen to stress his democratic and progressive credentials, see FO 371 
149755 EP 1015/2 dated 29 December 1959. See also FO 371 149755 EP 1015/20 dated 
18 February 1960.
529 hi a private conversation Arsanjani is reported to have said, 'The monarchy is 
like a chan which stands on four legs, I have destroyed one of them. ’ [ie the landed 
aristocracy]. Amini distinguished between a 'white revolution’ and real revolution, 
implying that the former merely represented radical reform - see FO 371 164183 EP 
1015/77 speech to the Ministry of Justice dated 12 June 1962.
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Ironically, despite his widely known liberal credentials, the fact that Amini’s relatively 
brief premiership was conducted in the absence of a sitting Majlis, incurred the wrath and 
enmity of National Front politicians who accused Amini of un-Constitutional behaviour. 
Nevertheless, in his brief 18 month tenure, Amini and Arsanjani began the process of land 
reform in earnest, with the tacit approval of the Shah.
Indeed the Shah’s desire to be seen at the forefront of the reform movement can be seen 
in his address to the outgoing Senate in which he identified the present state of Iran with 
the 'Middle Ages’, using language which many under attack considered more appropriate 
to Europe than to Iran.530 Aside from providing a reference with which opponents of 
reform could be identified, this may also be considered a strategy of universalisation and 
rationalisation, since the West provided the model for modernity and was perceived as 
scientific and rational, what was thought backward for Europe was equally backward for 
Iran.
Amini was well awar e of the concern that land reform, which involved the redistribution 
of large estates among tenant farmers, was causing among most landlords, many of whom 
resented the allusion to feudalism. Though most had accepted that some measure of land 
reform would be inevitable, after all even Dr Mosaddeq had proposed it, few were ready 
for the extent to which they would be stripped for the economic and consequently, 
political power. A previous attempt had been considerably modified by the sitting Majlis, 
but now Dr Amini, in the absence of a Majlis, was able to propose much tougher
530 FO 371 149804 EP 1461/3 dated 30 January 1960.
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legislation, and his enthusiastic Minister of Agriculture was keen to apply it. With 
customaiy vitriol, Arsanjani attacked the backward and reactionary 'feudalists’ and 
emphasised the 'progressive’ nature of the reform which would pre-empt a red revolution. 
Since many ulema were also major landowners, and private property was considered 
inviolable in Islamic Law531, they too became the target of attack, and along with the 
landlords were later to be characterised as ' black reaction’ by the Shah, while the left 
would be characterised as red subversion.532 These two eupkamisms were the 
quintessential aspects of the myth of the White Revolution, and effectively de-personalised 
and differentiated opponents of reform.
Indeed much of Arsanjani’s rhetoric was seen as excessive and regarded by many as 
counter-productive: “The Minister of Agriculture, by an intemperate campaign against 
'feudalism’ in the name of land reform, has provoked disturbances amongst the peasantiy 
and alarm against landowners. . . ” 533 On another occasion on a trip to Maragheh in 
Azerbaijan, the site of the fir st land redistribution, the minister became embroiled in a 
bitter argument with a local landlord,
“..The party then witnessed perhaps the most dramatic event of the day when Colonel
531 FO 371 149804 EP 1461/5 dated 1 March 1960 - Ayatollah Borujerdi issues 
a fatwa condemning land reform as against Islam. The Shah’s reply to this move was 
unusually blunt, threatening the ulema with a 'white coup d’etat’. See FO 371 149804 EP 
1461/7 dated 8  March 1960.
532 Amini sought to pacify the ulema by appointing a religious adviser to the 
cabinet, going on pilgrimage to Mashhad and Qom and visiting Kashani; FO 371 157611 
EP 1015/241 dated 22 August 1961.
533 FO 371 157608 EP 1015/185 dated 22 June 1961.
-240-
Esfandiari appeared for au interview with the minister during a tea interval It appears
that the notorious Colonel had risen from the people to be die owner of 20 villages, 15 of 
which he had recently sold or donated to his children and relatives. He was offering four 
of the remainder for distribution and retaining one which had a population of 10,000 
people. He pointed out that in doing so he was acting strictly within the terms of die law.
Dr Arsanjani became veiy indignant and swore he would deprive the colonel of this village 
as it was iniquitous diat he should remain in control of so many people. He added for good 
measure that he would strip him of his medals, to which Esfandiari responded tiiat he 
could have the medals any time he cared to come for them...”534
Like the Shall, Arsanjani was contemptuous of Iran’s tribes and drew analogies with 
European history: “...[He] called the persistence of the tribes in living a nomadic life 'a 
vestige o f the dark ages’. He said it was time for them 'to end this medieval practice of 
migration and living in tents’, a practice usefiil for little except the opportunity it gave 
foreigners to take photographs of them. He envisaged the settlement of the tribes in 
agricultural areas where they could engage in fanning. . . ” 535
However, the Minister was convinced that the development of sedentary agriculture was 
the salvation of Iran, and though he frowned on industrialisation in stark contrast to the 
Shah, he shared the latter’s belief in the abilities of the Iranian peasant and actively 
promoted a conception of a liberated Iranian yeomanry: “The Iranian peasant, who, 
although wholly illiterate, could recite his national epic by heart, was filled with resources 
o f intelligence and character which had been untapped for centuries. The lamp and the
534 FO 248 1589, dated 6  May 1962.
535 pQ 2 4 g j 589, conversation with Phillips dated 4 December 1962.
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bulb were there and only the liberation of a just social order was needed to supply the 
necessary connection and the electric current to light them. Eveiy aspect of Persian life 
and initiative began in the village. The only real source of a potential resurrection of Iran 
was the Persian peasant. ” 536
Contradictions & Tensions
The landlords and ulema challenged land reform on three grounds: first they contested the 
identification with feudalism; second they attacked the interpretation that the land reform 
represented progress arguing instead that it would cause social and economic dislocation, 
and third, and probably most damning, was then argument that the reform as administered 
by Amini, and subsequently the Shah, was illegal in that it both contradicted Islamic law 
and had been implemented in the absence of a sitting Majlis, and was therefore 
unconstitutional.537
Landlords were particularly incensed by the notion that they were exploitative 'feudalists’,
536 FO 248 1588 , conversation with Kellas dated 17 March 1962. hi a subsequent 
conversation, Kellas unsuccessfiilly compared land reform in Iran with that of Egypt, 
Arsanjani, cSvent on to complain that I had a low opinion of the skilfid Iranian farmers, 
while I magnified the ability of the degraded fellahin of Egypt.” FO 248 1589 dated 6  May 
1962, See also M RPahlavi Mission for My Country New York, McGr aw-Hill, 1961 pg 
10. Also Shah’s speech on 5 Dey 1341 / 25th December 1962 on the occasion of the 
murder of Engineer Malek Ebadi in Enghelab-e Sefid Shahanshah (The White Revolution 
of the Shahanshah), Tehran undated.
537 FO 371 157607 EP 1015/177 dated 2 0  June 1961. See also FO 248 1588, note 
by Kellas dated 31 January 1962. See also FO 248 1589 dated 24 November 1962, a 
number of ulema including Khomeini protest that the land reform is both un- Constitutional 
and anti-Islamic.
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and argued that the high estimation of the Iranian peasant was misplaced. 538 More 
seriously, they argued that such a radical change in the socio-economic patterns of life 
could only harm agriculture and encourage migration to the cities. Initially, landowners 
were able to express then views in the press. Ibrahim Mahdavi, in the newspaper Nedaye 
Sepehr argued against the tendency to associate with the West, “If  this kind of ownership 
has a feudal root it has vanished since a long time ago to the establishment of constitution 
and law and relations between the villages and towns....Owing to the above factors 
feudalism in the shape as existed in Asiatic and Western countries never existed and 
cannot be coincident with land ownership in Iran. . . ” 539 Amini, from a landowning family 
himself, was sensitive to the criticisms of the landlords, and tried to soften Arsanjani’s 
rhetoric.
Meeting landlords, who had organised themselves into an association, he argued that the 
primary piupose of the land reform was to maximise agricultural yields, he played down 
any notion o f class warfare but argued that in some cases landlord-tenant relations 
resembled the traditional perception of the Western feudal model.540
Most landlords were not impressed by Amini’s reassurances, and though they were 
prevented from airing their grievances publicly, they were privately scathing about the
538 Thus in a speech commemorating the death of engineer Malek Ebadi, dated 51h 
Dey 1341 [1962], the Shah argued that, “....They treated Iranian peasants as then* own, 
or members of their own tribes, and made use of them in this way....”
539 FO 248 1580; Ibrahim Mahdavi, dated 2 1  September 1960.
54° pQ 2 4 8  1585 1461, Keyhan International dated 2 0  M y  1961, and letter dated 
4 November 1961.
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refoim Although some accepted laud reform they were critical of its political aims. 541 One 
landowner, Malek Mansur, a bitter opponent of the reform described the whole process 
of land refoim as nothing more than a public relations exercise.
“In one case, after a quite bogus exposition of the activities of a rural cooperative society 
by the Minister of Agriculture, His Majesty had asked a peasant upon whom he was 
conferring title deeds whether he had found the cooperative useful; and the peasant replied 
'What cooperative?’ In another case His Majesty had asked a peasant, to whom he was 
about to give title deeds covering an allotment of 12 hectares, what was his annual income,
The peasant replied, '30,000 tomans’. His Majesty asked that his question should be 
translated into Turkish and it was repeated in that language. The peasant protested that that 
he understood Persian veiy well, explained that he farmed in fact a hundred hectares and 
that his income was indeed 30,000 tomans. Whilst a third peasant was receiving his title 
deeds from the Imperial hand, it was known to all present that his house was being burned 
by Fazlullah Beg, Khan of the Shahsavan, who is the landlord in those parts....”
Indeed according to Prince Malek Mansur, the peasants were reluctant to receive their 
deeds, knowing that having accepted them they could no more depend upon the 
indispensable assistance of Fazlullah Beg in hard tunes, and were earning his unlimited 
malevolence. Mi- Malek Mansur observed that the error of land reform and of so many 
other government projects was that they represent an ill-conceived endeavour to help the 
people in spite of themselves. But it was socially and economically hopeless to tiy and 
work in spite of the people, instead of with the people. In any case, hi his view, the 
Ministry of Agriculture were totally unequal to then task; if the doors of the Ministry were
541 FO 248 1580, Kellas in conversation with Hussein Ali Qaraguzlu, dated 28 
January 1960. See also FO 248 1588, Kellas in conversation with Mr Afshar, dated 1 0  
April 1962.
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closed today, it would be two years before any fanner was aware of it.”5'12
Otlier landlords ridiculed the notion suggested by the Shah and Arsanjani among others 
that the Iranian peasant could be transformed into a patriotic 'yeoman’. Thus the Shah had 
argued that, ccLand refoim in Iran has many different meanings. The aim of this work is 
not only that we give paper documents to some people and say that they have become the 
owners of land. No, they will become free-men who will elevated heads and independent 
spirits, with hope for the future, will become not only the owners of the land which they 
cultivate but also the owners of then own future and then childrens’ and shareholders in 
the present administration and the future of the nation. . . . ” 543
According to Sultan Ah Soltani, “...The regime expected that the distribution of land 
would produce a nation of patriots with a stake in the country, which they would be ready 
to defend against the Soviets. They were waiting for the camel’s tail to reach the ground 
(Persian for a blue moon’). On the contrary, they were promoting distrust, disorder and 
communism. , . . ” 544 Others, despite then suspicions of the United States, itself a reflection 
of both the success of the Cold War narrative, but the failure of the Shah’s interpretation, 
directed then venom against Arsanjani whose enthusiasm for land refoim at whatever cost
542 FO 248 1585 1461, Kellas in conversation with Malek Mansur dated 14 July
1961.
543 Enghelab speech on the occasion of the anniversary of the death of Engineer 
Malek Ebadi, dated 5lh Dey 1341 / 25th December 1962
544 FO 248 1588, conversation with Kellas dated 22 January 1962.
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was causing consternation.545 Hie British diplomat Makinson recounts a conversation with 
a certain Yusuf Akbar:
“....He said that strictly between ourselves he thought Arsanjani was going 'dotty’. He said 
that only the night before he, Arsanjani, had received an invitation, which he had publicly 
accepted, to attend a showing in Persian of a film about land reform in Mexico, called 
"VivaZapata’. Arsanjani had been scheduled to make a speech, but had apparently been 
dissuaded from such political foolishness. To do so would, according to Yusuf, have been 
public incitement to the peasants to riot....”546
The harsh reaction to the refoim highlighted the tensions inherent in such a profound 
process if  applied rapidly and without apparent coordination. The rhetoric, and in 
particular the emphasis on 'feudalism’ however also indicated the growing division 
between the new technocrats and then allied aristocratic reformers, and the traditional 
landowners, who found themselves politically and in some measure economically, 
disenfranchised, over-night. These divisions were to remain in place until the end of the 
Shah’s reign and the latter was confirmed in his belief that no progress could be made with
545 FO 371 149804 EP 1461/6 dated 8  March 1960. “...Almost all critics of the bill 
are curiously united in blaming the 'Americans’ for imposing it. Some argue that it has 
been thrust upon the Shah and the Government by the Americans, regardless of special 
conditions in Iran of which they have no experience, out of a misconceived notion that the 
existing system of land tenure is 'feudal’ or reactionary. Others are persuaded that the 
Shah is promoting the bill in an inept endeavour to ingr atiate himself to ill-informed 
American public opinion as a 'progressive’ monarch. Some even believe that the 
Americans are dictating legislation in this sense in order to break the political power of 
the landowners, traditionally the friends of the British in Iran, regardless of the natural 
order of Iranian society...” See also FO 248 1589 dated 10 September 1962, in which 
Lambton notes the dangerous repercussions for the regime of the prevalent idea of 
American imposition.
546 FO 248 1589, dated 29 October 1962
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the traditional classes - the forces o f black reaction.
The Shah was acutely aware that the longer he remained marginal to the process of 
reform, the less important he would become. He was thus anxious to divest Arsanjani and 
Amini o f any credit in initiating and pursuing the reform progr amme, the Shah quietly 
sought to reconstruct his reformist credentials during the Amini administration, while 
preparing to appropriate the entire reform programme and remould it in his dynasty’s 
image, and ultimately, his name.
The Shah and the 'W hite Revolution’
As early as October 1961, the Shah was privately confiding that he may take direct control 
of the government, accusing Amini, somewhat unfairly, of dithering’ .547 Privately, he had 
made it clear- to Harrison that, 4Che did not consider that Constitutional Monarchy, in our 
form, was applicable in this country. He also made it fairly clear that it was his present 
intention to rule for the next few years without a Parliament. . . . 548 By the beginning of 
1962, the government was facing serious protests from students who rioted in Tehran 
University campus. Police and paratroopers were sent in to disperse the students during 
which hundr eds were injured. 549
547 FO 371 157611 EP 1015/253 dated 5 October 1961. See also EP 1015/255 
dated 1 0  October 1961.
548 FO 371 157611 EP 1015/260 dated 5 October 1961. Alam, unusually, 
expressed concern at the possible outcome of direct rule, see FO 371 157612 EP 
1015/267 dated 25 October 1961.
549 FO 371 164180 EP 1015/19 dated 23 January 1962; also FO 371 164181 EP
(continued...)
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Amini, increasingly seen as a tool of the Americans, was also losing any sympathy he had 
enjoyed as a 'progressive’ reformist landowner. The students, who had been shouting long 
hve Dr Mosaddeq and down with Amini, and down with the Shah, were accused by the 
government o f having provoked the police, and to have been encouraged by an unholy 
alliance with the landlords - black reaction as the Shah liked to label them. The British 
embassy was understandably dubious of Amini’s assertions: “An alliance of student 
agitators and 'feudalists’ against the programme of reform of a progressive’ government 
is....hard to believe..... ” 550
hr the climate of increasing crisis, the turning point was to come in a confr ontation with 
the military.551 Amini, anxious to put Iran’s financial house in order had tried to cut the 
military budget which had brought him into confr ontation with the Shah and the military. 
He had also hoped for US aid to cover Iran’s budget deficit which was not forthcoming.552 
As a result Amini resigned in July 1962, and the Shah appointed the loyal Alam in his 
place.553 The scene was now set for the launch of the White Revolution.
(...continued)
1015/23 dated 24 January 1962, andEP 1015/29 dated 24 January 1962.
550 FO 371 164181 EP 1015/32 Hiller, dated 31 January 1962. See also FO 371 
164181 EP 1015/29, Hiller, dated 24 January 1962.
551 FO 371 157605 EP 1015/136 dated 26 May 1961, notes that the military had 
become increasingly dissatisfied with austerity measures and retirements (cf Mosaddeq). 
FO 371 157606 EP 1015/156 dated 6  June 1961, notes that Amini’s insistence that 
officers wear civilian clothes in non-military environments had caused discontent among 
the officer corps.
552 FO 371 164184 EP 1015/84 dated 18 July 1962.
553 FO 371 164184 EP 1015/85 dated 19 July 1962. Few were convinced by 
Alain’s appointment and generally regarded it as the Shah concentrating power in his own
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The White Revolution was itself launched by decree (the six points were first articulated 
in November 1961) and ratified by Referendum in January 1963. It was composed of 6  
principles, including land refoim, was to be subsequently extended to 1 2  points and by the 
late 1970s to a total o f 17 points. What distinguished this 'White Revolution’ from what 
had preceded under Amini was the fact that it represented a definite programme rather 
than a vague idea, and that its focus was the Shah as leader. Many of the myths which the 
Shah was to develop following 1963 were nevertheless being articulated to a greater or 
lesser degree during the Amini administration, and in order to trace the trajectory of this 
development it is important to analyse developments during this period.
There were several themes which the Shah attempted to promote in his own person, two 
of which had been emphasised with vigour by the Amini administration. The Shah wanted 
to identify himself with 'progress’ and what was understood as 'anti-feudalist’554. In 
addition to this he sought to develop the concept of the democratic sovereign, into the 
revolutionary monarch, and as such the language of political discourse became littered 
with 'revolutionary’ rhetoric which to many sat uneasily on the shoulders of a king. Tied 
to this was his desire to be the monarch of an egalitarian and 'democratic’555 society, 
populated by liberated, economically prosperous peasants, eternally grateful to their 
liberator. This likewise was an uneasy companion to a monarchy which would emphasise
(...continued)
hands - see FO 371 164185 EP 1015/110 dated 25 August 1962.
554 During the First Farmers’ Cooperative Congress the delegates urged the Shah 
to ban the term ret ’ya t (serf) from all official documents. Enghelab dated 19 Dey 1341 / 
8 th January 1963
555 The Shah was to subsequently articulate his own particular conception of 
democracy.
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tlie importance of the social and political order. Unlike Amini and Arsanjaui, the Shah 
wanted to promote industrialisation which was essential to his conception o f progress and 
modernity. 556 Unlike Amini, the Shah was dismissive o f the opposition, and characterised 
them as either reactionary (black) or subversive (red). His target audience were the 75% 
of the population which represented the peasantry, and although he continued to pay 
scrupulous attention to the army, which despite all evidence to the contrary, he continued 
to view as a vital pillar to the monarchy, he neglected the burgeoning professional 
classes.557
Probably his most controversial ideological construction was his vision for the future. He 
began with arguing for the development of a 'model5 country, which by the early 1970s 
had grown into the ' Great Civilisation5. This was his conception o f a new order which 
would successfully amalgamate monarchical tradition with 'modernity5; a monarchy based 
on the support of a gratefiil and liberated peasantry. Thus in a speech to farmers at Chehel 
Sotoon and Esfahan in 1962, the Shah said, “With respect to fanning, industry, social 
activities, good works, the effect of this move in the future will be so great that I think the
necessity of this order will be obvious to eveiyone The next generations will live in an
environment which I hope will be equal and comparable to the highest social standards 
anywhere on the planet....Thus on this road the freemen and free-women of Ir an must
556 FO 371 157601 EP 1015/55 dated 28 March 1961 - the Shah continued to pay 
lip-service to decentralisation, even though one aspect of land reform was in actual fact 
to centralise power.
557 FO 371 164186 EP 1015/135 dated 17 November 1962.
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head towards the future.” 558 This vision of the future was not only an ideological paradise, 
but a material one too: “...Your income should be such that you and yotu’ family are full. 
That you will have smart clothes. That you will have a nice house. . . ” 559
The Shah’s strategy can be divided into appropriation; (land reform he was always at pains 
to point out, had been his idea); differentiation, (enemies were to be de-humanised, or in 
Dr Mosaddeq’s case de-personalised, and marginalised); and legitimation through 
association with 'rational5 and 'universal5 norms, many of which were borrowed from the 
West and therefore meant little to traditionally minded Iranians. He was to return to 
tradition in his bid to secure the dynasty within his conception of'm odernity5, and a 
beginning was made in his re-construction of popular democracy, a reaction to the 
expectations of the popular conception of modernity among professional Iranians.
Indeed as early as January 1960 the Shah emphasised his identification with progress while 
at the same time differentiating himself from traditionalist 'reactionaries5, and taking the 
opportunity to attack Dr Mosaddeq:
“..As you have noticed yourself, reactionary thoughts and concepts are dying out in our 
country. The things we are doing today were perhaps unthought of a few years ago. I well 
remember that in 1950 when I proceeded to distribute my own estates....At that time we 
were the first country in this part of the world to do this. But in 1952, the then head of 
government prevented me from distributing my own estates. But as you see such
558 Enghelab speech dated 13 Esfand 1341 / 3rd March 1963
559 Enghelab address of the Shah to the heads of the Dehqan Congress, J 
Shahrivar 1341 / 28th August 1962
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reactionary and ridiculous thoughts have disappeared now...The more the people of Iran 
become educated....the weaker and less effective these thoughts become. Of course all of 
us shall witness die progress of our society in spite of such reactionary thoughts. These 
thoughts cannot prevent die realisation of the aspirations of die majority of die people who 
are definitely not reactionary....The more progressive a country and the more educated a 
people, die easier it would be to enforce laws such as die proposed legislation oil land 
reform.,..”560
He was also at pains to take any credit for achievement to date away from Amini. Thus
in an article published in the Echo of Tran, it was argued that Alam and the Shah had
always supported Arsanjani and the 'millions of peasants and toilers’, but that Amini had 
been obstructing progr ess. Indeed it even quoted Arsanjani as saying:
“...On the first day when I assumed die charge, I submitted all die clauses of land reform 
law to the Shall and the first person who was gready interested in diis programme and who 
in spite of all false reports and tricks by influential persons showed [no] resistence and 
tiius proved his great far-sightedness and devotion to die progress of the country was the 
Shah himself. It is my honest duty to thank the Shah whole-heartedly at tiiis juncture 
because at his heart his is always thinking of means and ways for the progress of millions 
of peasants and toilers of Iran...”561
It is worth noting that initially, though the Shah noted his own pioneering role, his 
importance did not as yet supersede that of the country as a whole, there were as yet limits 
to the myth of the saviour'. Thus it was the 'genius’ of Iran as well the Shah had pioneered
560 FO 371 149755 EP 1015/12 dated 26 January 1960.
561 FO 248 1589 Echo of Iran dated 9 September 1962.
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land reform in the region. These themes of anti-reactionary progress along with a bright 
future (it is worth noting how many times the word 'progress’ is mentioned in the 
following passage) were highlighted again during a speech to the 2 0 th Majlis in 1961:
“ The progress made during the previous session shows that our country is well on its
way to prosperity. It has made great progress in the political, economic, social, educational 
and health fields. Although considered just a beginning, die progress has been so great that
never before has so much been accomplished in such a short time There is little need
to mention here that all tiiis progress has been made in peace, order and political and social 
stability. We have been able to achieve all tiiese outstanding successes because traitors, 
subversives and demagogues have been kept out of affairs. We hope that our progress in 
the future will still be greater so that our country becomes, as is our aim, a model of 
spiritual and material progress....”362
This intrinsic genius came out more clearly in his articulation of Iran’s bright future:
“I would like to point out that Iran is a country which can rightly hope to have a very 
bright fiiture. This is because on die one hand we have great natural wealth and resources 
and on the other we have an ancient civilisation which produced great geniuses...Before 
long our country will stand out as a rock of stability and security in this rough and stormy 
sea....”563
Not surprisingly revolutionary developments administered by a revolutionary monarch had 
to be of historic significance, and as such another aspect of many o f the speeches was to
562 FO 371 157600 EP 1015/35 dated 23 February 1961.
563 FO 371 157599 EP 1015/19 dated 20 January 1961.
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emphasize the historical proiimdity of developments - contextualising and rationalising 
developments within a perceived narrative o f Iranian history. Thus, in a speech on the 
occasion o f Fanners Day, the Shah commented, “The land reform movement is not a 
reform limited to lands but something that will alter Iranian society.... It is the most deep 
rooted and revolutionary action that can happen in the life of a nation.,,Wlrat has taken 
others centuries to perform or has been accompanied by bloody revolution, which in itself 
can cause problems, we are performing in a short period. . . ” 564
In November 1962, the Shah described land reform as one of the most revolutionary 
measures to have been taken in 3000 years of recorded Iranian history.565 In a speech to 
farmers at Maragheh at the completion of land reform the Shah said,
“Tlie work which we have begun is not just one type of limited land reform for the 
peasants. This action will transform Iranian society. In other words it is one of the most 
profound and hi reality, revolutionary, applications, which is possible to occur in the life 
of a nation. Other nations have only achieved such great works slowly over centuries and 
sometimes through a bloody revolution....But I think we should take pride hi this that this 
great work, which others have taken centuries to complete we have been able to hiitiate 
this programme with ease and simplicity in this region and other regions, and achieved 
results within a short time.”566
564 pQ 2 4 3  i 5 g9  dated 23 September 1962.
565 FO 371 164186 EP 1015/138 dated 27 November 1962 - sucb historical 
importance provides another vital transitional bridge between revolutionary monarch and 
Divinely guided monarch. Curiously such sentiments were echoed by the BBC Persian 
service, see FO 371 170412 EP 1461/5 dated 29 January 1963.
566 Enehelab dated 1 Mehr 1341 / 22nd September 1962
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Or again at the Farmer’s Cooperative Congress: “Something which may be most nations 
could not to this standard, during centimes of conflict and blood-letting occasionally 
achieve, we have achieved in one year.... The magnitude of this profound social reform is 
so great and because we are looking at it horn a close distance, maybe we fail to 
understand its importance. . . . ” 567 During a dinner at Saltanatabad, the Shah reiterated 
familiar themes,
“...This step that we have taken today, just as you are aware, perhaps in the entire 2500 
year history of Iran, 110 action which has overturned society in this manner has been 
conducted. It is a matter of pride that a programme of this magnitude has ahnost been 
completed in the space of one year. Without being involved hi convulsions. Without the 
nation encountering revolution. Without bloodletting. Now, I don’t know how much 
information you have about what has occurred in other places but I can tell you such work 
may take 100 years, two hundred years, three hundred years, and then still their 
programmes have not been as progressive....”568
The Sliali’s vision of an egalitarian meritocracy of which he was the champion and 
guarantor was targeted essentially at the younger generations. This was a utopia that had 
been cultivated since the 1940s but which was given new energy with the advent of the 
White Revolution, and in particular land reform which had indeed altered socio-economic 
relations. His enthusiasm for this message won him derisory epithets from liis opponents. 
On the Shah’s visit to Turkey, Harrison noted that:
567 Enghelab dated 19 Dey 1341 / 8 th January 1963
568 Enghelab dated 2 0  Dey 1341 / 9lh January 1963
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“the Shah was reported in the press here to have told a gathering of Iranian students... that 
Iran was no longer a land controlled by a thousand families. 'Today....ours is a country of 
fanners, labourers, merchants and office workers, and the laws that are being enacted are 
designed for the majority.’ There would be equal opportunity for all honest and dedicated 
persons and there would be 110 limit to the progress which could be made. In a speech at 
a land distribution ceremony at Kennanshali on November 14, the Shah used precisely 
these same words adding, however, that Iran belonged to all without special privilege to
any group during his tour of Azerbaijan in September, when he spoke of the
revolutionary nature of die current programme of land reform. It is statements of this kind 
that have been earning him in less progressive quarters the title of the 'Royal 
Revolutionary’ or the 'Imperial Communist’....”569
Those who did not agree with the vision being proposed were de-personalised and 
dismissed as ignorant by the Shah,
“Of course we should not be surprised that in among this population of the country, we 
can estimate that several hundred people, don’t understand. This inability to understand 
may have several reasons. One is that they simply don’t have the capacity for thought and 
understanding. These people, then brains (minds) and thought work in different ways.
They call these people shallow (-minded). One may also call them many other things, but 
in any case maybe they are not really to blame since nature has not allowed then small and 
tired brains (minds) the ability to understand or think.”570
Duiing a speech at the Farmer’s Cooperative Congress in 1341/1963 be identified the 
forces of black and red with 'Ahiiman5 the Zoroastrian 'devil5:
569 FO 371 164186 EP 1015/135 dated 17 November 1962.
570 Enghelab speech to farmers in Biijand dated 13 Farvardin 1342 / 2nd April 1963
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“...Without doubt the reactionary agents of black who for their own selfish reasons want 
to keep die Iranian nation in the whir lpool of suffering and poverty and injustice, will not 
stand in the face of these profound and fundamental changes. Similarly the subversive 
forces of red whose aim is the overthrow of the nation and its surrender to foreigners, are 
unhappy with the progress of this programme and will try and destroy it. In these 
circumstances in accordance with my royal duties and loyalty to the oath which I took to 
protect die rights of the exalted nation of Iran, I camiot be indifferent in the fight between 
the forces of God and die forces of Ahriman, Since I have raised the standard of this fight 
on my shoulders ”571
Here also are clear allusions to traditionalism and religious nationalism with an evocation 
to Divine Providence. Allusions which were more clearly evoked in a speech to peasants 
in the holy city of Qom, where the Shah made plain his religious 'credentials’, and 
conviction and the fact that he was 'blessed’. “One night I dreamt that I was sitting 
opposite the Commander of the Faithful and his holiness had zulfaqir across his knee and 
he gave a bowl and bade me drink fiom it saying that tomorrow I would be well. In actual 
fact that night I sweated, my temperature fell and from the next day I regained my well­
being.” He also stressed his conviction that he had received visions from the Imams.572 
Such religious imagery would be central to his later emphasis on the 'myth o f the saviour’.
Contradictions & Tensions
571 Enghelab speech at Fanners’ Cooperative Congress dated 19 Dey 1341 / £>h 
January 1963
572 Enghelab speech to the people of Qom, dated 4th Bahrnan 1341 / 23rd January
1963
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It was however in his discussion of political democracy that the apparent contradictions 
in the Shah’s strategy became most obvious to critics. The Shah was aware of this and 
espoused his ideas on this matter with caution. Having initially argued in print that the 
monarchy could be abolished if it out-lived its usefulness, he now proceeded to argue that 
the institution was in fact a necessity. Thus in 1961, he cheerfully wrote: “I have learned 
to look with some detachment at my own position and at the role of our ancient 
monarchy; and if ever I felt that Persia’s monarchy had outlived its usefulness, I would be 
happy to resign as king and would even join in helping to abolish our monarchical 
institution. ” 573 However privately and increasingly in public he argued that democracy in 
the Western sense, was not suitable to Iran in its present situation, 574 and though he 
constantly referred to the possibility of democracy in the future, by the 70s, this expedient 
was discarded in favour of his own conception of democracy which though initially 
temporary, had become permanent.
It is indicative that in his first significant book, Mission for my Country, published in 1961 
he also argued,
“I have tried to make it clear that modem democracy, as I see it, is a very broad concept.
But democracy is not a series of activities alone; above all it is a philosophy of life, never 
easy, either for an individual or a nation to acquire. Real democratic government is indeed 
die most indicate and difficult kind to achieve...we must also realise that the achievement
573 M R Pahlavi Mission for Mv Country pg 327.
574 FO 371 157611 EP 1015/260 dated 5 October 1961; in discussions with 
Harrison, the Shah expresses concern over the possible composition of a freely elected 
Majlis. See also FO 371 157612 EP 1015/261 dated 29 October 1961. See also FO 371 
157612 EP 1015/271 dated 30 October 1961.
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of political, economic, and social democracy perforce takes time...There is a limit to the 
speed with which men and nations can develop in freedom. If we try to rush the process 
too fast, or if we become impatient or cynical, we shall defeat our own good 
intentions....”575
Similarly in a speech on the occasion of Constitution Day in 1961, the Shah distinguished 
between apparent and true democracy, arguing that the latter required education and 
intellectual maturity. He emphasised that freedom had its limits and that democracy did 
not imply the freedom to infringe the liberty o f others. He was careful also to stress that 
he had been instrumental in the past twenty years in leading the country towards 'true’ 
democracy.576 One may surmise from bis speeches the view that the monarchy was indeed 
guarantor of democracy. Thus in the speech he noted that, “The principles of equality and 
civil liberties were proclaimed for the first time in the world by the first monarchs in Ir an.” 
Later he stressed, “All along this period I have protected the principles of democracy 
against internal and external dangers and against the enemies that have appeared in the 
guise o f friendship. Just as the Constitution makes me the Guardian and symbol of 
democracy, I have strived, without any need to resort to pretense, to strengthen the sphit 
and natur e of our Constitutional regime and lead my nation toward a stable and more 
lasting democracy. . . . ” 577
On his message broadcast on Constitution Day in 1962 the Shah suggested that his vision
575 M R Pahlavi op. cit pp 164 & 193.
576 FO 371 157610 EP 1015/233 dated 8  August 1961.
577 FO 371 157610 EP 1015/236 dated 1 0  August 1961.
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of democracy might be different from what had been expected. According to a British
embassy report: “ the Shah himself was at pains to point out that there is more to
democracy than a couple of legislative chambers; nor was democracy a commodity to be 
imported from abroad, but eveiy nation must find its own system of government by and 
for the people. ” 578
Of course the Shah was able to argue subsequently that his referendum in which a 
suspicious 99% of the population voted in favom of the 'White Revolution’, proved that 
he was a democrat. This he would argue, was true democracy in that the people had been 
canvassed for then opinion directly, although it was in stark contrast to his prevailing view 
that the people as yet had not reached the level of intellectual maturity required for 
democracy. It also contradicted earlier views, some might consider a Freudian slip, that 
such referenda were the habitual favourites of fascist and communist dictators. Thus only 
two years earlier he had written,
“Communist dictators resemble Fascist ones in that they enjoy holding elections. They 
hope to give the ordinary working man the idea that he has a voice in the Government of 
Iris country. But the Communist rulers allow only one political party; anybody who tries 
to start another, or who speaks against the ruling party, is likely to be liquidated. In the 
elections (if you can call them by that name), the voter has no choice, for the only 
candidates listed are those of the ruling party. Purely as a matter o f  form, the citizen is 
urged or ordered to go  and vote; the authorities then triumphantly announce that, let us 
say, 99.9%  o f  the votes cast were fo r  the ruling party. I  wonder how m any intelligent
578 FO 371 164185 EP 1015/108 dated 13 August 1962.
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people are foo led  by that sort o f  thing. " [italics added]579
It seems that his inspiration for a referendum was Charles de Gaulle in France, and that 
his principal audience was Western public opinion, which seemed, curiously, to swallow 
the entire spectacle without visible concern.580 Congratulatory messages from foreign 
governments, including that of the US only seived to convince the Shah of his own 
popularity, hi responding to Kennedy’s message of congratulations, the Shah somewhat 
haughtily replied, “The result o f the referendum does indeed reflect the wholehearted 
approval o f my fundamental reforms by the well-nigh unanimous vote of the people of 
Iran.”581
Towards Ideological Consolidation
The success of the referendum, if orchestrated582, was nevertheless a public relations
579 M R Pahlavi op.cit. pg 162. Things were not to improve by 1970, when Prime 
Minister Hoveida commented that, “As the Shah has said, social democracy cannot exist 
without economic democracy, in my view most of those who talk about democracy are 
still limited in then concept to the schools o f thought advocated by Plato, Montesquieu 
and others, whereas democracy today is conditioned by modem times. We do not believe 
democracy means anyone should be free to act against national interests and moral values 
and traditions. From our standpoint democracy means respecting human rights and 
individuals. The interesting question is whether such democracy exists in those countries 
which are preaching to us on democracy...” See BBC SWB ME/3562/D/1 dated 17th 
December 1970 - Hoveida’s speech to the Central Committee of the Ran Novin Party, 
dated 15th December 1970.
580 FO 371 170424 EP 1461/3 dated 6 February 1963.
581 FO 371 170424 EP 1461/2 dated 2 February 1963.
582FO 371 170373 EP 1015/10 dated 24 January 1963. See also FO 371 170373 
EP 1015/13 dated 28 January 1963; EP 1015/15 dated 25 January 1963; EP 1015/16
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triumph, and most of the Iranian press concluded that the Shah had confounded both the 
reactionaries and the revolutionaries. One notable weekly cautioned against the 
triumphalism in the air, “..It was not until January 13 that a serious weekly magazine 
(Khandaniha) asked outright the question in the minds of many people; 'Where is the Shah 
leading us?’, and, in effect, gave warning that, unless kept under control, a revolution, 
whether started by the Tudeh or by the Shah, could be dangerous.”583 Others also 
privately expressed concerns at how the referendum was transforming the Shah into a 
revolutionary leader with dangerous consequences: “..while favouring reforms, they are 
apprehensive of the power which the Shah appears to be putting into the hands of ignorant 
country men and industrial workers....and fearful that forces may one day be unchained 
by demagogic leadership which could threaten both throne and constitution, particularly 
if disillusionment with the material benefits of the new land tenure sets in after the fir st 
flush of reform ”584
One hint of this demagogic leadership came in June 1963, when Ayatollah Khomeini was 
arrested for speaking out against the land reform, and women’s emancipation, leading to 
severe riots in Qom and Tehran and several other major cities. These riots were ruthlessly 
suppressed, though it was rumoured that much of the initiative for the law and order’ 
operation came from Alam. By 1964, Khomeini had been forced into exile after having 
launched a vitriolic attack on the Shah following the announcement o f legal exemptions
(...continued) 
dated 25 January 1963.
583 FO 371 170373 EP 1015/8 dated 15 January 1963.
584 FO 371 170373 EP 1015/18 dated 29 January 1963.
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for all US personnel working in Iran, a move, badly handled by the Prime Minister 
Mansur, and which with its overtones of 19* century 'capitulations’, contradicted the 
myth of the Shah as nationalist champion and heir to Dr Mosaddeq. This event, along with 
the widespread belief in a CIA orchestrated coup in 1953 to restore the Shah to his throne 
were to prove the two great contradictions to the myth o f the dynastic champion of 
Iranian nationalism which the Shah sought to appropriate and develop in a reciprocally 
dialectic relationship with both his political inheritance and prevalent environment.
The Shah had originally selected Mansur as the vehicle with which to create a technocratic 
elite loyal to his vision of modernity with monarchy firmly at the centre. Ironically, as the 
Shah sought to consolidate his ideological grip on the political affairs o f the country 
practical opposition increased, and although economic growth masked the increasing 
divide between ideological construct and social reality, as the events surrounding the 
Premiership of Mansur were to prove, the ideological foundations of the Pahlavi state 
remained precarious. In particular, although the economic gains of the fast decade of the 
White Revolution could disguise the growing tensions, as the Shah pursued his aims with 
increased vigour and ideological determination the contradictions between the various 
constructs became more explicit and polarised.
With the major 'reactionary’ challenges to his reform package suppressed, the Shah felt 
confident enough to proceed with elections for the new Majlis. However, his decision to 
support the formation of a new group, unsurprisingly, if significantly, called the 
'Progressive Centre’; a collection of technocrats, who were to form the core of the Iran 
Novin Party (New Iran Party), was not without difficulty. Iran Novin, led by Hasan Ah
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Mansur, was to be the Shah’s first real experiment with a one party state, though an 
official opposition (the Mardom party) was retained for the present. It was problematic 
because among other things:
“It is.... worth recording that some people believe that the idea of a one party system was 
the result of joint Iranian-American thinking culminating in an article by a University of 
Colorado professor, published in Iran in an English language review The Echo o f  Iran  last 
February. Whatever die origin of die idea, Mr Hassan Ali Mansur’s Progressive centre was 
chosen to implement it This centre had been founded in 1961 as a study group radier dian 
a political party.”585
This apparently pervasive American connection, a reflection o f the flawed success of the 
Cold War myth, was to resurface again within a year when it became apparent that the US 
State Department was seeking immunity from prosecution for all American personnel, 
diplomatic or otherwise living in Iran. The State Department, anxious not to antagonise 
Iranian public opinion had wanted the agreement to be informally ratified through an 
exchange of letters between the Iranian foreign ministry and the State Department. 
Mansur, however was adamant that this was a constitutional matter which needed to be 
ratified by the Majlis, which having been packed with supporters could be expected to be 
a push over. It is testament to the strength of prevailing nationalist feeling that despite 
this, of 130 deputies present, 60 deputies openly opposed the government. The American 
request had touched a raw neive, “a situation which has brought to the surface the latent 
widespread criticism, in the press and among the public, of the grant of such privileges to
585 FO 371 175712 EP 1015/3 dated 8 February 1964, report by Sir Denis Wright.
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foreigners - which is even talked of openly as a reversion to Capitulations.... The Shah was 
extremely annoyed. Not only had Mansur’s mishandling o f the affair provided an opening 
for widespread criticism on an issue which can always be calculated to arouse public 
emotion.”586 With the news that the Majlis had ratified a $200m loan from the United 
States for the purchase of aims, the press, normally respectful, ventured to be critical, and 
it was noted that at least one local editor had suffered for his editorial. The Echo of Iran 
was closed down altogether.587
The most stinging criticism came from the recently released Khomeini, who argued that 
the $200m loan was a pay-off from the US government in return for capitulations. Few 
believed Mansur’s argument that the two pieces of legislation were unconnected. 
Khomeini’s diatribe was now sufficient for the Shah to have him exiled. As Wright noted, 
“Khomeini’s open hostility...expressed in terms, as you will see from the texts, go far 
beyond anything we have heard from him in recent years.”588 Within three months, Mansur 
had been killed by an assassin.589
This however did not deter the Shah and, Mansur was replaced by Hoveida. Three months 
later the Shah outlined his impressions of developments; impressions which were to form 
part of his conviction and encapsulated his interpretation o f events, his personal
586 FO 371 175712 EP 1015/27 dated 29 October 1964 - Wright.
587 FO 371 175712 EP 1015/29 dated 30 October 1964.
588 FO 371 175712 EP 1015/31 dated 7 November 1964.
589 FO 371 189781 EP 1015/2 dated 21 January 1965, also EP 1015/6 dated 26
January 1965.
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rationalisation and narrativization o f events:
“Several years ago when we embarked upon the January 22 Revolution, despite the great 
enthusiasm of the nation.... and despite the great joy, there were some who did not believe 
that die fruits of die revolution would appear so soon in the country. Our White Revolution 
and the implementation of the six points have brought about a great transformation in the 
economic and social condition of the country....Class privileges have disappeared. 
Superiority is now based only on qualifications...and the country has embarked 011 
progress...Literacy Corpsmen, who first went to the villages to teach, have no gamed so 
much confidence and trust of the local inhabitants that villagers consult them on all their
affairs, hi fact they have become representatives of the revolution........ Of course this state
of affairs is intolerable for the enemies of our homeland and the opponents of the 
revolution....These people are unaware of the will of God and the determination of the 
nation....poverty must gradually disappear from our midst. The word 'poverty’ must be 
stricken from our dictionary....The Iran Novin Party, which was established at the tune of 
our revolution, and which is the offspring and protector of die revolution; and also of all 
other parties which believe in die principles of the revolution, must spread the ideas of the 
revolution in such a way which it can become an un-penetrable political school of thought 
throughout the country..[italics added].”590
In this speech, the Shah described himself as “monarch and leader of the revolution,” 
indeed 'our revolution’, thereby placing himself at the centre of political developments. 
There were three other significant points: his belief that somehow he had eradicated class 
privilege and implemented a meritocracy, with the additional note that he wished to 
eliminate the word 'poverty’; these were clear attempts at dissimulation, and his
590 FO 371 189781 EP 1015/21 dated 27 April 1965.
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suggestion that words could be eliminated from discourse though ostensibly benign, 
carried unfoitunate implications if as was to happen with other concepts, it was actually 
carried out. Lastly, the Shah made it clear that the Iran Novin Party was to be the political 
vehicle for implementation of the 'revolution’ - a clear fore-runner of the Rastakhrz party.
Indeed it can be argued that as early as 1965, the Shah had embarked in earnest on his 
personalisation of the ideology of dynastic nationalism and the characterisation of himself 
as the saviour of the country. An assassination attempt in the Marble palace by a 
disgruntled soldier, which provided the Shah with yet another miraculous escape, was 
exploited by SAVAK as proof of the multi-national conspiracy to de-rail the White 
Revolution, now for the first time termed 'the six point reform programme of the Shah 
and People’ by attacking its leader.591 The guardsmen who came to Shah’s rescue and 
gave their lives in his defence, were significantly, 'martyred’ in then defence of their 
apparently sacred monarch.592
Major celebrations were held in September 1965 to mark the Shah’s silver jubilee and the 
Majlis and Senate 'unanimously’ conferred the title ' Arya Mein-’ (Light of the Aryans) on 
him. The public reception of the celebrations however indicated how little the Shah had 
managed to capture the imagination of his people:
“Apart from the habitual eulogisers of the regime, the reaction of most sophisticated
Iranians in Tehran seem to have ranged from unenthusiastic to openly critical. Politicians
591 FO 371 180804 EP 1942/31 dated 24 June 1965.
592 FO 371 180804 EP 1942/6 dated 12 April 1965.
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and officials were clearly feeling pretty exhausted after the first few days. Motorists 
became intensely irritated by the traffic jams, made worse than ever by the triumphal 
arches put up in places which are traffic bottlenecks at the best of tunes. They were not 
amused to find themselves stuck behind a procession of performing elephants on loan from 
a visiting Indian circus. The inadequate public transport system became even more 
inadequate when buses were taken off their routes to ferry 'celebrants’ to mass functions.
This cannot have been welcome to a lot of the poorer people; as one critic put it, a 
workman who earns 7/6 a day cannot afford to take taxis. Many people were critical of the 
lavish scale of the decorations and illuminations, oil grounds of expense, of traffic 
congestion, and of the deleterious effect they had on Tehran’s over-strained electr icity 
supply. Others waxed sarcastic about the paeans of praise to the Shah put out by the 
government broadcasting network and the semi-controlled press. (To do the press justice 
there were also some mild criticism of the chaos caused by the celebrations, the blame 
being laid on the authorities responsible for administering them, not, of course, on the 
celebrations themselves),”393
The more formulaic the ideology, the greater the potential for the social reality to be 
antagonistic, and consequently the greater the attempts by the security services to squeeze 
the reality unwillingly into the ideological strait-jacket.
“Uglier charges circulated by word of mouth. SAVAK...were widely accused of putting 
improper pressure on every form of organisation to contribute then quotas of money and 
men to the celebrations. (SAVAK are said to have been particularly busy dragooning 
people into attending a mass prayer rally in which an estimated 100,000 people 
participated, a few elderly reportedly dying of heart attacks). Worse still, gangs of thugs 
were said to have gone round extracting money by threats of violence from merchants who
593 FO 371 180804 EP 1942/49 dated 30th September 1965
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were tardy in putting up decorations, while authority turned a blind eye...”594
Buoyed by healthy economic figures, the Shah pressed ahead and if anything, ideological 
construction became predictable and rigid. The Shah was increasingly less interested in 
appropriating ideas, but in consolidating his own preconceptions and conveying them to 
as wide an audience as possible. Any mechanics of reciprocation between agent and 
recipient could be said between the years 1965-67, to have effectively stagnated - the 
themes had been set, all that was needed was to stress and broadcast them, ideology was 
becoming increasingly polarised into political myth.
Thus by the time of the publication of his second major book, The White Revolution’, 
published in 1966, the revolution had been renamed 'The Revolution of the Shah and the 
People’, and the Shah was confidently describing 'our revolution’, and providing a new 
meta-narrative of Iranian history.595 In this book the Shah emphasised his desire for 
progressive reform, the obstruction of the 'reactionaries’ and the need for revolution, 
“The realisation came to me that Iran needed a deep and fundamental revolution that 
could, at the same time, put an end to all the social inequalities and all the factors which 
caused injustice, tyranny and exploitation, and all aspects of reaction which impeded 
progress and kept our society backward.”596 The Shah used extensive examples from 
ancient Iranian and Islamic Iranian history to justify his land reform programme and 
lambasted his opponents as backward.
594 FO 371 180804 EP 1942/49 dated 30 September 1965.
595 M R Pahlavi The White Revolution Tehran 1966 pg 1.
596 Ibid  pg 15.
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He then went on to articulate the philosophy of the revolution, making it clear that it was 
firmly embedded in nationalism:
“What were the philosophy and spirit of this revolution? As already stated, this revolution 
was essentially an Iranian revolution, compatible with the spirit and tradition of the Iranian 
people. We had not delivered this revolution to the people as an imported item. For it 
would be beneath the dignity of a nation which had for several thousand years been the 
pioneer of thinking, philosophy and religion, to wear anything borrowed...In our noble 
revolution, the two sacred principles already mentioned, emphasis on spirit and religion 
and preservation of individual and social freedom, have been fully observed, as has the 
general principle that every kind of exploitation that benefited the interests of a limited 
group but acted to the detriment of the majority must be discarded.”597
This philosophy o f the revolution was later to be re-named 'Pahlavism’ providing an 
ideological shift between the revolutionary monarch who would sacrifice the monarchy 
in the interests of the nation, to a Divinely inspired leader, who was the veiy embodiment 
o f the nation and essential to its survival. As Hoveida was to argue later, this was a 
quintessential^ Iranian’ revolution: “..Premier Hoveida stated that the secret of Iran’s 
economic and social success lay in the fact that it did not follow baseless schools of 
thought, nor was it inspired by East or West in its revolution - the revolution was inspired 
by national traditions and the Shah’s revolutionary ideals....”598
597 Ibid  pg 17.
598 BBC SWB ME/3562/D/1 dated 17th December 1970 Hoveida’s speech to the 
Central Committee of the Ir an Novin Party, dated 15 December 1970. See also BBC 
SWB ME/3568/D/1 dated 28* December 1970 - Hoveida’s statement to Iran Novin Party 
meeting, dated 22nd December 1970.lt is here that the concept of'neither east nor west’
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'Pahlavism ’
The publication in 1966 of a book entitled 'Pahlavism’ signified a shift in gear as the Shah 
no longer sought simply to symbolise an ideology such as nationalism (as his father had 
moved to do), or be seen as centr al to a conception of modernity; he and his dynasty were 
to effectively embody an ideology. That it was published in close proximity to his 
coronation cannot have been a coincidence, as both events marked a bold attempt to reify 
the Shah and his dynasty as unique to the salvation and progr ess of the country. Pahlavism 
and the coronation were the twin emblems of an attempt to sanctify the monarch, the 
symbolic and ideological tactics towar ds a strategy of hagiography. It is unclear how 
widely read 'Pahlavism’ was and it may be fan to conjecture that it had little impact 
beyond the core supporters, and certainly did not enter the lexicon of Iranian political 
discourse, as may have been hoped. The phrases ' Shah-People Revolution’ or White 
Revolution were much more widely used, and indeed there are few records of the term 
'Pahlavism’ being used. Nevertheless, the text unscholarly and shallow though it may have 
been ('St Augustine is transliterated 'S.T. Augustine for instance)599, remains unique in 
being the one attempt at a concise ideological record of the Pahlavi state and for this 
reason alone deserves special scrutiny.
(...continued)
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599 M Honarmand Pahlavism - Mdktab-e No (Pahlavism: a new ideology) 
Ordibehesht 1345 / April/May 1966 Tehran pg 52.
-271-
The book, entitled Pahlavism: a new ideology and subtitled 'a political, social and 
economic philosophy’, was published in 1345 [1966] by Manuchehr Honaimand, an 
author of whom little is known; indeed it may well have been a pen name. The book, or 
monograph comprised 126 pages in which the following topics were discussed: the history 
of political parties; the foundations of Pahlavism; Pahlavism as compared to other world 
ideologies; the economic philosophy of Pahlavism; the consequences of Pahlavi 
economics. Indeed, at least half of the text is devoted to economic issues. Several themes 
emerge from the text.
Firstly, as is characteristic of political myth, it is essentially an exercise in historical 
interpretation rather than philosophical justification; the emphasis is on providing historical 
examples to justify current policy, despite the fact that the historical analysis provided, 
though relatively copious, is of dubious quality, and essentially descriptive. Monarchy 
plays a central role, association with the great monarchs being frequently repeated, and 
in most sections, including the economic focus at the end, it is the rural peasantry who are 
portrayed as the heroes of the narrative. The work is revealing for what it misses out, in 
particular a lack of Islamic sources and an over-reliance on Western historical works, 
some of which were of a veiy general nature.
The introduction to the text makes it clear that monarchy is the centre-piece o f the Iranian 
political system, and not surprisingly, the first sentence begins with the Achaemenids, 
noting that 2500 years ago they brought about largest monarchy in the world, and arguing 
that it was this monarchy which laid the foundations for Iranian culture and arts which has
allowed Iran to retain its identity throughout the turbulence of history .600 The emphasis 
in the introduction is on the cultural progressiveness and immense contributions of ancient 
Iran to the world, and this is quite clearly tied to the foimdation of the monarchical 
system. The author even draws on Herodotus’ dubious accoimt of the discussion by 
several Persian noblemen on the virtues of various political systems, with Darius 
eventually succeeding to persuade eveiyone that monarchy is the best form. This 
hypothetical discussion has since been discredited by classical scholars as a creation of 
Herodotus himself; here it is presented as somewhat precarious justification for 
monarchy.601 This stoiy is indeed used to argue in a strategy of naturalisation, that every 
system of government eventually and naturally returns to monarchy. As Darius apparently 
says, Iranians must not 'trample’ on the laws of then country - the implication here being 
'natural’ laws. To emphasise this point, it is even stressed that 'republicanism’ was 
protected by the Achaemenids, using as an example Darius’ removal o f the 'tyrants’ from 
the Ionian city states and permitting them to practice local republicanism, albeit under the 
suzerainty o f the Shah. Here we begin to see the Shah’s reasoning behind provincial, or 
local, democracy under the control of the central monarchy. The text does not seem to 
point out that the 'tyrants’ had been placed there by the Persians, and that the Ionians had 
initially rebelled against this imposition.
This point aside the author then chooses to quote Will Durant to argue that the 
Achaemenids possessed a 'pure’ ideology and adds that “The pages o f history show that
600 Ibid  pg 1.
601 Ibid  pg 3.
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the Iranian nation has been offered other forms of government apart from monarchy, but 
that they always chose monarchy.”602 This sentence which comes up frequently in the 
Shah’s speeches is a clear' attempt at legitimisation through etemalisation. This over-riding 
philosophy, or culture has with-stood the impact of conquerors and won them over, 
including the Seleucids and importantly the Arabs. The author then sidetracks to quote 
from Zoroastrian scriptur es in praise of cultivators and labourers in a clear analogy of the 
Shah’s sympathies for the labourers and peasants who are meant to be the main 
benefactors of the White Revolution, before returning to lambast one of the main villains 
of the Pahlavi narrative, the Qajars. There is room for some modest praise of the 
progressive mullahs in favour of the Constitutional revolution and restoration of a healthy 
monarchy, before we get to the White Revolution itself.
The White Revolution is described as a 'pine’ policy intended to get Ir an in the most rapid 
way to the global civilisation and science of the world - all under the superior leadership 
of the Shahanshah. The author hopes that under this progressive ideology of a great king, 
Iran will rapidly approach a bright and prosperous future. Having attempted in a rather 
lacklustre way, and without reference to the many Islamic texts on kingship, to justify 
monarchy, the author then turns to debunking the notion that political parties can function 
in Iran. His argument is familiar. Essentially, parties from the time of the Constitution have 
lacked sound ideologies and have been too tied to individuals or to foreign powers to have 
been of any use. The emphasis here is on foreign powers, particularly in the post Reza 
Shah period when the Tudeh gained in strength with Soviet support, with the implication
602 Ibid  pg 7.
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being that in current circumstance, political pluralism will lead to foreign penetration. It 
is nevertheless significant that the oil nationalisation is dealt with in some detail and Dr 
Mosaddeq and the National Front are discussed, though of course there is no suggestion 
that the cause of his downfall was a coup, rather his own political mismanagement. One 
of the problems with political parties, writes Honarmand, is that no leader has emerged 
with the right qualities, apart from a certain Dr Kasemi.603 The conclusion drawn is that 
the new party Iran Novin, will now become the ideological standard bearer of the White 
Revolution.
As to the ideological foundations of'Pahlavism5, it is indicative of its intellectual poverty, 
that this chapter, arguably the most important, covers no more than 5 pages, and that the 
'political5 principle amounts to no more than once sentence. The social and economic 
principles are mar ginally longer and are discussed but are little more than a recap of the 
principles of the White Revolution. Thus the political principle reads that: “The 
government of the people is based on a parliamentary constitutional monarchy with the 
reform of the electoral law.’5604 The rest deals with land reform, share-ownership of 
factories, and such policies as the campaign against illiteracy, all key points of the White 
Revolution. The section concludes with the Shah's statement that he has no pride in being 
king of a poor country. Given that there is so little on what Palilavism (aside that it is 
comparable to the achievements of the Achaemenids) is as a philosophy as opposed to a 
programme for development, more may be gained by looking to see how the author
603 Ibid  pg 36.
604 Ib idpg  42.
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compared it to other more established ideologies.
The author argues unequivocally that:
“It is with considerable pride that one can say that in a world in which most of the 
countries are under the control of various ideologies which encompass five trends - 
feudalism, imperialism, liberalism, democracy and socialism - the Shahanshah has 
discovered a new doctrine which is ethically superior to socialism, has more freedom and
rights than democracy, is more practical than liberalism there can be little doubt that
this new political doctrine among the philosophical and political doctrines existing in the 
world, must be recognised in political cultures, as 'Pahlavism’.”605
That this should be so, is because of the good works implicit in the White Revolution, and 
because the White Revolution was a bloodless political revolution. “Palilavism, is a 
doctrine which in a short space of time can take a feudal society higher than social 
democratic parliamentiarism” Furthermore, ccPahlavism is a doctrine which can also take 
a nation with unprecedented speed away from a world of darkness, towards a bright 
future.” There is little detail on the practicalities of achieving this, other than the principles 
o f the White Revolution, which as the Shah was at pains to point out, was an 'Iranian’ 
revolution, tailored to Ir anian needs. The author however here seems to be suggesting that 
Pahlavism will sort out the troubles of the third world, and indeed is a universally 
applicable philosophy. This may well seive the need to legitimise it, but there are obvious 
contradictions in how a locally devised and applicable ideology can be applied 
internationally.
605 Ib id pg 50.
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Prior to launching into a comparative study of world ideologies the author diverts the 
readers attention into eulogy, and this is accorded in no uncertain terms and indicates that 
association and personalisation by proxy is no longer sufficient: “Thanks be to God that 
he has given us a Shahanshah more just than Anoushiravan, more diligent than Darius the 
Great and more intelligent than Cyrus the Great...”606 His comparative study is needless 
to say, shallow. Capitalism for instance, here interpreted as the exploitation of the workers 
by capitalists, has been answered with the implementation o f workers shares in the 
factories in which they work. Democracy, is answered with the simple statement that 
Pahlavism recognises democracy to have both economic and political aspects and that the 
former must be achieved before the latter. As to socialism; this too is dealt a blow by share 
ownership and state welfare plans, which altliough socialistic in outlook are implemented 
more justly under Pahlavism. Having concluded his analysis of the political foundations 
o f the new doctrine, the author then turns to explain the economic philosophy of 
Pahlavism.
The enormous attention given to economic aspects of the doctrine may in some way 
reflect a desire to legitimise the 'ideology5 by injecting a healthy dose of economic 
thinking or justification, having acknowledged the fact that all over the world people are 
thinking about economics. He adds that the myriad theses on economics which have been 
produced are not applicable to Iran and that Pahlavism (despite itself being universal) is 
the only economic philosophy which can raise standards of living in Iran. However this 
discussion, much like the political one which preceded it, is in large part given over to a
606 Ibid  pg 52
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brief and extremely broad history of economic thought, and subsequently the economic 
development of Iran, once again from Achaemenid times, with little indication of how 
such a survey may be o f relevance to modem Iranian economic development. The broad 
thrust of the argument is simply, the economic achievements o f the Iranians, the 
plundering of foreigners, and how the ancients had achieved certain economic goals well 
before the Europeans.
Several themes stand out, in particular the relatively healthy state o f the economic under 
the ancient dynasties, reflected in part in the attention devoted by the author to this period. 
Skating over the impact of the Umayyads and Abbasids on the Iranian economy, which 
was not by any means negative, the author then provides a textbook encapsulation of the 
Mongol conquests (5 lines), which were essentially a disaster, and in his discussion of 
Timur provides an opportunity for analogy when he argues that the rural peasantry at this 
stage really suffered, having on top of all then tribulations to pay 60% of then produce 
to then landlords. Honarmand then suggests the following rather contentious argument 
that since the Timurids had brought Islam with them (or were Islamic) they reduced the 
level of the tithe from 60% to 30%, thereby making a tenuous link between strong central 
government, the welfare of the peasantiy and Islam.607 This is more clearly seen when 
compared to the feudalism5 of the Aq Quyunlu.
The emphasis on the centralised state benefiting the economy is made again under the 
discussion on the Safavids when the economic condition of Ir an is compared favourably
607 Ibid  pg 106.
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with Achaemenid times.608 Meanwhile the Qajars are criticised for selling out to foreigners 
and Reza Shah is praised for achieving in several years what many thought might take 
over a hundred. Significantly however, 'Pahlavi economics’ emerges only with 
Mohammad Reza Shah, and the launch of the White Revolution, which it is emphasised 
is both in line with the teachings of Islam, and more progressive than socialist economics; 
a clear sign of where the Shah perceived his two main sources of criticism lay.609 The text 
concludes with discussion on how Pahlavi economics will deal with problems that arise, 
and indeed how it should deal with complications, in a manner more akin to a 
programmatic manifesto rather than a philosophy.
Concluding Remarks
The period of the White Revolution marked an important turning point in the ideological 
development o f the Shah and provides a clearer framework o f ideological development 
which the Shah intended to pursue. Henceforth, decreasing political plurality and an 
increasing unwillingness to listen or appropriate from critics meant that the parameters of 
ideological development would be extended rather than expanded. The polarisation of 
ideologies would become increasingly frequent, and the reaction they incurred would 
become equally polarised. The first indications of this process can be seen in the growing 
anti-Americanism within Iranian political culture which reflected the success of the Shah’s 
integration within the Cold War narrative, but the failure of his particular interpretation
608 Ib idpg  107
609 Ibid  pp 112-113.
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of this narrative. It was an example of the rejuvenation of political myth and the process 
of reciprocal polarisation.
The development of the myth of the saviour would be emphasised and concomitant with 
this, there would be greater attention paid to the reconstruction o f the past and the 
construction of the future. The Shah moved increasingly away from his characterisation 
as a democratic sovereign and identified more with his concept of a revolutionary leader. 
This shift is exemplified by the attempted construction of'Pahlavism5, a new more intense 
interpretation of dynastic nationalism which sought to develop the political myth of the 
Shah to a higher level. The Shah was not the personal manifestation o f an ideology which 
the product of political forces outside his control, he was, in the best traditions of the 
Platonic philosopker-king, the initiator of ideology and thus less a personalisation and 
more of a personification and embodiment of a complex ideological syuthesis. Whereas 
his father sought to make himself and the dynasty essential to national regeneration, 
Mohammad Reza Shah was the nation. As such he was not similar to Cyrus the Gr eat, but 
increasingly his superior. The intensity of this construction would result in a high 
propensity for the development of political myth and its consequences, as a result of the 
tensions implicit in trying to fuse a diverse cocktail of ideological constructs within the 
person of the Shah.
-280-
Chapter 6
Towards the 'G reat C ivilisation’ - The myth of Im perial Authority
“There is nothing more dangerous fo r  a man or fo r  a nation than to be a prisoner o f  
one's personal sentiments and a captive o f  o n e’s egotism .1,610
“One o f  the fe w  mistakes my father made was to rely upon a narrowing circle o f  advisers. 
Fearing Reza Shah, they fla ttered  him rather than telling him the truth; and I  am s o n y  
to scry they were by no means always incorruptible. M y sys tern is entirely different... in lieu 
o f  advisers I  obtain information from  many quarters and then try to strike my own 
balance sincerely and solely in the light o f  the public interest. Let me add that in no way 
do I  regard m yself as the one true repository o f  knowledge and enlightenment.... ”6n
Introduction
The last ten years of the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi witness the apogee of his 
ideological and political myth development with the explicit purpose of institutionalising 
the imperial authority of the Pahlavi dynasty within Iranian political culture. The relative 
economic success of the first five years of the White Revolution combined with the 
tremendous boost in oil revenues following the Yom Kippur War meant that the Shah 
could consolidate his autocratic power, suppressing opposition and ignoring criticism,
610 M R Pahlavi Mission for My Country, pg 126, 1961.
611 Ibidytg 322.
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wlrile indulging in increasingly extravagant symbolic ceremonies which gave mythic 
expression to his ideological convictions.
In terms of the development of ideological constructs and their transformation into 
political myth, this period represents one of growing, if sometime extreme polarisation 
rather than expansion, o f reluctant, if  somewhat magnanimous accommodation, rather 
than appropriation 612. Li other words there is comparatively little development of the 
Shah’s ideological convictions in this period, instead, greater clarification and emphasis 
on those parameters established in the previous years. Li particular the move Lorn 
personalisation towards emphatic personification in the guise o f the myth of the saviour, 
witnessed in the previous chapter, becomes more apparent and more attention is given to 
the process of personalisation by proxy, highlighting the qualities of Cyrus the Great while 
at the same time emphasising Mohammad Reza Shah’s superiority to his predecessor.
612 One of the most notable cases was that of Dariush Homayun, a left wing critic 
of the Shah who subsequently became his last Minister of Information. The regime’s 
attempt to co-opt the intellectuals was commented on by the left wing Radio Cornier: 
“....the current Lanian regime has taken various measures to enlist the seivices of 
intellectuals. These measures include establishing cultural centres such as the Pahlavi 
library, the Pahlavi cultural foundation and various cultural councils at the Royal Court, 
convening various congresses and conferences such as Poets and Writers Congress and 
the Aits festival held recently in which the Queen [Farah] took part, tight control of the 
Tehran, Tabriz, Shiraz, Meshed and Isfahan Universities through the trustees, control of 
the arts and culture ministry by Pahlbod, publishing newspapers and magazines, 
establishing a special transmitter for intellectuals, etc....The regime has faced the Lanian 
intellectuals with two alternatives: either to capitulate and enjoy privileges such a good 
position, wealth, fame and luxury, or to resist and suffer poverty, obscurity and privation. 
If you go beyond simple disobedience you have the Savak torturers, prison and execution 
waiting for you. Lanian intellectuals now ask themselves: should they join the current 
regime and try to justify its acts secretly and openly, or refuse to do so?....” BBC SWB 
ME/2640/D 2 dated 7th December 1967, Radio Iran Cornier dated 4th December 1967.
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Domestic political developments seem to bear little direct relevance to the Sliab’s pursuit 
of his ideas as the Shah increasingly builds on his own preconceptions and becomes 
increasingly dismissive of domestic critics. As such, the consequent extreme polarisation 
of his ideological convictions into political myth becomes more explicit. This is 
particularly evident in the explicit use of symbolism, the emphatic association with 
historical sites, the construction of monuments, and the enormous efforts given to 
historical reconstruction and revisionism along with a utopian vision for the future.613 The 
tensions and contradictions which contribute to the development o f political myth come 
primarily from within, from the difficulty in providing a plausible synthesis of the Shah’s 
ideological views, rather than from perceived political realities or the ideological 
challenges of opponents.
The Shah’s increasing disregard for domestic political developments was in part a 
consequence of his growing interest in the international political arena. Indeed if one 
development characterises and distinguishes this period from those that preceded it, it is 
the increasing internationalisation of the Shah’s political myth and his desire to expand his 
horizons beyond the traditional boundaries of Iranian political culture. The Cold War 
narrative, in which the Shah had sought to re-situate himself in order to support his 
ambitions within Iran, now seemed to dominate his thinking and to dictate his strategies. 
One of the more significant developments of this period is the changing natur e of his 
ideological relationship with the West and the increasingly ambivalent and sometimes 
hostile attitude of the Western media who began to critically deconstiuct the political myth
613 M R Pahlavi Be-Soove Tamadun-e Bozorg (Towards the Great Civilisation), 
Tehran 1978
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they were confronted with.614
Socio-Historical Context
The absence of political plurality combined with the increasing confidence of the Shah in 
dealing with domestic political affairs resulted in the appearance of political stability 
centred upon the actions of the Shah. Visible domestic politics for much of the period until 
the late 1970s, revolved around the edicts of a patrimonial Shah surrounded by politicians 
competing to be more deferential. Opposition existed, but was either underground, 
marginalised and exposed in a series of sliow-trials, or abroad, and indeed the chief source 
of criticism of the Shah and his policies comes from either opposition groups broadcasting 
from abroad, or the foreign media.
While the Shah increasingly dictated the political agenda615 at home, many policies and 
ideological constructions were becoming increasingly influenced by developments abroad, 
and the Shah’s desire to expand his horizons. As such, even domestic events were 
engineered with an eye to opinion overseas, arguably this aspect became an imperial 
priority. Television became an important medium in this respect. Thus while the 
coronation in 1967 was primarily an Iranian event, the celebration o f 2500 years of Persian 
monarchy was quintessentially an international event to which many Iranians found then
614 See for example the significantly titled R Gr aham Iran: the illusion of power 
London, CroomHelm, 1978.
615 A Alam The Shah & I London, IB  Tauris 1991, entiy for 19th April 1972 pg
210.
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access, beyond watching it on television, barred. This celebration, which occurred in 1971, 
also coincided with Britain’s withdrawal 'east of Suez’, allowing the Shah to exercise his 
political and military might as the 'policeman of the Gulf, as well as the Indo-Pakistan 
war which saw the formation of Bangladesh, This event in particular, and the fact that the 
United States was unable or unwilling to support her ally Pakistan which had resulted in 
her dismemberment, deeply concerned the Shah.616 hi 1973, the Yom Kippur war 
provided the catalyst for the Shah’s quadrupling of oil prices, allowing an equivalent leap 
in the state budget and providing the Shah with an economic buffer between himself and 
his opposition. The potential for dramatic economic expansion silenced the critics, and 
allowed the Shah to pursue even more grand schemes for the establishment of imperial 
authority. Thus in 1975 the Shah finally removed any pretence o f democracy by 
establishing a one party state in the form of the Rastakhiz party, which in ideological 
terms, allowed him to iron out the tensions inherent in his construction o f the myth of the 
saviour.
Utilising the mass media
The machinery of the Pahlavi state expended great effort in seeking to disseminate the 
various myths of dynastic nationalism, especially thr ough the new medium of television. 
The major celebrations of the period, the coronation, the commemoration of 2500 years 
of Persian Monarchy, the 50th anniversary of the Pahlavi dynasty were essentially visual 
pageants intended to impress upon ordinary people, the majesty and glory of the Shah, his
616 J Bill The Eagle & the Lion: The tragedy of American-Tranian relations pg 199.
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dynasty, and the Iranian monarchy. Indeed, given the growing isolation of the monarch, 
for security reasons among others, the televisual medium became disproportionately 
important in linking the monarch to his subjects. Television encouraged the development 
of a more succinct and symbolic visual political myth which allowed the Shah to reach a 
much wider captive audience than before, but also could expose the Shah and the regime 
to immediate rejuvenation and re-interpretation of myth. One particularly devastating 
example was the mishandled televised 'recantation’ of the left-wing poet Khosrow 
Golsorkhi in early 1974, in which millions of Ir anian witnessed a stubborn Golsorkhi 
condemn the regime, thus condemning himself to death.617
Of course, traditional tools of dissemination were not neglected, and with increasing 
censorship, the radio and print media, books, journals and newspapers all became to 
varying degrees, uncritical media of expression for the Pahlavi state. Although we carmot 
measure with any quantitative accuracy what the radio audience or readership of particular 
print media was, then importance may be assessed by the continued existence of a number 
of foreign (sometimes opposition) radio stations broadcasting into Iran and challenged on 
occasion by Tehran radio; while the publication of the Rastakhiz party newspaper, and the 
catastrophic impact of the Etela ’at commentary attacking Ayatollah Khomeini in January 
1978, are testament to the perceived and very real influence of newspapers in late Pahlavi 
Iran.
In 1966, the year prior to the coronation, the Pahlavi regime began a concerted attempt
617 op.citpp 191-92
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to produce a properly researched 'nationalistic’ historical narrative of Iran, with proper 
emphasis on the central role of the Iranian monarchy. The 'Historical Research’ magazine, 
which was published every two months by the Army General Staff, ran for 13 years and 
carried numerous articles of general and specific interest, but with an undeniable tendency 
to elevate nationalistic explanations of Ir anian history, hi 1976, to coincide with the 50th 
anniversary of the Pahlavi dynasty, the chief cultural ideologue of the Pahlavi dynasty, 
Shoja-ed Din Shafa,618 published the official dynastic history in several volumes. The Gah- 
Nameh-ye Panjah Sal-e Shahanshahi-e Pahlavi was a chronicle of the Pahlavi dynasty, 
the 3159 pages, covering the history of the dynasty in minute, pedantic detail. This was 
the first official history of the dynasty and its style precluded any discussion or apparent 
interpretation of events; dates were simply provided with important developments in the 
dynasty’s history.
Probably the most important text of this period for the purposes of ideological and mythic 
construction was the book, 'Towards the Great Civilisation’, published in 1978. This was 
effectively a summation of the Shah’s ultimate understanding of historical circumstance, 
the international system, and critically his vision for the firture o f Iran. Somewhat vague 
and ambiguous in its analysis, it nevertheless is a remarkable testament of the Shah’s 
world-view, and in light of the Shah’s illness and the very 'reflective’ nature of the prose, 
it may be conjectured that he considered it at the time, to be his last 'message’ to the 
people of Iran. Its main value lies in its emphasis on the myth o f the saviour. Indeed, as
618 Shoja-ed Din Shafa was head of the Pahlavi Library and chief adviser on 
cultural affair s to the Shah. A man of considerable intellect, he is the closest the regime 
had to a true ideologue and was thought to have been instrumental in promoting the 
concept of a 2500th commemoration of the Persian Monarchy.
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will be seen, the parallels with Feuer’s basic model of the 'Mosaic5 myth of deliverance 
are quite explicit, although in a dynastic sense there are also similarities with what may be 
called the “West Iranian 'national5 or 'royal5 epic....”619
Reconstructing the historical narrative:
The Coronation
As the Tudeh mouthpiece, Mardom noted, “The Shah’s coronation late this month 
represents the Shah’s efforts to stabilise monarchy in the Pahlavi dynasty.”620 The 
coronation ceremony marked the first of a series of spectacular pageants aimed at 
impressing the majesty and pomp of monarchy upon the populace, most of whom watched 
the ceremony on television. Ironically, the ceremony owed little to Iranian monarchical 
tradition. Although Reza Shah had crowned himself, the ceremony clothed itself in the 
ethnic and cultural diversity of Iran, Mohammad Reza Shah however chose to distinguish 
himself fiuther from his father by developing the ceremony along European lines 
(specifically British), even to the extent that his military escort wore strikingly similar 
uniforms to the British Life-Guards. Furthermore, the ceremony itself was but the
619 RFiye The Heritage of Persia California, Mazda 1993, pg 87, Fiye argues that 
the Mosaic myth and the various 'dynastic founder’ stories share many commonalities. 
“The motif of the founder of a dynasty being raised by shepherds or poor people who do 
not know, or who conceal the true royal descent of the child, becomes part of the 
charisma of Persian royalty repeated under the Safavids and other rulers in Persian history. 
I term it the West Iranian national’ or 'royal’ epic as compared with the East Iranian 
religious’ or 'heroic’ epic series.”
620 BBC SWB ME/25 96/D/1 dated 17th October 1967, exceipts from the Tudeh 
Party monthly Mardom, dated 15 October 1967.
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beginning o f a series of celebrations and parties organised throughout the country to 
commemorate the event and no doubt to emphasise its importance. For the Shah, his 
coronation provided the visible manifestation of the institutionalisation of his monarchy 
and the continuation of his dynasty. Coronations are essentially vehicles of 
institutionalisation, and the act of coronation is in itself an ideological expression through 
the use o f and identification with, familiar symbols. It is thus an expression of political 
myth.
One of the first problems the Shah had to deal with was why he had taken so long, 27 
years, to organise a coronation ceremony. The resultant dissimulation was that he had no 
desire to be crowned king of a poor country, and that, he wished first to achieve some 
measure of socio-economic progress before acquiescing to a coronation.621 The reality 
was probably more complex, and reflected the fact that the first 27 years of the Shah’s 
reign had been years of political uncertainty and doubt, hi essence the Shah wanted to feel 
moderately secure before holding the ceremony, and by 1967, he felt that five years of the 
White Revolution had provided him with this622. Some measure of the Shah’s confidence 
in the beginning of his 27,h year as monarch can be seen in the fact that in addition to his 
coronation and the commemorations held to celebrate his silver jubilee in 1965, the Shah 
was now intent on celebrating 27 years on the throne.623 The increasing frequency of such
621 Rastakhiz 3 Aban 2535 / October 1977; see also F Pahlavi My Thousand and 
one days London, W H Allen, 1978, pg 60.
622 Of coruse, it should not be forgotten that an assassination attempt on the Shah 
was made in 1965.
623 BBC SWB ME/2580/D/1 dated 28,h September 1967 - Tehran Radio dated 16 
September 1967.
-289-
ceremonies can be regarded as an attempt to emphatically situate himself and his dynasty 
within the reconstructed narrative of Iranian monarchy and to emphasise his importance 
to national identity and progress.
The coronation ceremony itself was an interesting exercise in the symbolism of dynastic 
nationalism combining both overt traditionalism and nationalism (although much of these 
had been invented), with innovations which aimed to signify an attachment to modernity 
and progress. Thus for example, although intended to express and impress the link 
between the Shah and his predecessors, many of the subsequent festivities in particular the 
carriage journey with liveried footmen and mounted cuirassed cavalry were lifted directly 
from the British coronation ceremony. Indeed according to Sir Denis Wright, Sami’i from 
the Iranian Foreign Ministry was sent to London with express orders to discover how a 
coronation ceremony should be administered.624 In contrast to these covert attempts at 
symbolic appropriation, the Shah was at great pains to emphasise the essential Iranian-ness 
of the coronation ceremony. The Pahlavi crown, which had heen constructed for Reza 
Shah was stated to have been modelled upon Sassanian models, though it is now known 
that each Sassanian Shah had a new crown made. The Shah sat on the Peacock thr one and 
wore the Naderi sword as his father had done, and like his father he crowned himself. This 
last act, as well as the crowning of Farah as Empress was an innovation, and resembled 
the Napoleonic example rather than Iranian tradition. Indeed, the Qajars had been 
crowned by members of the ulema, thereby symbolically acknowledging the link between 
the monarchy and religion. It seems unlikely that the Shah would have been unaware of
624 Interview with Sir Denis Wright - October 1996
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this practice, although the Pahlavi dislike for the preceding dynasty may have encouraged 
to Shah to disassociate himself from any tradition or practice connected to the Qajars. 
According to the Empress, the Shah’s justification for this procedure was that since he 
represented the people of Iran, “Through my hands, it is they who crown me.”625 As such 
it may be surmised that the Shah sought to use a traditional ceremony to impress his 
popular’ credentials upon his subjects.
The crowning of Farah as 'Empress’ may also be interpreted as an attempt to convey a 
sense of modernity. It fitted well with the Shah’s notion that he had emancipated women 
during the initial stages o f the 'White Revolution’ by giving them the vote and Farah’s 
coronation, along with the Constitutional amendments adopted to make her Regent in the 
event of the Shah’s premature death626, were officially characterised as unique and 
progressive, despite the fact that the historical record notes that Iranian queens had ruled 
in Iran before.627 Interestingly, this seemingly progressive move was rationalised by 
resorting to tradition in that Farah was lauded as a Seyyed, a descendent of the Prophet 
through Imam Hasan; despite the fact that the title 'seyyed’ cannot be transmitted through 
the female line. The tensions implicit in this symbolic act became increasingly apparent in 
interviews the Shall was to give in subsequent years, both to Oriana Fallaci, and 
importantly, the American anchor-woman, Barbara Walters, in which it became apparent
625 F Pahlavi My thousand and one days pg 62
626 BBC SWB ME/2589/D/l dated 9th October 1967 - Tehran Radio 6th October 
1967; Shah’s speech from the throne on the occasion of the opening of the 5th Senate and 
22nd Majlis.
627 Thus Farah recounts that, “I was veiy proud...to be the first Empress of Iran 
to be crowned for so many centuries of its history.” F Pahlavi My thousand., pg 63.
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that there were stark contradictious between the Empress’ role as potential 'regent’ and 
the Shah’s appreciation of the political aptitude of women.628
With respect to direct religious participation in the coronation ceremony, the Pahlavi 
monarchy differed from most o f then predecessors, including the Sassanians and the 
Safavids, and indeed for both Pahlavi monarchs, the ulemas’ participation was restricted 
to the brief recitation o f passages from the Qoran. The Shah differed from his father in 
having a trumpet fanfar e announce the beginning of the ceremony including “magnificent 
chons singing.”629 (Reza Shah had no music at all in order not to antagonise the ulema), 
and upon crowning himself, 101 gun salute was fried, hi addition the military were 
represented by individual soldiers, and officers, a fly-past was conducted by the air force 
and the mosques began reciting prayers in favour of the monarch, while radio and 
television broadcast music for the health of the Shah.
In a book published to coincide with the coronation, entitled '60 centuries o f history and 
coronations’,630 the significance of the Shah’s coronation was reflected in the historical 
context o f 6000 years of history in a clear attempt to eternalise and naturalise the 
monarchy within the reconstructed historical narrative, while at the same time 
differentiating the Shah from his predecessors, who impressive as they were, were no
628 O Fallaci Mosahebeh ba Tarikh (Interview with History), Tehran, Amir Kabir, 
1978. The original Italian was published earlier but was censored in Iran. The interview 
with the Shah was conducted in October 1973. Li this interview, among other things he 
argued that although women may be equal under the law, they were not equal in ability, 
p 10.
629 F Pahlavi ibid pg 62
630 Khan Malek Yazdi Shast Qarn-e Tarikh va Tai-Gozari Tehran 1967.
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match for the current incumbeut. The author provided more or less detailed accounts of 
crowns and coronations since the mythical kings of Ferdowsi’s Sliahnameh, in an 
interesting attempt to blend myth with history.631 Not surprisingly, the author notes that 
though it is up to the reader to ascertain which historic king was most deserving of a 
coronation and whose coronation was the most glorious, it must be obvious to all 
contemporary people, both in Iran and the world, that the coronation of HIM Shahanshah 
Aryamehr, and Farah, the Shahbanou632 of Ir an is the greatest and most glorious, because 
argues the author, we are witnesses to the ceremony, and everyone is aware of the 
tremendous achievements of the Shah.633 The text also promoted the myth of the 'popular 
sovereign’ by describing the Shah as 'great’ and also granting him the epithet of'friend 
of the people’.
The author then argues that to understand the greatness of the Shah it is necessary to 
survey the first 26 years of his reign, which continues to provide the increasingly 
standardised and familiar historical narrative of the country; from Reza Shah’s rescue of 
the country from backwardness, to the occupation of the country by the allies in World 
War II, which caused untold suffering for the people, to then penetration of the 
aristocracy (who then became tools of foreigners). The Shah is painted as a lone figure 
aware of the need to eliminate social oppression. His vision for the future of the country, 
later became the unprecedented reform which ensured that each person was rewarded
631 This extended royal lineage was to be given full exposure in M Karanjia’s 'Mind 
of a Monarch London, George Allen & Unwin, 1977.
632 This historic title replaced 'malekeh’ in March 1961; see FO 371 157601 EP 
1015/55 dated 28 March 1961.
633 Khan Malek Yazdi Shast Qarn-e Tarikh va Tai-Gozari pg 263.
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according to liis or her own efforts.634 The epithets 'just5 and 'people-loving’ are 
emphasised in a probable effort to identify the Shah with the characteristics of rulers most 
often cherished by Iranians in then rulers.
Indeed, the author leaves the reader with little doubt as to the analogy, when having 
reminded the reader of his good fortune to be living at this time, and in Iran, following the 
path of progress, concludes with the note that in reality the only king that can be 
compared to the Shah is Cyrus the Great, who likewise eliminated oppression and was 
known to the different nations as a 'father.’635 The comparison, and ideological 
personalisation by proxy, with Cyrus does not stop there however. The reader is reminded 
that just as that king requested a trusted Persian officer to organise his coronation in 
Babylon, (and likewise Nader Shah) so the Shah instructed General Yazdanpanah to head 
a committee for the preparations. Unlike his predecessors though, since the Shah is a man 
of the people, his coronation is to be organised with the people in mind. As the author 
points out, this coronation is not simply for the aristocracy but for 26 million people, so 
celebrations must be organised tlnoughout the country.636 hi order to familiarise the world 
with Iran the Shah has instructed that special tourist facilities be established so that those 
who wish to come to Iran for the celebrations can do so with ease, thereby universalising 
the importance of the ceremony.
Beyond the coronation itself, a number of ceremonies and celebrations were held in
634 Ibid  pg 264.
635 Ibid  pg 266.
636 Ibid  pg 269
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honour of the Shah and to institutionalise the coronation ceremony and the dynasty within 
the popular memory. On the night of the coronation a special concert was held at Rudaki 
hall. The following day, in the afternoon a military parade was held, while in the evening 
a special dinner was held by the prime minister at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On 6lh 
Aban (28th October), two days after the coronation an athletic exhibition was held, while 
in the evening a dinner was held by the minister of court at the Hilton. On the 7(h Aban 
(29th October) the Shah and empress visited the ministry of Finance and in the evening 
were guests at the officers’ club, following this with another evening at the Rudaki Hall. 
Only on the 10th Aban (1st November), that is 6 days after the coronation, did the Shah 
visit Mashhad for a pilgrimage at the shrine of Imam Reza. Celebrations for the enjoyment 
of the general populace were held in Tehran and other major cities, including a 
photographic exhibition of the Shah’s reign.637
The year 1967 also marked a dramatic upsurge in the number of statues o f the Shah - the 
concrete personalisation of ideology - erected throughout the country. Prince Gholamreza 
unveiled a statue of the Shah in Twiserkan in September638, followed by another unveiling 
in Khoi (18th October); Kerman (23 October); Zahedan (26 October); Saveh '(30 
October), andMaku (11th November).639 Other ceremonies also continued, with the senate 
holding a thanksgiving service on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Shah’s escape
637 BBC SWB ME/2616/D/1 dated 9th November 1967, Tehran Radio, dated 29 
October 1967. See also ME/2610/D/l dated 2nd November 1967.
638 BBC SWB ME/2580/D/1 dated 28th September 1967 - Tehran Radio, dated 16 
September 1967.
639 BBC SWB ME/2604/D/1 dated 26h October 1967; ME/2610/D/1 dated 2d 
November 1967; ME/2616/D/l dated 9,h November 1967; ME/2622/D/1 dated t'6 
November 1967 - Tehran Radio, dates as noted. This was just the first batch!
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ftom assassination, coinciding with similar ceremonies held throughout the country/40 The 
Shah was increasingly described in messianic terms. In a speech to the Majlis, Hoveida 
described, ‘the Shah’s constant missionary struggle to secure the Iranian peoples’ rights 
is such that if revealed one day it will clearly show the extent to which the Shah’s single- 
minded determination has been decisive...”641
hi the book the 'White Revolution’ published just before the coronation, the Shah 
explained his understanding of a king’s all-encompassing, responsibilities to his people, 
“Christensen, the Danish orientalist, has rightly said that a real king in Iran is not so much 
a political head of a nation as a teacher and leader. He is not only a person who builds 
roads, bridges, dams and canals, but one who leads them in sphit, thought and heart.”642 
This book was to be studied as a textbook in schools,643 and in the following year seminars 
were inaugurated to study the text.644
Tensions & Contradictions
For many in opposition, the idea that the White Revolution justified the Shah and the
640 BBC SWB ME/2999/D/2 dated 13th February 1969 - Tehran Radio, dated 3 & 
4th February 1969.
641 BBC SWB ME/2713/D/1 dated March 1968 - Tehran Radio, dated 
February 1968,
642 M R Pahlavi The White Revolution pg 1.
643 BBC SWB ME/25 80/D/1 dated 28th September 1967 - Tehr an Radio dated 17 
September 1967.
644 BBC SWB ME/2672/D/1 dated 18th January 1968 - Tehran Radio dated 6 
January 1968.
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monarchy was treated with contempt: “The propagandists also argue that the Shah’s 
monarchy is unique in that it has launched a so-called white revolution and that it has 
enabled Iran to make maximum progress. They say that the world is amazed at the Shah’s 
sagacity, that the 'entire world is studying and imitating what has been achieved through 
the Shah’s genius, and that the Shah’s era is the most brilliant era in Iran’s history.’ 
Shame!”645
Similarly, the centr al role that the Shah wished to claim for himself and the monarchy was 
also ridiculed. The Tudeh argued,
“The Shah and his propagandists claim that monarchy is a natural part of the Iranian 
culture. When a number of political prisoners were being tried, Masudi, the proprietor of 
Etela’at wrote: 'These people wanted to kill tire Shah and began guerilla warfare in Iran.
If  the Shah were killed, there would be no Iran m which to conduct guerilla warfare.’ 
Obviously this is incorrect. Many of the countries of the world have discarded monarchy.
Even at its best - constitutional monarchy - this system of government is undemocratic. At 
its worst, the system is profoundly reactionary.”
Tlie article added that tliougb many dictators throughout history have considered 
themselves indispensable to the universe, they usually proved to be inconsequential 
creatmes, “The idea of omniscient, omnipotent leaders can only appeal to the imbecile.
645 BBC SWB ME/25 96/D/1 dated IT1' October 1967 - Exceipts fxomMardom  
dated 15 October 1967.
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It cannot deceive the wise.”646
Special celebrations were held eveiy year to commemorate the anniversary of the 
referendum which launched the Shah’s White Revolution, hi 1969, it included 
participation by a pan-Irauist group which seemed markedly different from that which had 
supported Dr Mosaddeq. Its appearance chew criticism from Iran’s left wing opposition:
“...Stage managing demonstrations and organising shouting crowds are some of the Iranian 
regime’s new tactics. The farcical ceremony the regime staged on 6th Bahman this year 
again proved the disgracefulness of this kind of operation...
To the worthless and ludicrous scenes of this years farce must be added the more 
disgusting and yet far more dangerous scenes staged by the Pau-Iranists. These self-styled 
fascists, with then paramilitary groups, parades and short and long hurrahs, wanted to 
prove then role as the regime’s crack elements. The Pan-Iranist ring leaders....wanted to 
reaffirm their fascist role. Like then Hitlerite inspirers they employed all the tactics used 
by the Nazis. Like all fascists, the self-styled fascists’ grey-uniformed and black-uniformed 
groups paraded. The leader of this gang has copied the Hitlerite eagle insignia. A b aimer 
with golden insignia is carried behind him.
This was the special insignia belonging to the self-styled Fuhrer. If the Shah can have his 
own imperial standard and a crown, why should the Fuhrer’s caricature be deprived of his 
golden eagle b aimer to be held aloft wherever he stands. The Pan-Iranists so called 
disciplinary group wore uniforms exactly the same as those worn by the Hitlerite SA 
group....Their uniform, tlieh caps and then armbands are identical to those worn by the 
Nazi SA assault gang. The black uniformed guards of the Pan-Iranists moved in military
646 Ibid
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formation. Their own band, with their grey uniforms, black trousers and red lanyards were 
all reminiscent of the Hitlerite scenes which created so much misfortune....
There can be little doubt that the left wing opposition exaggerated the extent to which the 
regime was adopting the insignia of the Nazi party, but there can also be little doubt that 
the rhetoric of 'Aryanism3 (the Shah was after all the 'Light o f the Aryans’) and the 
increasing research into the pre-Islamic past, 648along with the increasingly heavy hand of 
the government, opened the regime up to this charge, and allowed it to gain a measure of 
credibility. Thus the polarisation of ideological constructions and the development of 
political myth resulted in an equally extreme reaction and interpretation. Indeed, in student 
demonstrations which occurred in December 1970, among the slogans they adopted (in 
general criticising the very notion of a 'white3 revolution) was one which noted that, 
“Only a Fascist regime needs such a police force.35649
Accommodating the Opposition
In that year, the celebrations marking the referendum were marked with the publication 
o f the Shah3s speeches and books, as well as television programmes broadcasting the
647 BBC SWB ME/3010/D/l dated 26th February 1969 - Radio Iran Courier dated 
24 February 1969.
648 Historical Research Magazine, Mordad-Shahrivar 1351 (July-August 1972) 
published an article on Mithraic symbols with a focus on one symbol which bears a 
striking similarity to the swastika.
649 BBC SWB ME/3567/D/2 dated 23rd December 1970 - Peygham-e Emruz dated 
21 December 1970.
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'philosophy’ of the revolution.650 Furthermore, the language to describe the Shah began 
to subtly shift. The Prime Minister, Hoveida, declared that be had been “inspired by the 
lofty views of the distinguished leader”, while the press began to use similar language with 
increasing frequency.651 The wisdom of the Shah’s leadership was to be confirmed by the 
confession of a growing number of repentant prodigal sons such as Parsa Nezhad, a 
former member of the Tudeh Party. In an interview Nezhad acknowledged his mistakes 
and in the process emphasised two themes which the Shah would appreciate. Firstly that 
the reforms promoted by the left had been anticipated by the Shah - thus he was indeed 
revolutionary - and the fact that two farm coiporations were named after Darius the Great 
and the Shah emphasised to listeners the favourable comparison that ought to be dr awn - 
further personalisation by proxy.652
“...My studies on the country’s economic growth led me to conclude that in fact some of 
our programmes on Iran’s revolution and its economic, industrial, and social development 
were incongruous with Iran’s realities, because the same government and regime had 
already implemented some of our programmes. Laud reform has been carried out for 
example We did not believe that anyone except us could implement land reform. We
650 BBC SWB ME/3297/D/1 dated 5th February 1970 - Tehran Radio, dated 26 
January 1970.
651 BBC SWB ME/3301/D/1 dated l ( f  February 1970, Tehran Radio dated 8h 
February 1970. Hoveida praises the 'wise leadership’ of the Shah, BBC SWB 
ME/4180/D/1 dated 29* December 1972, Hoveida’s statements on the country’s progress, 
Tehran Radio, dated 27th December 1972. See also BBC SWB ME/3504/D/1 dated 10th 
October 1970 - Keyhan dated 8 October 1970.
652 There were 19 farm corporations in total of which only one was named after 
a previous king (Dariusk-e Kabir), four others after other members of the royal family, and 
two denoting justice’. See D R  Denman The King’s Vista Berkhamstead, Geographical 
Publications, pg 216.
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did not believe die bourgeoisie could implement land reforms....I saw that land reform has 
actually been implemented in these areas - that is, the Iranian peasantry had received land, 
and the domination of feudalism had been abolished from the Iranian village.
I have seen an even more advanced phase of land reform, namely the farm corporations 
of Darius die Great and Aryamehr. These reflect a much higher phase of land reform... we 
thought that the abolition of feudalism and laud reform implementation were empty 
propaganda. When I arrived here I saw for myself. The feelings of the peasants who talked 
to me were transferred to me. So I realised that the land reform we believed should take 
place following ail anned uprising had been implemented without it ,,6S3
The association, in this case, with the Achaemenian King Darius, and the increasing 
identification o f the Shah in the image of a latter day Cyrus the Great, just, benign 
patriarch of a grateful people, universally admired and revered,654 was to receive its most 
emphatic expression with the celebration of 2500 years of Persian Monarchy.
Reconstruction and Internationalisation
653 BBC SWB ME/3383/D/1 dated 20th May 1970 - Tehran Radio, dated 17 May
1970.
654 BBC SWB ME/325 8/D/l dated 18fh December 1969, Tehran Radio, dated 7 
December 1969, notes that the Shah was awarded the gold peace medal by the Grotius 
Association of Jurists, and on the occasion of the 21st anniversary of the declaration of 
human rights, draws comparisons with the Cyrus cylinder.
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2500 years o f Persian Monarchy
By 1971, the Shah was ready to commemorate an event which had been planned and 
repeatedly postponed for several years. This was the 2500th anniversary of the Persian 
monarchy. The idea had first been canvassed in the 1950s, and had originally been 
regarded as a showcase in which modem Iran could be introduced to the world. It was 
initially envisaged as a cultural event in which the historical record would be put straight 
and the cultural contribution of Iran to world civilisation be truly recognised. Although 
the cultural aspects of the celebrations were extensive, the main theme of the entire 
spectacle was the centrality of the monarchy within the Iranian political system. The aim 
of the event was to identify the Shah not only with Cyrus the Great but to associate him 
with the great historical monuments of Iran’s past. It was the mythical exposition of the 
ideology of dynastic nationalism and it presented to the world a new interpretation of 
Iranian history in which the emphasis lay on kings and military might.
The tensions inherent in this enormous exercise in political myth were apparent from the 
start when few academics could agree on a precise date for the proceedings. Throughout 
the decade of the 50s, the Iranians had been urging foreign governments to participate in 
the celebrations, which most found peculiarly esoteric. By 1964, it was announced that 
the celebrations would be held on 23rd of October 1965, which would coincide with the 
Shah’s birthday and possibly, it was argued, his coronation. As the British Embassy noted, 
“The Iranians are attaching great importance to these celebrations...”655 It had also not
655 FO 371 175743 EP 1961/8 dated 4 August 1964.
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escaped anyone’s attention tliat, “...The object of the celebration is clearly to emphasise 
both at home and abroad the continuing strength of the tradition of monarchy in this 
country....”656 However, one month after this announcement the celebrations were 
postponed again, this time until 1967.657
By early 1971, preparations for the celebrations were in earnest and the person of Cyrus 
the Great emerged as less of an historical and cultural icon and increasingly as a 
fundamental principle of government ideology. Indeed before the Shah could effectively 
identify with Cyrus, The Achaemenid king had to introduced and familiarised to a wider 
general public. Indeed, Cyrus was even evoked in the prime minister’s budget speech, 
“Since the beginning of its glorious history, our coimtry has been famous for peace, 
friendship and humanity, and this can be clearly proved by studying the methods and 
measures of the great kings such as Cyrus the Gr eat, whose efforts made possible our 
celebration next year- of the 2500th anniversary of the Banian monarchy.... ”658 In his New 
Year message, the Shah was in buoyant mood, declaring the new Persian year to be the 
year of Cyrus the Gr eat:
“...The year now beginning is the year of the celebrations of the 2500th anniversary of the
Iranian monarchy; I therefore proclaim this the Year of Cyrus the Great, as a token of the
national respect to the founder of this monarchy. The best gift we can give to this immortal
656 FO 371 140887 EP 1961/1 dated 1 January 1959.
657 FO 371 175 743 EP 1961/21 dated 21 September 1964.
658 BBC SWB ME/3619/D/1 dated 25* February 1971 - Hoveida’s budget speech 
dated 23 February 1971 - his reference to 'next year’ implies the next Iranian year which 
begins on March 21st.
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hero of Iranian history at the beginning of such a year is undoubtedly the existence of a 
proud, progressive, and developed Iran with an even brighter future ahead based on its vast 
past heritage, an Iran which follows the practice - made the basis of the Iranian monarchy 
by Cyrus of the Achaemenid dynasty - of continuing to defend the principles of humanity 
and to respect human rights and the eternal standards of justice and idealism in today’s 
world. There is perhaps no other example hi world history of a country which has been 
able to preserve to such a degree its spiritual integrity and idealistic entity...
The year that passed was one of the brightest years hi Iranian history...The present 
activities to implement all aspects of the revolution clearly show that during this year and 
the years to follow, the Iranian revolution will be daily blooming and yielding
successes The year which has just begun will undoubtedly have a special page hi the
2500 years of Iranian Monarchy, shice it beghis hi complete faith and trust. The Iranian 
nation, now more than ever, has faith hi its national and world personality, in the eternal 
values of Iranian civilisation and culture, hi the certainty of achieving the big and bright 
goals it has chosen for itself, and the importance of the mission which history has given 
this nation from the start....”659
'Cyrus the Great year’ was marked by special programmes on television and radio, articles 
in the press, “Schools, universities, factories, trade unions, women’s and youth 
organisations have all prepared plans and set committees to ensure their playing proper 
pait in the festivities.”660 Literary magazines and journals published widely on the ancient
659 BBC SWB ME/3641/D/1 23rd March 1971 - Shah’s Now Ruz speech dated 21 
March 1971.
660 Facts about the Celebration of the 250(31* anniversary o f the founding of the 
Persian Empire by Cyrus the Great 11971) Committee of International AfFairs, Tehran, 
July 1971.
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period and the symbol adopted for the ceremonies was the Cyrus cylinder.661
It was during this year, while reflecting on past glories that the model country of the 
future began to be described as the 'Great Civilisation’. Hoveida, in a policy statement to 
the Majlis argued, “...It is an honour that ban’s revolution has put an end to backwardness 
and has placed us on the cour se of a bright change to the realms o f a great civilisation, the 
principles of which were submitted to the b  anian nation by the shahanshah. It is natur al 
that only through faith in the principles of the revolution and by depending the firm
idealistic and moral bases shall we be able to tread this road ”662 However, as with the
notion o f a 'White Revolution’ before it, it would appear to have been the Shah who 
provided definition (albeit ambiguous) for the concept. During a speech in the run-up to 
the celebrations, the Shah elucidated his vision of the Great Civilisation developing his 
new utopia on the back of his reconstructed historical narrative:
“I think that we can veiy firmly and with absolute certainty say that ban will not only 
become an industrial nation but in my assessment in 12 years time enter what we say the 
era of the Great Civilisation. The era of the great civilisation for those interested to know 
means the kind of welfare state where everybody bom, until he is dead, will enjoy every 
kind of social insurances to permit him to go into industry, to other jobs, to work and to 
die in peace and tranquillity. But also this welfare state doesn’t mean that society will be 
completely undisciplined. It doesn’t mean that our society will also sink into all die
661 For a sampling see articles in the Historical Research Magazine for the year 
1350 / 1971-72. Shoja ed Din Shafa’s description of the cylinder as the first Bill of Rights 
(see above pp 219-20), a theme often reiterated, undoubtedly meant more to Americans 
than to banians.
662 BBC SWB ME/3794/D/1 dated 23rd September 1971 - Hoveida’s speech to the 
Majlis, dated 19 September 1971.
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degradation that we can see in some places. Within the 12 year period illiteracy will be 
completely eradicated from this country...”663
This speech was important not only for having introduced and elaborated upon the Great 
Civilisation, but significantly, for having provided a time-table. Arguably, one can see a 
replication of the Mosaic myth with the Shah leading his people to a tangible promised 
land of economic and technological progress within little more than a decade.
The trend towards internationalisation was evident in the fact that the immediate audience 
were to be visiting heads of state and the Shah’s decision to follow 19th century protocol 
when it came to seating guests made s subtle point with respect to the importance of 
monarchs over republican leaders. Thus Emperor Haile Selassie was second to himself in 
the official rankings, while Presidents and vice-presidents came veiy near the bottom of 
the list. For this reason Resident Georges Pompidou of France refused to attend, sending 
his prime minister instead.664
The celebrations, physically and ideologically embedded in the Achaemenid capital at 
Persepolis had a heavy military bias665, and although there were conferences and seminars
663 BBC SWB ME/3818/D/3 dated f l  October 1971 - ffiess conference at 
Saadabad Palace, dated 18 October 1971.
664 See W Shawcross The Shah’s Last Ride London, Chatto & Windus, 1989 pg 
39. See also F Pahlavi op.cit. pg 90.
665 The strong association the Shah wished to emphasise with the military was 
exemplified by the publication of such books as Shah va Sepah. bar bonvad-e Shahnameh 
ve Ferdowsi (King and Army as explained in Ferdowsi’s Shahnameh) Aligholi Etemad- 
Moghadam, published by the Ministry of Aits and Culture, Aban 1349 / October 1970.
(continued...)
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to highlight ban’s cultural achievements, the centre-piece of the event was a vast military 
parade among the ruins of Persepolis, surveying ban’s military forces since the time of the 
Achaemeuians. It culminated with a march past by ban’s modem armed forces, including 
the women’s coips in order to stress the Shah’s dedication to the emancipation of women. 
The soldiers who participated in this extravaganza had been ordered to grow beards 
months in advance and the parade, in the words of the official programme and in a clear 
acknowledgement of the the important of television for the propagation of myth, “will be 
televised and transmitted throughout the world by telstar satellite to allow millions all over 
the world to see it.”666 Later it was to be claimed that some 2.4bn people joined Iran in 
the celebrations.667
Earlier the Shah had provided a eulogy at the tomb of Cyrus the Gr eat which had been 
preceded by a 101 gun salute, again intended to popularly identify the Shah with Cyrus 
the Great:
“Cyrus, great king, king of kings. Achaemenian king, king of the land of Iran, from me,
King of kings of Iran and from my nation, I send greetings you, the eternal hero of
Iranian history, the founder of the oldest monarchy in the world, the great freedom giver 
of the world, the worthy sou of mankind, we send greetings!.... Cyrus, we have gathered 
here today at your eternal tomb to tell you: sleep in peace because we are awake and we
(...continued)
One may argue that this was the beginning of the relegation o f 'militarism’ within the 
umbrella of'Pahlavism’.
666 Facts about Tehran July 1971, pg 28
667 Rastakhiz newspaper, dated 18th Mehr 1356 / 9th October 1977
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will always be awake to look after our proud inheritance...."668
As one historian was to later comment: “ A joke of the period claimed that an Iranian 
office worker was so enraptured by reading these words of the Shah in his newspaper that 
he went home unexpectedly early to tell his wife; there he found his wife and his neighbour 
Cyrus, asleep together in his bed. Overcome by the drama of the moment he raised his 
hand and said, “Sleep easily Cyrus, for we are awake.”669 Indeed, it may be argued that 
with dissent suppressed within the country the safest form of rejuvenation was through 
ridicule and humour, arguably an extension of the semiological chain.
The concrete reification of the ideology of dynastic nationalism was familiarised in an 
entirely new symbolic construction (itself a sign of modernisation), the ' Sh ally ad 
Aryamehr’ monument on the outskirts of Tehr an, significantly in view of the desire to 
impress both a foreign and domestic audience, en route to the airport. Construction of this 
peculiar monument was initiated in 1967 - its name means 'remember the Shall 
Aryamehr’. It was presented as an apparent gift from a grateful nation to the Shah, and 
was opened on 17th October 1971 in the presence of international dignitaries,, following 
a visit to the mausoleum of Reza Shah.670 The young architect in charge of construction 
argued that the design was meant to incorporate Achaemenian, Sassanian, Safavid and 
modem Iranian influences, and was meant to symbolise the link between ancient and
668 Rastakhiz newspaper, dated 19 Mehr 1356 / 10th October 1977
669 R Mottakedek The Mantle of the Pr ophet pg 327.
670 Facts about.... pg 29.
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modem.671 The lavish expense of the ceremonies had largely been dismissed by the Shah 
who explained to reporters that the event was both an excellent public relations exercise 
and that in any case many infiastructural projects would be completed.672 Subsequently, 
explanations were felt necessaiy for the extensive purchase of foreign goods and food, 
which seemed to contradict the essential Iranian-ness of the festivities.673
Contradictions and Tensions
Criticism of the final nature of the celebrations, the expense as well as the peivasive 
security which meant that banians themselves had to watch the event through television 
came from some of the Shah’s closest advisers. Ardashir Zahedi, the Shah’s son-in-law, 
is reported to have urged the Shah to encourage the secmity services to be more lenient; 
others simply expressed private regret and refused to attend the ceremonies.674 The most 
virulent public criticism came from Najaf, where Ayatollah Khomeini used the occasion 
to declare his opposition to monarchy as a whole, a shift which reflected the continuing 
polarisation of ideological perspectives. While the Shah was praising the virtues of 
kingship, Khomeini was arguing that the 'goodness’ of banian kings was relative, and
671 Rastakhiz newspaper, dated 26 Mehr 1356 / 17th October 1977
672 BBC SWB ME/3818/D/3 21st October 1971 - Press conference at Saadabad 
Palace, dated 18 October 1971. According to Charlotte Curtis o f the New York Times, 
the Shah felt compelled to personally answer journalists who were questioning the wisdom 
of the expenditure. See Dorman & Farhang The US Press & ban California 1987 pg 119.
673 See in particular F Paklavi My Thousand., pp 87-97, which covers the festivities 
in detail and responds to the criticism over foreign purchases.
674 Ardashir Zahedi, transcript o f interview for BBC2 documentary Reputations, 
April 1996.
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even the best had been capable of atrocities against then* own people. He added that, “the 
title of King o f Kings, which is borne by the monarchs of Iran, is the most hated of all 
titles in the sight of God.” He concluded by declaring the festival un-Islamic and urged 
people, Iranian and foreign alike not to participate for, “to participate in it is to participate 
in the murder of the oppressed people of Iran.”675
Internationalisation
Some articles in the foreign press however tended to follow the official line, and a special 
supplement in The Times included material provided by the Ir anian government which 
succinctly outlined the Shah’s political views to a foreign audience who must have 
wondered about the relevance of the material presented. The emphasis on the links 
between nationhood and monarchy were explicit as were comments about the relationship 
between the present Shah and his Achaemenian predecessor. Thus, The Times wr ote on 
25th September 1971 that,
“To the people of Iran, the Institution of Monarchy is not a mode of government but is 
rather a way of life wliich has become an essential part of the nation’s very existence. This 
is at should be, for since the birth of their nationhood, the Iranians...have always 
considered monarchy and nationhood to be synonymous.... the institution of monarchy has 
run like a connecting thread, even like a lifeline through twenty five centuries of eventful 
history, and has been the most effective factor in ensuring the Iranian people’s survival as
675 R Khomeini Islam and Revolution Trans by H Algar, Berkeley, Mizan Press, 
1981. Declaration issued fromNajaf on 31st October 1971 entitled The Incompatibility of 
Monarchy with Islam, pp 200-208.
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a nation, with its own identity, characteristics, art and civilisation. It is often said that the 
Iranians owe the continuity of their nationhood...to their ability to adapt and to 
adopt....The real secret of this continuity lies in the institution of monarchy, which since 
the founding of the Persian Empire, has stood for nationhood, independence and unity.
This has given the Monarch a unique role in the nation’s life, for he is not only the Head 
of State and the country’s foremost citizen but also the spiritual leader, mentor and 
paragon of virtue. He provides guidance in all the nation’s major activities and is the 
ultimate source of justice....In short he is looked upon as the supreme authority for 
ensuring the nation a happy prosperous life.”
Having explained the centrality of the monarchy, the article then turns to the unique 
contribution of the Shah:
“Since the foundation of the Persian Empire, the personality and ability of the monarch 
have been so closely linked to the nation’s well-being that whenever a really great 
monarch has been on the Persian thr one the nation has accomplished astonishing feats.
There have been many examples of this in the nation’s 2,500 year old history, the most 
impressive in recent centuries being the achievements of the White Revolution - a socio­
economic reform programme conceived and spearheaded by the Shahanshah....”
Another article emphasised,
“...Within the short span of less than a decade, the Shahanshah has led his nation in a 
gigantic leap forward and created from a feudalistic society with a backward economy, a 
modem, thriving state that has already achieved much and seems certain to achieve even 
more in the immediate fixture....”
Then in a panegyric on Cyrus the Great, the point is made:
“....Twenty five centuries after Cyrus the Great history is repeating itself through another 
great King, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, whose nation has given him the title of 
' Aryamehr’ (Light of the Aryans) for his gallantly and farsighted efforts to revive the 
splendour of Persia, and to uphold a tr adition of humanitarianism established by the 
founder of the Persian Empire.”676
Whatever the criticisms of Ayatollah Khomeini or the private reservations of his domestic 
allies677, the fact that US magazines and newspapers were focussing on the lavish spectacle 
with such titles as 'Iran: Model Middle East State - Celebrating 2500th Anniversary’, and 
noting that Iran had 'arrived’, can only have further confirmed the ideological convictions 
of the Shah, who in the absence of domestic opposition can only have been reassured by 
the foreign acceptance of his message.678
Developing the M yth of the Saviour
For many within Iran, foreign support for the Shah, as well as the apparent growth of his 
power and prestige on the international stage seemed to confirm that the image was not 
so far removed from reality. Although the economy was already encountering inflationary
676 The Times - special supplement, dated 25 September 1971.
677 Parviz Radjii, the Shah’s last ambassador in London, argues that it was difficult 
to confront the myth when foreign leaders were competing to praise the Shall; transcript 
from interview conducted for BBC2 documentary 'Reputations’ April 1996.
678 Dorman & Farhang US Press & Iran Berkeley, University of California Press, 
pp 118-119.
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pressures the overall impression appeared to be that of a healthy economy which was 
growing at a substantial rate. This impression could be confirmed by foreign assessments 
of the growth of the Iranian economy which suggested that Iran might be the next Japan 
and reflected the internationalisation of the semiological chain. Myth was thus constructed 
upon myth especially when the Shah quoted such figures to justify his policies and indeed 
his rule in general. The celebrations at Persepolis brought the myth of the saviour to the 
international stage and, confident of the favourable response, the Shah took every 
opportunity to pursue it. The withdrawal of British forces east o f Suez’ at the end of 
1971 provided the Shah with an opportunity he needed to substantiate his image with 
action.
By acceding to the independence o f Bahrain, the Shah was able to promote his image as 
a supporter of international justice679, while his subsequent very public military seizure of 
the thr ee islands of Abu Musa and the two Tunbs (despite the intense private negotiations) 
in the aftermath of the Persepolis celebrations allowed him to portray himself as a 
nationalist champion of Iran’s territorial rights.680 Although some criticised the loss of 
Bahrain, many more accepted that Bahrain had in practice been independent for many 
years, while the acquisition of the three islands, however small, seemed to signify that the 
period of decline and territorial losses inaugurated by the Qajars, was now at an end.
679 BBC SWB ME/3502/D/1 dated "8 October 1972 - Shah’s speech at the 
opening of the Majlis and Senate 6th October 1970. See also BBC SWB ME/3 710/D/1 
dated 16th June 1971 - Tehran Radio dated 141h June 1971.
680 The Shah sought to maintain rights to Bahrain right up until the last minute; see 
BBC SWB ME/2968/D/1 dated 8th January 1969 - Tehran Radio dated 7th January 1969; 
ME/2975/D/1 dated 16th January 1969 - Tehran Radio dated 13th January 1969.
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Ironically, by accepting to become the 'policeman of the G ulf, which in Persian was 
translated as 'Gendarme5 (a term which has more servile connotations) the Shah 
inadvertently played into the hands of his opponents who argued that he was merely doing 
the West's dirty work. This charge would surface again when Iranian troops were sent to 
help suppress the Dhofar rebellion in Oman.
Domestically, the Shah moved to consolidate dynastic nationalism and remove the 
inconsistencies which persisted, especially in attempting to incorporate the 'democratic5 
aspect of modernisation. The Shah decided to redefine democracy and thereby eliminate 
the contradiction. Whereas he had previously argued that Iran was not ready for 
democracy, now the emphasis shifted to argue that Iran was indeed democratic but in its 
own peculiarly Iranian sense. At the end of 1970, Prime Minister Hoveida argued, 'the 
secret of Iran's economic and social success lay in the fact that it did not follow baseless 
schools of thought, nor was it inspired by East or West in its revolution - the revolution 
was inspired by national traditions and the Shah's revolutionary ideals....' He then 
continued with an attack on Western conceptions of democracy, alluding to a theme which 
would become increasingly virulent, that, such conceptions simply created social 
problems.
“As the Shah has said, social democracy cannot exist without economic democracy, in my 
view most of those who talk about democracy are still limited in their concept to the 
schools of thought advocated by Plato, Montesquieu and others, whereas democracy today 
is conditioned by modem times. We do not believe democracy means anyone should be 
free to act against national interests and moral values and traditions. From our standpoint 
democracy means respecting human rights and individuals. The interesting question is
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whether such democracy exists in those countries which are preaching to us on 
democracy...”681
This notion of neither 'East nor West5 was repeated at an Iran Novin Party meeting one 
week later, “....We believe that we shall become one of the advanced countries in the near 
future. However.... one of the original aspects of our revolution is that we are not inspired 
by exported ideologies. We are inflicted neither with Westernisation nor 
Eastemisation...55682 Hoveida impressed upon his listeners that the motivating ideology was 
Iranian, and that it was ban’s economic success which had attracted the criticism of 
foreigners.
Tensions & Contradictions
While banian opposition groups lampooned the elections o f 1971 as tomfooleries’ and 
'fabricated’683, it was the emergent criticism of foreigners which appeared to generate the 
greatest response, indicating that the international deconstmction and reinterpretation of
681 BBC SWB ME/3562/D/1 dated 17th December 1970 - Hoveida’s speech to the 
Central Committee of the ban Novin Party, dated 15th December 1970. 'National 
interests’ can be safely defined as the monarchy, which as the Shah continually argued was 
the central manifestation of banian nationalism. Therefore in these speeches we see an 
exercise in trope as 'nationalism’ and the Pahlavi monarchy become essentially 
interchangeable.
682 BBC SWB ME/3568/D/1 dated 28th December 1970 - Hoveida’s statement to 
ban Novin Party meeting, dated 22nd December 1970. See also Hoveida’s comments to 
students and staff at Tehran University, dated 26th April 1972, BBC SWB ME/3975/D/1 
dated 28,h April 1972.
683 BBC SWB ME/3733/D/1 dated 13,h July 1971 - Radio ban Cornier dated 9 
July 1971.
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the Shah’s political myths had begun, an unforeseen consequence of the Persepolis 
celebrations and an indication that integration into the Cold War narrative was not always 
beneficial, encomaging a policy of differentiation. The vitriolic response of the Iranian 
media to the foreign criticism reflected the extreme polarisation of ideological positions 
and the use of political myth is apparent, hi one particular case the Persian daily Keyhan 
vented its fury upon the British newspaper, The Daily Telegr aph for attacking the validity 
of the elections, “..The Conservative paper would do better to look at itself first and then 
try to explain democracy. The Daily Telegraph would see Britain as a country facing great 
economic, social and political difficulties. It would see the way military force is used in 
preserving a type of tranquillity in Northern Ireland.... That type of democracy naturally 
does not exist in ban, and no one wants to follow blindly the British style of life. What the 
Conservative’s paper calls democracy is of no interest to us.” The editorial then continued 
to characterise the British as 'imperialists’ in a clear' attempt to appropriate the ideological 
familiarisation used by Dr Mosaddeq.684
A significant contradiction in the mythic construction was that despite the increasingly 
chauvinistic nature of this strategy of differentiation, it was itself transformed into a tool 
of internationalism by arguing that the achievements of the Shah were applicable globally. 
This universalisation of the Shah’s apparent domestic achievements was a continuation 
of the myth of the White Revolution.685 However, as argued above, increased confidence 
transformed a tendency to invite foreigners to leam from ban, to one in which foreigners
684 BBC SWB ME/3739/D/1 dated 20th July 1971, Keyhan dated 15th July 1971.
685 One could even argue that the Shah wanted to 'export’ his revolution.
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were being rather abruptly lectured about then inadequacies and how they should leam 
from ban and its leader. As Hoveida argued:
“... the great feats initiated in ban  under the Iranian leader’s initiative which have now 
assumed a global dimension. The great feat of the campaign against illiteracy and the 
formation of the legion to serve mankind are among them....This is yet another example 
of the great achievements initiated in ban and which have rapidly assumed international 
dimensions...”686
The Shah’s increasing impatience and irritation with his officials indicates that the reforms 
inaugurated in the White Revolution were not yielding the results the Shah had hoped for, 
or indeed was boasting about687. This tangible failure was being ascribed to the lack of 
communication between the Shah and the implementors of the reform. Quite simply, it 
was argued that people either did not understand, or were unwilling to exert the effort 
required to maintain the momentum of the revolution. The Shah, increasingly convinced 
of his message, thus blamed the messenger.
Thus in addressing the new cabinet in September 1971, the Shah admonished them with 
the statement that, “...Your revolutionary spirit must not flag for even one moment. All 
this progress or, as foreigners say, all this miracle in ban could not have been achieved by
686 BBC SWB ME/3635/D/1 dated 16U March 1971 - Speech to Worker’s 
Congress, dated 13 March 1971.
687 See A K S Lambton Persian Land Reform 1962-66 Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1969; BBC SWB ME/4419/D/1 dated 9th October 1973, Shah’s speech to Majlis dated 
6th October 1973 in which he refers more attention to raise agricultural yields and 
measures to deal with over-pricing by 'shop-keepers’; H Richards Land Reform & 
Agribusiness in ban Merip 1975.
-317-
routine work. All this has been achieved through faith and conscious belief in the charter 
of the revolution. This revolutionary zeal must exist with the same intensity it had during 
its first days...” Then, in order to deal with the unsatisfactory 'education’ the Shah 
proceeded to argue that, “...The people should adopt the revolutionary sphit, otherwise 
progress will not be made. It is the job of the Information ministry to acquaint the people 
with then duties...”688 This need to educate a generally receptive and willing public was 
combined with harsh words for those who simply would not cooperate. Thus Prime 
Minister Hoveida declared that, cTJnless a man is patriotic there is no room for him in our 
society...”689
The emergent equation of critical opposition with treason, the tactic originally used 
agamst recalcitrant nationalists, was now applied to all those who opposed the Shah’s 
particular ideological conception. Thus at a press conference the Shah argued, “...I can 
tell you that the number o f political prisoners in this country is exactly amounting to the 
number of traitors in this country....”690 Such 'traitors’ were increasingly held responsible 
for all the ills that befell the country and gr adually domestic traitors (the red and black) 
were linked to foreign imperialists thus unifying two hitherto distinct areas of ideological 
operation. In a curious radio commentary on a bank robbery, it is stated that, “....The 
colonial powers which have become accustomed to sucking the blood of nations can equip
688 BBC SWB ME/3788/D/1 dated l6 h July 1971, Shah’s speech to the new 
cabinet, dated 13lh September 1971.
689 BBC SWB ME/3796/D/1 dated 25lh September 1971, Hoveida’s speech to the 
Majlis, dated 23rd September 1971.
690 BBC SWB ME/3818/D/1 dated 21st October 1971, Shah’s press conference at 
Saadabad Palace, dated 18th October 1971.
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their devoted hirelings with money, as they have done. The Iranian nation, which has 
already seen the ugliness of colonialism reflected in the most infernal of faces and which 
has seen how rotten and abominable colonialism aims to mar the calm, creative and 
constructive atmosphere of banian life with disturbance and fear, no longer needs to ask 
why the devoted hirelings of colonialism kill two respectable banians for 47,000 rials. 
Then target and that of then masters and motivators is b an’s security and stability at this
auspicious time ”691 Or again, in responding to criticisms of ban bom  abroad, Tehr an
radio argued that, “...National interest is the highest priority in ban. This should be known 
by both the left and right reactionaries....ban has chosen to tread an extremely clear and
unequivocal road Any step taken outside this main line will meet certain defeat The
banian nation condemns any type of reaction and any type o f colonialism, in whatever 
form or colour....”692
In effect as Pahlavism’ subsumed all that was supposedly constructive within its totality, 
so the 'enemy’ coagulated into its own polarised totality with the consequence that an 
increasingly ambiguous mythic construction was polarising into well defined parameters 
for action. At one end stood the promised land of the Gr eat Civilisation, which required 
constant vigilance and effort against the unscrupulous sabotage and conspiracies of its 
enemies.693 This polarisation between a duality of good and evil, or light and darkness was
691 BBC SWB ME/3887/D/1 dated i f  January 1972, Tehran radio dated Tb 
January 1972.
692 BBC SWB ME/3929/D/1 dated 2l March 1972, Tehran Radio dated *&7 
February 1972. See also BBC SWB ME/4056/D/1 dated 2nd August 1972, Tehr an Radio 
condemns terr orism and associates it with colonialism, dated 30th July 1972.
693 BBC SWB ME/3936/D/1 dated 1& March 1972, Shah’s press conference,
(continued...)
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increasingly used to portray ban as having been lifted out of'darkness’ through the wise 
leadership of the Shah and on the threshold of a bright future. Thus on a trip to 
Baluchestan, one of the least developed provinces of ban, Hoveida told the locals that, 
“You young people will never see these dark and disastrous days.”694 Or in a later speech 
he argued, ‘During the last ten years we have left behind us an era full o f darkness and 
devoid ofhope and have reached a world bill of brightness and hope...”695 Something of 
the growing polarisation of interpretations can be gleaned bom  Radio ban Courier’s 
criticism of Hoveida’s visit to Baluchestan:
“[Hoveida] informed the people that in the near future Iran will become a world military 
power and called on the people to pray for the Shah and the crown prince. Obviously all 
his remarks were utterly incomprehensible to the Sistan and Baluchestan people, who have 
never seen a factory chimney or a railway and who are being further impoverished every 
year by trying to put up with repeated droughts and cultivate their arid land. The fust 
reaction of the people to Hoveida was undoubtedly the bewildered question: who is this 
man? Where has he come from? What is he hying to say? ”696
The Shah’s speech on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the 'White Revolution’ in 
1973 nevertheless reflected a king generally confident of his own ideological convictions
(...continued) 
dated 7th March 1972,
694 BBC SWB ME/4111/D/1 dated 6th October 1972, ban Novin rally in Zahedan, 
dated 4th October 1972.
695 BBC SWB ME/4180/D/1 dated 29th December 1972, Hoveida’s statements on 
the country’s progress, Tehran Radio, dated 27th December 1972.
696 BBC SWB ME/4112D/2 dated 7th October 1972, Radio ban Courier, dated 
5th October 1972.
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and his personalisation if  not personification of it, while at the same time, hinting at the 
persistent ideological friction involved in trying to integrate modernisation within dynastic 
nationalism:
“even though in our history the class gap...did not exist, and all the founders of dynasties 
of the different rulers of this country all rose from the nation. The founder of the last
dynasty, my own, rose from a simple military rank [applause] But nevertheless, the
social principle of Iran was based on feudalism ”
He then continues on the theme of differentiation, and uses this trope to associate himself 
with the nation,
“ Such a situation could not be altered without opposition....On 5th June black reaction, 
with the constant support of the stateless Tudehs, did something in Tehran the stain of 
which will never be erased. The burning of a bus full of girl students, the burning of a 
library, and other acts will always be remembered. But this last ditch action did not last 
until evening and was strangled. It was after that that Black reaction was 
demolished....Once Black reaction was demolished, others did not bother us in our work 
and many times helped b an ’s movement and progress and showed then nationalist fibre 
too. These savage attacks were in fact aimed at the banian nation, at the body of
ban  The head had to be attacked, and, on 10th April 1965, this attempt was made but
it was not destined to succeed, hi the same way that I thought from the first day of my life,
God has given me a duty and so long as that duty is not accomplished nothing can stop me 
[applause] ”
This growing emphasis on his Divinely inspired duty and indeed destiny to succeed would
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be increasingly used to appeal to traditionalists and to stress the sacral aspect of kingship.
“I would like to say that I personally believe...that all the material advances which will 
bring us to the frontier of a great civilisation will be worthless without spiritual life 
[applause]. This we already have at our disposal in the form of Islam [applause], Islam 
which was brought to us by the Prophet not the religion which was adulterated for self- 
seeking gains [applause],..All the principles of Iran’s revolution are based on the original 
Islamic principles [applause].”697
His use of Islamic terminology expressed a desire to reach a wider audience along with 
the traditionalists, but his suggestion of Divine Guidance with the implication that he was 
acting according to God’s Will drew fierce criticism Following an interview on the BBC’s 
Panorama programme, Radio Iran Cornier commented:
“....In touching upon internal issues the Shah truly gives himself away. The Shall., .claims 
Divine inspiration. This is not the first time he has uttered such things. It is however, the 
first time he openly claims to be a prophet. But is not our country a constitutional one?
Then how is it that a prophet is ruling it, a prophet ruling it through Divine 
inspirations? ”698
The Oil Price Rises & the Implementation o f a New Order
hi his New Year message in March 1974, the Shah announced that his quadrupling of the
697 BBC SWB ME/4203/D/1 dated 23h January 1973 - Tehran Radio dated 23 
January 1973. Continued in ME/4204/D/1 dated 26th January 1973.
698 BBC SWB ME/4423/D/2 dated 13th October 1973, Radio ban Cornier dated 
5 October 1973.
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oil price tlie previous December had, “iutroduced a new order more in line with the 
realities of the international community and the requirements of its development.699 hi the 
aftermath of the Yom Kippur War, and the Arab boycott o f the West, the Shah was able 
to portray himself as a fiiend of the West, while at the same time demanding a significant 
change in the relationship between ban and the oil consortium which had been operating 
in ban  since 1954. If  the commemorations for the 2500th anniversary of the Persian 
monarchy had only raised a few criticisms in the Western media, this event, insofar that 
it led directly to economic difficulty in the Western industrialised world, resulted in much 
gr eater scrutiny of banian affairs and the government of Shah.
Initially however, the ideological tensions with the West seemed respectful, hi the words 
of Time magazine, the Shah had become 'The Emperor of Oil’ and the stem picture on 
the cover can have left few in doubt as to the Shah’s heightened international standing. 
The veiy real power the Shah exerted on Western economies through his control of oil 
prompted the Associate Editor of Time Spencer Davidson to argue that, “The Shah’s 
power is exploding and Americans would be wise to pay attention to his dreams.”700 Later, 
directly echoing the official banian line, he argued, “Mohammad Reza Pahlavi has brought 
ban to a threshold of grandeur that is at least analogous to what Cyrus the Great achieved 
for ancient Persia.”701
699 BBC SWB ME/4558/D/1 dated 23rd March 1974, Shah’s New Year Message, 
dated 21st March 1974.
700 Time Magazine, dated November 4th 1974, pp 28-38. The title says it all, Oil. 
Grandeur and a challenge to the West There are suggestions, as yet unveiifiable, that the 
Shah effectively bought these articles in Time.
701 Time, pg 28.
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With such praise, it is not hard to see why the Shah became increasingly arrogant and 
confident in his discussions with foreign reporters, with the result that political prudence, 
which may have previously disguised his more extreme views, and contradictions, was left 
by the wayside as the Shah lectured people on his thoughts and then own inadequacies. 
Some of this was undoubtedly an exercise in political theatrics and helped confirm the 
image of the lofty imperial monarch both for foreigners and domestic audiences 
alike. Thus, when he announced the decision to raise the price of oil in a press conference 
relayed by Tehran Radio, the Shah declared that,
“as far as the industrial world is concerned...die era of extraordinary progress and income - 
and an even more extraordinary income - based on cheap oil has ended. They should find 
new energy resources and gradually tighten then belts, and eventually all the children of 
wealtiiy families who have plenty to eat, who have cars and who act almost like terrorists, 
planting bombs here and there, or choosing other ways will have to reconsider these 
aspects of this developed industrialised world. They will have to work harder....”
The Shah then pointed out that since ban would soon join the industrialised club, she did 
not want to deliberately hiut the industrialised world, or indeed to 'destroy5 it, but simply 
to remove 'defects’; in other words, encourage an adjustment.702 This theme was repeated 
again in an interview with II Corriere della Serra, when he described the move as one of 
'self defence’. “We do not wish any harm either to the developing countries or to the 
industrial countries, particularly since our own country will soon become an industrial
702 BBC SWB ME/4485/D/1 dated 28th December 1973 - Shah’s press conference 
dated 23rd December 1973.
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nation.”703 In an interview with Der Spiegel, the Shah appeared to avoid any distinction 
between the state of Iran and himself when he remarked that, “I shall sell my oil in the 
foim of petrochemical products., [italics added].”704
The extra revenue made available by the price rise meant that the 5°’ Development plan 
had to be reviewed, and the $7bn originally allocated leapt to over $21 bn overnight, hi 
1975, the Finance Minister Hushang Ansari announced that economic growth was 
expected reach 41%!705 Li the accompanying enthusiasm there was talk o f making Tehran 
an Asian financial centre. Central Bank Governor Yeganeh, enthused, “that effective steps 
might be taken towards a grand [great] civilisation...that the constructive and critical role 
assigned to the Iranian economy in the international arena by the Iranian nation’s great 
leader, the Shahanshah Aiyamekr, might be achieved in the shortest possible time....”706 
As the utopian vision acquired an unprecedented ah of possibility so the belief that Iran 
was about to cross the frontier into the Great Civilisation, and indeed overtake the West 
became voiced with increasing conviction. In an interview with A l Ahram , the Shah 
argued that, “...In ten years Iran’s population will be equal to that of France and Britain 
today. Iran’s population, in other words, will not be less than 45m, but I can see Iran 25 
years from now and we hope to be better off than France and Britain. Iran will have an
703 BBC SWB ME/4493/D/1 dated 7th January 1974, II Corriere della S en  a dated 
5,h January 1974.
704 BBC SWB ME/4494/D/1 dated 8th January 1974, Interview with Der Spiegel, 
dated 5th January 1974.
705 BBC SWB ME/4833/D/1 dated 18th February 1975, Tehran Radio, dated 15lh 
February 1975.
706 BBC SWB ME/4498/D/1 dated 12,h January 1974, Tehran Radio, dated lOh 
January 1974.
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income that will probably be more than Britain’s. ...”707 The Shah also took the 
opportunity to reiterate the message that the White Revolution had rid the country of big 
feudalists, who were essentially a manifestation of 'foreign domination’, thereby 
emphasising the singularity of foreign and domestic opposition.
In a famous interview with Peter Snow, the Shah was far more emphatic in elucidating 
these themes, and in particular, for lecturing the British, behaviour which must have been 
calculated to win him the support of nationalists, for whom Britain remained the villain.708 
“....hi 25 years Iran will be one of the world’s five flourishing and prosperous nations... I 
think that in 10 year’s time our country will be as you are now. I am not the only one who 
says this but, according to others, dining the coming 25 years Ir an will become one of the 
five most flourishing and prosperous nations of the world....” The motivation for attacking 
the British came not only from a desire to play to anti-British sentiment but also, as argued 
above, as a strategy of differentiation to distinguish Iran from the West, so that 
unfavourable comparisons over democratic rights could not be dr awn. Thus when Peter 
Snow asked what the Shah’s views were on the socio-political system in the West and 
Britain in particular, the Shah replied, “...I do not really oppose it but I should state my 
opinion on it for you. If  you continue this unruly and in-disciplined social system, your
country will explode You will go bankrupt, you do not work enough, you try and
receive more money than necessary for what little you do and this situation cannot
707 BBC SWB ME/4515/D/l dated 1‘ February 1974, interview in Al Ahrarn, 
dated 301h January 1974.
708 That this rhetoric may have had more impact among certain domestic 
constituents is exemplified by the fact during the Revolution of 1978-79, some urged the 
Shah to apologise’ to the British for the harsh criticism he had unleashed.
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continue; it can possibly continue for a few months or for a year or two but not 
forever....” When challenged over the issue of democratisation, the Shah was even more 
explicit, “Who says the people of Iran want to have the type of democracy that you have 
in Britain?” When it was emphasised that economic progress may lead to political 
democracy, the Shah finally laid to rest any hopes for political liberalisation which may 
have permeated his thoughts in the early 1960s. Democracy was replaced by a 
paternalistic monarch who knew what was best for his people,
“This is not necessarily the case because we Iranians have a custom which is exactly the 
opposite of this. The people and the Shah of Iran are so close to each other that they 
consider themselves to be members of one family. I think that the people of Iran respect 
their Shah in the same way that children of Iranian families respect their fathers.”709
The Rastakhiz (Resurrection) Party
Hie Hezb-e Rastakhiz (Resurrection Party) was the Shah’s solution to the contradictions 
implicit in promoting the myth of the saviour with the democratisation many expected 
would result from economic development. It was in effect an experiment in 'democratic 
centralism’ in which competing views could be aired within the ideological umbrella of 
Pahlavism - now renamed the 'philosophy of the revolution’. Rastakhiz was intended to 
become the ultimate tool of ideological dissemination and differentiation. Its membership 
would define loyalty to the Pahlavi system and members of the party could expect 
preferential treatment and patronage, while they would provide the raw material for the
709 BBC SWB ME/4514/D/l dated 31st January 1974, Interview with Peter Snow 
for ITV, dated 29th January 1974.
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political education of the masses, through lectures, rallies and the production of a party 
newspaper. With the foundation of Rastakhiz, the Shah definitively shattered any 
pretensions to multi-party politics and confirmed to many people including those well- 
disposed to sympathise with him, that the autocratic nature of government was likely to 
remain a feature o f the Pahlavi. Rastakhiz was a remarkably bold initiative, in that it 
signalled the Shah’s impatience with apathy and passivity - he was now demanding the 
active loyalty o f the people. This forced many who would have tolerated his otherwise 
grandiose behaviour and rhetoric, to make a decision about then political position with 
often negative results for the Shah. As one student activist later recalled, the Shah was not 
interested in partial support; given a choice of being labelled friend or foe, many chose the 
latter.710
In rationalising his decision to impose a one party system upon the country, the Shah 
made it clear that this was his decision, and that the strategy was one of differentiation, 
“I reached the conclusion - in view of the fact that we are again witnessing provocations 
with regard to oil, the country’s astonishing progress on the international scene and other 
provocations in the country - that we should separate the ranks of Iranians clearly, 
properly and identifiably...Those who believe in the constitutional law, the monarchy 
regime and the 6th Bahman revolution will be on one side and those who do not believe 
in these on the other.” Having explained that within this umbrella organisation, or 
'movement’ as it was later to be characterised, opinions could be freely aired, as long as 
they did not contravene [dynastic] national principles, the Shah concluded with a
710 Abbas Abdi - transcript of interview for BBC2 documentary 'Reputations’, 
April 1996.
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statement that insulted the sensibilities of the professional educated classes whose support 
he arguably most needed to cultivate:
“Two alternatives are open to those who do not join this organisation or do not believe in 
these principles I have already mentioned. Such individuals either belong to an illegal 
organisation - that is, they are Tudeh Party members, as we call them; in other words, as 
we say, and with the force of evidence, stateless individuals. These belong in an Iranian 
gaol. Alternatively, they could be given passports tomorrow with the greatest of pleasure 
and without charging them any exit dues, so that they can go, if they so wish, to any 
country they choose. This is because they cannot be regarded as Iranians; they have 110 
home country and their activity is illegal - the penalty for their activity having been already 
determined by law.”
He then prevaricated before confirming his initial viewpoint,
“On the other hand, those who may not be Tudeh Party supporters - or traitors to their 
country - and who, at the same time, do not believe in the above-mentioned principles - 
such individuals are flee provided they officially and openly declare that they are not 
against the homeland. But backing both sides and wanting their cake and eat it is 110 longer 
acceptable. Eveiyone must clarity their position in this country like a man....So my point 
is that, from now, from tomorrow, eveiyone of voting age should establish their- national 
position....”711
The philosophy of the Iranian revolution as encapsulated in the doctrine of the Rastakhiz 
Party was very much a repetition of the belief system outlined in Pahlavism some years
711 BBC SWB ME/4845/D/1 dated 4th March 1975, Shah’s press conference, dated 
2,ld March 1975.
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earlier. The existence of the party and its organ, the newspaper Rastakhiz meant that this 
philosophy, or ideology could be more widely disseminated. Thr oughout, the centrality 
of the paternalistic and benign Shah is emphasised, quoting heavily from his own sayings 
and describing him as the Farmandeh, 'commander’, possibly an allusion to the 
Islamic/Arabic amir al-momenin (commander of the faithfiil - usually ascribed to Imam 
Ah). Indeed, this is not only a distinctly Ir anian revolution, but it was also quintessential^ 
a 'spiritual’ revolution, which aside from providing industrialisation and welfare, would 
also inaugurate a classless society.712
Indeed, with the advent of Rastakhiz, the Shah’s claims for his policies simply became 
more extravagant. Thus for example, in August 1975, the Shah decided to institute share 
ownership for factoiy workers as yet another principle in the ' Shali-People Revolution’ 
which he argued, would pre-empt the development of'industrial feudalism’ transferring 
the myth of feudalism to industrial relations. This 'extortionate situation’, which he 
described as, “the exploitation of man by man”, would be eliminated by this policy.713 He 
later made the extraordinary claim “that the word exploitation no longer figures in the 
Iranian revolution’s new vocabulary,” thereby implying that by eliminating the word, or 
ideological construct, one eliminated the problem.714 hi effect myth was being constructed 
on myth and the Shah became enmeshed in an increasingly complex reciprocating
712 Falsafe-ye enyhelab-e Iran (The Philosophy of the Iranian Revolution) in 
Rastakhiz Newspaper no 452, Wednesday 5lh Aban 2535 / 26th October 1976.
713 BBC SWB ME/4976/A/2 dated ’<? August 1975, Tehran Radio, dated 6 
August 1975
714 BBC SWB ME/5119/A/1 dated 281h January 1976 - Shah’s speech at the 14th 
anniversary of the White Revolution, dated 26,h January 1976.
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semiological chain.
The Myth of Imperial Authority
During a speech from the throne at the opening of the new Majlis and Senate, the Shah 
made it clear that a main function of Rastakhiz was political education, "the true purpose 
of education is not only to teach lessons but also to train even more worthy individuals, 
imbued with the spirit of patriotism and nationality and moral and spiritual virtues; in other 
words, principles on which the future of Irani an society is based.... This is the responsibility 
of the Resurgence Party as the country’s leader in political education.”715 This was a task 
that the newspaper Rastakhiz seemed to have embarked on with some vigour, more so in 
the Persian year 1355/2535 (1976-77) which marked the 50lh anniversary of the dynasty.
A sampling of the articles in the party newspaper Rastakhiz exemplifies the mood in 
1976.716 There was for example, a renewed emphasis on reinforcing the Shah’s religious 
credentials in order to stress the sanctity and religious authority of the monarchy. Thus 
there were pictures of him on pilgrimage to Mashhad, as the protector o f the shrine of 
Imam Reza, and mourning the death of Imam Hussein. Indeed, in general the language 
takes a decidedly religious tone, as a pilot shot down over Yemen (PDRY) is described 
as having been martyred. For the anniversary of the White revolution, some 300 mullahs
715 BBC SWB ME/5332/A/5 dated 8th October 1976, Shah’s speech at the opening 
of the Majlis, dated 6,h October 1976. See also BBC SWB ME/5348/A/4 dated 2^ 
October 1976 - interview with Amir Taheri, dated 25°' October 1976
716 Exceipts taken from Rastakhiz, dated 1355-56 / 1976-78
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were drafted in to praise the Shah, and the Rastakhiz party hold a thanksgiving ceremony 
praying for the health of the Shah717.
On 14th Mehr 2535/1355 [5th October 1976], it is pointed out that the Shah understands 
the centrality of religion to the nation.718 On 26th Bahman,[14th February 1977] Dariush 
Homayun editorialises that the purpose of Rastakhiz is to mobilise the people for political 
and public life - the word he uses significantly enough is basij,719 On l2h Esfand [2d 
March 1977], Jamshid Amuzegar argues that the aim of the party is to create 'faith5 
among the people, ostensibly one would guess in the future of the country, but more 
probably in the person of the Shah.720
On the inauguration o f the 15 th anniversary of the White revolution, the centrality of the 
Shah was emphasised when a huge demonstration was held at the Shahyad monument 
with the participation of 150,000 people. Books were published, foreign reporters invited 
and newspapers hail the revolution5 with headlines about the millions of Iranians in 
celebration, and the fact that the 'sun of the 6lh Bairman (the Persian date of the 
referendum) rises5. At a Rastakhiz party commemoration, a huge portrait o f the Shah was 
unveiled in the now familiar pose of the Shah in civilian clothes standing among the clouds
717 Rastakhiz 6th Bahman 2535/1355 / 22nd January 1977 pg 1
718 Rastakhiz 141 Mehr 1355/2535 f1 5 October 1976 pp 13-14. This was 
reportedly first said in 1968.
719 Rastakhiz 26th Bahman 1355/2535 / l4h February 1977 pg 4. The Islamic 
Republic was later to mobilise the masses - the basijis.
720 Rastakhiz 12th Esfand 1355/2535 / 2nd March 1977 pg 1
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with his arm raised.721
The cultivation of the myth of the saviour continued throughout the year. For example on 
the 2nd Dey [22nd December 1976] an article on leadership was published comparing the 
Shah, once again described as the farmandeh (commander) to such notables as Churchill, 
and the leaders of the USSR.722 Churchill’s foresight is constrained by Parliament, while 
the communist dictators lack foresight altogether. The Shah on the other hand was 
farsighted and wise, and if  problems have arisen it is only because the Ir anians have 
misunderstood him. For the first time, he is described, interestingly, as rahbar-e enghelab- 
e melli (the leader of the national revolution). As a great leader of course, the Shah enjoys 
the admiration of the world and throughout the paper compliments from world leaders are 
reprinted. Thus, even JFK is reported as having said, “The shahanshah of Ir an is one of 
the best informed leaders o f world.”723 He is joined by a gratefiil Churchill for the Shah’s 
role in World War II,724 and Ibn Saud, who had allegedly described the Shah as “one of 
the standard bearers of the Islamic movement in the 20th century world.”725
Narrative reconstruction & the myth o f the saviour
721 Rastakhiz 6th Bahman 1355/2535 / 26th January 1978 pg 1
722 Rastakhiz 2nd Dey 1355/2535 / 22nd December 1976 pg 8
723 Rastakhiz 15th Mehr* 1355/2535 / 6th October 1976 pp 12-13
724 Rastakhiz 2nd Dey 1355/2535 / 22nd December 1976 pg 8
725 Rastakhiz 7th Mehr 1355/2535 / 28th September 1976; there is a complete list 
of admirers in this issue including: Churchill, Ibn Saud, Kennedy, Pope Paul VI, 
Padegomi, Huohito, Ford, Nixon, Johnson, Roosevelt, King Badouin. US Presidents 
predominate.
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The continuing development of the myth of the saviour would eventually impact on the 
reconstruction of the historical narrative needed to support it. On 23 rd Esfand 1355 [13th 
March 1977], the eve of the anniversary of the birth of Reza Shah, the Shah’s family 
lineage is reconstructed to show a solidly military line; a comprehensive genealogical 
reconstruction which received fruition the publication of M Karanjia’s 'Mind of a 
Monarch.726 By this stage the Shah seems to admit a belief in the mythical kings of 
Iran as real personages, thus extending the Persian monarchy not to Cyrus the Great 
but to Jamshid and Fereidoon. Having been flattered by Karanjia by the comment th a t  
he should write a new Shahnameh to record his own deeds, the  Shah then discusses 
his family lineage in Mazandaran province, which he describes as one of the ancient 
homelands of the Aryan tribes. .It was from a traditionally military family belonging to 
the hardy Bavand clan from the upper Mazanderan region of the Savadkuh which was part 
of the original homelands of the ancient Aryan races, that my father Reza Shah was happy 
and proud to trace his ancestry.”727 This genealogy cannot but be a fabrication.728
The relationship between the myth of the saviour' and the historical narrative is amply 
illustrated by the following re-construction of the historical narrative, Reza Khan is 
described as having been persuaded to choose monarchy over a republic by public
726 Karanjia The Mind of a Monarch London 1977.
727 Ibid  pg 31
728 Few Iranian families would have been able to trace then ancestiy beyond the 
early Qajars, documentation is scarce and normally non-existent, and since Reza Shah 
himself introduced surnames (including his own) and registration it is difficult to see how 
the lineage of the a lowly Cossack officer coidd be accurately traced more than a couple 
of generations.
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acclamation, and to have been a religious man fond of visiting the holy shrine of Imam 
Reza in Mashhad.729 Furthermore, the Shah was sworn in as monarch in 1941 after huge 
public acclaim swayed the allies, but the British, never happy with him or his dynasty, 
fomented trouble against him, even going so far as playing the Qajar anthem at a reception 
in the embassy; though there is no record of any such anthem. His accoimt of the 
liberation o f Azerbaijan is a virtual fantasy, as Qavam is portrayed as treacherous, the 
Allies as only interested in the division of Iran (the Bevin Plan?),and the Shah being the 
only patriot willing to lead the army to re-take the province by force.
The theme of Divine guidance is again stressed in his description of the decision to march 
on Azerbaijan, which was,
“really inspired and decided by that mystical power to which I owe my career and its 
direction. It is this Divine intelligence that directs my actions, as also the timing of them, 
and assures their success..,Tlie fates have so arranged the course of events around me as 
to leave me in 110 doubt about the Divine hand guiding me to my destiny....this is the 
reason why I am more and more concerned everyday with my deep belief in this mystical 
life of mine and the mission ordained for me by higher powers.”730
The most significant attempt to reconstruct the Iranian historical narrative in the image 
oftke Paklavis was the publication in 1976, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the 
Paklavi Dynasty of a three volume chronicle of the Paklavis, beginning with the coup
729 Karanjia op. cit. pp 39-42.
730 Ibid  pp 89-90.
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which brought Reza Khan to power in 1921 and continuing thr ough to 1978.731 It was 
obviously intended as a day by day chronicle and its abrupt termination in 1978 was a 
result of the political collapse of the regime. The three volumes total some 3159 pages, 
and incomplete as it is, it is indicative of the relative importance of the Shah to his father, 
that the latter occupies 200 pages, while the activities of the son take up pages 201-3159. 
O f these 800 pages cover the period up to 1956, another 1000 take the history up to 
1967, while the last 1000 pages are devoted to ten years between 1967 and 1977.
The emphasis is quite clearly the dynasty with accounts of then holidays, visits as well as 
political activities; and spends considerable time highlighting the praise of the foreign 
diplomats and statesmen along with the media for the Paklavis. Thus it is recorded that 
in 1962, the American television channel CBS made a film about the Shah which 'millions’ 
of Americans watched.732 Likewise, it is argued that the coronation was broadcast via 
satellite to 'millions’ of people tlnoughout the world.733
Key personages which may compete with the Pahlavi lustre were either ignored or 
belittled. For instance, in Reza Shah’s reign the Minister of Corut, Teymomtash barely 
gets a mention, while for Mohammad Reza Shah, the role of Qavam in the Azerbaijan 
crisis is secondary, and Mosaddeq is re-situated into the historical narrative as a man who 
behaved unconstitutionally. Other personages, such as Cyrus the Great, far too distant in
731 Shoja ad Din Shafa Gahnameh-ye Paniah Saleh-ye Shahanshahi-ve Pahlavi 
(Chr onicle of 50 years of the Pahlavi monarchy) Tehran 1978
732 Gahnameh entry dated 19th April 1962 / 28th Farvardin 2521
733 Gahnameh entry dated 26th October 1967 / 4th Aban 2526
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history to be of contemporary concern, were hailed as champions of'humanity5, in an 
attempt to universalise the Iranian monarchy.
The chronicle was dated in the new imperial calendar, read in this case retrospectively into 
recent Iranian history. The Shah’s decision to suddenly impose a new calendar upon the 
country in 1976, on the 50th anniversary of the Pahlavi Dynasty, was the most blatant act 
of narrative reconstruction, changing overnight and without much consultation, the 
historical reference point with which most Iranians were familiar. It was arguably an 
explicit attack on the historical framework on which the myths sustained by Iranian 
popular culture were situated. This fourth calendar - the Imperial calendar - dated fr om 
the reign of Cyrus the Gr eat. Overnight, Ir anians who thought they were in the year 1355 
(1976), found themselves in 2535. Hoveida congr atulated the Majlis on ratifying the new 
calendar with the words, “Your decision is indeed a reflection of the historic fact that 
during this long period, there has been only one Ir an and one monarchic system and that 
these two are so closely interwoven that they represent one concept.”734 The year was 
harder to comprehend because a mere five years earlier the Shah had triumphantly 
announced the 2500th anniversary of the Persian Monarchy. The date was in actual fact 
correct if calculated from 559 BC, but it cannot have been lost on the Shah that this meant 
that the beginning of his reign coincided with the Imperial year 2500 (1941). Thus while 
Cyrus the Great spawned the fir st 2500 years of Iranian history, Mohammad Reza Shah 
would define the next 2500 years.
734 Keyhan International, March 15th 1975, quoted in Zonis Majestic Failure, p 82.
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Towards the Great Civilisation
In an interview with the Iranian journalist Amir Taheri, the Shah was asked about the 
achievements of the Pahlavi dynasty during the first 50 years of then rule. After 
commenting on the poor state of the country prior to his father’s accession and asking the 
people to judge for themselves the differences that had emerged since 1921, the Shah 
reflected that, ‘to  tell the truth I no longer think of the past, for my thoughts are directed 
towards the future.”735 The product of his reflection on the future, the promised to which 
he would lead his people, was his third and arguably final book736 'Towards the Great 
Civilisation’, which was published in 1977, and in the Shah’s words, was intended to deal 
with the fixture, just as the first had dealt with the past and the second with the present. 
Much criticised in retrospect, by the intelligentsia, who mocked the simple analysis and 
somewhat vague if mystical self reflection which permeated the book, it was nonetheless, 
less the ramblings o f a madman, than a last testament with probably more honest 
expression of personal belief than many would have liked. For his detractors, it was just 
another example o f the Shah’s detachment, and it is indicative of this huge divide from 
social reality that the book was treated with more derision than reverence.
Central to the book is the concept of sacral monarchy and the fact that the Shah believes 
himself to be Divinely-Guided, though there are hints of fatalism in this statement; and
735 BBC SWB ME/5350/A/1 dated 2^ October 1976 - Shah’s interview with 
Amir Taheri, Tehran Radio dated 25th October 1976.
736 His final book was in actual fact 'Answer to History’ but this was written after 
his downfall.
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characteristically, the Shah emphasises the paternal role of the Iranian monarch with 
respect to his people. Indeed for the Hi st time the Shah explains what he understands by 
the term 'Shahanshahi
“Ail important point to note is the real meaning of the word shahanshahi, which cannot 
be explained in ordinary historical terms. When it is necessary to translate into a foreign 
language, it is normal to translate it as 'Imperial’, but the meaning of the Western term 
Imperial is simply political and geographic, whereas from the Iranian perspective, the term 
shahanshahi has more than the normal meaning, it has a spiritual, philosophical, symbolic, 
and to a great extent, a sentimental aspect, in other words, just as it has a rational and 
thoughtful relevance, so too it has a moral and emotional dimension. In Iranian culture, the 
Iranian monarchy means the political and geographic unity of Iran in addition to the 
special national identity and all (hose unchangeable values which this national identity has 
brought forth. For this reason no fundamental change is possible in this country unless it 
is in tune with the fundamental principles of the monarchical system.”737
Monarchy, he stresses, is central to the Iranian identity, “Another manifestation of the 
eternal national values is the monarchical system of Iran. This is a system which from the 
very first day has been identified with the existence and identity o f Iran and its 
durability.... can be counted as one of the triumphs of history.”738
In this book the Shah moves more emphatically away from the West. Criticising the 
immoral lifestyle of the West, the Shah also attacks the unfair international system which
737 M R Pahlavi Be Sooye Tamadun-e Bozorg pg 244.
738 Ibid  pg 243.
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serves the industrialised world, in language which seems more appropriate to Marxist 
writings, hi light of this he warns his people against become 'west-toxicated’, actually 
using the phrase ghcirbzadegi which Jalal Ale Ahmad had made famous nearly twenty 
years previously, though he cautions that this should not he confused with anti- 
westemism,739 Iran will avoid the mistakes of the West and head towards a glorious future 
which according to the Shah, is unparalleled in Iranian history thereby confirming his 
importance in Iranian history:
“The Great Civilisation which we are advancing towards, is not just a chapter in our 
history, it is the greatest chapter in our histoiy. It is the ideal destination of several 
thousand years of Iran’s histoiy and culture; an ideal which once attained becomes the 
starting point of a new era in our national life. And it is the dictat of history that of the 
many generations of Iranians, today’s generation will be the one to witness the dawn of 
the most brilliant era in the histoiy of our country.”7"10
As for the Great Civilisation itself, the Shah describes this in vague utopian terms, which 
he nonetheless believes is achievable,
“hi Iran during the era of the Great Civilisation, there will be nothing left of such age old 
and destructive factors such as: poverty, ignorance, illiteracy, corruption, exploitation, 
discrimination and the like. The widening activities of the health service will maximise the 
health and fitness, up to that which research allows, for each Iranian; and the spread of 
education will bring the maximum mental and intellectual well-being, up to available
129 Ibid  pg 231.
140 Ibid pg 232
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standards....”741
Essentially the Great Civilisation is a super welfare-state combining intellectual and 
political well-being with religious conviction and spirituality.
“A highly humanitarian and democratic social order will prevail in Iran during the era of 
the Great Civilisation, with individual freedoms, social justice, economic democracy, 
decentralisation, informed public participation in all affairs, and productive national 
culture.”742
Although in some areas the era of the Great Civilisation has already begun, the Shah 
appears to push the frontier further back as compared with earlier speeches. Nevertheless 
this frontier can be crossed:
“If all our efforts continue as at present, and if no foreseeable situation outside our control 
arises, we shall construct during the next 12 years a solid industrial, agricultural and 
technological substructure for die country’s development and will reach the present level 
of progress of Western Europe. At that time our country will have a population of 45 to 
50 million, ie comparable to the population of larger countries of Europe, and the era of 
the 'Great Civilisation’ will have begun...”743
Ironically, in light o f the pivotal role they were to play in the events that were rapidly to
741 Ibid  pg 258.
742 Ibid  pg 279
743 Ibid  pg 265
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dis-entangle the complex weave of myths the Pahlavi’s had spun about themselves, the 
heroes of the piece were the labouring masses, whom the Shah still believed he had 
championed, and who remained essentially loyal to him.
“Two groups occupy the first rank in reaping the advantages of the Revolution and of 
social justice: these are the two classes that constitute the pillars of Iran’s society and 
economy, namely the workers and the fanners.”
Tensions
The Shah sought to eradicate the tensions, which even he appeared on occasion to 
acknowledge, within his attempted synthesis of ideological construction and inheritances 
into a reconstructed ideology of dynastic nationalism, through an emphatic concentration 
on developing the myth of the saviour. By personalising the ideology and seeking to 
become its personification and essential source, he aimed to eliminate the essential tension 
which exists when ideas are identified with individuals. Ironically this process only resulted 
in an increasing polarisation of ideology into more extreme and less flexible political myth. 
Although sustainable by a sycophantic court, the semiological chain this resulted in, 
insulated the Shah from the tensions which existed heyond the imperial entourage thus 
contributed to an inability to react effectively to external developments.
In early January 1978, following the latest in a series of inflammatory speeches from 
Najaf, the Shah decided to reply in kind to the Ayatollah Khomeini, one of the more 
outspoken members of 'Black reaction’. Instructions were sent for an article outlining the
Shali’s beliefs, his conception of the historical narrative, the opposition of the 'red and the 
black’, and the particularly wicked and reactionary role of the Ayatollah Khomeini, to be 
published in the newspaper Etela 'at. This relatively short column entitled, 'Iran and the 
colonisation of the red and the hlack’744 was a concise summary of the imperial myth, and 
apart from the attack on Ayatollah Khomeini, consisted largely of repetitions of the myth 
of imperial authority.
For those within the increasingly insular and isolated cocoon known as the Court, the 
publication of the article was matter of routine;745 even opponents of the Shah could not 
have anticipated the negative reaction it would promote. Indeed the Shah’s erratic 
reaction to the spiral o f riots sparked by the article and the fatalism which he exhibited 
throughout 1978 suggests that he personally experienced a sudden reinterpretation of the 
political myth he had constiucted, replacing certainty with doubt, belief in his legitimacy, 
with disbelief. His announcement in November 1978 that he acknowledged the 
'Revolution of the Iranian people’746, and that he sought to make up for past mistakes, 
along with his failure to comprehend the opposition that manifested itself on the streets 
in the summer and autumn of 1978 only encouraged his opponents and hastened the fall 
of the regime. The year of the revolution revealed that the greatest essential tension of 
Mohammad Reza Shah’s reign remained the Shah himself.
744 Etela'at, dated January 8th 1978.
745 Dariush Homayun, transcript of interview for BBC2 documentary Reputations, 
April 1996.
746 BBC SWB ME/5962/A/9 dated 7th November 1978 - Shah’s speech to the 
nation, dated 6th November 1978
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Conclusion
Two themes characterise the development of political myth during this period. Firstly this 
period witnessed the increasing internationalisation of the ideology of dynastic nationalism 
concomitant with the Shah’s own increasing political activities on the international arena. 
The attempt to situate himself and Iran in the narrative of the Cold War which had begun 
in the 1950s as a strategy which would support and sustain his consolidation of power 
within in Iran now began to predominate and to influence his actions irrespective of 
domestic developments and considerations. The increased international scrutiny which 
resulted altered the relationship between the Shah and the West, from one of rather 
peripheral if essential support, to one of ideological antagonism. The reality of practical 
relations aside, ideologically the Shah was busy throughout the 1970s trying with mixed 
results, to extricate himself from associations which earlier had provided him with 
considerable legitimacy. As an increasingly critical foreign press urged democratic 
reforms, the Shah sought redefine 'democracy’ and situate it firmly within his conception 
of dynastic nationalism and the vigorous development of the myth of the saviour.
Increasingly certain of his own ideological convictions, and proceeding in a political 
environment in which public dissent was limited, the Shah emphasised to a greater degree 
the reification of dynastic nationalism within his person, moving away from any 
personalisation by proxy and indeed arguing for his own superiority to the icons of the 
past. If anything, he now sought to identify himself with the Deity, so much so that to be 
a friend of the Shah (Shah-doust) was no longer sufficient, and instead loyalty was
measured in levels of Shah-parast, literally 'worshipping the Shah.747 Indeed the 
polarisation of ideology approached new levels, with the development of Rastakhiz and 
its use as tool of mass differentiation.
This period was quintessentially one of historical reconstruction and utopian visions, as 
the Shah either unaware or dismissive o f ideological frictions external to his world view, 
sought to further define and impose his interpretation. This definition was encouraged by 
internal frictions and contradictions which the Shah sought to remove and the semiological 
chain which emerged reflects the other major theme of this period - the reciprocity of 
mythic development. The more the Shah reconstructed the historical narrative, the more 
he developed the myth of the saviour, and as this self-perception became more defined, 
so more attention would be given to the historical narrative so that the relationship 
reflected a reciprocal dialectic, each feeding and developing off the other. Though the 
complex web of semiological chains insulated the Shah from external pressures, the 
increasingly polarised myth was itself subject as normal to re-interpretation and 
rejuvenation by his opponents and when the opportunity presented itself, the ideological 
reaction was equally polarised and bewildering to the Pahlavi regime.
747 I have found no written evidence for this term, though there is plenty oral 
evidence.
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Conclusion
Writers such as al Ghazali and Nizam al Mulk attest to the fact that the charisma of 
Persian kings, the Divinely bestowed 'light of good fortune’ {Farr-e Izadi) was something 
which was not inherent in kings but was acquired and importantly could be lost. It was a 
characteristic of kings which both reflected and depended upon then* ability to govern.748 
hi other words aspirations to Divine right’ had to be earned and maintained through 
practical application of political skill, and that application would in turn have a direct 
bearing on one’s de jure  authority to govern. With this in mind, it is worth remembering 
that whatever the essential tensions, contradictions and weaknesses in the construction of 
Pahlavi ideology, the dynasty did survive for nearly sixty years during a period of 
significant social and economic change which pre-dated then* rise and ultimately outlived 
them. Compared to most post-Islamic dynasties, then* period of rule was not unusually 
short. Indeed, it was Mohammad Reza Shah’s longevity, despite difficult challenges, that 
encouraged some of his critics to soften then* attitude and in some cases tentatively believe 
in his cause.
At the same time, this belief depended on the provision of a comprehensive ideological
748 This reciprocal relationship between the de jure and de facto  sources of 
legitimacy was candidly summarised in a comment attributed to Ayatollah Beheshti 
following the fall of the Shah when he is reported to have said that, I f  the Shah was 
stupid enough to let us throw him out then he did not deserve to be Shah.’ For further 
detail on the concept of farr~e Izadi see G Aneer Imam Ruhullah Khomeini. §ah 
Muhammad Riza Pahlavi and the religious traditions of Iran Stockholm, Uppsala, 1985, 
pp 9-11, 64; see also A K S Lambton Theory & Practice in Medieval Persian Government. 
London, Varorium Reprints, 1980
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construct centred on their persons which would provide the Palilavis with consensual and 
popularly based legitimate authority, and since both Shahs suffered from a crisis of 
legitimacy originating from the role of foreign powers in their respective rise to power, 
the nature of this ideological construct became correspondingly more impoitant. Indeed, 
it is significant that the Islamic Revolution has been described as above all a 
'psychological’ revolution, allowing the people to challenge and ultimately break 
hierarchical bonds they had previously considered sacrosanct.749 This is important, since 
it suggests that one of the key, possibly pivotal contests which has permeated Ir anian 
political discourse in the twentieth century has been an ideological one, in which different 
factions have fought for the right to define Iranian history and contemporary development.
Indeed, one of the most striking aspects of Iranian political development during this period 
has been the parallel existence of a number of dynamic and conflicting historical 
narratives, each in then own way building upon valid interpretations of the past to serve 
their present needs, yet acutely flawed by then denial of the validity, or even existence of 
other interpretations. This thesis has focussed on the interpretation constructed by the 
monarchists, the ideological construction defined here as 'dynastic nationalism’ and its 
identification with the person of the Shah. Insofar as other interpretations influenced or 
were appropriated by the monarchy, they have been touched upon here. But then 
incidental existence in relation to the construction of dynastic nationalism should not 
disguise the fact that they were comprehensive constructs in then own right, a reality
749 Interview with Abbas - photo-jomnalist for the agency 'Magnum’, who 
photographed much of the Revolution in 1979; conducted for BBC 'Reputations’ 
documentary, September 1995, Paris.
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proven and plurality exposed, by the success of the Islamic Revolution in 1979.750 
Underpinning all these interpretations however was the increasingly pervasive ideological 
credo of nationalism and central to the contest was the right to determine and define the 
meaning o f'Iran ’.
As such, this was fundamentally a contest over meaning rather than structure and while 
structures may change, they were almost secondaiy to the intense semantic struggle for 
control over and identification with particular meanings which in some cases became 
extremely nuanced and subtle. While the adoption of the surname 'Pahlavi’ could be 
considered an explicit attempt at historical appropriation and reconstruction, the different 
emphases given to the term Shahanshah implied pretensions to grandeur which were not 
always immediately obvious. Thus when Reza Shah insisted on its use a Foreign Office 
official noted that while it was a teim which had a 'respectable pedigree’, it had 'not been 
used in quite the same manner as at present’.751 By emphasising the meaning of 
Shahanshah (king of kings) in terms of universal kingship (which might have validity in 
Achaememan and even Sassanian Iran), and not in its other connotation as a king among 
kings, a sort of primus inter pares of the Parthian period, the Pahlavi’s inadvertently 
invited both unfavourable comparison with then more illustrious predecessors and in some 
cases, ridicule.752 As the official added, ‘Sve might ask them which kings is Reza king
750 As they had been similarly, though less emphatically, in 1941.
751 FO 371 17890 E56 dated 6th December 1933.
752 Titular grandiosity was of course not new but an interesting comparison can be 
made with Mardavij b. Ziyar, a petty king from Gilan in the 10th century who sought to 
restore Zoroastrianism, and the Persian empire, constructed a imperial genealogy and 
appropriated imperial titles but was widely ridiculed for his ambitious pretensions.
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over...”. More contentious was their promotion of a particular conception o f'Iran ’, a term 
which they inherited and sought to redefine and which remains essentially contested. 
While the Palilavis promoted an industrial Iran which was exclusively 'Persian’, 
nationalists sought to emphasise a more decentralised inclusivity. Others have sought to 
'bring religion back in’, to then* definition of Iran, returning to a nineteenth century 
conception in which being 'Iranian’ and being ' Shi’i, was considered one and the same753. 
At the same time, it is significant that none had chosen to return to the imperial plurality 
of the Qajar period in which the state was described as Mamalik-e Mahruse-ye Iran (the 
Guarded kingdoms of Iran754) in which immediate loyalties were for the majority of the 
population, regional and 'Ir an’ (and the Shah) represented a distant and probably vague 
political and cultural focus for a variety of differing identities.
This change which underpinned most subsequent interpretations o f Iran can be in part 
attributed to Iran’s integration into the global community and the technological advances 
in communication. Better communications within Iran and an awareness and appreciation 
of differing identities beyond the traditional frontiers encouraged the re-invention of Ir an 
and of a specifically Iranian identity and this was developed and promoted enthusiastically 
by the competing political elites. The influence of communications and the emergence of 
the media should not be underestimated in the development of contemporary Ir anian 
ideologies, hr accelerating the production and magnifying the dissemination of ideological 
constructions, the modem media often had un-intentional effects on the impact of these
753 The Slii’is of Bahrain have often been called 'Persians’ for the same reason.
754 Mamalik is often translated as 'countries’ in modem usage, though the term 
'kingdoms’ is probably more appropriate to the 19th century usage.
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constructions on tlie public. Tlie notion of a un-interrupted monarchy of several thousand 
years duration was not an invention of the Pahlavis, neither was the association with 
ancient Iran.755 But the Pahlavis gave new emphasis to this association and inflicted the 
imagery thr ough television, radio and print media with an unprecedented frequency and 
consistency, and with a direct, if mediated, accessibility to the public that previous rulers 
had not enjoyed. The Shah was no longer a distant and majestic figure but an immediate 
and omni-present one, for whom obedience was in practice continuous rather than 
periodic and occasional. The media facilitated the construction of the political myth and 
the development of a modem bureaucratic state brought the myth to life for many Iranians 
and importantly, forced them to make a choice about identity and loyalty which they 
otherwise would not have had to make.
The tendency towards ideological monopolisation which the Shah was able to pursue with 
unusual vigour' because of this new technology and the means to exploit it, further 
intensified the semantic struggle such that, during the Islamic Revolution, all symbols of 
monarchy, (however remote), whether representative of the Pahlavis or not, were 
attacked. Similarly, the process of polarisation and rejuvenation resulted ironically in the 
Shah being char acterised as the evil Pharaoh, while his nemesis, Ayatollah Khomeini was 
not only accorded the title 'Imam’, but was characterised as a new Moses. Yet, 
paradoxically, probably the most explicit ideological representation of the Pahlavi 
monarchy, the Shahyad monument in Tehran was not destroyed. Instead it was re­
755 See A Amanat Pivot of the Universe: Nash al Din Shah and the Iranian 
Monarchy 1831-1896 London, IB  Tauris, 1997, pg 97. Monarchists under the leadership 
of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Massoud Khan Ansari in 1848, went so far as to argue 
that, “For five thousand years the Persian Monarchy has remained uninterrupted....”
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interpreted, appropriated and incoiporated into the new revolutionary narrative as the 
Azadi (freedom) monument, reflecting perhaps the importance of meaning over structure 
in the political life o f modem Iran.
Theoretical conclusions
In arguing that political myth is the personalisation or familiarisation o f ideological 
constructs, this thesis has suggested a theoretical framework through which the concept 
of political myth may be identified and applied for the purposes o f political analysis both 
as a tool of ideational analysis within a state, and also as a tool o f comparative analysis. 
Indeed while this study focussed on political myth construction in a developing society, 
the process of internationalisation suggested by the integration into the Cold War 
narrative, indicates opportunities for comparative analysis with both other developing 
societies and developed societies in the First world, where the ‘mediazation o f modem 
culture’ is much more advanced.
In focussing on the relationship between political myth development and the role of 
political leadership this thesis has chosen to highlight one particular mode of political myth 
construction which may be both easier to identify and hence to study. The definition is not 
intended to be exclusive and does not preclude the possibilities of other arguments of 
political myth construction and identification. At the same time, the difficulty in identifying 
myth and the potential extent of its social penetration and reach means that in the course 
of this study on Iran, only the most obvious and prominent political myths have been
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identified.
Iran was chosen as a case study because of the potentialities o f its political culture and the 
combination of profound socio-economic change with a political system which remained 
focussed throughout the period under review, on personalities. Its nuanced language and 
complex history contributed to a socio-political unit fidl of competing tensions and as 
such it facilitated an analysis of political myth. However, it is important to remember that 
Iran is not unique in witnessing the development of ideological constructions defined here 
as political myth, and that this phenomenon studied in the particular, may be applied 
universally. As such a number of conclusions about the characteristics o f political myth 
highlighted in this particular study can be drawn for general application.
It must be remembered that political myth, although at times distinct, remains in essence, 
an aspect of ideological constiuction. As such in identifying political myth it is essential 
first to identify the ideological framework dominant within a given political group. The 
boundaries between political myth and its parent ideology remain inherently ambiguous 
and as a result it will remain difficult to distinguish and identify. Despite these difficulties 
however, the concept of political myth, its particular nature and characteristics of 
development, make it an important component of ideology to be distinguished since it 
sheds light on the processes of ideological development.
At the same time it is argued that one way in which the distinction can be facilitated is by 
arguing that political myth is the personalisation or familiarisation o f ideology. This 
process often involves the use of concepts and social myths familiar to the political culture
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ill question and therefore requires a critical awareness of these concepts by the student of 
political myth. Personalisation may involve the association of ideological constructs with 
people, or more emphatically, with the individual leader. The framework o f socio- 
kistorical analysis dictated by the methodology of critical hermeneutics as outlined in the 
first chapter is thus essential.
The personalisation of ideology can be defined as the reification of ideological 
constructions within the confines of the individual. The personalisation involved in the 
process of identifying an idea or complex of ideas with an individual provides a 
particularly accessible form of political myth development especially when the individual 
involved aspires to political leadership and seeks to promote a public image. The resultant 
political myth with respect to political leadership can be teimed the 'myth of the saviour’. 
The process by which an ideological universal is identified with a physical particular is 
intrinsically contradictoiy and replete with tensions, thus encouraging political myth 
development.
The process of personalisation reaches its apogee with personification. In seeking to 
identify with an ideological construct a political leader aims to associate himself with ideas 
whose source and origin is external to his own being, hi extreme circumstances however 
this process may be extended towards personification, by which it is meant the political 
leader seeks to become identified as one with the ideological constiuction and to 
appropriate rights of definition and explanation. The source and origin o f the ideological 
constiuction is transferred to the political leader and a leader who achieves this may be 
characterised as enjoying charismatic authority. The tensions and polarisation
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characterised by the process of personalisation is multiplied by personification.
The myth of the saviour is deconstructed through the de-personalisation of ideology. Just 
as political myth is a consequence of the personalisation of ideology so the resultant myth 
of the saviour may be deconstructed by de-personalising ideological constiucts and 
divorcing themfiom any identification with the individual. This process may take several 
forms. An opponent maybe associated with ideas and ideologies contrary to the views he 
identified with. This is a form of ideological rejuvenation. More emphatically, the identity 
o f the opponent may be erased fiom any association with the ideological construct in 
question; and less dramatically, the opponent may be mentioned by name but not 
associated in any way with the ideology he identified with.
The process of personalisation may occur by proxy. A political leader may seek to identify 
with an ideological construction by association with another who has succeeded in this 
process of personalisation. This tends to happen with historical figures rather than 
contemporaries so as to minimise the possibilities for rivalry. Historical figures are in any 
case better suited because they are situated within an historical narrative and may have 
already acquired mythic characteristics in the popular imagination. Furthermore as details 
of historical personalities are frequently scarce, they are more amenable to historical 
manipulation by the political leader who wishes to appropriate their mystique. As such the 
process of personalisation by historical proxy involves a reciprocal dialectical relationship, 
in which the political leader magnifies, or even manufactures, those characteristics he 
wishes to associate with and emulate in the historical personality. The pattern of 
development is normally one of association, favourable comparison, and finally
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supersession. Just as the myth of the saviour can he removed by depersonalisation, so too 
can this process he applied to proxies.
Ideological polarisation is characteristic of the process o f personalisation or 
familiarisation. Ideology tends towards polarisation and simplification, a process which 
is accelerated by and characteristic of, the personalisation of ideology. In identifying the 
universal with the particular, the complex tends towards simplification. Political myth can 
therefore be further characterised as the simplification of ideology profoundly expressed.
This process of ideological polarisation encourages hegemonic monopolisation. The 
reduction of complex ideological constructions into relatively simple 'truths’ encourages 
the socialisation or institutionalisation of those constructs into unchallenged beliefs. This 
becomes increasingly probable as semiological chains expand and multiply and, the 
potential for dissent is curtailed, insulating the semiological chains fiom external criticism. 
Dynamism and the frequency of construction are sacrificed in the interests of clarity and 
the establishment of authority, but taken to an extreme this process hastens rejuvenation.
The essential paradox of political myth development is that as it provides the concise 
summation of one ideological construct, so it opens the door to the possibilities of other 
diverse and sometimes contradictory interpretations. The leader, in personalising an 
ideology can thus be both praised as a saviour by his followers while at the same time, be 
demonised by his opponents. Political myth is therefore both the point of ideological 
consummation as well as inteipretational departure; it is the point of ideational 
rejuvenation. These interpretations are often mirror images o f each other with extreme
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polarisation resulting in an equal if opposite reaction.
Rejuvenation is a dialectal and reciprocal process. The relationships which encourage the 
development of ideological constructions and political myth are basically threefold: 
ideologies out of then own inherent contradictions and tensions; through conflict with 
competing ideological constructs; and, through interaction with then socio-historical 
environment. These relationships are reciprocal and dialectic and encourage mythic 
reproduction.
Political myth encourages the reconstruction of historical narratives and the construction 
of utopias. This process is particularly explicit where political leadership is concerned, hi 
identifying with an ideological construction the leader seeks to eliminate the tensions that 
result. Part o f this process is to reinterpret and reconstruct the past in order to suit the 
image of the present. The most obvious examples are the 'discovery5 and construction of 
genealogical pedigrees along with the reinteipretation of the past situating the leader 
firmly within the centre of the narrative. This reconstruction enjoys a reciprocal 
relationship with the development o f the myth of the saviour and as with the process of 
rejuvenation a reciprocal dialectic may develop. The reconstruction of the past to suit the 
present will also encourage the development of a vision of the future to provide the 
ideological construction and the leader who personalises it, with a distinct purpose.
Political myth serves to institutionalise power and establish authority. I f  ideology is the 
use of meaning to sustain and support a particular relation of domination, political myth 
is the aspect of ideology which seeks to establish beyond question, the legitimate
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foundations of that relation. While ideology sustains power, political myth anchors that 
power in legitimate authority. This authority is cultivated through the personalisation and 
familiarisation o f ideology with traditional myths and icons which permeate all political 
cultures and groups. The disparity between a claim to authority and belief in authority is 
a critical tension in which political myth development is facilitated.756
Other tensions which contribute to political myth development may be external to the 
ideological constructions, in terms of socio-economic change, or internal, in terms of 
frictions between conflicting ideological constructions. This friction become most 
apparent when differing constructs are synthesised into a new constiuction thus making 
the implicit contradictions explicit. Another form of tension already alluded to above, 
results when ideological constructs are reified within the physical constraints of the 
individual. Often, such a process involves the reconstitution of differing ideological 
constructs into a new 'custommade’ ideological construct, thus multiplying the propensity 
for tension.
Political myth is itself a cause and consequence of tension. Political myth is encouraged 
by the existence of tension, be they social (contradictions with and within perceived 
reality), ideological (friction between constructs) and procedural (in terms of the process 
of personalisation). However the process by which ideological constructs are simplified 
and polarised, in particular through personalisation, itself is a source of continued tension 
which results in historical reinterpretation and reconstruction, as well as a tendency
756 See P Ricoeur Lectures on Ideology & Utopia G Taylor (ed), New York, 
Columbia University Press, 1986, pg 13.
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towards further political myth.
As such, political myths tend to become engulfed in 'semiological chains’. Mythic 
reproduction results in the growth and development of complex semiological chains in 
which complimentary and contradictory interpretations are constructed upon each other. 
Complimentary reproduction encourages further polarisation towards hegemonic 
monopolisation increasingly divorced from perceived reality and may contribute to an 
inability to respond effectively to political developments.
The advent of mass communications accelerates the production and dissemination of 
political myth, increasing the propensity for semiological chains. The emergence of the 
mass media, in particular the development of the radio and television has encouraged the 
popularisation of political discourse and widened the potential arena of political operation. 
An increasingly immediate access to a wider population has encouraged the simplification 
of ideological constructs for the purposes of mass consumption, while the emergence of 
television has encouraged a greater use of visual symbols. At the same time, since 
technology tends to centralise power, the mass media have also encouraged a greater 
popular focus on the political leader at the expense of political and administrative 
intermediaries. This will become increasingly important as television becomes increasingly 
ubiquitous. As technology centralises power, so it re-focuses attention away from the 
political party towards the political leader, thereby facilitating the personalisation of 
ideology. A technological development which was used by leaders to 'access’ the public 
has been reversed to focus on the character of the leader.
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Mass communications encourage tlie internationalisation of semiological chains. Mass 
communications not only allow the rapid dissemination of ideological constructions 
throughout a political culture in an immediate and accessible format, they also facilitate 
the extension of particular ideological constructs and political myths outside then 
traditional environment. A new reciprocal dialectic and semiological chain may be 
developed with the 'foreign’ ideological constructions. Alternatively if  two hegemonic 
ideological constructions replete with polarised political myths clash the consequence may 
be further polarisation and insular monopolisation, each construction consolidating and 
reconstructing through recourse to its own political culture.
It may be argued that the concept of political myth belongs to that particular categoiy of 
political concepts which are regarded as essentially contested. Certainly, problems persist 
in defining, identifying and applying a concept whose essence is ambiguity and subjective, 
even emotive interpretation. This thesis has argued however, that a conception of political 
myth can be defined and usefiilly applied to political analyses, but more so, can help 
illuminate the processes by which ideas in general and ideologies in particular operate. By 
extension, it suggests that ideological operation and political myth development, though 
seen through the particular example of Pahlavi Iran, possess a number o f characteristics 
which in differing measures, may be applied to all political groups and cultures.
Indeed, a global political environment in the throes of rapid socio-economic change, and 
the continuing gr owth of mass communications, which itself accelerates awareness of that 
change and provides immediate accessibility to political leaders, may be considered 
uniquely ripe for the polarisation and personalisation of ideological constructs. The
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acceleration o f ideological exchange, liiction and appropriation, and the rapidity of the 
multitude of reciprocal dialectic relationships, encouraged by the growth and development 
of mass communications, may lead to semiological chains of bewildering complexity and 
these will need to be understood, and if possible, deconstructed. Ideological polarisation, 
insulation, and hegemonic tendencies are more apparent in the international sphere 
because the conflicting ideological constructs have been developed and consolidated 
predominantly in particular’ political cultur es, and then extended into an unfamiliar global 
or particular environment. In such a situation, the potential for ideological and material 
conflict is magnified as the opposing state is anthropomorpliised, personalised and 
occasionally de-humanised. This process of political myth development in particular, and 
the concept in general, deserves greater investigation.
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